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1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Studying Illicit Economies and the State 
The image of illicit economies and organized crime activities is dominated by violence, armed criminal 
groups or drug cartels, and kleptocratic state officials. From the opium trade in Afghanistan, diamond 
smuggling in Sierra Leone, and cocaine trafficking in Colombia to human trafficking in Libya, the 
examples of large-scale illegal activities are very broad, and so are their implications. Often, they are 
subsumed under the concept of “organized crime” or illicit economies and treated similarly despite 
the broad differences not only between those activities, but also between the countries in which they 
take place. Reports and studies related to violence and organized crime or illicit economies have 
sprung up in recent years (e. g. Snyder and Martinez 2009; Felbab-Brown 2010), including journalistic 
approaches (Glenny 2009, Naím 2012). In particular, for Latin America the effect of organized crime 
and illicit economies on violent deaths appears to be high. Around 30 % of all homicides committed in 
the Americas are related to organized crime activities or gangs (UNODC 2013a: 40). Additionally, the 
financial impact is high; the UN estimates that criminals have laundered up to 1.6 trillion USD or 2.7 % 
of the global GDP in 2009 and the gross profits from the cocaine trade alone made up for around 84 
billion USD (UNODC 2011). Even though illicit economies are present in all regions and countries of the 
world, it is often argued that in “weak states” and developing countries the effect of these economies 
are particularly devastating. In this regard, concerns have been raised about the potential threat of 
illicit economies and the potential increase in violence and insecurity (World Bank 2011; Kemp and 
Shaw 2012; Cockayne and Roth 2017). It has been debated in policy related work that this results in 
negative spillover effects, which can lead to the erosion of state capacity and contributes to state 
weakness (World Bank 2011; Miraglia et al. 2012). Illicit economies are seen as a hindrance to a stable 
state and the quality of governance (Van Dijk 2007). Moreover, grey and popular literature fuels the 
perception that “Mafia states” pose a major threat to international security (Naím 2012). However, 
arguments presented for the “illicit economies-weak state rationale” are often based on anecdotal 
evidence rather than robust proof. Despite the growing attention on illicit economies and the state, 
we still know little about their relationship and its impact on local order. 
Addressing these aspects, the thesis counter-intuitively argues that illicit economies can be an 
essential aspect for the provision of order. To do so, I build upon studies on related topics that show, 
for instance, that illicit economies are not necessarily the breeding ground for violence (Snyder and 
Duran-Martinez 2009; Duran Martínez 2014). The connection between illicit economies and violence 
is neither a clear cut one and nor is it generalizable (Andreas and Wallmann 2009). Other studies have 
already analysed the influence of criminal actors on governance and politics (Casas-Zamora 2013; Arias 
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2017), but often the focus has been on an urban setting (Arias 2007, 2017; Jütersonke et al. 2009). In 
particular, in Latin America illicit economies have been shown to have a broader influence on states 
and democracies (Arias and Goldstein 2010; Felbab-Brown 2010; Cruz 2016). Nevertheless, studies of 
illicit economies are often driven by the imperative to analyzing their relationship with violence 
(Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009; Lessing 2015; Trejo and Ley 2016; Barnes 2017). Despite growing 
attention to illicit markets in academic literature, we still lack analyses that focus on the externalities 
of illicit economies for order and the state. This represents a crucial gap and highlights the need to 
analyze the impact of an illicit economy more closely. This thesis contributes to the understanding of 
this field by studying the relationship between illicit economies and local order. For the analysis I focus 
on the subnational level, which enables us to highlight consequences and implications of an illicit 
economy in regions of low state influence. 
Even though illicit economies are not merely being found in “weak” states, they are highlighted in 
particular in the literature (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Miraglia 2012). Most studies that focus on the 
damaging effects of illicit economies draw upon assumptions that take the ideal-typical Westphalian 
State with its uncontested monopoly over violence, a complete control of its territory and a centralized 
bureaucracy as the norm of a stable (as opposed to a fragile) state. Based on this reasoning, the so-
called fragile states are seen to be particularly vulnerable to the influence of illicit economies and 
criminal non-state actors. Mostly analyzed at the national level and characterized as a monolithic 
block, states are defined as either weak or strong, fragile or even failing (Miliken and Krause 2002; 
Rotberg 2004; Schneckener 2007). However, the labels such as a weak or a failing state are similarly 
problematic and reductionist (Hill 2005). Conceptually, they often have Weberian ideal type state in 
mind, influenced by a Weberian understanding of the state. But most of the states in question 
developed along different tracks and show a high diversity in terms of order and rule within their 
territory. Fully consolidated and sovereign states with a total monopoly of violence and complete 
control over their territory largely remain a myth. Historically, most states did not fully monopolize 
violence or established bureaucratic control throughout their territory (Mann 1993: 55). Instead, we 
see a variety of local structures within the states, which are parallel or entangled with the “state”. This 
thesis follows the discussions on states that have developed along different tracks in comparison to 
most of the European states. It thereby contributes to a larger debate, which has highlighted variations 
in states and state development (e g. Ozlak 1981; O´Donnell 1997; Bayart et al. 1999; Migdal 2001; 
Hibou 2004; Schlichte 2005).  
This study thus recognizes multiple ongoing processes within areas of limited state dominance and 
alternative structures, for example, in brown spots as Guillermo O’Donnell (1993) described them, or 
grey zones (Auyero 2007) that are also influenced by illegal economies. Indeed, states that lack 
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comprehensive control over their territory or implementation capacities of their rules offer more 
opportunities for the growth and influence of illicit economies. In many countries of the “third world” 
the state is not an impartial actor, providing the frame of social interactions. Often the state is 
incapable of providing this frame and implementing rules or providing control (e.g. Migdal 2001; 
Schlichte 2005; Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; Soifer 2013; Vergara 2015). Gaining an understanding 
of the interplay between these different structures, is thus crucial to providing a more nuanced 
assessment of state formation processes and illicit economies. Therefore, this study talks to a broader 
set of literature concerning state formation, including the recent strand of studies on the Latin 
American state and beyond (Kurz 2013; Soifer 2015; Kurtenbach 2015; Vergara 2015; Centeno et al 
2017). I include the particularities of state formation, and take alternative structures of rule as well as 
the interrelation of the state with illicit economies into account. Instead of assuming illicit economies 
and the actors involved in it to be a threat to the state or an indication of state weakness, I analyze the 
influence of such economies on local order and power structures. I focus on areas with low state 
control and analyze the interactive processes between illicit economies and the state 
Summing up, I argue that the influence of illicit economies in and on states is not at all clarified for two 
main reasons: (1) because of a monolithic conceptualization of state that rules out the importance of 
territories without or with low state control and (2) the lack of robust empirical analysis that goes 
beyond anecdotal evidence. This thesis addresses these two gaps by first proposing a 
conceptualization of the issue that makes explicit the importance of the local level and does not take 
it for granted that illicit economies damage the state formation process per se. I develop a framework 
that enables us to study the impact of illicit economies on local order. Secondly, I offer a robust 
empirical analysis, based on a conceptual framework of local order and by using a comparative case 
study design.  
 
1.2 The Approach  
As I have elaborated above, the variety of state formation processes and particularities of order within 
states has been stressed by a number of studies. Even though there are recent contributions 
highlighting “disorder” and potential threats because of low state control (Felbab-Brown et al. 2017), 
it is analytically more helpful to talk about the productive side of alternative order or informal 
structures. By focusing on the evolution and the externalities of illicit economies we gain a wider 
understanding, instead of simply assuming its damaging aspects. Following this premise, I analyze the 
effect of illicit economies on local order at the margins of the state. Against academic common sense, 
I do not assume a priori that illicit economies create disorder or chaos. While we know about the 
potentially violent effects of illicit economies, recent studies have presented evidence that the 
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relationship is not causal and the links are more complex (Snyder and Martinez 2009; Andreas and 
Wallmann 2009). Part of this complex reality is that criminal actors take over service provision and 
control when there are no other dominant institutions to do so (Arias 2017). Furthermore, in recent 
years, studies of the state have highlighted how informal and formal governance structures are 
intertwined and how state structures are entangled with non-state authorities (O’Donnell 1997; Hibou 
2004; Davis 2010; Dewey et al. 2017). The relationship between these aspects of alternative order and 
illicit economies, stands at the center of this analysis.  
This thesis therefore bridges two debates: the effect of illicit economies on local order and state 
formation. I focus on the externalities of illicit economies and move beyond an actor centric approach. 
Instead, I argue that the effect of illicit economies at the margins of the state results in a complex 
structure of local order that does not necessarily bring about a single dominant actor. This might result 
in the role of the state being contested, though not inevitably in a violent manner. At the same time, 
it might also result in no contestation at all or an entwined connection of formal and informal actors. 
These aspects are part of my analysis. Understanding the dynamics of illicit economies and the 
connection to state formation supports the understanding of dynamics in the margins of the state. 
This leads us to a more comprehensive understanding of the externalities of illicit economies and guide 
tailored policy approaches. Therefore, the present work starts by analyzing the way in which illicit 
economies influence local order, including measures of power structures. Often research on illicit 
economies or on crime focus on single actors, who influence local order. The present study moves 
beyond this actor centric approach and instead focusses on illicit economies and their externalities.  
I define illicit economies as locally bound economies that depend on the voluntary exchange of goods 
and services, whose production or consumption is officially banned (Arlacchi 2002: 203; Beckert and 
Wehinger 2013; von Lampe 2016: 81; Beckert and Dewey 2017). These illicit economies produce 
externalities, which not only affect actors but social realities that need to be analyzed (chapter 2.2). 
The thematic focus of this thesis lies on the drug business, more precisely the cocaine economy, since 
it involves many actors at various levels of the production chain and needs to be organized. Moreover, 
the production regions are at the margins of the state. Drug trafficking is a globally banned criminal 
activity and generates the highest profit margins of all considered organized criminal activities. It is 
also one of the most researched areas when it comes to criminal activities. I focus on cocaine and Pasta 
Basica de Cocaina (PBC) as they are globally labeled as illegal and offer high profit margins for people 
involved in the trade. Many different actors participate in the whole value adding process which makes 
it a good choice to analyze its effect on society. 
Instead of focusing on criminal organizations or single actors, I concentrate on local order and the 
consequences of illegal activities and examine the effects of these activities once they became 
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institutionalized at the margins of the state. To this end, I develop a new conceptual framework, which 
focuses on the analysis of local order and charts out a new approach to do so. I define local order as a 
combination of historically formed institutions and practices that structure social interactions, and 
organization in a given region. The core aspects of local order include historical development, 
economy, security, and power. Those key features are analyzed according to their link it to illicit 
economies; the thesis contributes theoretically to an analysis of illicit economies and state formation 
as well as empirically by presenting evidence from a comparative case study. To this extent Bourdieu’s 
concept of “fields” (Bourdieu 1985) and his notion that power is ultimately based on “capital” one can 
accumulate in a certain environment greatly aids the thesis in identifying the variety of local power 
sources and in mapping out their dynamics. 
In a second step, the thesis links the analysis back to the state and traces the influence of illicit 
economies on the state formation process. In this regard, the thesis questions the common-sense 
rationale that illicit economies flourish in regions with low state control and lead to state fragility. Since 
the spatial reach of most states is restricted and the infrastructural capacities to include regions at the 
margins of the state often remain limited (e. g. Mann 1993; O’Donnell 1993; Boone 2012; Soifer 2015), 
I analyze how this local order relates to the state. To make this analysis, I bring in the particularities of 
state formation processes, local historical settings, and local order into the analysis. Illicit economies 
have often existed for a long time, especially in regions with low state domination historically, and this 
thesis analyses the consequences of this and its interrelation with state formation.  
Hence, the focus of this analysis is on how local order is influenced by the illicit economy. In formulating 
a new approach for analyzing the impact of illicit economies in areas with low state control, I combine 
sociological and political approaches. Thus, I distance this research from studies that merely focus on 
state capacity, which has led to reductionist arguments on strengthening institutions and perceiving 
illicit economies in peripheral regions as a threat to the state. Instead, I analyze the effects of these 
illicit economies, processes in local order and power structures, and how this links back to the process 
of state formation. The main interest of the present work is therefore the effect that illicit economies 
have on regions with low state control. Thus, we can define the main research questions that guide 
the study as:  
1. How do externalities of illicit economies influence local order in the margins of the state? 
1b. What effect do illicit economies have on power structures? 
2. How does this local order link back to the state and state formation? 
 
The first question makes up the main empirical part of this thesis, yet the other questions are not 
isolated, but related to it. I develop a conceptual model to analyze local orders at the margins of the 
state. I include the historical context as well as the key features of economy, security, rule and power 
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into the analysis. By using this concept, I am not only able to analyze the main components of local 
order in-depth and in relation to each other, but can also compare the regions in focus. By using 
ethnographic methods and a mix of different data sources, I give a detailed analysis of each of these 
components and their relation to each other. The second question focusses on the relational power, 
which is guided by Pierre Bourdieu´s concept of field and capitals. The final question is answered on 
the basis of the previous two. By asking for the link back to the state, I am interested in the dialogical 
relationship between the state and the local order. That includes how state policies work and how the 
state and its institutions are perceived in regions that are dominated by an illicit economy. 
The findings of this study further develop our knowledge of the effects of illicit economies and expands 
the literature that addresses on similar phenomenon. Studies have highlighted the productive side of 
“unlawful” or “illegal” activities and focus on political externalities. Another field of study highlights 
the diversity of state formation and the dependency on the local context. It has been established, that 
many do not hold an uncontested control over their territory and that local order can differ widely in 
different contexts. Nevertheless, we find order and control in these areas even if it differs from state 
control. The thesis draws on these academic discussions and contributes to both fields of inquiry. I 
follow the argument to move beyond a Eurocentric view and measurements against “ideal-types” and 
that an analysis should include local particularities within the state. Therefore, I focus on two “brown 
spot” regions and an in-depth analysis of these regions.  
Summing up, in this thesis I address a clear research gap on how illicit economies affect local order at 
the margins of the state. While there is growing interest on the effect that illicit economies have in 
regions with low state control, we still know little about it. I assume that instead of having a harmful 
effect, externalities of illicit economies support the evolution and the persistence of local order. This 
order is not necessarily opposed to the state, but can develop in parallel or be intertwined with the 
state. The approach the state takes towards this economy at the margins of its influence can therefore 
affect the regions beyond just the economic aspects. Criminal activities might be regarded as illegal by 
the state but not perceived to be illegitimate by the population, for example, because of the provision 
of economic opportunities as well as stability and order which the state cannot provide. Thus, we see 
a divergence between formal legality defined by law and the understanding of what is socially 
legitimate. In regions with low state capacity to implement formal rules, an action that is formally 
regarded as illegal might be socially accepted or seen as legitimate. We might call that legitimate 
illegality (Mayntz 2016). In consequence, this might produce a system, which follows its own logical 
parallel (or entangled) to that of the state. When the state approaches to integrate those areas that 
depend on an illicit economy, it might lead to tensions or lead to a hybrid system that hinders the 
creation of an intended inclusive society by influencing or eroding official institutions. 
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For the empirical analysis I opt for a comparative case study that scrutinizes a region where the state 
recently destroyed the illicit economy and a region where the illicit economy is still present. The results 
of this analysis give us a deeper understanding on the effect of illicit economies on social order as well 
as the relationship to the state.  
 
1.3 The Cases 
The present thesis does not give not a “catch-all” analysis on the phenomenon of illicit economies but 
rather aims to contribute to a broader theoretical and empirical debate on illicit economies and the 
state. It therefore develops a framework for the analysis, and studies the effect of illicit economies in 
the form of a comparative case study design. This analysis provides in-depth knowledge on the cases 
and rich empirical data to address the research question. Furthermore, it allows for the drawing of 
theoretical implications and indicating possibilities for further research from the results. 
The selection of cases follows the premise that the case needs to have a presence of illicit economies 
and lack coherent state control throughout its territory. Furthermore, it needs to have a long history 
of illicit economies. In the Latin American region, we find several cases where the state did not develop 
a coherent territorial control or influence throughout its region (Centeno 2002; Soifer 2015). Peru is 
most suitable for the research objective. The country has not only been historically one of the main 
producers of coca and cocaine but also showcases an unequal reach of state influence and territorial 
control, which allows us to focus on regions with low state influence (Dargent 2012; Vergara 2015).1 
Classical studies on state formation describe the modern state as an unintended consequence of 
monopolization of power. This includes, in simplified description, a monopolization of violence, 
taxation and a legitimate bureaucratic order (e.g. Tilly 1985; Elias 1994, Weber 2010). Contrary to the 
European experience the Peruvian state was not able to or did not want to completely centralize 
power. Instead, distribution of power was more diffuse – as in many other Latin American states 
(Centeno 2002; Soifer 2013; Vergara 2015). Relatively little international recognition has been given 
to the impact of the Peruvian Drug trade (Felbab-Brown 2010).2 But, Peru has always been a major 
contributor to the international cocaine market. In 2012, the country was the largest producer not only 
of coca but also of cocaine (UNODC 2013). The UN estimates that in 2012, coca production comprised 
 
1 In a recent thorough comparative analysis Alberto Vergara (2015) highlights the relationship of local powers in peripheries 
to the central state in the broader context of state formation, including structural and historical particularities. He highlights 
the relationship of regional elites for the overall state formation in Peru in comparison to Bolivia.   
2 In comparison far more international attention has focused Colombia, especially in the course of the peace process in 
recent years (e. g. Otis 2014; Kurtenbach and Lutscher 2015; Rettberg and Otis-Riomalo 2016). 
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more than 60,000 ha with the capacity for producing around 340 tons of cocaine (Ibd.).3 Geographically 
Peru offers good conditions for the production and trafficking of drugs. The Peruvian rainforest makes 
up 60.3% of the country’s territory which therefore makes it difficult to access or control (INEI 2014: 
3). The country has climatically favorable conditions for growing coca, the basis for cocaine. In the 
1980s, Peru was the primary producer of coca constituting for roughly 65% of the global coca 
production in 1985 (Bolivia 25% and Colombia 10%) (Bagley 2009: 25).  
A historical fact adds another aspect for why Peru is an interesting case to study the impact of an illicit 
economy. As I outline in chapter 5.3, the development of cocaine as a “global drug” (Gootenberg 2009) 
is inseparably linked to Peru. While for centuries coca has been a traditional crop in the Andes, it was 
the invention of cocaine that ultimately also led to a controversial discussion on coca. Coca is the basic 
ingredient in producing cocaine, which at first was used as a legal drug or as an ingredient in drinks. 
However, since the UN Single Convention of Drugs (1961) and the global prohibition regime on drugs, 
cocaine and also coca became an internationally illegal good. This did not stop coca or cocaine 
production, but led to a now illegal economy that still produces the drug. Parts of the coca production 
is regulated and not all coca is illegal in Peru. However, the vast majority is not sold legally to the 
national monopoly of coca commercialization Empresa Nacional de Coca (ENACO), but is sold on the 
black market instead (Zevallos 2016). This historical relevance and development of coca and cocaine 
makes it interesting (and possible) to see how the illicit economy has developed over time in the 
regions I focus on. This allows for a more precise analysis of the relationship of this illicit economy to 
local order and the state. 
While Peru has always been a major producer of coca and cocaine (besides other illicit goods), at the 
same time since the termination of the internal conflict in 2000, Peru has been a comparatively stable 
country with relatively low rates of lethal violence in regional comparison. The country´s homicide rate 
was at 7.2 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015, and thus lower than the homicide rate in the majority of 
the countries in the region (INEI 2016). Furthermore, the regions of coca and cocaine production are 
in the margins of the state where state control and state presence were historically weak. Finally, the 
production of coca and cocaine varied in recent years and government policies led to a sharp decline 
of coca and cocaine production in one region, while it remained high in others. The Peruvian 
government claims that more than 31.000 ha have been destroyed in 2014 (DEVIDA 2015). While the 
absolute number is hard to verify, the data gives a good indication of where to find high levels of illicit 
drug economies and where they have been before. These aspects make Peru a good study case for 
 
3 To an extent these changes have also been due to growing eradication efforts in Colombia which led to a shift of the 
production southwards to Peru.. 
 
 
9 
analyzing the impact of illicit economies on the local order in a comparative case study. I select two 
regions for the analysis. One that is the historical center of drug production not only in Peru but in the 
world, the Alto Huallaga Valley (AHV). The other region is the current center for drug production, the 
VRAEM. In those regions I identify main districts which I focus on during my research.  
By analyzing the development of two marginal areas of Peru I show the historical evolution and also 
its current state. By analyzing in depth the two regions, we are able to see the patterns of state 
formation that affect not only local order, but also state-society relations today. Furthermore, using 
an empirical study with extensive field research and first-hand data, this thesis contributes to 
knowledge generation for little researched regions in Peru on an under-researched topic.  
 
1.4 Data and Method 
In order to answer these research questions, I follow a structured focused comparison. I define my 
research concepts based on the theoretical discussions on state formation and illicit economies before 
I start analyzing the cases. The analysis follows a comparative case study design on the sub-national 
level comparing regions that until recently had high levels of drug production to regions with low levels 
of drug production. By using a structured focused comparison, I combine theoretical conceptualization 
and extensive field work in order to present a thorough analysis on the processes and implications of 
an illicit economy at the margins of the state. This allows me to identify patterns and systematically 
compare cases.  
The present study combines research on state formation and illicit economies and focuses on the 
effects on local order. After discussing the relevant literature and the state of research, I define a 
framework that allows us to analyze local orders and the effect of illicit economies. Moreover, this 
framework lays the basis for the structured comparison. More specifically, I concentrate on the local 
level and analyze the processes and effects of drug production in the margins of the state. Studying 
local order in regions with low state control implies the understanding of aspects beyond written 
sources or data. It implies getting to know the everyday and understanding local practices. Therefore, 
I include ethnographic approaches into my research whenever appropriate and whenever it 
contributes to understanding the phenomenon.   
Even though interest on the topics of illicit economies has been increasing in recent years, we still do 
not understand the nature and influence of illicit markets at the margins of state influence sufficiently. 
This is partly because of the difficulty of data access. Obviously criminal activities happen in the 
shadows, hidden from potential interference, which makes the process of data gathering more 
challenging. The data I present in the following is therefore mostly generated through a qualitative 
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approach and field research. During 11 months’ of field research in Peru, I spend 4 months in each of 
the respective regions, and the remaining as a guest researcher at the PUCP in Lima. During the field 
research, I conducted 120 topic-guided expert interviews with community members, authorities, 
politicians, police officers, military officials, researcher, journalists, public servants, (ex)drug- 
traffickers, cocaleros, and prisoners. These interviews helped me to assess the impact of the illicit 
economy on local order. Due to the weak data availability, I included a questionnaire to document the 
perception of local citizens on socio-economic aspects and trust in state- and non-state institutions. 
118 respondents participated and completed the questionnaire. 
 
1.5 Research Aims 
While there is a growing interest in addressing illicit economies and the state, the present study 
combines both aspects into the analysis. I aim to give a better conceptual understanding for studying 
illicit economies and the effects it has on state formation. By shifting the focus from a damaging aspect 
to a productive feature, we get a further understanding of the way in which externalities of illicit 
economies influence local order and the state. Based on this conceptual contribution, I provide an in-
depth empirical analysis that investigates the relation between illicit economies, local order, and the 
state. Thus, this study further develops the conceptual approach and provides empirical evidence for 
the analysis of illicit economies in the margins of the state. To this end, the study combines various 
academic literatures: firstly, I bridge the discussions on illicit economies and the state. These research 
strands are often discussed separately or in opposition to each other. By bridging them, the study 
provides a profounder understanding of both these areas of study, that are in fact intertwined. This 
approach sets the work apart from previous studies that have highlighted either the negative effect of 
illicit economies or only insufficiently took their relationship to the state into account.  
Secondly, I present a conceptual outline for studying local orders at the margins of the state. Bearing 
in mind that many regions have developed without or only with low state influence, my aim is to 
contribute to the understanding of local order and the relationship to the state and examine the role 
of illicit economies in this regard.  
Thirdly, the study further analyses, how state intervention then affects this local order. While anti-drug 
policies and statements to tackle drug economies are often well formulated, the effects they have on 
the local level and the local order are often less anticipated. This study, gives a better understanding 
of the interplay of local order and the state after state intervention. 
Fourthly, in this thesis I analyze the effects of an illicit economy on local order and in doing so deepen 
our knowledge that we already have on how criminal actors affect local governance structures (Arias 
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2006, 2017). By doing so, this study moves away from an actor centric approach and proposes the 
analysis of a structure. This broadens our focus and enables us to analyze the consequences for the 
wider state formation. I show that the illicit economy can have a decisive impact on local order as well 
as on state formation, which goes beyond a harmful outcome.  
Finally, I give an overview and an in-depth analysis of the illicit coca and cocaine economy of Peru and 
on the focused regions in particular. I scrutinize the historical development of the now illegal good and 
its implications for the local economy and further aspects of the local order today. Moreover, I 
elaborate on the effects that state policies had not only on the illicit economy directly, but also as a 
consequence for local order. 
Summing up, I argue that regions with a low presence of the state and a strong illicit economy (here: 
drug trafficking and production) can result in different local order. This, might establish a system that 
in fact prevents violence and instability instead of provoking it. The argument therefore stands against 
the rationale of crime-fragility and the logic that low state presence results in disorder. This notion 
challenges a normative Eurocentric approach to “the state” that misses out regions where state control 
is limited or non-existent but which are not necessarily ungoverned. Instead we find different forms of 
“order” represented in these areas, which can be affected by illicit economies. Furthermore, I expect 
that state intervention affects local order and ultimately also the state society relationship towards 
this regions, since it is based on an illicit good which the state seeks to destroy. A key part of the 
analysis shows how the intervention of the state alters local order and how this is related to the illicit 
economy.  
Thus, the project bridges debates on illicit economies, local order and the state. By that it provides a 
deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms at play and the influence that drug trafficking has 
in the margins of the state. 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis will give a detailed analysis on the effect of the coca and cocaine economy in two regions 
of Peru. In the following I will elaborate the research topic theoretically, methodologically and 
empirically and conclude by linking the findings to research and policy. 
In chapter 2, I will analyze the theoretical underpinnings for this research and identify the core 
concepts my research will address. I depart from a definition of the state formation processes, 
highlighting the particularities of state formation from a Non-Eurocentric perspective. As many states 
have not developed a (uncontested) monopoly of violence or a complete spatial reach throughout its 
territory I highlight the importance of alternative orders. As a second broader aspect, I discuss the 
relationship of illicit economies to the state and to alternative order.  
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This is followed by chapter 3, sets out the conceptual framework for this research, synthesizing 
approaches to capture local and illicit economies. I define the main features of local order as historical 
development, economy, security, rule and power that will guide the research. Each aspect derives from 
the previous discussion on illicit economies and the state. The definition is the result of a hybrid 
conceptual approach and combines aspects from sociology and political science. This conceptual 
framework bridges different research strands and allows for the systematic analysis and comparison 
of cases. 
In chapter 4, I lay out my research design as well as my methodological approach to the study. Here, I 
also expound the underlying logic of case selection. The presentation of my case selection explains in 
detail the selection process and the criterions used for selecting these cases. I will explain the benefits 
of using a small-N comparative case study research design and why it is suitable to use given the 
complexities of the research topic and the scarcity of resources and data. The chapter describes the 
logic of selecting the methods applied in this thesis. I will give a transparent overview over the data 
sources I used and explain as to why I opted to use these sources. Moreover, I will elaborate on the 
data gathering and its analysis. Finally, I reflect about the ethical implications of the study as well as 
my role as a male European researcher in the coca growing regions in Peru. Doing fieldwork in the 
margins of the state with a different cultural background results in challenges for the research and 
urges the discussion of ethical implications. It is important to have these implications and restrictions 
in mind when researching in areas in the margins of the state and on sensible issues. 
The broader spectrum and important background information are presented in chapter 5. This chapter 
is setting the scene for the following case studies. The presentation of the historical development of 
the marginal regions and state policies in Peru as well as the development of the illicit drug economy 
will be the basis for my analysis. It is important to highlight the historical development on the national 
level, because these had important consequences on the local level for the cases analyzed. 
Furthermore, the chapter will outline important non-state actors and state policies that have had an 
impact on the cases I analyzed.  
The chapter 6 and 7 are the core chapters for the empirical analysis. I analyze the cases of Alto Huallaga 
and the VRAEM including the districts of Monzón, Santa Rosa and Llochegua, specifically. The empirical 
analysis is divided into three major parts. The first part gives an analysis on the socio-historical 
preconditions, and the government’s approach in relation to these regions. These descriptions are 
essential to give an understanding on the context and conditions in which the illicit economy was 
formed. The second part zooms into the cases and specifies the influence of the illicit economy for 
local order and the implications on power. The chapters are guided by the conceptual framework and 
examines the implications of the illicit economy for security, economy, local rule and power structures. 
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In chapter 6 this framework will be used for a within case comparison of Monzón which compares the 
local order before and after eradication of coca. Chapter 7 presents the analysis of two districts in the 
current epicenter of drug production in Peru, Santa Rosa and Llochegua. In each chapter I detail on 
their historical development, and the relation of marginality and drug trafficking. Each chapter and 
sub-chapter endswith a discussion of the findings.  
Chapter 8 presents a cross regional comparison of the findings. This comparison follows the logic of 
my conceptual framework. By comparing a former to the current center of drug trafficking in Peru I 
will be able to highlight similarities and differences, which will enable us to identify patterns and show 
the influencing factors of the illicit economies to local order and the relationship to the state. The 
chapter terminates with a summary of findings. 
Chapter 9 will conclude by recapitulating the major findings and by discussing its implications for 
theory and practice. I will highlight the contribution for political science, sociology as well as on 
research on state building and on illicit economies. As this work bridges various approaches, I discuss 
the results of this study for a variety of research strands including studies on state formation, 
statebuilding or illicit economies. Finally, the thesis highlights the policy implications of the findings. 
Those implications can potentially be of practical use particularly for promoting long-term 
development in areas affected by an illicit economy.  
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2. Theoretical Approaches – “the State and the Illicit” 
In this book the relationship of illicit economies with social order and state formation will be analyzed. 
Hence, before we will get to the core of the analysis it is paramount to take a closer look on some of 
the discussions on “the state”, “order” and “illicit” and their relationship towards each other.  
While we have seen that in the context of European states, power has been centralized, 
depersonalized and transformed into a form of institutionalized state rule, this is not the case in many 
other countries of the world (eg. Schlichte 2005). Rule is diversified up to the point where local non-
state actors and structures indulge in “state like” activities. The following chapter will highlight 
differences between several aspects of state formation and the particularities in non-western regions, 
including rule, security provision, and power structures.  
Firstly, I will review the debate on state formation and highlight the importance of different 
development tracks as well as alternative order within the state. I will highlight the different aspects 
of state formation and local alternative rule. Secondly, I will discuss the concept of illicit economies, 
and their potential for influencing states and state formation. Here, the analysis embraces the 
discussion on how to analyze local order in the margins of the state. Finally, I will present the relation 
between illicit economies the state and order.  
2.1 Bringing formation back in4  or the State from a Non-Eurocentric 
Perspective 
“Bringing the state back in” was the demand that Evans, Rueschmeier and Skocpol (1985) formulated 
in their edited volume in 1985, because of the prevailing sense that the state had been 
underrepresented in academic debate. It proved to be influential in bringing the state back in as social 
science research focused more on this matter in the years to follow. The lines of work that influenced 
the discussion of state formation can be divided into several categories that include historical, rational, 
and society-based approaches. An analysis of these concepts and their implications has been stated 
elsewhere (Vu 2010; von Hau 2015). The ’bringing the state back in approach´ (Evans et al. 1985) has 
brought about new interest in the state and defined it as an autonomous actor related to an ideal type. 
In the twenty years that followed, the state and state functions have become central in the discussion 
on development and security. Countries and even world regions were divided in their views on what 
was perceived to be the “correct” state model. But even if work on the state has intensified, it is still 
 
4 This is not an attempt to give a complete overview on the discussion of state theory and state formation. For a more 
detailed account, see for example Benz (2008); vom Hau (2015) or Spruyt (2002), also Mann (1993) 
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difficult to pinpoint what is the state. In the last 30 years, the discussion on “the state” and how we 
should approach it, has diversified and shows different strands of arguments.  
 
for the conceptualization of state formation, it is helpful to first provide a brief overview on the 
discussion of state formation based on the European tradition. This is because of two primary reasons. 
Firstly, the conventional definition of the state is based on European experiences. This ideal prototype 
of the modern state is now reflected and referred to on a global scale (Schlichte 2005). The exportation 
of the European state idea also translated into concepts and assessments of the state in academia. 
This includes inter alia, the focus on the monopoly of violence, sovereignty and territorial control. Thus, 
understanding and reflecting on the ideal, can be an effective starting point for a further analysis of 
the state. It helps in sketching the differences, while using “the same language”. Secondly, since this 
has been a common reference point, it can also benefit the comparison between different cases. 
Analysis helps to highlight differences and particularities from this point of comparison and includes 
different patterns of state formation. Most of the states worldwide have developed on different tracks 
that differ from the European state. A clear delineation of these different pathways helps to identify 
patterns for further analysis.5 While the recognition of the “European” state concept is a helpful part 
of the analysis, the European characteristics could not be simply translated into other world regions. 
The analysis should not stop by simply demonstrating divergences to European state formation 
process. For understanding state formation, it would is necessary to take a step further and focus on 
the inherent development of order within the state, including regional differences.6  
From the European model, we learn three basic aspects that were crucial in the state formation 
process: a) territorial control, legitimate monopoly of violence, and control of violence; b) rational 
administration and bureaucratization that included fiscal capacities; c) centralized legitimate rule. Even 
if there are deviations among the states, the modern (European) state model successfully 
depersonalized and centralized power while basing public governance on the rule of law (Spruyt 2009: 
568). The most important arguments for state formation include the role of violence (and its control), 
control over territory and institutions. These aspects have proven to be significant, but cannot 
necessarily be copied in relation to the non-western world. Coming from the European understanding 
 
5 A concept that addresses a similar problem is the methodological nationalism (German: „Methodologischer 
Nationalismus“) that argues, that we are all in a way stuck on the ideas and concepts of the nation-state and that ideas such 
as ”power“, ”rule“, and  ”state“, comes from a predefined mind-set in the realm of the nation state and therefore 
influences our discussion about it (Beck and Grande 1997). 
6 At the same time, as a European researcher, one should be aware of Eurocentrism and the tendency of leaning towards 
the ideal type. It is essential to be aware of this bias when theorizing on the state (Draude 2008; Sabaratnam 2013; Risse 
2015). 
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on the state, most scholars agree on what should form the basis for a state and how it came to being. 
For the European experience, “bellicist” approaches have stressed the importance of war in the 
process of state formation (Tilly 1985). In European history, war had a crucial impact on the 
centralization of power. Mass mobilization of infantry proved to be more effective than mounted 
cavalries. These unskilled troops proved to be more successful and less expensive than highly skilled 
and well-equipped knights (Spruyt, 1994, 2009). This change in warfare, which was costlier and relied 
on more sophisticated war technology and defensive structures, needed an alternative form of 
organization, centralization and financing (Ibd.). Utilizing resources and collecting taxes has been 
pivotal in the creation of effective bureaucracies (Tilly 1985). Taxation and a regulation in processes 
led to the establishment of an administrative system and thus was one of the key features of early 
modern state formation. For this “circle” Charles Tilly famously stated, “war makes the state and state 
makes the war” (Ibd.). Tilly compares the state to a protection racket and argues that the state offers 
protection to its citizens and in return, extracts resources from the population in form of taxes. Tilly 
argues that in the long run, this process of providing protection leads to monopolization in the use of 
force, control of territory, and bureaucratization. Thus, this line of work explains state formation as a 
by-product of war rather than a conscious undertaking. Tilly´s work concentrated on the European 
experience and ultimately on the formation of a central state. However, he was aware of the 
limitations his conclusions had for its applicability on other regions (Tilly 1985: 185-186).  
However, the European state formation process cannot be transferred to other world regions. It seems 
redundant, but it is important to note that non-European state formation proceeded on different 
tracks from that of European state formation. A strict analysis along Weber’s ideal type is therefore 
not helpful. Well aware that Weber was talking about an ideal type of state which differs from the real 
world states, Migdal criticizes the use of Max Weber´s concept. He argues that many scholars use the 
idea of an “ideal-state” as if it was the normal form of the state. This would not help in explaining the 
state and its tremendous variations and furthermore, leaves no space for including the complex state 
society relation (Migdal 2001: 14-15). This notion has vast implications on how we perceive and 
analyze these states.  
Recent work gave a more nuanced picture on state formation, accounting for example on the absence 
of big international wars and external threats. Centeno argues that wars in Latin America were mostly 
isolated domestic conflicts and were too short to have had an impact on state formation (Centeno 
2002). Internal conflicts could be detected but they did not evolve on a strong “Leviathan” level.7 Latin 
American countries were mostly uninvolved in big international wars, but rather affected by internal 
 
7 For an overview on civil wars and the role of war in Latin America, see Centeno (2002: 58-100). 
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conflict. That is one reason why Tilly´s formula on state formation and war cannot be easily transferred 
to Latin America (Tilly 1985; Centeno 2002; Kurtenbach 2011). It also influenced political inequalities 
since in many countries, internal war was decentralized and the way political parties participated in 
those wars became important for state formation. A crucial role was played by the mobilization of the 
rural poor in Latin America and the role of political parties (López-Alvez 2000).  In the conflictive history 
of Colombia, war was for long time basically between two parties that included armed militias in the 
rural areas (Bushnell 1993; Lopez-Alves 2000: 125-134). In Argentina, in contrast, the centralized urban 
military financed from the capital was able to defeat rural militias. Thus, while in Argentina, conflict 
led to centralization, in Colombia on the other hand, it led to fragmentation (Kurtenbach 2015). 
Similarly, for many African countries we find comparable processes. Besides the economic aspects, the 
lack of external threats and bigger conflicts among states for land, the states did not develop strong 
institutions, bureaucracies and centralized structures. Instead, power was fragmented and rule not 
centralized (Herbst 2000). Entrenched practices like clientelism reliance on traditional leaders, stayed 
in place. The political parties supported a system that focused on patronage (Ibd.). Historical patterns 
of state formation led to areas with low state presence that had spatial as well as social inequalities. 
Another aspect that shows a deviation to the European model is the focus on violence and its control 
(eg. Davis and Pereira 2003; Kurtenbach 2015). Cameron Thies (2005) stresses on the influence of 
intrastate rivalries between states on the state formation process.  
Power centralization, like it happened in the European experiences, did not take place in most Latin 
American states. Instead, the political center relied on local elites and cooperated with armed actors 
(López-Alves 2002: 31). In this book I will particularly focus on Latin America. While particularities in 
state formation has been discussed for other world regions as well (Schlichte 2005; Vu 2010) and illicit 
economies are certainly not restricted to the Americas (eg. Baker and Milne 2015, Beckert and Dewey 
2017), I find that the combination of the presence of illicit economies in marginal areas of the state 
and the possibility to study these phenomena, are best given in Latin America and more precisely in 
Peru.8 In Latin America, the state competed with other actors for the extraction of resources. 
Additionally, Latin American states often relied on local sources and foreign loans for funding, which 
did not lead to a centralization of power but led to increased debts (domestic and foreign) and financial 
crisis (López-Alves 2000: 19). We also find great variation among states of the region, highlighted in 
different studies. For example, the case of Chile in historical comparison to Colombia (Kurtenbach 
1991) and in comparison to Peru (Kurz 2012; Saylor 2013) can be considered. Soifer (2015) presents a 
historical comparison for Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru and highlights differences during several 
 
8 In the case selection chapter (4.2.1)I will elaborate on this.  
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periods in time. In his main argument he highlights how the decisions of (local) elites and the ideas for 
state building as well as their capacities to succeed influenced state building efforts. Alberto Vergara 
(2015) studies differences in the political developments of Bolivia and Peru and highlights how regional 
imbalances of power within the countries and the relation to the state influences state formation 
processes. 
Territory and population are also often mentioned as important arguments for state formation. 
Territorial control is argued to be central in the state formation process and “the principle of sovereign 
territoriality is a sine qua non for international recognition” (Spruyt 2011: 15). For Max Weber (2010: 
38; 159), the concept of rule (Herrschaft) also means an institutionalized power in a clearly defined 
territory over a defined population. The monopolization of violence was preceded by a struggle for 
land (“Ausscheidungskampf”), as described by Norbert Elias (1939). At a later stage, it resulted in the 
control and monopolization of violence. Furthermore, Tilly argues that the centralization of power also 
took place because of territorial wars and scarcity of landmass in Europe. In the non-European 
experience, the territory argument plays out differently. In a landmark article, Guillermo O´Donnell 
(1993) highlights the spatial unevenness of state reach in Latin America. Centeno (2002) regards 
territory as an important aspect and argues that because of its landmass, bureaucratization was far 
costlier in Latin America than in Europe (Vu 2010: 154; Centeno 2002). A similar argument can be found 
for Africa or Asia. Jeffrey Herbst (2000) reckons that bureaucratization and centralization was difficult 
because of the vast territory and the high costs of state extension. There have been different types 
and levels of authority in different areas before colonial times. Moreover, the European colonial 
powers consolidated territorial states rather than national states, meaning that they created fixed 
boundaries without really establishing a cohesive rule through all of that territory (Herbst 2000: 35-
57). Finally, James C. Scott (2009) recognizes that geographical differences in South-East Asia resulted 
in different expansion of the state. His argument established that the relatively inaccessible mountain 
areas had a sort of refuge from state power in contrast to the population of the valley. In his view, 
these territorial differences resulted in the differentiation between “self-governing and state-
governed peoples” (Scott 2009: 3).  
Authors have shown that neither the bellicist approach nor territorial and economic perspectives are 
sufficient to analyze state formation in the non-European world. It is also debatable whether a state 
with fragmented power necessarily results in instability: “Centralization is not necessary for states to 
be strong, and what is rational depends on context” (Vu 2010: 158). It has been noted that the focus 
on materialistic issues, institutional development, and the structure of the state is not enough for 
understanding state formation. Additionally, the specific context and cultural aspects need to be taken 
into account. Instead of analyzing states as monolithic blocks, the inclusion of subnational levels 
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without a strong presence of the state seems reasonable in this regard. As Norbert Elias mentions: to 
understand the state “one must see it how it becomes – has become in the past, is becoming in the 
present, and may become in the future.” (Elias, cited in Migdal 2001: 23). Evidently, not all processes 
of state formation are the same in a given region; differences in Europe too are apparent. Including a 
historical analysis will therefore, be helpful for understanding rule within the state and particular local 
patterns. For Latin America, López-Alves (2000) summarizes:  
“Latin America lacked an entrenched nobility, confronted very different international pressures, 
underwent no industrial revolution, formed a rather weak and late industrial bourgeoisie, held 
no colonies, and experienced colonial rule. To these, one must add differences in demography, 
culture, and factor endowments. But it is precisely these contrasts that both mark the limits of 
theories emerging from the European experience and contribute to a sharper picture of state 
making on both sides of the Atlantic.” (16). 
It is important to understand not only different regional, materialistic, and territorial aspects of the 
state, but also cultural and social preconditions. Elias already recognized the relationship between the 
monopoly of violence and the monopoly on raising taxes; the financing of organized violence as an 
important aspect in the formation of the European state (however not as explicit as Tilly 1985; 
Schlichte 2005: 77). In describing the process of European state formation as a process of social change 
that includes the relationship between individual and society, he sets another milestone for the 
analysis of the state (Elias 1988b: 143). Elias’ work does not describe a teleological project but rather 
the dynamic relationship between the individual and society as a process. His initial point of reference 
is not the individual, but the relationship between individuals that is shaped by collective context and 
distinct circumstances (Elias 1991: 170). Thus, the understanding of the state involves the state not as 
an autonomous actor, but closely related to society, a thought that is echoed by several academics at 
a later point (e. g. Migdal 1988; Jessop 1990, 2002; Ozlak 1981). 
Discussions on state formation have long been characterized by a statist approach that neglects the 
complex interplay within a state and argues from a Eurocentric perspective.9 This approach focused 
primarily on the formation of the Western states and did not or only insufficiently took into account 
the different processes in other world regions. With regard to state formation, the focus has been on 
state capacity in the sense of the resources and bureaucratic possibilities that are actually subsumed 
by the state (Skocpol 1985). However, state capacities in the context of resources do not necessarily 
coincide with the “power” articulated as the implementation of this ability into practice. That includes 
the implementation by political actors and the acceptance of social actors (Centeno et al. 2017).10 
 
9 For a critique see among others Mitchell 1991; Schlichte 2005, on Eurocentrism and a critique to the liberal peace 
approach, see Sabaratnam 2013. 
10 Notwithstanding these understandings on the variances of the state and state formation, the fragile and failed state debate 
presented simple reasons for why states are stable and what the potential solutions are. Despite the huge differences 
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Analysis of the state had for a long time been a subjective approach, understanding the state as the 
only actor “who” is implementing policies. Rather, it should be understood as a complex arrangement 
formed through a historical process (Migdal 1988). Thus, for understanding the state, questions should 
be raised on how specific structures developed to account for the current status of the state and the 
manner in which they interact with society.  
2.1.1 History and Power in the State 
Many states do not have full territorial control and have feeble existing administrative structures. They 
also lack a comprehensive nationwide outreach with regard to public goods, basic services and security 
and/ or lack in social integration (eg. Schlichte 2005). The understanding that the state is able to 
regulate most parts of society and hold an uncontested monopoly on violence does not hold true for 
many states in the world. The particularities and specific types of state development has been argued 
for in influential works (among others Oszlak 1981; Bayart 1989; O´Donnell 1993; Herbst 2000; Hibou 
2004; Schlichte 2005).  
Colonial powers in Africa strengthened themselves on patrimonial rule. Local authorities such as chiefs 
and elders were installed instead of building inclusive and cohesive states. Furthermore, after 
independence, bureaucratization took effect, but at the same time, informal relations were kept in 
place. Till this day, most of the African and Latin American states are based on a hybrid system that 
includes formal and informal governance structures (e. g. Oszlak 1981; O´Donnell 1993; Erdmann and 
Engel 2007; Bayart 2009; Boege et al. 2009). Thus, differences to the Westphalian ideal type are 
striking, such as alternatives in territorial control and unconventional forms of rulemaking. Also in 
Europe, the nation-state was in fact a relatively late result of violent conflicts (for a discussion see 
Kurtenbach and Wehr 2013). This is not to make an evolutionary argument that states and regions 
 
between states in different world regions and development processes that have already been recognized, a concept was 
created to define states that differed from the “European track”. With the turn of the century and in particular after the 
terror attacks of 2001, the world recognized “fragile or failing states” as a global threat (UN WDR 2011). Despite countless 
academic output on that matter, the debate was largely dominated by a “Western” perspective, assuming that those states 
would need fixing. Thus, interest in these states was still largely dominated by a statist approach measured against the 
Westphalian model state. “Measuring” the variation against the ideal type gave the opportunity to categorize those states. 
“If real states fell short of the standard, as they were bound to do, all sorts of words can be invented to express the gap 
between actual practice and the ideal” (Schlichte and Migdal 2005: 11). Among those concepts were weak states, quasi-
states, shadow states and fragile states. In particular, states with an uncomprehensive control of its territory or a contested 
monopoly on violence were regarded as a threat not only for the countries themselves, but also regionally and even globally. 
Literature on failed or fragile states tend to merge them under these labels (Miliken and Krause 2002; Rotberg 2003; 
Schneckener 2004). States that are connected to “state failure or fragility” are seen as breeding grounds for organized crime 
and terrorists. The understanding of these states was that they can be “fixed” with the right measures.10 The liberal 
statebuilding approach raised expectations and states simply needed the right toolbox to get on the right track and provoked 
a lot of criticism not least, from perspectives in political sociology (e. g. Bliesemann de Guevara 2012 Lemay-Hébert et al. 
2013; Bonacker et al. 2017).  
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outside the European context are “latecomers in a teleological development”. On the contrary, 
differences should be included as part of the analysis and not be taken as a problem that should be 
overcome.  
An obvious, yet important, factor for this analysis is that long before the beginning of colonial rule, 
power structures and authorities have been present in what later became the colonial state. These 
were not completely dissolved after independence. In many states we do not find a centralization of 
power, territorial control or bureaucratization as we find described for the contemporary European 
states (Tilly 1985; Elias 1988b; Weber 2010; Spruyt 1994, 2011). Instead, countries are (highly) 
disjointed with a privatization of security and fragmentation of power (Kurtenbach 2011). Surveys such 
as the Latinobarometro and African Barometer reveal that historical and contemporary developments 
resulted in a low recognition and acceptance of the state and state institutions. Low trust in the state 
and state institutions, especially in the government and the police, are commonly expressed. State 
development concentrated on core areas that were economically and strategically important (trade, 
security, etc.) while other areas of society were exploited for the benefit of the elite. In many cases, 
the rule was taken over by new regimes that did not promote state development but rather sought to 
secure their positions. Indeed, consequences of colonial rule differ regarding cases and context – for 
example India, Burma and Pakistan (Vu 2010: 163): “If society is fragmented, bargaining is not possible 
and states can be predatory such as in many colonial states.” (Ibd.). 
In Latin America “for many centuries, the central role of the state was not the creation of a nation but 
the maintenance of social privilege” (Centeno 2013: 18). This maintained not only social disparities and 
elitist politics but also regional imbalances since only particular regions were supported and 
developed, especially for extraction of resources. The exploitation of resources and people during 
colonial times and the focus on core economic regions led to fragmentation and inequalities in regional 
development. In Latin America, the legacy of such a system is still visible in some regions, for instance 
in the areas of the mita and encomienda system in Peru (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 17-18).  
According to Migdal (1988), local implementation of state rule is hindered by the interests of local 
authorities. Thus, the “implementers”, as Migdal calls local officials, find themselves pressured by 
several interest groups such as their superiors, local strongmen, clans, local authorities and families 
(Migdal 1988). States are therefore characterized by their relation to social forces and authorities. 
Their strength therefore, depends on how and if they can implement their agenda in society. Not taking 
the state as a closed unit of analysis separate from society, is crucial for the understanding of the state. 
It is also helpful to disengage several aspects of the state and open them for discussion. Different 
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groups within society have their own agendas and purposes. So, while the state reaches out to society 
in different ways these do not necessarily imply the feelings represented by the state (Migdal 1988).  
 
2.1.2 Spatial Reach of State Power and Security Provision 
The fragmented development in many post-colonial states in Africa and Asia, and in most of the Latin 
American states, led to the fact that many subnational regions are de facto, not controlled by the state 
(O’Donnell 1993). In Latin America, there was no centralization but rather a dilution of power resulting 
in the formation of local elites, and the relationship of these local elites became therefore essential 
(Centeno 2002; Soifer 2015; Vergara 2015). Control over territory also has economic consequences, 
since it allows the extraction of resources and the possibility for financial gains through taxes. This 
leads to the extension of state control and feeds into the formation of states (Tilly 1985; Saylor 2013). 
Most Latin American states developed core areas and cities while the periphery was basically left to 
local power holders and partially this resulted in a lack of full territorial control and ultimately inability 
to provide basic services in the margins of the state (O’Donnell 1993). However, these regions in the 
margins that are out of state influence are not necessarily “ungoverned spaces” (Clunan and Trinkunas 
2010). O´Donnell distinguishes between blue areas that have an effective government and fully 
functioning state institutions and brown areas that have low state control and ineffective institutions 
(O´Donnell 1993). Brown areas feature non-state rule, but are not necessarily opposing the state. 
Rather, they coexist with the national state: 
In these regions “(...) the bureaucratic state may be present in the form of buildings and officials 
paid out of public budgets, but the legal state is absent: Whatever formally sanctioned law 
exists is applied intermittently, if at all. More importantly, this intermittent law is encompassed 
by the informal law enacted by the privatized—patrimonial, sultanistic, or simply 
gangsterlike—powers that actually rule those places.” (O´Donnell 2004: 41).11 
Thus, many states do not have full control over its territory and are unable (or unwilling) to implement 
it. Instead, in those areas other forms of order emerge and actors other than the state fulfill state-like 
tasks like providing security and economic goods. While some regions benefit from government 
investments and programs, others are left out and left behind, which is visible for example, in the 
extreme regional imbalances in Latin America. In those areas, it is also more likely for an illicit economy 
to evolve since the possibility of being sanctioned is lower than in areas with strong state control. In 
 
11 Similar notions such as “grey zones” in urban contexts (Auyero 2007) or “states-within states” (Kurtenbach 2011; 
Kingston and Spears 2004) describe how non-state actors provide local rule and order. 
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brown spots, the vacuum of state power is filled by other actors.12 The evolution of drug trafficking 
and drug production is one example in this aspect (Thoumi 2003). 
Most visible are alternative orders in the case of security provision. Different examples can be found 
today for non-state actors that assume control in regions that have low state control. In Colombia, the 
evolution of paramilitary forces was also provoked by the inability of the state to provide for security. 
These paramilitaries not only challenge the state but also created a social basis in the respective 
regions (Romero 2000). In Peru, autodefensas or rondas campesinas13 not only served for the provision 
of security but also became an important aspect for the counter insurgency strategy and defeat of the 
guerrilla (Degregori 2006; Zech 2014). Also gangs can become the the providers of social order and 
services (Rodgers 2006) or drug traffickers de facto control over parts of bigger cities (Arias 2006; 
Duncan 2013). Ultimately, the formation of vigilante forces in Mexico’s states of Michoacan and 
Gerrero was in part because of the threat posed by drug cartels and abuses by state forces. While 
these vigilanties essentially took over police-like tasks, a faction of them routed the Knights of the 
Templars cartel (Grillo 2014). While some states cannot account for an uncontested monopoly on 
violence, different non-state actors control parts of the territory. That might include violence control, 
the provision of public goods and order, and by that being included in the “state” (Reno 1998). They 
can also be key players for post war stability (Ellis 2004) and influence national politics as for example 
Will Reno (2009) describes for illicit commercial networks help former warlords to get electoral 
support. 
Hence, these areas with low state presence cannot be termed as ungoverned. Scholars have widely 
acknowledged that states should not be taken as a teleological project, which leads to the Westphalian 
state in the end. Instead, the analysis should include the various forms of rule, order and state society 
relations within the state (e .g. Schlichte 2005; Vu 2010; Lemay-Herbert 2013). There is a vast array of 
possible terms, which describe the myriad forms of order and power which alienates the Westphalian 
ideal type. Different forms of local order developed that are sometimes parallel but also often in 
connection to the state. The “state” itself can be viewed differently by the population depending on 
their cultural background and place of living and might even be regarded as something alien to people 
living in areas with only limited presence of the state. Many terms have been found to describe this 
condition. Trutz von Trotha´s “para-sovereignty” describes different forms of power on the local level 
forming an economic, social and political center different from the state. “Parastate” refers to the 
institutional side of “para-sovereignty”, the rights based side within this political form of authority. In 
 
12 See also the discussion on “governance in areas of limited statehood” (e. g. Risse 2011). 
13 They will be explained in detail later in this study. 
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providing goods and services within these centers, non-state actors provide key elements that are 
expected to be provided by the state. (Trotha 2011: 37).14 In many regions of the state, the distinction 
of what is public or private, state or non-state, legal or illegal, legitimate or illegitimate, is often blurred. 
Hibou et al. (2004) famously labeled the “privatization of the state”, where private actors and public 
actors restructure local order and sovereignty. The term “hybrid order”, (Boege et al. 2009) captures 
how state and non-state order is intertwined. Authors rightly argue that this is a sign of state formation 
rather than a symptom of state failure (Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Boege et al. 2009; Meagher 
2014).15 In fact those are not ungoverned regions but we find, as Thomas Risse (2011, 2006) calls this, 
“governance in areas of limited statehood”, which does not mean a lack of rule, but rather different 
types of rule. These regions can also have close relationships with the state and are not necessarily 
striving for autonomy. For example, in Sierra Leone, local chiefs became dependent upon state 
revenues, and the state became dependent on strongmen for local rule (Migdal 1988: 141). Also the 
neo-patrimonialists point out that behind a legal institutional façade, actual rule depended on other 
structures (eg. Eisenstadt 1973, Clapham 1985). Still, these concepts were linked to a Weberian idea 
of the state, and therefore were still limited in scope or included the difficulty of becoming a catch all 
concept that lacked conceptual and methodological applicability (Erdmann and Engel 2007).16 Local 
preconditions, cultural settings, and rule were neglected, or only insufficiently taken into account. 
Hence, we can analyze state formation by viewing these areas as integral elements. The question 
remains, what do we gain from these concepts for the empirical analysis? For a thorough empirical 
analysis we need to be more precise.  
In recent works, the idea of the state as an autonomous entity changed. It is established that the state 
cannot be understood when detached from society and its actions are correlated with other actors 
and society (Migdal 2001). Instead of analyzing the state as a static element that takes autonomous 
actions, the state is understood to be intertwined with different actors, more so, if state rule is 
fragmented throughout its territory. For the process of state formation and for this study, Michal 
Mann´s definition of infrastructural power that includes a set of centralized institutions radiating 
toward the periphery and having the capacity to implement its power (Mann 1984, 1993), serves as 
 
14 Similar arguments can be found in the “limited access orders” (LAO) concept (North et al. 2009), meaning that the access 
to resources and decision making is limited to a small amount of people. This in turn creates and sustains an elite. At the 
same time, it prevents disorder and limits violence. Limited access controls violence “by forming a dominant coalition that 
includes the groups with potential for violence” (North et al. 2012: 2). “All low and middle income countries today are LAOs” 
(Ibd.: 6). 
15 On the institutional side, authors described “twilight institutions”, (Lund 2006) where the boundary between private and 
public is not clear cut.15 Most importantly, as this research shows, these areas are not ungoverned spaces but, have different 
forms of rule which needs to be taken into account (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, 2016; Risse 2011; Hagmann and Péclard 
2010; O´Donnell 1999: 133-158). 
16 For a critique on the use of the ideal type approach see for example Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 11-13 or Lemey-Herbert 
et al. 2013. 
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another basis. These capacities are exposed through what I call state practices; actions undertook by 
the state to implement power. Recent studies use the concept of infrastructural power to show the 
restricted reach of the state in Latin America (vom Hau and Soifer 2008; Eaton 2012 vom Hau and Biffi 
2015, Soifer 2015). At the same time, they highlight the presence of infrastructural capacities that do 
not necessarily mean higher influence of the state in the particular regions (Soifer and vom Hau 2008). 
The local social preconditions are an important factor in this regard. Therefore, the present study 
regards the territorial reach and implementation of state rule as an important factor but also builds on 
Migdal (2001) and Schlichte (2005), also Elias (1994), who argue that the state is part of a permanent 
interplay between different actors and power sources. This interplay includes local preconditions, the 
society, and power structures, which are implemented in local orders. The relationship of these orders 
to state formation is crucial for our understanding and study of the state. Hence, I define the state as 
actor who seeks dominance over a given territory and who is in a dialogical relationship with society. 
Additionally, I understand that within this territory the dominance of the limited scope of state power 
and the essential role local orders and alternative power have in the process of state formation. These 
local orders might develop alternative to the state, but not necessarily in contrast to it. Instead, they 
are integrated into a wider process of state formation.  
The assessment of state formation should consequently, take these conditions into account and 
include different actors (state and non-state, or formal and informal) into the analysis. These actors 
indulge in practices that can be within the rules of the state, against them or simply parallel towards 
them. They can act within a formal state structure defined by boundaries, formal rules and a defined 
monopoly of power, in short, a formal central rule. But since in practice, this ideal type cannot be found 
in many regions, we see types of formal and informal rule that are connected in a dynamic process 
(Schlichte 2005: 106, 110; Migdal 1994; Hibou 2004; Erdmann and Engel 2007). In this regard the 
perception of the state plays an essential role. In a late lecture on the state, Pierre Bourdieu reckons 
that “the state” cannot be reduced to power or territorial control but is rather a collective belief that 
structures the whole of social life. In the words of Bourdieu, it is a “well founded collective fiction” 
(Bourdieu 2014: 4). Although Bourdieu also sees the legitimate monopoly of violence as a condition 
for the state, he reformulates the classical understanding by Max Weber:  
“If the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates itself simultaneously 
in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in 
subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought. By 
realizing itself in social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the instituted 
institution makes us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts of institutions (in the active 
sense) and hence has all the appearances of the natural” (Bourdieu 1994: 4). 
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Thus, for Bourdieu, the state is not only an actor exercising coercion, but in order to be a leading actor, 
the state needs to be also a symbol whose ideas and values are incorporated within each individual. 
This symbol rises through the construction of different fields.  And further: 
“The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital 
of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) 
informational capital, and symbolic capital. It is this concentration as such which constitutes 
the state as the holder of a sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of capital 
and over their holders. Concentration of the different species of capital (which proceeds hand 
in hand with the construction of the corresponding fields) leads indeed to the emergence of a 
specific, properly statist capital (capital etatique) which enables the state to exercise power 
over the different fields and over the different particular species of capital, and especially over 
the rates of conversion between them (and thereby over the relations of force between their 
respective holders). It follows that the construction of the state proceeds apace with the 
construction of a field of power, defined as the space of play within which the holders of capital 
(of different species) struggle in particular for power over the state, i.e., over the statist capital 
granting power over the different species of capital and over their reproduction (…).” 
(Bourdieu 1994: 4-5) 
 What Bourdieu describes is in fact a state that has control not only over its territory, but also over 
violence and the “rules” within the state territory.17 Indeed, he developed and refined his ideas and 
projections under specific circumstances of the European (the French) society, but we can still learn 
from his concept,18 since Bourdieu’s take on the state recognizes that it is not a monolithic block and 
includes several forms of power.19 His concept gives us some indication of the state’s connection with 
society. How does the reach of the state unfold in the particular regions and how is its relationship 
with society? In this regard, I understand the interrelation of state power and non-state power from a 
multidimensional perspective, instead of concentrating on the power emitted by the state from its 
center to its periphery (also Swartz 2013: 147-153). 
This work builds on previous works of Migdal and Schlichte, who have already taken up the 
understanding of Bourdieu by including constant struggles and a dialogical and conflicted state-society 
relation (Migdal 2001; Migdal and Schlichte 2004). The balance between actors is never in a state of 
equilibrium. As they constantly shift, they are almost never truly balanced, which is due to the 
 
17 Describing the evolution of the state Bourdieu describes the transformation from diffuse symbolic capital that rests on 
nobility during aristocratic rule, to objective symbolic capital that leads to bureaucratization (Bourdieu 1994: 11). The 
specific symbolic capital is based on recognition by the state and becomes part of the habitus (Bourdieu 1998: 99; for an 
application Schlichte 2005: 75). 
18 Therefore, his concept cannot be directly transferred to analyze coca producing and brown spot areas, but the ideas of 
fields offer the basis for analyzing and understanding the functioning of localized illicit economies within a country. Other 
authors already made use of Bourdieu´s concept in other circumstances. See for example Schlichte (2005); Migdal and 
Schlichte (2005). 
19 Also Michael Mann (1993), gives an important contribution to the analisis of power and order. 
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persistent actions of actors and also due to acts of protest and consent (Schlichte 2009: 17). For Migdal, 
the state is only one institution among many that seeks to exert control. Instead of seeing two different 
systems, he sees the state as embedded in society. The state in this regard is understood as a field in 
which power struggles takes place (Migdal 2001: 22). Understanding power struggles and balances of 
power within a given territory are essential for the understanding of local rule. Migdal and Schlichte 
build their arguments on Bourdieu’s notion of fields: “Every field is the site of a more or less overt 
struggle over the definition of the legitimate principles of division of the field.” (Bourdieu 1985: 734).  
Klaus Schlichte and Joel Migdal argue that “the state is a field of power” but also “The extent 
to which a field actually becomes one of state domination varies considerably both within a 
country and from one state to another. In many cases “the state” is not the deeply 
institutionalized set of rules expressed in the standard image but rather a shaky field of power 
relations that are not much more than sheer coercion and brute force” (Schlichte and Migdal 
2005: 16).  
As I have discussed, recent studies acknowledge the particularities of the state and formulate a 
conceptual critique (among others Migdal and Schlichte 2005; Bayart 2009; Centeno 2002; Kurtenbach 
2011) but only few empirical studies analyze the dynamic state formation process at the local level. 
The recognition of local order and their particularities are key to analyze local processes and the 
connection to state formation. Since it is not only about the relationship of single actors dominating a 
system but also about a structure defined by relationships of various actors and processes, it is more 
useful to utilize a concept that is able to capture both.20 I believe these different dynamic processes 
are essential and should be included in studies on state formation, which is why I account for local 
order and the dynamic process of power. These dynamics of different power structures and limited 
state control becomes apparent when we include illicit economies into the debate as we will see in the 
next chapter. 
 
2.2 Illicit Economies  
2.2.1 Illicit Economies and the State  
This sub-chapter will build on the previous concepts on the state and highlight the effects of an illicit 
economy. It seeks to bridge the debates on state formation and illicit economies in order to open up 
theoretical and conceptual possibilities for the analysis of the effect of illicit economies on the margins 
of the state. I will highlight what we know and what we do not know in the connection of illicit 
 
20 In this sense, the presented argument is influenced by Migdal´s and Schlichte´s work (2001,2005), which describes the 
state as a field of power and recognized power relations within that field. It also follows a more flexible approach and is 
open for the inclusion of rule alternative to state dominance, and to analyze the role illicit economies play in this regard. 
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economy, the state and local order. Illicit economies are not a new phenomenon; neither is its impact 
on the state a new topic. Different patterns have already been studied, but mostly only on the national 
level. Structured and cohesive studies in the brown spot areas with low state control are scarce.  
In accordance with recent research on illegal markets, I will define illicit economies as those that are 
locally bound and depend on the the voluntary exchange of goods and services whose production or 
consumption is officially banned (Arlacchi 2002: 203; Beckert & Dewey 2017; Beckert & Wehinger 
2013; von Lampe 2016: 81). This approach includes not only “the criminals” that produce or circulate 
officially banned goods and services, but furthermore implies the externalities of the market. A 
distinction is also made between organized crime and illicit economies. Illicit economies describe a 
system whose externalities might affect rules, security, power and social aspects. Organized crime 
actively colludes and cooperates with these aspects as they are aiming to gain control over certain 
territories and secure market access. Hence, while externalities of illicit economies might come as a 
byproduct, organized criminals actively interfere in these areas. Furthermore, while studies on 
organized crime typically focus on networks and actors (von Lampe 2016), illicit economies that might 
be produced or used by criminals, are characterized by an emphasis on structures and “systemic 
consequences”. Therefore, the present study focuses more on illicit economies and primarily 
concentrates on the externalities of these economies.  
The effects of illicit economies have been actively discussed. A growing number of works recognize the 
importance of illicit economies and organized crime on the state, but describe its impact mostly as a 
major threat to security and state institutions (World Bank 2011; Miraglia et al. 2012). This work 
defines states with pervasive presence of illicit economies, especially the narcotic economies often as 
weak, or fragile states that are affected by disorder because of the illicit economy. Most academic 
works center their arguments on a circle of crime and state weakness, where the illicit economy is 
connected to violence and corruption. Similar arguments can be found in popular literature and even 
the portrayal of the illicit economy as a global threat (Naím 2006; Glenny 2009). The inflexible focus 
on the destructionist effect of illicit economies blurs the view on its potential influences on local order 
and power relations which are seldom analyzed closely. This is an important point as it is not so much 
about the influence of single political actors, but rather the drug economy and its influence on local 
order. Thus, as a first step this section highlights the relationship between the state and the illicit 
economies. I will give a brief overview on previous works that highlighted state and illicit economies 
before I focus on the impact of today’s biggest global illicit economy, drug trafficking.  
The interconnection between illicit economies and the state has been argued before, but this 
relationship is not necessarily undermining the state. For example, Peter Andreas (2013), makes a 
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compelling argument on the role smuggling played in the formation of the United States. He notes that 
the state makes smuggling (through laws and their enforcement), and smuggling in turn remakes the 
state (Ibd.: 2), reframing Charles Tilly’s famous statement, “State makes war and war makes states” 
(Tilly 1992). Andreas captures the dynamics between state formation and illicit markets when he 
highlights how these markets shaped the United States of America. Diverse patterns can be found in 
different cases and should be examined thoroughly. Meagher (2014) shows that smuggling networks 
had different outcomes in East Africa, where illicit trade fuelled war economies, whereas in West 
Africa, largely legal goods were smuggled, which in turn reinforced state power instead of weakening 
it. Hence, the consequences of an illicit economy vary and can hardly be generalized or drawn from 
singular examples. Nevertheless, it has been established that illicit economies have particular influence 
on security, protection, territorial control, and economic outcome. 
Illicit economies can foster a closer connection between criminals and state officials, by instances of 
corruption or direct involvement of state agents in illegal activities up to a degree where it is difficult 
to distinguish between the state and the criminal. Examples for the latter can be found in Burma 
(Snyder and Duran-Martínez 2009), Guinea-Bissau (Strazzari 2015), and in some areas of Mexico, 
where non-state criminal actors try to influence policy making through the strategic use of violence 
and bribery (Lessing 2015). This partial recognition of extra-legal actors and the acceptance of illicit 
economies is not necessarily an unchangeable fate, nor does it describe a complete absence of state 
actors and control. Often, state security actors are able to manage protection, suspend or apply it and 
thereby use their power as a commodity and thus exercise control (Dewey 2012). Hence, the option 
of imposing law enforcement and implementing harsher rules stays intact and remains an assurance 
of control for state actors. The persistence of extra-legal actors and illicit economies can also lead to 
the politicization of illicit economies, which serves as a justification for state intervention. This 
relationship can result in what Jenny Pearce (2010) called “perverse state building”. The potential 
threat posed by a lack of territorial control or the emergence of crime and violence is often answered 
in Latin America with hard-handed politics (mano dura). This translates into restrictive policies, 
investing in the state security apparatus and “no mercy” for criminals in the hope to (re)establish 
government control. The lack of state security provisions can also signal a growing demand for private 
security operators who in the long run, undermine the legitimacy of the state (Davis 2009; Aguetta 
2013). This would be in contrast to the European state formation, which saw a gradual monopolization 
on violence and eradication of private armed actors (Elias 1994; Spruyt 2011).  
Baker and Milne (2015) challenge the strict dichotomy between states and illicit economies, by 
focusing on states with low capacities for licit revenues. In these cases, states with weak fiscal power 
might make use of illicit income resources which consequentially are not a problem per se, but instead 
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are even incentivized by the state. Also endemic corruption can be analyzed more from a “constructive” 
perspective:  
“It begins to look less like the dirty pocket money of a naughty state functionary and more like a full-
blown economy that financially sustains institutions and their staff, as the case studies in this thematic 
issue reveal. Indeed, following the money – paying specific attention over extended periods to how illicit 
monies are generated, circulated and shared – reveals the key role state officials play in the creation and 
maintenance of criminal economies.  Systemic corruption therefore does not necessarily occur beyond 
or outside of state building. Rather, some states depend on the proceeds of corruption for everyday 
governance and their very political survival.“ (Baker and Milne 2015). 
Furthermore, Baker and Milne (2015) describe an example of the logging industry. Once the state 
defines an area as a protected one, timber extraction, which is a primary income for locals, is 
criminalized. Needless to say that though the intention of the state might have been noble, this does 
not necessarily stop the logging. On the contrary, as the example from South East Asia shows, after 
the law was passed to protect certain areas, state agents earned their share in the form of bribes 
through the formalization of illegally extracted timber (Baker and Milne 2015: 167).  
While it is often argued that illicit economies harm the national economy, we see in fact states profit 
financially from illegal activities. In the Asian context, Baker and Milne (2015) point out that states may 
actually use illegal profits for state financing. The states resulting from this are not necessarily weak or 
strong because of illegal practices. On the contrary, they are able to implement “strong state practices” 
because they are empowered through the finances of the “dirty money”. Revenues of these illicit 
economies used by the state represent an example that the effect of illicit economies is not necessarily 
opposed to the state. It is a symbiotic relationship of the state with its periphery that enhances the 
state’s capacity for territorial control. In Gambia and Benin, the illicit economy provides significant 
state income and is central to the organization of the formal economy (Meagher 2014: 498). On the 
other hand, economic opportunities offered by illicit economies shapes the acceptance for alternative 
rule and also for the state. This happens if the population profit from the illicit activities and if there 
are other ways of money making. The perception of externalities of the illicit economy will translate 
into the legitimacy of the given order. In areas that have low presence of the state, economic 
opportunities are scarce since this is an offshoot of infrastructural deficits. Illicit economies therefore, 
are seen as a good opportunity when other state sponsored options are scarce.  
Illicit goods are generally out of reach for extracting state revenues. Often, they consume state 
revenues in the attempt to fight these illicit economies. But with regard to drug production, there are 
examples of how the drug trade financed and supported the territorial expansion of the state. For 
instance, the role of heroin trafficking in the Shan region in Burma (Meehan 2014) and the drug trade 
in Guinea-Bissau (Strazzari 2014) are classic cases. In both instances, parts of the state could actually 
 
 
31 
(re)establish territorial control because of the illicit economy. In Burma, the state itself became 
involved in drug trafficking (Meehan 2015, 2011). Meehan’s analysis of the Shan region explains, how 
the state coopted the opium and heroin trade and how this “resulted in processes of negotiated 
statehood, defined by brokerage, coalition building, and the management rather than state 
monopolization of the means of coercion and extraction” (Meehan 2015). By using the illicit economy, 
the Burmese state that had limited territorial control, could hold several incentives to co-opt and 
regulate different local groups which would otherwise have been out of their control. Hence, brokering 
a deal with non-state militias, and the indirect profits from the illicit economy helped to project state 
influence in peripheral areas and extend its influence territorially. Meehan challenges the argument 
that drug trafficking has negative consequences and argues that “the social relations surrounding 
production and trafficking determines the relationship between drugs, conflict and state 
consolidation/breakdown” (Meehan 2015: 260).21 Similar arguments can be found in Latin America. 
Ballvé (2012) argues that the presence of a paramilitary group that was primarily driven by the drug-
economy in the region of Urabá, Colombia, helped to (re)establish state reach in the region. This was 
accompanied by severe consequences for the local population as human rights abuses and violence 
escalated in the region, driven by the paramilitary presence. But instead of undermining the state, they 
actually facilitated territorial expansion. Thus, instead of being the cause of chaos, illegal economies 
are promoted by the state as “tools and devices of state territorialisation” (Baker and Milne 2015: 
166).  
Even if the state defines and castigates illegality, the differentiation between the legal-state versus the 
illegal non-state is not always clear cut. Illicit economies are mostly not completely detached from the 
state and its formal laws and rules. Actors move between the two structures, where the boundaries 
between legal/illegal and legitimate/illegitimate are sometimes hard to define. The results can be the 
formation of a hybrid norm system which includes state and illicit rules. Local politicians for example, 
have less leverage to implement their policies and they are also not necessarily involved in 
implementing government policies. This makes those areas more prone to creating hybrid systems, 
which give local politicians more opportunities to implement their policies. With regard to the state, 
the illicit economy generates profits that can benefit state institutions.  
Various studies have been argued before that illicit economies evolve and rise especially in regions of 
low state control or in transition phases. This has been argued by Vladim Volkov, who describes the 
rise of the Russian mafia in the countries transition to democracy. He makes the argument that “violent 
 
21 Meehan contents that it is not necessarily a “successful“ form of state building since it loses ”moral legitimacy“. Non-state 
militias profit from an uneven power distribution (Meehan 2015)   
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entrepreneurs” developed in this transition phase. While the state did not account for a monopoly of 
violence these groups filled a gap with private security actors (Volkov 2002). Varese (2001) and Dewey 
(2011) present other examples of illegal protection where the state cannot provide for it. This does 
not lead to more fragility, but rather results in a (re)configuration of local rule.22 It creates an illegal-
state protection system, in which state forces sell protection to criminals to shield them from state 
prosecution or where state agents sell their protection to civilians to protect them against criminals. 
Dewey (2011) argues convincingly in the case of the Argentinian police forces, that this type of illegal 
protection does not necessarily results in weakness. On the contrary, it manifests into a hierarchical 
order that allows the police to hold on to its superiority in the local pecking order, and enables them 
to fulfill their tasks. This strengthens state institutions, but not the state as a whole. Thus, this hybrid 
action of the state institutions selling protection illegally while at the same time securing order does 
not necessarily strengthen the state, but has several consequences. Firstly, they provide security 
through state actors even if this comes through the informal selling of protection. Secondly, although 
state actors are providing protection, it weakens the state at the same time, since there is no respect 
for the legal boundaries set by the state. And finally, this form of informal protection through formal 
security actors results in a form of resource extraction and a sort of informal taxation. Recently José 
Miguel Cruz (2016) made a compelling argument for Latin America, that high levels of criminal violence 
are related to the transition for democracy, when political actors connected with criminals to increase 
their political reach. 
In extreme cases, an illicit economy might be a vital part of the state and not only connected to state 
actors, but also intrinsically linked to its structure. However, discussions about these topics are often 
normatively biased and relate to instability and violence. Guinea-Bissau is a case in point and often 
paints the portrait of a “narco state”. The shortcomings of such a term were recently addressed in an 
edited volume by Patrick Chabal and Toby Green (2016). In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the authors 
highlight how elites made use of the drug economy when few other resources were available. There is 
no doubt that the country became a hub for drug trafficking and that elites were deeply involved in it, 
but the relation to security or poverty is yet to be analyzed (e.g., being a consequence or a symptom). 
The authors argue that instability is not a consequence of the drug trade but stems from it (Chabal and 
Green 2016). The categorization of a “narco state” or “mafia state” offers no analytical depth that 
allows tackling of the social and political complexities within the countries (similar to the terms of state 
“fragility” or “weakness”) (for a discussion Andreas 2012). Instead, analysis of the social and historical 
conditions should be preconditions for the analysis. Hence, a clear delineation of illicit economies and 
 
22 Volkov´s work on the Russian organized crime also sees a connection of privatization policies in post-soviet Russia with 
the emergence of illegal actors (Volkov 2014). 
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the state might not be useful for an analysis since the entanglement of state officials and institutions 
with illicit actors and illicit activities, might be a crucial aspect in understanding state formation 
processes. Therefore, a more nuanced approach for analysis is needed, one that explores the practices 
and processes in more detail. 
Following these thoughts, I contend with Felbab-Brown to follow a new approach and not see crime 
or illicit activities alien to the state or state formation: “In strong states that effectively address the 
needs of their societies, the non-state entities cannot outcompete the state. But in areas of 
sociopolitical marginalization and poverty—in many Latin American countries, conditions of easily 
upward of a third of the population—non-state entities do often outcompete the state and secure the 
allegiance and identification of large segments of society.“ (Felbab-Brown 2010: 156). Starting from 
these approaches and the recently growing awareness that crime and its externalities should become 
more included in political science research (Barnes 2017), this thesis approaches illicit economies and 
analyzes its importance for the state. The focus on local order will thereby help to analyze the 
consequences of the illicit economies and the relevance for state society relations. 
The impact of illicit economies on local order and ultimately on the state formation process, needs 
closer examination. In the brown spot areas, there is often not a clear delineation of what constitutes 
illegitimate formal and informal behavior. Furthermore, state rule is not or only partly accepted by the 
population. This becomes even more significant in regions where illicit economic acts might be 
regarded illegal but perceived as legitimate, for instance, when they are providing livelihoods to the 
majority of the people. This reasoning makes the imposition of state rule seem like a threat of 
perceived legitimate rights.  
 
2.2.2 Illicit Economies and Order 
Control over its territory has become a classical feature of states with a “Weberian” lens. Yet most 
states differ from these “ideal types” and lack such a control over the territory.23 These areas are 
effectively controlled by other actors. These actors do not endanger the stability of a particular region 
or integrity of the state. In fact, they can act as providers of stability by controlling a certain territory 
(Arias 2017). This might happen parallel to democratic consolidation of the countries and instead of 
being antagonistic, it is an analogous process, producing parallel structures. These parallel structures 
are not necessarily opposing the formation of states, but within them, local authorities exercise control 
 
23 Weber was well aware of this fact when he was describing his “ideal types” (for a discussion see Migdal 2001)  
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where the state cannot or does not want to. Often, these areas stay untouched by the state and leave 
space for the development of an alternative territorial control by criminal actors, among others (Ibd.).  
Three regions can be highlighted in this regard: border regions, as well as marginal urban and rural 
areas. These areas are suitable examples as they are particularly prone to alternative order. They exist 
mostly in the margins of state powers, while at the same time smuggling of various types of goods 
offers a lucrative income possibility for the many types of non-state actors. Smuggling of weapons, 
drugs, natural resources and humans are the many ways in which the border offers opportunities for 
illegal income. The conditions of low state control and lucrative illicit business opportunities can create 
conflictive dynamics, affect territorial control along the smuggling routes and provoke informal rules 
for exchange. Thus, in the borderlands we can see regulatory dimensions. Paradoxically, state borders 
also offer a territorial dimension of rule (Clunan and Trinkunas 2016: 102-104; Idler 2014; Andreas 
2003). Furthermore, in favelas, comunas or informal dwellings of cities, illicit economies are often 
accelerated through internal migration. Consequences can range from gangs to informal rule in those 
parts of the city (Arias 2006, 2010; Hazen and Rodgers 2014; Muggah 2015; Trinkunas and Clunan 
2016: 104-107). Lastly, unequal state development creates peripheral rural areas, where state 
presence is scarce and illicit economies can rise without much resistance. This is especially visible in 
drug producing regions. In all of those areas, illicit economies can flourish because of the absence of a 
functioning sanctioning mechanism by the state as well as through non-state actors who act as a 
driving force for the development of illegal markets. 
We are witnessing processes of contested, entangled, and parallel powers within states. Be it 
Afghanistan, Iraq, border regions in Colombia, Michoacán in Mexico, favelas of Rio or coca growing 
areas in Peru, to name a few. In these areas, the notion of what is legal and what is not becomes 
blurred, since the notion of the state that defines legality is unclear as well. At the same time, other 
forms of alternative rule become visible. Recent studies challenge the understanding of the “weak 
state – organized crime rationale” and broaden our view on legitimate rule besides that of the state. 
More specifically recent work stress the effect of criminal actors on local order.  In urban areas in Latin 
America studies highlight alternative rule and social order that evolved because of an illicit economy 
or criminal actors. The works of Gustavo Duncan (2013) or Abello–Colak, and Guarneros-Meza (2014) 
on Medellin show how this was closely to the drug trade. Gustavo Duncan (2013) analyses Pablo 
Escobar’s role in the city suburbs in Medellin, that surpassed the typical corrupt or violent approach of 
criminal groups („mas que plata o plomo“). Escobar not only dominated the areas with violence, but 
also reorganized the local power structure, including the provision of services, through a network of 
“employees” (Duncan 2013, 2014: 264-271). This network operated out of many “mini-cartels” and 
extended the power of “El Patron”, Pablo Escobar. It is important to see how rule and power structures 
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are established and what they are based on. Ruling actors emerged because of the illicit economy and 
the lack of state control. This does not imply that everybody necessarily supports these actors, but 
suggests that they fill a void left by the state.  In a thoroughly study Desmond Arias’ (2006, 2010) work 
on urban grey zones such as the favelas in Rio de Janeiro24 or more recently in a comparative study on 
Medellin, Rio de Janeiro and Kingston he highlights how these actors do not only create a system for 
security provision but also political control and civic organization (2017). Although examples differ a 
lot from each other, they share similar preconditions such as informal dwellings in or surrounding big 
cities, low or no state control, and the emergence of gangs as local power holders. Those are good 
examples that explain how governing structures are formed in areas with low state control that are 
actually based on an illicit economy. Dennis Rodgers (2009) analyzes how gangs influence local 
structures in urban neighbourhoods of Nicaragua and how they affect community identity. The now 
classical study by Diego Gambetta on the Sicilian Mafia presents how void for state security creates a 
demand for protection, which was filled by the Mafia (1993). Intentionally or not, non-state criminal 
actors often fill a void left by the state and their services are then used by the local population. Hence, 
there are various studies on the influence of criminal actors on local social order, often with an actor’s 
specific view. Undoubtedly, the influence and charisma of people such as Pablo Escobar facilitated the 
emergence of these alternative rules and we gain valuable insights when focusing on his role. Diane 
Davis (2010) offers with “fragmented sovereignty” an interesting concept that can help to capture the 
attempts of criminal actor and -organizations to create as social basis and organization in areas where 
the state does not provide for it. As some authors point out, pursuing legitimacy can be important for 
traffickers who make significant efforts to build support among the population (Felbab-Brown 2011; 
Arias 2006). Ultimately, Barnes (2017) calls for a conceptualization of criminal organization as political 
actors and broadening the debate and analyzing the variety of influence. In particular, he focusses on 
the aspect of violence and promotes an organizational framework for analyzing the relationship of 
crime and states. While all of these contributions highlight important aspects for the research on crime 
and for broadening the debate, the majority focusses on actors. However, the mere focus on “actors” 
will not lead us to understand the nature of local social order when influenced by an illicit economy 
and should therefore be broadened. This thesis seeks to move beyond the focus on groups or actors 
and instead seeks to understand the externalities of an illicit economy on social order in the margins 
of the state. 
 
24 Misha Glenny (2014) describes in detail the rise and fall of Antonio Francisco Bonfim Lopez (“Nem”), a Brazilian gangster 
boss who came to rule probably the biggest Favela in Brazil, not by brute force but by the establishment of rules respected 
by the people. 
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As studies have shown, those externalities of illicit economies can result in different forms of social 
domination (Auyero and Berti 2015; Dewey 2016; Dewey and Beckert 2017). In some cases, this might 
be direct. For instance, criminal actors finance visits to hospitals, provide food, or loans. In another 
instance, the illicit economy itself provides the necessary funds to purchase goods and services by 
giving the opportunity to work in the first place. Large scale infrastructure investments such as the 
construction of streets, water systems, hospitals, and schools are usually not found and stay in the 
hands of a state that is not able or willing to provide it. Hence, up to a certain point, illicit economies 
can account for the need of the local population, but they cannot fully replace the state. Strazzari 
(2014) shows that in Guinea-Bissau, which many regard as the showcase of a “narco-state”, state 
involvement in drug trafficking, in fact assures and retains its position (Strazzari 2014: 30; also Chabal 
and Green 2016). ”Political tolerance, often expressed at a local level and in an informal fashion, plays 
a pivotal role in providing political stability and the means for the continuing success of the market“ 
(Dewey 2016: 7). Externalities like violence, produced by illicit economies can be negative, but can also 
have positive outcomes, for instance, in producing economic outcomes for people in areas with low 
economic possibilities, securing the provision of electricity such as in the favelas in Rio and creating a 
consistent security structure. This in turn defines their reaction towards those who stand for or against 
this economy. Thus, if people regard those externalities as mainly positive, they would rather support 
the alternative local order, even if it is considered illicit.  
Drugs can be an important financial resource for non-state groups. For example, rebel groups during 
war and postwar periods. In light of the “greed” argument, these “lootable” resources which are 
relatively easy to extract, might prolong the war since they provide financial options for fighters and 
represent incentives for personal enrichment (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross 2004). Peace would be 
an undesirable condition in this regard, not only for political but also financial reasons. Besides playing 
a role in the actual fighting, illicit economies can play a pivotal role in the post-war period (Goodhand 
2009). Following this, peace represents high opportunity costs for rebel groups that base their finances 
on the illicit economy. In case of the FARC in Colombia, it is argued that the cocaine industry not only 
helped to finance their fight against the Colombian state, but also enhanced their capacity for 
corruption and influence on local politics (e. g. Cornell 2005). However, the economic argument can 
also be viewed differently. Snyder (2006) argues that “lootable” resources can be regarded as a factor 
that promotes instability and in contrast, also an element that maintains political order.25 This would 
 
25 Similar arguments can be raised for transforming war economies and peace processes. The presence and 
interdependence of many actors such as organized crime groups, gangs, and smugglers may also harm the peacebuilding 
process and penetrate local government structures (Cockayne and Lupel 2011). Also war economies might transfer into 
peace time when a power vacuum after war offers opportunities for installation of illicit economies (Pugh et al. 2004; 
Andreas 2009; Berdal 2009). 
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depend on the actor’s mechanisms for extraction that evolve regarding these resources (see also 
Goodhand 2009). In the instances of regions where state rule is scarce or (re)established, the state has 
to deal with different forms of order, some of which support the illicit economy.26  
Dewey et al. (2016) describe an entangled order that result as an interaction between two sets of 
actors; the state actors and the non-state actors involved in illegal and informal activities. People might 
enter the illicit market simply because of the lack of opportunities to earn money legally. Nevertheless, 
they can be connected to the legal market. Engwicht (2016) describes the Sierra Leonean diamond 
market, where illegally mined diamonds are sold on an illegal market to a legal firm. The connection 
to the legal market justifies illegal earnings in the first place, while there are additional links between 
the legal and the illegal sector. Actors rarely inhabit the illegal sphere in totality. Instead, they swerve 
between the legal and illegal spheres, for example, they could be using facilities to launder money or 
simply be buying legal objects with illegally earned money.  
Legality and illegality are defined by the state that regulates the economy. Therefore, illegal markets 
can only be explained in relation to state development and its definition of illegality. However, what is 
legally wrong might be morally acceptable or even supported by the population. In other words, the 
notion of what is defined as illegal by the state can be at the same time seen as legitimate by the 
population, resulting in a form of legitimate illegality (Mayntz 2015). This notion might seem trivial, 
but is an important guideline for the construction of a society. Illegal economies interpret state laws 
in real life by influencing the notion of what is accepted and what is not. It also examines the rules that 
are seen as appropriate to be followed. Following Webers definition of legitimacy, it is significant if 
people believe that the norms are legitimate (“Legitimitätsglaube”, Weber 2010). While people might 
accept state norms and rules, they might also follow what they believe is an “adequate” behavior even 
if state law defines it as illegal. Thus, not all that is considered illegal is illegitimate while on the other 
hand, not everything that is allowed by the state is seen legitimate. “If the legitimacy of a political 
authority is contested, or if a political authority cannot impose threatened sanctions, illegality is only 
formal. Where formal legality and social legitimacy diverge, legitimate illegality flourishes” (Mayntz 
2015: 3). These forms of illegality become deeply embedded in the system over time and might play a 
decisive role in fostering new forms of memberships for social groups (Dewey 2016: 9). 
Consequentially, these social practices are then defined from outside, taken as part of illegal acts that 
ought to be penalized by the state. However, they can also be defined from within as a connecting 
factor to those being confronted with the threat of getting punished. Thus, the state has the leading 
 
26 Other examples are on organized crime in West Africa (Vorrath 2015) or overviews on organized crime per regions or 
countries (Albanese 2014; Baigly 2009; Vanda Felbab-Brown 2009, 2011). Further links are drawn to gangsterism in Central 
America (Muggah and Rodgers 2009), criminal governance (Arias 2010), OC and state development in Iraq (Wiliams 2015). 
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role in defining what is legal and what is illegal. Furthermore, the definition of legality and illegality is 
also a tool of power. Defining something as illegal enables the state to act against illegal practices, 
which might result in incarceration or a justification for using other coercive means. On the other hand, 
illegal markets in regions where the state has only little influence, creates a social reality, which in the 
end might depart even further from state influence. 
The state plays an important role in the evolution of an illicit economy by defining what is legal and 
illegal, and therefore creating the opportunity for illegal activities in the first place (every law has its 
loophole, hecha la ley hecha la trampa). One crucial aspect of the state is the distinction between 
private and public. The state has the right set of rules and regulations to intervene in the social realm. 
The private realm on the other hand, is regulated by individuals and non-state agencies (Migdal and 
Schlichte 2005: 27). A clear distinction between both is not easy since it is not a fixed divide. On the 
contrary, in societies, there is a constant discussion on how far the state is “allowed” to interfere in 
the private realm for the greater good.27 By defining what is legal and illegal, the state sets the rules 
and if within a given territorial order, rules are implemented, they lead to common practice (Elias 
1939). The legal definition is therefore a crucial task of the state. As the central authority, the state not 
only sets rules, but also implements them and needs to be able to sanction those that are acting against 
the law. Rules do not just function to regulate the society, but also are a means of securing domination 
(Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 31). Laws can be understood as an institutionalized form of state 
domination that stabilizes and controls power relations (Ibd.). A clear definition of legal and illegal 
practices can either lead to conformity or inconformity of those rules. Conformity towards state rules 
depends also on local tradition and practices beside the state’s ability to inflict punishment. In regions 
with low state control, this becomes more obvious. In these areas, rules certainly do exist, but there 
are no penalties by the state, given its limited scope. Thus, even if laws exist, the state has no 
mechanisms to actually implement its rule. These are essentially brown spots or grey zones where 
unlawful behavior stays unpunished and thereby, exposes the limits of the state. Nevertheless, these 
areas are not “unruly” but have alternave rules and practices. 
Recently research has shown, regions that are influenced by illicit economies can result in formal and 
informal practices in areas where the state cannot implement a monopoly of violence or provide for 
basic services. Consequently, in many regions, we find a connection between these two spheres, 
where illicit actors influence state actors or state actors cooperate with non-state actors and indulge 
in illicit practices (Lund 2006; Dewey et al. 2017). The interaction of the illicit sphere with the formal 
 
27 The discussion about the trade-off of giving away privacy for getting (supposedly) more security might serve as one 
example. 
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state actors produces different forms of orders wherein rule and power structures deviate from formal 
and state dominated order. But, we should not forget, even in areas where state dominance is 
contested, the state is often present. As Dewey and colleagues hold: “the provision of goods and 
services in such areas takes place as the result of the interaction between legal and extra-legal actors, 
leading to a regime of domination in which patrimonialistic and rational bureaucratic principles are 
closely intertwined.” (Dewey et al. 2017: 399). These interactions and practices can result in a social 
order that might differ to other areas with an unchallenged dominance of the state. In a dynamic 
process, these rules secure the provision of goods, services and economic outcome and also provide 
security. The interaction of formal state actors with extra-legal actors might also depend on the type 
of illegality, producing different levels of orders. While some illegal goods such as fake clothing and 
pirated DVDs are ordinarily tolerated,28 there are also the ones that are publicly condemned, like drugs 
and human trafficking. Illegal drugs are often suppressed with high levels of coercion by the state not 
only in the cities, but also in the production areas. Nevertheless, they can be socially accepted. Illegal 
economies and illegal acts are perceived differently if they are embedded in culture or tradition 
(Dewey 2016: 5; Beckert and Dewey 2017). 
Hence studies point out, illicit economies have a regulatory impact, structuring social and political life 
in the form of a hybrid configuration in connection to the state, or as an alternative structure parallel 
to the state. Dewey and others describe the result of fragmented order as clusters of orders: “Clusters 
of order emerge when the synergies between actors involved in illegal activities and state agents are 
able to deliver important resources to certain sectors of the population and achieve a certain degree of 
authority and domination in these groups” (Dewey et al. 2016: 9). Regions with low state control offer 
conditions for the development and expansion of illicit economies because the sanctioning capacities 
of the state are low or non-existent. This leads to the emergence of local power actors who are not 
necessarily directed against the state, but form alternative systems (Dewey 2016; Davis 2010; Clunan 
and Trinkunas 2010). As discussed above, low state capacities in some areas lead to hybrid systems or 
alliances between private actors and the state instead of direct confrontation. Illicit markets can play 
a role in these situations, by (re)structuring of local rule and creating memberships for social groups 
(Dewey 2011, 2016). Local rules might be seen as more legitimate than the state precisely because it 
backs the illicit economy. This includes the externalities they have for the state and society. The 
population supports the illegal economy and might also regard it as positive as long as they feel that 
 
28 There is no problem locating a shop with pirated DVDs or a center with fake clothes in Bogota or Lima and in part these 
shops, like other legal stores, are tolerated and guarded by the police. See also Dewey (2015, 2016) for a discussion on 
illegal markets and security provision in Argentina. 
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the “positive externalities” for the particular region or area overweigh the negative. This in turn can 
be reflected in the local order.  
The previous chapters have highlighted the unequal distribution of state reach and the necessity to 
include non-state order. In this regard, this thesis moves beyond a Eurocentric focus on state formation 
and endorses approaches that highlight local and social dynamics. For the analysis the previous chapter 
has called for a more nuanced approach to capture local dynamics. Furthermore, it has shown that the 
relationship of illicit economies and the state is not necessarily damaging but can result in an ordering 
aspect or even a defining feature of the state. Having these two aspects in mind, I will define in the 
next chapter a concept that enables us to analyze the effect of illicit economies on local order in a 
structured manner. Hence, the aim of this study is to focus on areas in the margins of the state, 
territories with low control of the central state where local order might differ to the “normatively 
correct” order of the state or regions that are in within state control. In these regions institutions 
evolve that are not only different to those of the state but where influence of the illicit economy is 
high. 
3. The Conceptual Frame 
In many of the regions described above, local order is not defined by the state. Public goods and 
services, including the provision of security, are provided by other actors. This chapter sets the 
conceptual framework for the thesis. I argue that the presently used concepts on the state and brown 
areas are not sufficient to trace the influence of illicit economies on local order and ultimately their 
influence on state formation. Analytically, it seems therefore more useful to disaggregate the 
boundary between society and alternative order. I propose a concept to analyze local order and to 
include the use of fields of power to provide the basis for a discussion on state formation and illicit 
economies. Not following an ideological and normative understanding of state presence opens up the 
possibility to include illicit economies and actors as part of a process, which is not as harmful for the 
state and the state formation process as it had been regarded. This entails that an analysis on the 
influence of illicit economies should not focus on the state and state agents alone, but should also 
include non-state actors and illicit structures. Thereby, I build on recent studies that address similar 
aspects (e. g. Arias 2010, 2017; Dewey et al. 2017).  
The thesis seeks to move beyond a state centric approach and non-state actors as well as an illicit 
economy are not a priori understood as a threat towards the state. As I have discussed before, the 
presence of illicit economies does not necessarily lead to disorder, instead they lead to specific types 
of order depending on local circumstances. Thus, in this study, their role in state formation is included 
into the analysis by looking at key aspects of local order and by analyzing how illicit economies affect 
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local order. As I have defined, this thesis looks at illicit economies as locally bounded economies that 
are based on the production, trade and/ or services which are officially banned. Acknowledging the 
variety of order in the particular regions allows us to make an in-depth analysis of the respective 
region. That involves the historical and structural aspects and allows the inclusion of dynamic 
processes of power shifts. In this chapter I will specify the concepts for my analysis. Thereby, I will 
define the key components of local order consequentially from the previous analysis. This chapter will 
also explain why these aspects are essential for analyzing the effect of illicit economies on local order 
and for the state formation process.  
3.1 Defining Local Order 
While it was long time believed that order was first and foremost produced by the state, I have 
highlighted in the previous section that this is not necessarily the case. The limited reach of the state 
does not leave areas uncontrolled or ungoverned and in disorder but in these regions we rather see 
alternative rule and order (O´Donnell 1993; Levitski and Helmke 2006; Erdmann and Engel 2007). This 
has also been shown for the cases of civil war (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas et al. 2008; 
Arjona 2014, 2016). Instead of the state, also, local groups might have an important role in local orders. 
These can be church groups, sports clubs, schools or cooperatives that give structure to community 
life or can organize marches and protests, but also criminal groups can fulfill such a role (Arias 2010, 
2017: 26-27). Also, the interplay of the state with informal rules or hybrid orders have been highlighted 
before (Erdmann and Engel 2007; Lund 2006; Boege et al. 2009; Dewey et al. 2017). In this thesis I will 
build on these results and moreover concentrate on the effect of illicit economies on local order.  
I refer to local order as a frame that gives a predictability of clear rules (formal or informal) in a given 
territory and that offers guarantees to meet economic needs and personal security. I define local order 
as a combination of institutions and practices that structure social interactions, and organization in a 
given region, which have formed in historical processes.29 Bearing in mind that order can vary across 
space and time, I regard the following categories as essential features for local order: the provision of 
security, the provision of economic means and the presence of clear rules (North et al. 2009).30  
 
29 Ana Arjona (2016) convincingly argues that rebels prefer order over disorder and influence territorial rule, the political and 
economic sphere as well as social life. This in turn would lead to a reinforcement of territorial control (2016: 11-16). While 
Arjona addresses the conscious production of a social order by rebels (which she calls Rebelocracy or Aliocracy) the present 
study highlights how local order is formed unconsciously as result of a formative process. 
30 In fact, these factors are typically also related to core functions of state order (e.g. Weber 2010; Mann 1993). Even if Weber 
did not directly define what he understands by “order”, we can follow from his work that the basic principles “structures” 
which are based on the principles of security provision, economic stability and territorial rule (Anter 2014). 
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A core condition for this local order to be sustainable is its acceptance and the belief of its rightfulness. 
To control a certain territory, the possession of means of coercion is necessary, but not sufficient and, 
as it was already argued by Elias (1994), presupposes a certain amount of internal social organization. 
We can assume a general belief of what is right or wrong therefore lies beyond the demand for 
coercion and the sanctioning capacity of the “ordering” entity. People follow rules either because of 
the ultimately coercive means of the ruling actors or because they believe that the rules are “just” and 
serve the society. Accepting the rules and the coercive power is therefore connected to the belief of 
its legitimacy (Tyler 2006). This does not imply that coercion cannot play an important role in local 
order. On the contrary, imposing rules through coercion can be very effective in the short term and 
but might be less sustainable in the long term, especially if the means for control are limited. Hence, 
providing and securing rule does not only come through the fear of coercion but rather stems from 
the “belief” that the rule is just and “legitimate” (Weber 2010; see also Lukes 1987; Tyler 2004; 
Bonacker 2012). This belief in the legitimacy of rules can refer to formal rules given by the state but it 
can also be referred to local traditional rules, which reflect the belief and acceptance of the local 
population. 
The legitimate form of order is thus based on an affirmative relationship among those that govern, and 
those being governed; or in other words, trust by those who are governed. For Alagappa (1995: 15), 
who worked on political legitimacy in South East Asia, key terms described for legitimacy are shared 
values, conformity with established rules for acquiring power, and the proper and effective use of 
power and consent.  
He adds that legitimacy “is the belief by the governed in the ruler´s moral right to issue 
commands and the people´s corresponding obligation to obey such commands. Legitimacy is 
furthermore a dynamic interactive process between actor and those being ruled. Thus it is not 
a teleological aspect. A relationship between those being governed and those who govern is 
based on shared norms and values” (Alagappa 1995: 29). 
Similarly, Beetham stresses an important specification, when he holds that it is not only the belief in 
legitimacy, but one act in accordance to such a belief (Beetham 1991). Hence, legitimacy is a commonly 
accepted condition for stability of a given order, whether formal or informal.  
Local order can be guided by formal and/ or informal rules that developed over time and that meet 
the collective belief of the population. Fundamental aspects for a local order are the provision of 
security and the control of violence, as well as the access to the economy and clearly defined rules 
(North et al. 2009). I am building on this premise when analyzing the effect of illicit on local order 
economies in the margins of the state. Therefore, I will analyze how institutions and practices are 
expressed in the following core areas: security, economy and rules. Order is formed in a historical 
process while there is no actor that consciously “construct” this type of order. I assume that it is formed 
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as a result of a process, which is deeply affected by the illicit economy. Therefore, the analysis of this 
process will be a key part of this analysis. 
Another important facet of local order is not only the use but also the distribution of power. I am 
focusing in particular on the dynamic processes of power, conceptualized by Pierre Bourdieu. Before I 
will come to the definition of the concept of power used for this thesis I think it is important to highlight 
some understandings of the widely discussed topic. From Weber’s understanding power as the chance 
“to realize the own will, even against the resistance of others” (Weber 2010). Weber does not specify 
the sources for this “chance”. It can derive from structural, social or historical contexts. Coercive force 
is therefore not necessarily a precondition to power, but might be used as ultima ratio to achieve a 
political goal. At the same time, Weber understands power as a process; power is not static or absolute 
(Weber 2010). In a more definite sense, power can be understood as the absence of violence. 
According to Hannah Arendt (1970), the need to use violence in order to get people to follow an order 
rather reflects on the lack of power than the possession of it. For Arendt, power is not so much about 
the position of a particular actor or institution as it is about a relation within the political sphere. 
Following this understanding, the use of violence disqualifies people from wielding positions of power. 
That is an important aspect that leads us to recognize the non-violent aspects as well as the diversity 
of power. Furthermore, we can hold that power does not derive from a single dominant institution or 
actor but is more disperse, decentralized and executed in society. In fact, the presence of power is not 
only ingrained in society, it produces reality of society (Foucault 1991). While I agree with these 
understandings of power, I want to stress the relational aspect and the basis of power in a cultural and 
societal setting (Bourdieu 1985). This thesis takes this relational aspect into consideration for the 
theoretical analysis as well as the empirical assessment of the case study.  
The distribution of power and control in a given local order often is diffuse and does not depend 
exclusively on the relationship with the state (it is sometimes less firmly institutionalized as well). In 
contexts of low state control, the assessment of different sources of power is therefore helpful to 
analyze the power relations more closely. For example, the relational aspect of power is important and 
can give us a deeper understanding on the dynamics between different actors. Instead of focusing on 
the power of the state, this approach asks how different forms of power develop in areas that have 
low state control. The concept Pierre Bourdieu elaborates with his “fields of power” takes this 
relational aspect into consideration and offers both a theoretical contribution as well as an analytical 
tool for our analysis. According to Pierre Bourdieu (1986), power is based on the inequality and 
distribution of the social, political, and economic "capital" that defines positions in a field. By adding 
this aspect to the analysis, the study takes the dynamics of power into account and will be able to 
describe more accurately the relationship of illicit economies with the state in “brown spot” areas. This 
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conceptualization opens analytical possibilities to capture local processes in relationship to the state. 
It also captures social processes and structures as well as the dialogical relationship between the state 
and local order. This will give us analytical depth and highlights not only the dynamic process between 
actors but also the setting in which this process takes place. This is why I will apply concepts of local 
order and power into the analysis. In this sense, by synthesizing the current debates I will analyze how 
illicit economies affect local order, including security, economy, territorial rule and relational power.  
3.2 Local Order: Security, Rule, Economy, Power 
The following will present four factors that are important for analyzing local order in the margins of 
the state: the economy, security and protection, territorial rule, and power. I understand these factors 
as interlinked and it is important to include all of them and their relationship into the analysis. These 
elements also enable us to link our analysis back to state formation. Additionally, I regard the analysis 
of the historical development of these regions as a core factor, since we get an overview over the basis 
of local order and the basis for the dynamics in the region. Indeed, by following the previous analysis 
and by understanding that there are alternative structures to those of the central state, these factors 
serve as important aspects for understanding the impact of illicit economies towards local order.  
3.2.1 Historical Development  
According to Tilly (2006: 521), the recognition and analysis of history is essential for explanatory 
political science. Soifer argues, in particular for Latin America, recognizing historical continuities are 
essential in understanding the presence (or absence) of ‘stateness’ and must therefore not be 
understated (Soifer 2015: 250-252). This becomes even more important when focusing on the 
formation of local order and social structures and their relation towards the state (Migdal 1988; Elias 
1992; Mann 1993). Areas in the margins of the state often represent alternative rule, but also show 
different social dynamics within the territory (O´Donnell 1993; Herbst 2002; Scott 2009). For analyzing 
the specific local order in a certain territory, historical patterns that led to the colonization of this 
territory and the current organizations are important aspects, since a clearly defined territory also 
defines the region of influence by actors and/or structures. The historical context allows us to identify 
the most important variables and to integrate them into the analysis of social powers in relationship 
to the state. Or in the words of Pierre Bourdieu: “The social world is accumulated history (…)” (1986: 
241). These aspects are also crucial for the formation of states in relation to the concentration of power 
(Tilly 1975; 1990; Mann 1993; Bourdieu 1994). Hence, getting an understanding on how regions within 
a state are formed and how local order developed is a precondition to analyze the role of illicit 
economies and the connection to the state.  
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For analyzing the historical aspects, I will refer to state policies of integrating the marginal regions to 
the state. Furthermore, I analyze how the historical process of state formation and integration of 
marginal areas played out on the national level before I will zoom in to the regional and local level. 
Similarly, I will analyze national drug policies and their effects on the regional and local level. Finally, I 
will highlight local dynamics of migration/ colonization and the evolvement of local order as well as 
the evolution of an illicit economy and its importance in the region.  
3.2.2 Economy  
The assessment of economic consequences is difficult mostly because of the reliance on data. This is 
why studies that rely on estimations are driven by a political agenda and should be put into the relevant 
context (Thoumi 2005; Andreas 2011). The effect of such illicit economies is therefore particularly 
difficult to measure in large-N-studies. More focalized studies have shown that it is not a binary 
relationship that has either low corruption with high state capacity or high levels of corruption with 
low state capacity. Instead, they highlight that corrupt practices can in fact support state capacities. 
Low revenue states might even promote these for the extraction of resources (see Baker and Milne 
2015). In this sense, illicit resources can also be understood as a commodity that strengthens the 
various forms of state formation. The economic effect of illegal practices and illicit economies is case 
sensitive and a number of emerging academic works explores the variety of effects. Contributing to 
the literature, this thesis focuses on the effects on the local level and how they are established in the 
local order.  
For the assessment of the relationship between legality and illegality, legitimacy becomes an 
important aspect. In public perception, the definition of something as illegal often implies a certain 
deviation from a “moral standard”. However, that does not have to meet the same standard on the 
local level. What is considered formally illegal might be viewed as socially legitimate. Legitimacy always 
depends on the “beholder” and can therefore differ from legal norms. Illicit economy or its 
externalities can therefore be accepted or even regarded as legitimate. As Renate Mayntz calls it 
“legitimate illegality” (Mayntz 2016). Acknowledging the potential deviation between formal legal 
norms and legitimacy is crucial for our understanding of illicit economies. Both can guide local order 
in a parallel, combined, or separated state. For our understanding, it helps to recall the importance of 
the subjective concept of legitimacy; taking Weber’s understanding of legitimacy as a subjective belief 
into account, local acceptance the economy and its externalities will help us for the assessment of the 
economy and local order (Weber 2010). A legitimate order is one that meets the people´s demands, 
which is related to how these markets are perceived in the population. 
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The principal and most direct form of influence by illicit economies can be sensed in the economic 
sector. These can be direct and indirect influences. Instances of direct influence include the 
“employment” in an illicit activity or the facilitation of illicit deeds. Indirect influence can be seen with 
regard to money laundering, investment of illegally earned money in legal businesses, rising price 
levels, and even signs of a “Dutch disease”, because of the inflow of illegally earned money (eg. Thoumi 
1995). The leading questions here are: What role do the presence of illicit goods play in the overall 
economy? How far is the legal economy related or even dependent on the illicit economy? How is the 
overall economic situation perceived by the population? The thesis analyzes three aspects os the 
economy: 1) the basis of the local economy, 2) the involvement and acceptance by the population, 3) 
the relationship towards legal and illegal economy. 
3.2.3 Security 
According to Guistozzi, the security provision can be taken over by different actors, particularly in 
regions where the state cannot provide for security (Guistozzi 2011). This is tolerated as long as these 
non-state security actors do not turn against the state center. However, as Guistozzi tells us from a 
historical perspective, these non-state security actors often provoked a state-building from below 
(Guistozzi 2011: 200-202, 232). Elias (1994) described the centralization of security and the 
monopolization of violence as a process. While at first, violence and security was a private or 
traditional possession, it finally became monopolized as a form of public “possession”.31 Hence, the 
role of non-state actors in the state formation process should not be underestimated. Security services 
were provided by rebels, mercenaries, bandits, paramilitaries, militias and so on. On the contrary, as 
Davis, Pereira and colleagues have shown, the role of non-state security actors plays an integral role 
in politics and state formation (Davis and Pereira 2003).32 The form and development of these 
processes is highly case sensitive. In some instances, the state cooperates with criminal actors in order 
to fight crime.33  
The presence of illicit economies, can be but is not necessarily linked with violent actor and insecurity, 
even if academic and policy related works often explore this connection (Albanese 2005). The drug 
 
31 For a discussion on violence in these processes, see also Kurtenbach and Wehr 2013, and Davis and Pereira 2003. 
32 In post-conflict situations, control of violence is particularly relevant. Kurtenbach shows that the ending of conflict does 
not result in the ending of violence. Instead, we often see life in a grey zone of formal peace and on-going violence. In 
context of the youth, this results in a difficult situation when growing up in environments of violence, insecurity and crime 
(Kurtenbach 2011; Kurtenbach and Hensgerth 2011). 
33 During the search for Pablo Escobar, security actors of the Colombian state infamously “cooperated” with paramilitary 
groups and the Cali Cartel, including ex-guerrillas. The cooperation was probably necessary in order to find Escobar (which 
ultimately meant killing him), since the state security institutions were incapable of capturing the head of the Medellin 
cartel (Duncan 2006; Bowden 2001). These instances of “cooperation” do not necessarily indicate a weakening of the state, 
but could signal a broadening of state influence. 
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market is probably the most prominent example where the nexus between illicit economies and 
violence is discussed. The argument is often made with regard to the “war on drugs”, and the 
escalation of violence in Mexico. However, recent studies show that violence and drug markets are not 
necessarily interlinked in a linear way. Eruption of violence depends very much on the structure of the 
market and whether it is stable, unstable or highly competitive (Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009; 
Andreas and Wallmann 2009, Friman 2009; Snyder 2006). Duran-Martinez (2015) focuses in her work 
on why there are variations in drug related violence in the comparison of five cities (Cali, Culiacán, 
Ciudad de Juárez, Medellín; Tijuana). She found that the fragmentation of the security apparatus is an 
important aspect as it becomes less reliable the more fragmented it gets. Violence also depends on 
the number of organizations competing for market shares. Hence, low cohesion in the state security 
apparatus and high fragmentation of organizations are important aspects when considering whether 
organized drug trafficking leads to violence or not. While non-state actors in an illicit economy are 
often portrayed as illegitimate and a threat for security, several empirical studies show that these non-
state structures and actors can play an integral part in violence control and security.  
This thesis includes security as an important factor for local order. While I have discussed that illicit 
economies can affect the security situation, this thesis accounts for the control of violence and the 
provision of security and how it is affected by illicit economies. With the analysis I give an 
understanding on the regulation of violence, the role of the actors involved and the impact illicit 
economies have on local security. These aspects are related to the following questions: How do actors 
became predominant in the institutions they formed to provide security? In which structures are 
security actors intertwined? Do state and non-state security actors oppose each other or cooperate? 
Besides the formal security structure, the study asks for security perceptions. How does the local 
population perceive security and security providers? What is their impression about the personal and 
community security situation? Thus, the main aspects involved in the assessment of security are 1) 
security structure (e.g. formal or informal) 2) public safety and security perception 3) connection to 
the illicit economy (e.g. as source of resources). 
3.2.4 Rule 
As we have seen, the presence of illicit actors and the absence of state control does not result in chaos, 
or the nonexistence of rule. On the contrary, as I have mentioned before, a number of studies show 
otherwise and presented evidence for rule by illicit actors. I have defined rule as a key feature of local 
order and which I will analyze regarding “trust”, “rules” as well as “formal and informal institutions”.  
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Trustful relationships or the missing of such is one example of how extra-legal actors influence local 
order.34 Diego Gambetta’s classical work on the Sicilian Mafia (1993), describes the impact of the mafia 
by analyzing the selling of protection. Gambetta argues that in Sicily, low control for market exchange 
created a demand for protection, and that this “protection industry” became the basis of power for 
the mafia. His analysis shows that the lack of trust among the population and the incapacity of the 
state to provide protection and a rule of law has been key elements for the development of the mafia 
in Sicily. As a result, the mafia fills a void left by the state, creates order, and acts as a form of authority. 
However, the mafia does not want to overthrow the state. In fact, the mafia secures property rights 
and monitors market rules within the borders of the state (Gambetta 1993). Corruption scandals 
involving the highest ranks of the political sphere are typically interpreted as the mafia’s extension of 
their “core market”.  Recognizing that trust is an important aspect of order, trust will be an important 
aspect of the analysis. 
Another important feature of this aspect are the rules applied in the region. These rules might differ 
with regard to the state rules. A lack of territorial control by the state can result in the formation of 
areas that form under the auspices of the state but in differentiation to state rule. Within the analysis, 
this differentiation will be acknowledged. The analysis also considers, the established rules and their 
implementation within the territory. Important contributions within this line of argument have been 
made by Helmke and Levitski (2006), and Erdmann and Engel (2007), highlighting the interplay 
between formal and informal institutions that are affecting local rule. This differentiation of formal 
and informal rule might result in “procedural rule”. As a consequence, this would result in local 
enclaves that practice rules different from that of the state. Instead of formal legal structures, informal 
structures provide rule, thereby determining the social order (also Migdal 1994). Finally, territorial rule 
has not only a spatial dimension but also includes the aspect of who defines a territory and how. In 
our cases of analysis, this involves self-determination and a “foreign” definition of territory.  
People believing in the legitimacy of state institutions are more likely to follow rules. That involves 
trustworthiness and justice (Tyler 2006b; Levi et al. 2009). Thus, when talking about the “rightfulness” 
of rule, it seems more accurate to refer to the belief in legitimacy (“Legitimitätsglaube” Weber 2010: 
157) than to the fear of punishment.35 In that sense, rule making is essentially important: who makes 
the rules? How are they made? How are they justified? (Tyler 2006a: 377). Tyler points out that if 
people perceive the given rules as a reflection of their own beliefs, they are more likely to obey the 
 
34 For a discussion on trust and order see also Putnam (1993) or Braithwait and Levi (2003) 
35 Although Beetham criticizes Weber for not being comprehensive in his description of legitimacy, as he did not include 
legal aspects and consent (1991), Weber is still the reference point in legitimacy. 
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law (Tyler 2006b; also Nivette 2014). Thus, legitimacy needs to be proven by the ruling authorities 
which makes it dialogical, since the authority must prove the rightfulness to the citizens and they must 
trust this authority (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Nivette 2014). This makes legitimacy a claim and 
response cycle between citizens and the ruling authority. As an important reference point, authorities 
need to have a dialogical relationship with its citizens instead of a top down approach to increase 
compliance. A core aspect in this regard will be predictability of rules and justice.  
The questions that will be analyzed during the thesis are, 1) what are the most important rules 2) who 
is implementing them (actors) 3) how is the relationship of those actors to society 4) how these 
different structures are related to the illicit economy, and how are these structures are further related 
to the state.  
3.2.5 Power 
As a fourth and consequential feature of the analysis of local order I am including power. The analysis 
of the complex interplay between power structures is inspired by Bourdieu’s concept of the fields of 
power. This concept provides more analytical depth and methodological possibilities to analyze these 
power structures in the margins of the state. It allows us to include the interrelation of power and 
evaluate how this unfold in a structure. While there is a great diversity for the analysis of power and 
the attempts to conceptualize it,36 Bourdieu’s concept offers the possibility to overcome a static 
concept of “domination”. Instead of focusing the pattern of actors getting others to do something they 
would not have done otherwise (e.g. Weber 2010; Dahl 1957). The approach by Bourdieu recognizes 
the dialogical process of power and secondly it allows to distinguish in different sources of power, 
which prevents to overload the concept of power by simply adding up different aspects (Guzzini 2013).  
The concept Pierre Bourdieu elaborates with his “fields of power” takes the relational aspect of power 
into consideration and offers both a theoretical contribution as well as an analytical tool for our 
analysis. The distribution of power and control is more diffuse and does not depend exclusively on the 
relationship towards the state (it is sometimes less firmly institutionalized as well). In this regard, the 
use of different forms of capital, as indication for accumulated influence in a given field, is helpful to 
show important aspects. For example, take the instance of the construction of power relationships. 
Instead of focusing on one particular resource of power, this approach asks for the resource itself and 
how it is interrelated with other resources. By adding this aspect to the analysis, the study takes the 
dynamics of power into account and will be able to describe more accurately the relationship of illicit 
economies with the state in “brown spot areas”. The concept of fields opens analytical possibilities to 
 
36 See for example Haugard (2012) for an extensive overview on the discussion of power definitions. 
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capture local processes in relationship to the state. The definition of fields by Pierre Bourdieu (1985) 
helps to identify the particularities of a region in the margins of the state. Bourdieu’s definition of fields 
and capital allows us to represent the position and power relations between actors in a given society 
and trace the basis of their power with regard to the understanding of “capital”. By analyzing if an illicit 
economy forms a particular field and how it is constituted internally and in relation to the state, 
broadens our analytical perspective on the state and the effect of illicit economies.37 This use of the 
field concept will give us analytical depth and highlights not only the dynamic process between actors 
but also the setting in which this process takes place. 
The unequal distribution of capital within the field demarcates the position of a particular actor and 
affects the dynamics with other actors. Following Bourdieu the understanding of capital and its 
distribution is key for understanding social structures: „the structure of the distribution of the different 
types and subtypes of capital at a given moment in time represents the immanent structure of the 
social world, i.e., the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its 
functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices.“ (Bourdieu 1989: 15). 
Furthermore, Bourdieu defines a field as a network of relations, as it gives a setting for the interaction 
of actors within the field. While Bourdieu’s concept goes much deeper and has further aspects to it, I 
want to borrow Bourdieu´s concept for our discussion on power because of two reasons: empirical 
applicability and theoretical development.38 The first reason is the empirical applicability to analyze a 
dynamic process of power relations and to trace changes in these power relations. The concept also 
allows us to define the basis of power for different actors. Secondly, Bourdieu’s understanding will 
allow us more theoretical depth for the analysis of marginal areas and the interactive process with the 
state.  
 
In the case of illicit economies and to understand a field without a monopoly of violence the present 
study includes a new form of capital: coercive capital. This is another form of capital to account for the 
particular condition of illicit economies in brown areas. Hence, the forms of capital used for the 
following analysis consists of: 
Table 1 Forms of "Capital" used for the Analysis  
Type of Capital Specifies 
 
37 In the same way in which Bourdieu describes the position of a writer as being dependent on the overall field of literature 
(Bourdieu 1999), we can describe and understand the positioning of actors with the field. 
38 To prevent possible confusion:  Bourdieu does not understand fields as a social system which is in his view static and 
suggests an automatic regulation within a system in which subjects are rather passive. Bourdieu’s understanding rather 
underlines the activity of different actors (Müller 2016: 75). For Bourdieu, fields are flexible both in scope and positioning. 
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Social Capital Social networks, social relations, and connections 
Economic Capital Money or easy exchange of financial resources 
Symbolic capital Prestige or Charisma. The symbolic capital serves as an overarching form of accumulated capital 
Coercive capital Capacity of using and mobilizing coercive means 
 
While social capital as result of social networks and relations and economic capital as easy to exchange 
resources (e. g. money), seems to be intuitively understandable, we need to highlight some 
particularities of symbolic capital and coercive capital. A precondition for symbolic capital is that it is 
accepted and given by others to a certain person. In other words, symbolic capital is received through 
recognition of status within the field (Bourdieu 1989: 17). Capital is very much a relational concept, 
which holds true for all types of capital but in particular for symbolic capital. Following Bourdieu’s 
understanding, symbolic capital can never stand for itself but needs recognition by others in a form of 
unconscious recognition that is similar to most of the discussion on legitimacy. Coercive capital is a 
fourth form that I am adding and which is not a classic form of capital described by Bourdieu. In regions 
without an unequivocal monopoly on violence, the possession of coercive measures results in a 
comparative advantage for actors within the same field. This in turn, results in a higher position within 
the field of power. Even if we find similarities to the security element of local order, which I have 
described above, coercive capital has not the same meaning. We can find for example actors with 
coercive capital that are not part of the local security structure. At the same time the notion of coercive 
capital allows us to distinguish the importance of different actors according to their accumulated 
coercive capital. Coercive capital can be transformed into other forms of capital such as when the use 
of coercive means leads to greater social capital. People need actors who have the ability to protect 
their assets and others who have more influence on political decisions. 
Actors that occupy a position in the field, do also play a role in preserving the field and follow its specific 
rules. The strategy for capital accumulation and the exchange of various types of capital to improve 
social position in the world are central to our understanding. Capital is inter-convertible but only in a 
zero-sum game (Swartz 2013: 53-55), which means that one is gaining more capital as opposed to 
another. This "game" or struggle is drawn into the "field". A field of power is not only about the struggle 
for a particular type of capital but rather sets the standard for the accumulation of power.39 The 
 
39 Bourdieu´s concept of power is mainly a concept of power over (Swartz 2013: 118-122). This concept captures the 
institutionalized form of the field of power as including the recognition of capital and power by other actors, hence it is tied 
intrinsically to legitimacy (Guzzini 2013: 82-87).39 
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position within the field depends on the accumulated capital and the relationship with other subjects 
in the field. In this sense, we can understand society as a market where the position of different actors 
is defined by its accumulated capital. This gives rise to a relational arrangement within the field and 
Bourdieu's concept allows us to deploy a picture of positions, which are connected to each other and 
maintain dynamic relations (Bourdieu 1993: 30).40 The positions within the field depend on the very 
existence of space and on the relation with other subjects in the field. These are no static 
constructions, but constantly relating to each other. Since capital define the positions in the field the 
forms of capital are therefore paramount for the constitution of a field and altering them affects the 
structure of the field itself.  
Furthermore, fields can and should be analyzed in relation to other fields. The field analysis of Bourdieu 
will give an overview on the constellations of actors and the relationship between different fields. For 
analyzing the complex nature of a coca society within a prohibitive regime, this field analysis fits well. 
It is possible to capture the role different actors and institutions play within a coca growing territory 
as well as the relations towards “the state”. In brown spot areas, certain groups and actors gain higher 
positions, based on capital that might differ from areas under state control.41 What role do illicit 
economies play in this regard? Can they become a defining aspect in the formation of such fields of 
rule in areas that have low control? We know that there are individuals and/ or groups from the illicit 
economies that have power, mostly through their economic and coercive capital in Bourdieu’s sense 
(1985). What is less scrutinized is the effect from illicit economies on the social structure. Do these 
illicit economies create fields of power? How are they defined? How are the actor’s role and position 
defined? How does this reflect on the state formation process?  
As discussed, according to Bourdieu, power relies on inequality and the distribution of “capital” that 
defines positions in a given field. In this sense, a field of power describes a social environment that 
itself provides the rules and defines the rules of the game within the field. The positions of actors in 
the field are dependent on how they play by the rules and how far they are successful in accumulating 
the forms of capital. This notion of fields of power can help us to understand how illicit economies 
 
40 In the understanding of society as a sort of market in which actors can accumulate forms of capital that translate into 
power, Bourdieu mentioned a particular group for his state formation approach; lawyers who managed to develop a 
particular source of knowledge and cultural capital, which they could finally translate into symbolic capital. That allowed 
them to secure a particularly high position within society (Bourdieu 1994; Schlichte 2005). 
41 People’s behavior is defined by a certain habitus, which is the “socialized subjectivity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 159), 
in a sense the collective prepositions for social behavior. Habitus is at the same time a signaling behavior that distinguishes 
social classes and draws lines between different spheres of society. 41 The habitus delineates one’s behavior and defines the 
membership of a certain social sphere within a field. It is difficult to change and thus presupposes the “belonging” to a “class” 
which then translates into the access to influence and power. Therefore, the position within a social field is defined by the 
habitus and the relationship towards other actors within that field, and is therefore a precondition for the understanding of 
power structures and ultimately local social order.  
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produce fields of rule in the absence of the state. It accounts for the dynamic process not only within 
these fields of power, but also in relation towards the state, even though the state does not hold 
control over the respective territory. This can result in a hybrid, symbiotic, or confrontational 
relationship.42 Therefore, the following analysis of power within the margins of the state will define 
the powerful actors based on the different forms of capital. The dynamic model allows us to analyze 
more closely the power structures in the regions. Furthermore, it allows us to examine the basis of 
power in a more precise manner.  
3.3 Synthesizing the Analysis of Illicit Economies and Local Order  
In this chapter I have conceptualized the analysis of local order and illicit economies. I have argued 
that four aspects are paramount for the understanding of local order in the margins of the state: 
economy, security, rule and power. The concentration of these factors allows us to analyze the 
influence of illicit economies on local order. Unlike many studies on illicit economies, I will not analyze 
these factors in deviation to state dominance. Instead, this thesis focuses on the relation to the state 
and dynamic processes of order and power. The question is about the type and level of interference 
or cooperation in this regard. For example, how does non-state security provision with relation to illicit 
economies, interact with the provision of security by police or military? Do they result in violent 
confrontations or do they run parallel to each other? Or how is the illicit economy related to the licit 
economy? These factors are important for an analysis of state formation and illicit economies.   
Often, studies have an actor-centric-view when analyzing illicit economies. However, I elaborated that 
the focus on actors alone will not be enough for understanding the influence of illicit economies on 
local order. Such an attempt falls short in describing the dynamic processes within the region of illicit 
economies and the relationship to the state. An actor centric approach is good at evaluating the direct 
forms of power, but often falls short in describing and analyzing the consequences for social order. 
This in turn, is necessary to understand the dialogical relationship of state formation processes, which 
an analysis of state formation needs to be considered (Schlichte 2005; Migdal and Schlichte 2005). The 
proposed conceptualization includes the aspects of historical context, territorial rule, economy, and 
security as important features that influence order. These aspects are not stand-alone features of local 
order neither is the line of influence a one-way street. Rather, structures influenced and created by 
these aspects are linked in a dialogical relationship. Finally, they are providing a structural basis for 
power accumulation. The different dimensions have similar importance for the analysis and are 
connected. This approach acknowledges different sources of social power (Bourdieu 1986; Mann 1993; 
 
42 They therefore, differ from for example, indigenous enclaves that are completely detached or even unknown by the state 
and vice versa. 
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Guzzini 2013). It is helpful to include the dialogical relationship of local order and power, instead of 
concentrating on power penetrated or provided merely by single actors and/or institutions.  
Instead of analyzing the supposed threat that illicit economies pose, the present thesis analyses how 
the externalities of illicit economies affect different features of local order and how this ultimately 
affects the interrelation with the state. An important aspect for the analysis is the link to power 
structures in the area and ultimately to the state. It allows accounting for the complex relationships 
within those areas and to the state. Understanding the historical conditions and the variety of factors 
for local order, opens analytical possibilities to overcome the ‘overationalized’ view on state formation 
(Swartz 2013: 142, 148-153). Integrating the state into the analysis is important, since the state’s 
regulation produced the opportunity for an illicit economy in the first place. Also, the state is seldom 
completely absent but often operates through institutions and policies in the regions as well. The 
question is, how much they can influence local order by that or what (dynamic) process they can 
influence. When the state seeks not only to control the region but also to fight the illicit economy these 
factors can consequentially also influence state formation. How do orders develop and evolve in the 
absence of effective state control and with the presence of an illicit economy? 
By analyzing the acceptance of the illicit economies, the trust in local authorities, and the definition 
and acceptance of local rules, I will be able to outline what is perceived to be a legitimate order and 
how this is related to the illicit economy.  I analyze the previously mentioned categories by using 
qualitative measures in the region as well as by using secondary literature on which I will further 
elaborate in the following chapter (4.4). I also analyze these categories via interviews and 
questionnaires. The following table gives an overview on how the different categories have been 
operationalized. Some questions give information for the analysis of different indicators. While the 
questions in the survey did not change, interview questions varied depending on the interview 
situation. The following gives an overview on the core questions within my topic guide.
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Table 2 Operationalization of Local Order in Interviews and Surveys 
 
Categories of 
Local Order 
Indicator Questions addressed in Interviews (open questions) 
 
Questions Addressed in Questionnaire 
Historical 
development 
Formation of Regions 
Efforts by the state of integrating the 
regions 
Do you know when the first people moved to this area?  
Why did they come here?  
What was the economic basis? How did it develop? 
 How was the infrastructural situation? 
Not addressed in Questionnaire 
Economy 
 
Perception of Economic Situation 
Basis of the local economy  
What are the most important challenges in your community? 
How do you perceive the overall economic situation in the 
community? 
Is the money you earn enough to cover your basic needs? 
Evaluation of economic situation (ordinal scale) 
Involvement and acceptance of illicit 
economy by the population 
Have you heard about influence of drug trafficking? 
Do you or somebody you know had experiences with drug 
trafficking?  
What is your perception on coca? 
What role does drug trafficking have in your community? 
How big is the problem of drug abuse in your community? 
Relation towards legal and illegal 
economy  
Did you personally had problems related to drug trafficking? 
Do you know somebody who had problems with drug 
trafficking? 
In which sector are you working today (five years ago)? 
Role of the presence of illicit goods 
play in the overall economy? 
Who secures economic development?  
Security Public safety  
Security perception 
 
What are the most important challenges in your community? 
Are there conflicts within the community? What has change 
in the last 10 years? 
Evaluation of security (ordinal scale) 
Do you go out on the street when there is no light? 
Do you feel safe in your community? 
 What is security for you? Do you or someone of your family has been attacked or victim of a 
crime? (violent/non-violent) 
Security structure (e.g. formal or 
informal)  
- Cooperation or opposition of 
formal and informal actors 
Accountability 
What do you think about [police, military, autodefensas]? 
Do they oppose each other or cooperate?  
What are the main aspects involved in the assessment of 
security? 
 
To whom do you turn to in case of violence? 
To whom do you never turn to in case of violence? 
How much do you trust the [military/ police/ autodefensas]  
Did you or somebody you know had to pay a public official in the last 
12months? If yes, why? 
What are the most discussed issues in your community? (Probe) 
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Connection to the illicit economy (e.g. 
as source of resources). 
 Do you see a connection from [police, military, 
autodefensas] to coca/ drugs? 
 
Rule Most important rules 
 
What are the most important rules and values in society?  
Do people follow rules of the state? 
What do you think about state rules? Do you follow them? 
What are the three most important rules in your community? 
 
Relationship of state and non-state 
authorities to society  
How much trust do people have in institutions and actors?  
What are the common judicial institutions?  
To whom do you turn to in case of violence? 
Trust in institutions [judiciary, political representatives] 
What should the most important authorities provide to/ do for the 
community? 
Do you agree with the following sentence: The “authorities” respect the 
rules of the society?  
Did you or somebody you know had to pay a public official in the last 
12months? If yes, why? 
Relationship of different structures to 
the illicit economy/ to the state.  
How do you perceive the formal/ informal justice system? Not directly addressed 
Power  
 
Identifying most important actors in 
society 
Identification of power dynamics 
Identification of the basis of power 
(Capital) 
 
Whom do you trust most, if you have problems? (Violence, 
Family, Economic) 
From your point of view, who is the most important actor on 
the local/ regional level?  
- Do you trust this person/ group? 
What are other important groups?  
Do they support the community? 
 
Whom do you perceive as a role model in your community? 
What are the most important characteristics of a community leader? 
Who are the most important actors in society? 
Do you feel represented from the most important actors in society? 
To whom do you turn to in case of violence? 
To whom do you never turn to in case of violence? 
Who should address the most important issues in your community? 
Do you agree with the following sentence: The “authorities” respect the 
rules of the society? 
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4. Research Design and Methods 
4.1 Research Design 
The study follows the argument of Richie (2003: 25) who holds that social research is based on 
theoretical assumptions, even if these are implicit. At the same time, it is suggested that social research 
is effective when theoretical insights and empirical research are “mutually enhancing” (Ibd.: 25). 
Hence, this work embraces the theoretical work on state formation and illicit economies and tries to 
amplify our understanding of their relationship. Contextual research aims to closely analyze “what 
exists”, while explanatory research delves into the reason for its existence. This study seeks to 
understand how regions in the margins of state form, what influence illicit economies have and how 
this manifest in local order in the region. Primarily, the study identifies patterns of social order and 
power structures. Secondly, it interprets the effect of such an economy and local social order for state 
formation. Theories that are presently in circulation do not endeavor to capture the vagaries of local 
power structures influenced by illicit economies. The present approach strives to close that gap by 
contributing to the process of theory production rather than producing a theory per se, which would 
involve a more deductive approach. To a certain degree, the present approach seeks to reinforce and 
refine existing theoretical understanding.43  
I am focusing on the outcome of an illicit economy on local order, which I have conceptualized in the 
previoius chapter, and the relationship towards the state (Rohlfing 2012). To this end I am using case 
studies defined as “an intensive, observational study of a single case or a small number of cases which 
also promises to shed light on a larger population of cases” (Gerring 2016: 28). There are several 
advantages for using case studies over other methods, among those is the high conceptual validity. As 
many phenomena are difficult to measure, such as power or legitimacy, statistical approaches fall short 
to account for such complex aspects. Qualitative case studies do not typically try to measure these 
aspects but instead have the benefit of explaining those aspects in more in detail and include context 
which influences such variables. Contrary to statistical methods, case studies also reduce the risk of 
sampling too many cases that do not fit together. Case studies offer also the possibility to generate 
new hypotheses by including aspects that come up during the study, for example, by using open 
questions, or observations made while doing field work. By including contextual factors, case studies 
contain the possibility to address causal complexity, meaning that they not only examine if X leads to 
 
43 As such my research is based on qualitative data gathering and analysis. For a broader discussion on “qualitative research” 
see for example Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), King Kohane and Verba (1994) or Brady and Collier (2004). 
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Y but moreover explain how. It is discussed that studying cases might lack generalizability but since the 
research focus is narrower it can be more precise and specific in its explanations (George and Bennett 
2005: 19-22). Even if case study researchers should be careful to overgeneralize their findings, the 
selection of representative cases increases the chances for identifying patterns, and information that 
serves to understand a broader theoretical problem. 
The complexities and variations of my research question, the lack of data availability and the broad set 
of possible explanations are best suited for a comparative case study research. The research question 
will be analyzed in a small-N comparative case study design; a qualitative approach in which to explore 
a real-life, multiple bounded systems (cases) over time using multiple sources and information and 
conduct in-depth analysis (Creswell 2013: 97). Such a research design allows to account for differences 
and similarities among cases and to provide explanations on potential outcome variations as well as 
scrutinize the aspects that lead to these variances. Instead of aiming for a universal generalization of 
the findings, this study seeks to point out specific patterns in relationship to the studied research item 
and presents a framework to study similar cases. By comparing a small number of cases, the study 
seeks to generate a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of illicit 
economies in the margins of the state. This strategy offers the possibility to generate in-depth 
knowledge on the particular case, allows to account for complexities and shedding light on the 
specificities. While being aware of the specificities of the cases, the careful selection of cases seeks to 
identify potential implications for the theory and further studies on the topic. A comparative study has 
the advantage when it comes to exploring different aspects of the phenomenon. It also gains additional 
perspective when canvassing the similarities and differences in terms of actors and structures. 
The structured focused comparison provides a competent method for this type of research (George 
and Bennett 2005).  Starting with a question which is generated from the theory and from the current 
academic debate, it focusses on a particular problem and certain aspects of the cases that are 
examined. This method follows the structure of defining standardized questions that address the 
research objective and have an overarching structure.  
The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the 
research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and 
standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the 
findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects 
of the historical cases examined (George and Bennett 2005: 67).  
This standard forms the basis for the study, which should be focused in a way that it addresses a 
particular research problem. The researcher therefore, has to be selectively sensible and concentrate 
only on facets he intends to study, in short, discharging all other aspects that might be interesting to 
study as well but are not necessarily relevant for the present study. It should be guided by a well-
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defined theoretical objective. Therefore, questions need to be based on theory, clearly stated and 
reflect the general objective of the study (George and Bennett 2005: 70). The structured, focused 
comparisons encourages to use theory as basis for the study. Hence, my research will be guided by the 
theoretical strands and my conceptual approach stated in the previous chapters.  
For the comparative analyses I will identify common themes and issues which transcend the particular 
case (Yin 2009). Context plays an essential role on the regional and structural level but also for each 
individual case. Therefore, besides the empirical analysis, a detailed context analysis provides a deeper 
understanding of the regions and as background information becomes a vital part of the analysis. To 
account for these complexities, I will apply and combine different methods for the analysis. Finally, the 
study will make concluding remarks, identify patterns and explanations and link the findings back to 
the theoretical chapter of this thesis (Yin 2009; Cresswell 2013). Each case will be analyzed in depth 
before I will compare the core aspects between the cases. 
 
4.2 Case Selection and Methods 
4.2.1 Case Selection  
The selection of cases is crucially important for the comparative small-N analysis. Multiple case study 
research can enhance the robustness of the findings and the selection process is based on theoretical 
reasons such as the capacity to extent theoretical explanations or to avoid rival explanations (Yin 
1994). To improve the robustness of the study, selection of cases is essential in a comparative case 
study design. This study follows a purposeful sampling strategy, identifying core cases that can best 
speak best to the research problem (Creswell 2013: 100). After defining the research gap and 
identifying the research purpose as well as the variables, this study seeks to explain the influence of 
illicit economies on local order and the relationship to state formation. The selection of cases is based 
on my previous analysis and conceptual clarifications. It seems therefore suitable to compare two 
regions within one country, one with a high amount of drug production and one where drug production 
was destroyed by state intervention. 
Often designs in social science follow a most-similar-systems or a most-different-systems design based 
on John Stuart Mill´s method of agreement/ difference (Przeworski and Tuene 1970). While popular 
and intriguing, such a selection process implies the difficulty that in the “real world” such a 
constellation is difficult to find. Probably the most important aspect is the difficulty to find truly 
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comparable cases and to take all variables into consideration (Levy 2008: 10).44 Nevertheless, I hold 
that this strategy of case selection is still an intriguing way of selecting cases, that allows to control for 
intervening factors. The suggested “structured focused comparison” of George and Bennett provides 
an additional approach, used by this thesis. The authors suggest the gradual narrowing down of 
possible cases based on the theoretical knowledge. Based on this knowledge we can identify variables 
and a universe of cases important for the study (George and Bennett 2005). By identifying the current 
research strands this study has highlighted the most important aspects that highlight marginality and 
illicit economies. There is a consensus that the selection of cases in small-N research running the risks 
of selection biases and should be carefully selected in order to not predefine the outcomes one might 
want to see see (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane, & Verba 1994: 124–128; Collier et al., 2004; George and 
Bennett 2005). Hence, to be transparent for my selection of cases, I will elaborate on the selection 
process in the following chapter. 
4.2.2 Process of Case Selection 
The selection of cases followed several steps, guided by the structured focused comparison.45 First, a 
country was selected based on theory guided variables; second, the regions and districts for my within-
country-comparison are chosen based on the theoretical analysis.  
To answer my research question, the selected country needed to combine various aspects: high levels 
of drug production and trafficking with relatively low levels of violence. Furthermore, it needs to have 
an unequal distribution of state presence within the country that allows to select regions in the 
margins, it needs to be on a drug trafficking route (producer, trafficker or both) and finally represents 
relatively low levels of violence. For the within-country comparison I identified cases that are similar 
on most of its variables identified and state marginality but differ in the presence of drug trafficking. 
Concerning the factor of drug trafficking, I identified a region that shows changes in drug production 
in the last five years before start of the analysis as well as another region with continues high levels of 
drug production 
The thematic focus lies on the drug business since it produces an illicit economy that involves many 
actors needs to be organized and is considered as national challenge. Moreover, drug trafficking is a 
globally banned criminal activity and it generates the highest profit margins of all considered OC 
activities. It is also one of the best researched area when it comes to criminal activities. I will focus on 
 
44 The most similar case study has also been called the method of “controlled comparison” (Bennett 2004: 9). 
45 based on Patton (2001); Richie and Lewis (2003). 
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cocaine and Pasta Basica de Cocaina (PBC) as they are globally labelled as illegal and offer high profit 
margins for people involved in the trade and the production. The drug has also additional benefits for 
the research topic. Since I am interested in marginal regions, the focus on a plant based drug with 
production in the rural areas and a broader involvement of the rural population in the production 
process allows to combine the wide extension of the illicit economy with marginal areas into the 
analysis. The selected regions should have had a long history of absence of state control and presence 
of an illicit drug economy.  
Given the particularities of the research in particular, Peru came out as the most interesting country 
for the analysis. While Peru gets less attention in both media and academia than neighbouring 
Colombia concerning drug production, it is nevertheless an important case. Its involvement in the drug 
trade, the essential role in producing in particular PBC and the development of the state makes the 
country and important case for studying the results of illicit economies. The country is one of the main 
production and distribution centers for coca and cocaine. Geographically Peru offers good conditions 
for the production and trafficking of drugs. The Peruvian rainforest, for example, makes up to around 
60% of the countries territory which makes it therefore difficult to access or control and the lacking 
infrastructural control in marginal areas is visible among others in the inequal distribution of poverty, 
education or basic services (INEI 2007, 2014: 3). Climatic conditions make the country favourable for 
growing coca, the basis for cocaine. While I would also have found interesting cases in Colombia for 
the analysis that match similar conditions, the Colombian peace process might have resulted in a 
strong influence and affected my research outcome. Additionally, the conflict in Colombia restricted 
state activities in many regions that were of interest for this study. In Peru the conflict officially ended 
in 2000 and gave the state various opportunities to intervene in the coca and drug production regions 
Peru was always one of the biggest coca and cocaine producer in the world (Gootenberg 2008), even 
though it was also affected by changes. The volatility of coca production is best described by the 
“balloon effect”. That is the shift and diversification of production once state restrictions become 
“tougher” in one place. Production and trafficking of drugs changed dramatically in the last 20 years. 
Peru became again primer producer of coca and cocaine in 2011 when at its peak it produced 62.500 
ha (UNODC 2015). Concerning international reports this has changed quite drastically. For 2014 
UNODC estimates that still 42.900 ha of coca are produced (Ibd.). It is argued that this decline is mainly 
due to the extended eradication programs with different regional success. The Peruvian government 
claims that more than 31.000 ha have been destroyed in 2014. While the absolute number is hard to 
verify, the data gives a good indication of where to find high amounts of illegal coca and drug 
production and where to find former hotspots. Thus, also with regard to coca presence and state 
activity, Peru was an interesting case to study. 
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The within-country comparison has to include some preliminary knowledge of the cases, but this 
selection cannot presuppose the dependent variable which is the local social order or the relation by 
the state as those aspects are too complex and need further qualitative investigation. Because I am 
particularly interested in a specific universe of cases that can answer the research question, the 
theoretical analysis serves as basis for the theory-guided selection of non-random cases. I narrow my 
research down to the local level where illicit economies and its externalities can be observed more 
direct and dynamics resulting from illicit economies become more visible in everyday life. In 
concentrating on one district at a time allows to analyse in depth these externalities and their 
importance for social order. This also gives the opportunity to take a closer look on how criminal actors 
are perceived in comparison to other authorities.46  
The selection of the within-country cases followed basically two steps. At first the major illicit coca 
production regions and districts within Peru have been identified and its change in production 
documented. The levels of coca production serve as an indicator for the regions of illicit drug 
production, which will be elaborated in the chapter “The Bigger Picture” (chapter 5). By that, I 
identified not only the major coca producing regions but also those with decreasing numbers in coca 
production in the last five years.47 While in one case the illicit economy is still present, in the other 
case the economy was recently destroyed. In a second step, I compared socio-economic indicators for 
the identified districts, which would serve as proxy for state presence in the region. The main 
characteristics of these sub-national cases are that they have low levels of “state presence”.  
Using mostly the latest available figures for all regions (INEI 2007), my control variables are first of all 
socio-economic. To operationalize them by concentrating on variables that express state 
infrastructural power (Mann 1984) thus, factors that describe the state reach such as education (school 
attendency), access to communication services as well as levels of poverty and extreme poverty to 
control for the economic capacities of the region. Analyzing newspaper articles, official national 
reports, illicit crop monitoring reports and international drug reports will serve as a controlling factor 
in analyzing the scope of drug trafficking in the region.48 At first I came up with 15 districts, which I 
lowered down to four with similar socio-economic indicators but differences in the level of coca 
production. That selection process resulted in the districts of Monzón, Subde de San Jorge and Padre 
 
46 That could be connected to de jure statehood (the amalgator of institutions legally constituting the state), and de facto 
statehood (represented by actors recognized as components of the state) (Stel and Ndayiragije 2014: 17; Brinkerhoff 2011: 
139). 
47 That leads to districts in the departments of Huánuco, Ayacucho, and Cuzco For follow up studies Puno might be of 
interest as it borders Bolivia and is considered as a main smuggling gateway. Also data suggest the “balloon effect” drives 
coca production towards this area. 
48 El Comercio, Diario Correo, IDL-R, Insight Crime, Nexis-Lexis; Police Reports. 
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Abad (Huipoca) as examples for decreasing coca production. Both are in the area of Alto Huallaga. The 
region is historically the center of coca production not only in Peru but played an essential role first for 
licit and later also for illicit coca and cocaine production. Recently, coca was destroyed in the region 
and only few coca plantations are left. Therefore, the region makes a good example for analyzing 
changes after the destruction of an illicit economy. The region for comparison is the VRAEM, the 
current epicenter of coca production, in particular Llochegua, Santa Rosa, and Cumunpiari. The VRAEM 
is one of the biggest coca and PBC producing regions in the world and even if state presence has 
increased in recent years, coca production remains the highest in the country. Llochegua and Santa 
Rosa are two districts with the highest amounts of illicit coca and drug production. The development 
in these two regions allows to study the consequences of a sharp decline coca production and compare 
it to areas that continue to produce large quantities of coca and PBC. In other words, it is a comparison 
of a district with a former illegal economy to one with a still very strong presence of an illicit economy.49   
While doing field research in all of the mentioned districts, I further narrowed down my research on 
the districts of Monzón, Santa Rosa and Llochegua. This was because I found Monzón as a perfect fit 
for a region where the coca and drug economy has been destroyed recently and a growing state 
involvement, where we can analyze the local reaction on both. As comparative cases I used two 
districts in the VRAEM where the state also recently increased its presence, but did not destroy the 
illicit economy – Llochegua and Santa Rosa. I decided to use two core districts in the VRAEM since it is 
a difficult to reach environment, which makes data availability and reliability more difficult. 
Furthermore, we see high similarities in the important variable of coca presence but variances in the 
levels of poverty, which is an interesting element for controlling for the results (see table 2). This 
selection of three core cases allows to give a detailed and focused analysis on the research questions. 
In addition, and in order to have the possibility to further compare the data, I include three additional 
cases, which allows for validity checks and further comparison. These cases will be not analyzed in 
depth but primarily compared in the survey. Hence, this results in six cases: three core cases and three 
comparative cases. 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 Obviously research in an area dominated by an illegal economy has its limits concerning security issues. The findings 
presented below are preliminary and do not represent the complete results of the study. 
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Map 1 Coca Production Areas in Peru 
 
 
UNODC 2015 (The red circles resemble the areas of field research) 
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Table 3 Case Selection 
Region:  
Department 
- Province - 
District 
Coca 
Production 
2011 in ha 
Coca ha 
per 
inhabitants 
2011 50 
Coca 
Production 
2014 in ha  
Coca ha per 
inhabitants 
2014  
Coca 
Production 
2014 in ha  
Inhabitants  Population 
(Census 
2007) 
Poverty 
Incidencia 
de 
pobreza  
Poverty 
in % 
extreme 
poverty  
Extreme 
Poverty 
in % 
Gini 
coefficient 
households 
without 
„servicios de 
información“ 
and 
communication 
Households 
without 
„servicios de 
información“ 
and 
communication 
(in %) 
population 
in 
households 
with 
children 
not going 
to school 
population 
in 
households 
with 
children 
not going 
to school 
(in %) 
Homicide 
rate per 
100.000 
inhabitants 
2011 
(department 
level) 
Huánuco - 
Huamalíes -  
Monzón 
7005 0,306 393 0,0172 393 28.605 18.751 12.724 62,8 4118 17,4 0,21 4.527 95,8 990 9,2 6 
Ucayali - 
Aguaytía – 
Padre Abad 
(Huipoca ) 
1570 0,059 256 0,009 18 25,971 25,633 11,458 40% 3,935 14.4% 0,34 4,523 70,2 135 2.1% 10 
Leoncio 
Prado – 
Rupa Rupa 
Subte de 
San Jorge 
1829  n.a. 191 n.a. 191 63.764 56.389 20.163 33 4367 6,1 0,32 7.115 49,1 2170 7,3 6  
Ayacucho - 
Huanta - 
llochegua 
3,323 0,253 2567 0,185 2567 14.047 12.131 4.597 36,8 1206 9,8 0,3 3.060 95,5 729 11,8 7,6 
Ayacucho - 
La Mar - 
Santa Rosa 
3,311 0,293 2461 0,217 2461 11.286 11.200 7.233 62,7 3077 27,1 0,31 2.137 73,5 893 13,4 7,6 
Cumunpiari 3,311 0,293 2461 0,217 2461 11.286 11.200 7.233 62,7 3077 27,1 0,31 2.137 73,5 893 13,4 7,6  
 
INEI 2007; 2009; UNODC 2015 
 
50 based on population projection 
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This comparative research design will be beneficial in various ways. I will have the opportunity to 
compare in total six cases from two areas in Peru with each other. Three from a former epicenter of 
drug trafficking and three from the current center of drug trafficking. This allows for controlling the 
result of the in-depth case study. The main focus will be given to three focus districts: Monzón as the 
case of currently low drug and coca production, Santa Rosa and Llochegua as the cases for high levels 
of drug and coca production. The analysis of a case with no more illicit economy provides first-hand 
information of the changes for local order and the state-society relation. This will then be compared 
to the cases where the illicit economy is still prevalent. This research design will give us information 
on the cases in particular and highlight causal mechanisms. By using a comparative small-N case 
comparison I will be able to provide a deeper understanding on these understudied research topics 
and environments. It allows us to compare patterns and highlight differences as well as similarities.  
 
4.3 Methodological Approach  
Academic work covers only insufficiently the influence of illicit economies have on state formation and 
local social order. Data allowing the analysis of illicit economies, local power structures and their 
relationship to the state are generally scarce. The areas that this study is interested in are difficult to 
access and few reliable data has been produced to analyze them. Generating first hand qualitative data 
is therefore a necessary step for the analysis. I am analyzing cases that will give the opportunity to 
identify and analyze in-depth possible explanation for the relation of illicit economies and local order. 
The study includes observation, contextual data and a combination of data that will allow to study 
patterns and potential causal mechanisms. 
Reliable data was to a large extent not available for the regions. Furthermore, topics interesting for 
the study such as power or state society relationship are difficult to “measure” but they are 
nevertheless observable. Due to the lack of data I am including ethnographic approaches into my 
research. The inclusion of interpretative ethnography allows to use several different techniques to 
access data. Studies have demonstrated benefits of such a combination for political science methods 
with ethnography (Wedeen 2010). Taking an interpretative ethnographic lens can therefore help to 
sharpen the research since it allows to include different techniques and use directly observed 
information. “A study becomes ethnographic when the fieldworker is careful to connect the facts that 
s/he observes with the specific features of the backdrop against which these facts occur, which are 
linked to historical and cultural contingencies.” (Baszanger and Dodier 2004: 12). My attempt is to use 
this dialogical approach of observable facts and the context and link it to theoretical understandings. 
Ethnographic studies can help to set data into context and provide useful information on the “local 
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realities”. Sensing how communities function through the account of their everyday life or the 
description of emblematic situations helps get a more nuanced study that recognizes individuals and 
incorporates this into the overall analysis.  
In the context of analyzing the illicit economies on a local level, the combination with ethnographic 
approaches helps to analyze how daily lives are influenced by these economies, different actors and 
ultimately by state policies. It is difficult to define the exact starting and end point of each observation 
which rather flows together. This “flowing together” could also be understood as giving the whole 
analyses its narrative and an ordering of observations (Gering and Craig 179). Being able to detect and 
describe this narrative correctly, the researcher needs to understand the world correctly in which it 
occurs (Ibd.). Giving background information is therefore essential similarly to a clearly defined 
research question and the verification of singular stages of the research in order to match the logic of 
a narrative as well as the model as a whole. Important aspects of interpretative ethnography are the 
understanding and inclusion of the historical context, the recognition of a “socially constructed” reality 
(including the one of the researcher) which influences perception and interpretation as well as the 
recognition for shifts of meaning depending on the location and context (Wedeen 2010: 260-261). For 
the analysis it is therefore helpful not only to include contextual information on the cases but also 
reflections on the researcher´s role as well as reflection of collected data. The data gathered in the 
regions are not “raw” but rather reflect a tendency that ought to be put in context. The reflection and 
feedback loops are therefore important aspects of my study. During research I presented and 
discussed my findings with locals, civil servants or investigative journalists in bilateral meetings or 
presentations. These presentations allowed me to link my own findings back to experiences made by 
local actors working on related topics. Also these encounters allowed me to share and discuss 
information that might give useful insights to people working in these regions or on similar issues. A 
four months stay as guest researcher at the PUCP in Lima also gave me the opportunity to an extensive 
exchange and to contrast my own findings with the view of other researchers. The dialogical process 
with data became an important feature of my research and I regard this as an essential step to get a 
more accurate picture.51  
Because the development of social order and the formation of power structures evolve over time the 
focus of the study will be on a process that influences local structures. The study analyses key events 
and periods that led to the development of the region. Those key events and periods will be highlighted 
to clarify the historical development of the regions and to specify the contextual conditions. Hence, I 
present the history for the regions and give an analysis on key aspects for the formation of the region, 
 
51 During all these presentations and discussions made sure that my sources were protected at all time. 
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highlighting economic, security and social aspects that were important. For comparative study of few 
cases, this highlighting and comparing of key events proves to be a good tool for the analysis in a 
structured comparison (Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003: 6). Understanding that events take place 
within specific contextual conditions, the analysis includes these context conditions that shape 
dynamics of the particular region.  
The focus on a small number of cases allows to study and highlight events important for the 
development of the specific case. This study focusses on one case at a time before comparing the 
results. By that and besides additional in-depth-results for the singular cases, this approach will 
highlight how the cases differ in their processes and stresses similarities. Based on the theoretical 
analysis an analytic scheme is developed to analyse the formation of local power structures and the 
relationship to the state. For Monzón it is important to give a broader analysis on the local order before 
and after state intervention. By this within-case analysis we are able to see the changes which occurred 
or were affected by the state intervention, which will allow to give a more accurate presentation of 
the case. Since such a defining state intervention did not happen in Santa Rosa or Llochegua the 
analysis will concentrate on the present condition and the development of local order under the 
presence of an illicit economy. Linking the findings with existing statistical data, reports and available 
secondary literature will give a broader overview on the social reality in the cocalero areas and the 
relationship to the state. At the same time, I am able to systematize the findings, identify patterns and 
provide possible comparisons to other brown spot areas influenced by illicit economies. The 
combination of these different approaches seeks to provide for a deeper understanding on the 
complex effects of an illcit economy on local order. 
 
4.4 Data Collection Strategy 
A strength of case studies is the combination of multiple sources where all evidence can be of use and 
contributes to the in-depth analysis. There are several ways to collect evidence or “data” and several 
types of data. Yin (2009) defines six useful types of information to collect: documents, archival records, 
Interviews, direct observation, participant observation, physical artifacts. The focus of this research is 
the illicit economy and its impact on social order as well as state formation. All aspects are difficult to 
“measure” quantitatively but are indeed observable by using qualitative measures. Therefore, 
methods and tools used for analyzing the research question are conditioned by the nature of the study 
matter and the research is mainly based on qualitative tools. For the comparative case study, I am 
combining interviews, participant-observation, document analysis with a questionnaire conducted in 
the field. During the time naturally occurring data as well as generated data was gathered (Richie 2003: 
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39-39). Generated data includes expert interviews, biographical methods, as well as a survey52. 
Naturally occurring data used for the study includes participant observations as well as revision of 
documents. Analyzing the different data sources in a structured matter allows to identify patterns and 
contribute to answer the overall research question of this thesis. As each data source has its particular 
weakness and strengths the combination of different sources, triangulation seeks to increase validity 
and strengths of the data gathered while compensating for the weaknesses of each single approach 
(Patton 2001: 306). Triangulating different data sources also allows to give closer approximation to 
reality and broadens our understanding on the subject (Fielding and Fielding 1986). The different 
sources are used complementary to each other and as a control. In total I realized 11 month of field 
research from October 2015 to June 2017 from which I spend eight months in the respective regions. 
For my field research, I focused on the district capitals since I found local institutions and authorities. 
I also found the best opportunities to gather information on the local conditions not only on the district 
capital but also the district as a whole.  
Analyzing the defined dimensions security, economy, territorial rule and historical context, needed in 
part different approaches. The provision of security and the perception of the security situation is a 
difficult aspect to measure. The main source of data on security are typically police statistics. Reliability 
of data, on victimization or perception of security are generally difficult to obtain or verify in Peru (eg. 
Mujíca and Zevallos 2016). In the case of the analyzed areas getting reliable data is even more 
complicated. First, because control by the police is not complete or only recently established and so 
their basis of information stays incomplete. Secondly, because the police not necessarily react to all 
crimes committed, which was mainly explained by lack of resources. Finally, people might not report 
wrongdoings to the police because they do not trust them. Hence, analysis involves the use of surveys, 
interviews but also participant observation with specific focus the aspects of public safety, security 
perception, formal and informal control. Since the extent of illicit economies is difficult to measure 
quantitatively, I am combining official data and estimations on drug production with qualitative data 
gathered in the respective areas. That includes four aspects, interviews and talking to people about 
their economic situation, counting of businesses and categorize them within two blocks two each side 
of the main square53, participant observation and use the survey to get more information. The survey 
includes questions on the perception on the personal economic situation, the economic situation 
 
52 I also tried to include Focus Group Discussions during the first field trips but did not generate a lot of information. This was 
mainly due to high distrust concerning the researcher but also a clear hierarchy of who gets to speak. After giving a treatment 
mostly in form of a questions, there was no discussion but participants rather were looking up to the leader within the group 
so that he (the two focus group discussions were with men) would give the answer.  
53 Which is the place where the majority of the businesses are to find. 
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within the community and labor activities.  Rules considering the analyzed regions do not include fixed 
and written norms and rules but rather procedural practices of rule, I will rely mainly on information 
given in the region. That includes participant observation, interviews with community members and 
authorities on their perception of rule setting and rule implementation as well as information from the 
survey. Two of my survey questions for example read: “What are the three most important rules in the 
region” followed by “Who is implementing these rules?”. Similar questions were asked during the 
interviews. Accounting for the historical development of the regions follows a similar approach of data 
triangulation, since there are few written analysis of the local history of the region and even less on 
the districts and local level. Therefore, I will rely on the few secondary literature combined with 
interviews and primary sources, where possible. While I will reflect on the general research restrictions 
and settings of the research in a following chapter (Reflecting on Ethics and Researchers Role), it is 
important to note that my intention was to get the best picture possible of the society. Hence, the 
presentation will be the best possible approach given the specific circumstances that all social science 
research has to cope with. In this sense, the representation and analysis (or picture) I present here will 
rather be a “painting than a photograph” most accurately as possible based on the available data 
(Charmaz 2000: 522, cited in: Swartz 2009: 173). 
 
4.4.1 Expert Interviews 
Expert interviews serve as an important source of data for my study. Experts are defined as people 
having expertise in a particular field. Thus, they do not necessarily need to be from the elite and their 
insight on processes, contexts or people due to their personal participation. These personal 
informations can be of valuable information for the study. Interview partners have been selected 
according to their function in society and their relation towards the illicit economy and local order. A 
major challenge for selecting interview partner and experts is to avoid selection bias (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994: 128). Therefore, people in the research areas are selected from different spectrums 
of the society. I selected people for the interviews following two strategies. The first followed a 
proposive selection criteria depending on their role in societies, public opinion leaders, legal and non-
legal authorities including mayors, Juezes de Paz (“Peace Judges”) or police officers. A second sampling 
strategy is used for getting information from the population on local order and perception of the illicit 
economy. Here, the focus was on “gatekeepers” or “focal persons” with a good overview on the overall 
setting and public opinion. Those are persons with access to a large part of the population and a variety 
of opinions. People that I interviewed in these categories and that are not public opinion leaders or 
authorities were shopowners, taxi drivers, restaurant or bar owners as well as teachers or clerics. 
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Because of their profession and close contact with people from all levels of society these people were 
identified as having a good overview on their community. These two strategies result in the following 
interview partners: police officers, military officials, self-defense forces (autodefensas), clerics, 
salesmen, public servants, mayors, restaurant owners, cocalero leaders, journalists and drug 
traffickers.  
Table 4 Groups Interviewed 
State and non-state authorities (Gatekeepers) Focal Persons  
- Local politicians 
- Self-defence group leaders 
- Juez de Paz 
- Police officers 
- Military officials 
- Public servants 
- Cocalero Leader 
- Restaurant owner 
- Bar owner  
- Salesmen 
- Taxi Driver  
- Clerics 
- Journalists 
- Drug trafficker 
 
The analysis of these interviews included the difficulty of interpretation and a verification, which is 
prone to most ethnographic oriented studies and in particular when studying critical situations (e. g. 
Wood 2003). This includes that memories of historical events might be blurred by changes of the social 
setting or loss of memories. Also the discussion of illegality might lead to answers reflecting “social 
acceptance”. And finally the fear of being regarded as a traitor when talking to me about drug 
trafficking or illicit practices is also a factor that needed to be considered during research. I attempted 
to confront these aspects by various steps. First, the guarantee of anonymity and security of 
information had to be given at all time. I made sure to establish a relationship of trust before the 
beginning of the formal interview and to provide a broad explanation about the research and what the 
data will be used for had to be given before each interview. Second, a combination of questions aimed 
not only at addressing my core research question directly but also clarified the context for answering 
the core questions. Third, through the in-depth interviews and by reflecting on these interviews 
afterwards, I obtained an idea on local norms and patterns when talking about the respective research 
topics. That allowed me to adjust my interview approach. It was therefore important to conduct all 
interviews myself to develop this reflection and adjustments. Only at a later stage, a research assistant 
conducted 10 additional interviews after being able to brief her on the research topics and –
techniques. Since these additional interviews were conducted by a local (and university trained) 
researcher in Quechua, these interviews also serve as a check and a comparison to the previous 
interviews.54 Finally, I tried to conduct as many interviews as possible in order to get the possibility of 
comparing interviews and identifying common patterns. I continued with the interviews on my 
 
54 Interestingly: Many of the interviews conducted by the research assistant were shorter and less open. 
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research topic until found data saturation, when aspects were repeated in several times by different 
people and I did not get more information by any additional interview. 
Getting people to talk to me as a stranger about issues connected to local realities and drug trafficking 
was, as expected, a challenge. Mostly that was related to trust and uncertainty about what will happen 
to the information they would give me. Additionally, many inhabitants of the area experienced the 
internal conflict and violence, which resulted in traumatic experiences and some degree of mistrust 
also seen in other contexts (Wood 2003). Hence, a critical aspect for doing research in these marginal 
and (former) drug production areas was trust and assurance of anonymity. I informed every 
interviewee at length about the aim of my study, that I was going to interview a broad spectrum of 
interview partners.55 The connection to local authority, the presence in local events and general 
openness about my research but also about me as a person have been key elements. Thus, I was really 
open about what I was doing and regarded it as important that people would know about my research 
and to not mistaken my intentions and to underline my position as a neutral researcher. In particular, 
in the coca producing areas of the VRAEM it was important to make sure that I was not perceived as 
an anti-drug agent.  
By the end of research, I conducted 120 semi-structured expert interviews realized during a six-month 
field research in two regions and five districts from November 2015 to March 2016 and May to July 
2017 (see Annex for list of interviews). The majority have been male (109). 112 were conducted by me 
mostly in a one-on-one situation. In some instances, other persons were present but never more than 
three. 8 interviews have been conducted by a research assistant. The shortest interview was 15 
minutes and the longest 3:30 hours. Interviews with academics and local authorities were more 
focused and directed towards my research question while other interviews in the region, in particular 
with drug trafficker, had to be more open and informal for security reasons. Nevertheless, my topic 
guide was the basis for all of my interviews. Most interviews were recorded, when not possible or 
interviewees did not agree on recording notes were taken. I used open interview questions and gave 
the respondents the possibility to elaborate on their own experience. Even if the core questions 
remained the same, questions were modified or added depending on the information received 
through other data sources after the first research stay. 
In three cases biographical interviews were used. Biographical methods are the analysis of life stories 
in the light of the research question. In the case of the present research they provide useful 
 
55 To assure the anonymity I provided a “code” for each interviewee of the which is based on the locality as the first and the 
position with in the community: for example, for a male (m) restaurant owner (res) in Santa Rosa (Sro) the code reads 
Sroresm. 
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information on particular social, economic or political shifts in the region. These personal “life stories” 
allows to analyze the effects of structural changes on the individual level and the interpretation of 
these changes for the individual and their families (Richie 2003: 36). During field work key personalities 
have been identified to tell a period of their personal life that coincide with key events for the local 
community. These personalities include community leaders such as (former) leaders of the self defense 
forces, economic leaders, journalists or the Justice of Peace (Juez de Paz). The biographical method 
was used only after having received and analyzed already other data sources for being able to have 
knowledge on the circumstances, local history and after defining key events.  
Interviews were transcribed in part by me, particularly those interviews that I regarded as particularly 
sensible both in content and concerning the interview partners. The majority of interviews were 
transcribed in full length by a research assistant. Following that, I have coded the transcripts in 
different steps by using the software MaxQDA. Coding of interviews identify the main themes covered 
during the interviews and follows two major steps. Before starting to transcribe and code the interview 
material, I identified some key codes based on theoretical concepts before starting to code such as 
“Trust”, “Infrastructure”, “Economic Development”, “Coca” or “Rule”. I have then applied in vivo 
coding – identifying relevant codes during the process of coding. This gave the opportunity to include 
interview data directly into the strategy of analysis. Therefore, during the process of analysis, I 
reconsidered coding and added new codes. This procedure helped not only to make the analysis more 
precise but also to reflect on the relationship, and to identify categories and structures.  
 
4.4.2 Surveys 
For further information, I used a survey with a small sample for being able to compare data generated 
from the interviews and to create a new data source. Additionally, by using the survey, important 
features of the sample are identified such as trust in the state and state institutions or perception of 
the local security situation. The interviews deepened the information on these issues. The survey will 
be used to accompany the information of the interviews and participant observation. Participants for 
the survey are different from those selected for the interviews and were randomly selected. The survey 
was realized with the local population but not with authorities. The survey serves as additional data 
source to test data from the interviews and other data sources. In total, I conducted 118 topic specific 
surveys with the local population. 44 participants have been female and 72 have been male (2 refused 
to indicate their gender). From those 65 have been conducted in the VRAEM (Santa Rosa, Llochegua 
and Cumunpiari) and 59 in Alto Huallaga (Monzón, Subde de San Jorge, Huipoca). The surveys covered 
the topics of trust on local authorities and towards the state (institutions) as well as on satisfaction 
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with local development and personal needs. Furthermore, it asked for influential people in society and 
is thus intended to get an overview of local perception of power structures. 
The survey will be a good tool to complement the analysis. In all of the selected regions, little 
information is available on the socio-economic structure, neither do we have a recent detailed on the 
perception of life and the relationship towards the state. The latest Census publication is from 2007 
(INEI 2007) while most of the more recent household data are projections. Furthermore, data on local 
power structures and trust in the state- and non-state institutions in the region have not been 
available. The survey will therefore create a new data source to provide further basis for the analysis. 
Findings help to increase generalizability and the possibility for replication of research. Finally, given 
the sensitivity of the topic a survey provides the opportunity to address sensitive topics that can be 
answered anonymously. The survey included open- and close-ended questions to address topics on 
living conditions, the personal perception on institutions or drug consume as well as the perception of 
security, infrastructural development or the behavior when experiencing violence. Close-ended 
questions aimed for data about institutions and service provision and included ordinal scales56. Open-
ended questions prompted more detailed answers on the perception of rules or powerful actors within 
the community (e. g. “What should the most powerful authorities provide for the community?”) (See 
survey questions in Annex). 
4.4.3 Participant observation 
A third form of data included the “naturally occurring data”, participant observation and the revision 
of documents. Participant observation deepened the knowledge on the local specifics concerning 
several aspects of the regions. Participant observation is a good tool to investigate specific social 
realities recognizing the researcher as a spectator and actor at the same time allowing the researcher 
to include every-day life or “ordinary” conversations and interactions into the data gathering process. 
Participant observations allow the researcher to get insights through events as they occur and allow 
to get the right “feeling” for the situation and circumstances (Richie 2003: 35). We can distinguish 
between non-participant, passive-participant, moderate-participant, active-participant or complete 
participant (Kawulich 2005). My role shifted during the research stays from passive-participant, when 
I took a role as a bystander, to moderate-participant, when I became active though remained an 
outsider from the main activities and complete participant, or to active-participant when I became 
part of the process and in that situation a member of the group. These shifts sometimes overlapped 
for example while I took the role as a passive participant, when I was for example waiting on a 
 
56 E g. on the question “How much trust do you have in [institution]?” options to answer this question have been: a lot, 
some, few, none. 
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transportation facility or walking through the villages to get an overview on local habits during 
different times of the day, I often became involved in informal talks and changed my role to a moderate 
participant. I also became often a complete participant when eating or drinking something together or 
chatting informally with the local population. The combination of these activities gave me a broader 
overview about local habits and structures.  
During time in the field, information was gathered in the form of field notes that not only helped to 
order data but also structure and focus the participant observation.57 I will give detailed analysis when 
useful including aspects of transportation, local economy and security. These aspects will be described 
in more detail in the different chapters. By using a field diary, I made sure to take notes on a regular 
basis while I was in the field. I noted experiences that had direct relevance to my research question 
but also encounters and situation where the connection was not as obvious. Furthermore, I 
recapitulated interviews and wrote down thoughts, doubts and hypotheses. Through that the diary 
became an important tool during field research but also it facilitated writing my analyses.  
 
4.4.4 Secondary literature and Document Review  
The last data sources used for the study included publicly available information such as official 
documents and secondary literature. This information gives important insights on state formation 
since we can track the policies for colonization of and policies regarding areas in Peru. Likewise, by 
using reports of ministries or non-governmental organization, I will gather information on the current 
socio-economic situation. Documents of the police, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Organized 
Crime (UNODC) and anti-drug agencies (DEVIDA) gave insights on the level of drug production and anti-
drug policies. This was also used as background information for interviews and the analysis as well as 
for the case selection. Finally, newspaper and journal articles serve as a further source of information.   
Before starting field work in an understudied environment it is unclear which data will be found “on 
the ground” and which will be used. The mix of different data sources and different strategies allows 
to analyse the subject matter from different angles. That includes different people and different levels 
of social standing within the societies (mayors and self-defense group leaders but also taxi driver or 
shop owner). It also allows to cross-check the available data. The data used in this study allows to give 
a detailed picture on the context and a focused analysis of the research question. I used information 
 
57 On a critical account on participant observation and objectivity. Bourdieu (2003) 
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given during field work to refine questions and used the given information to calibrate data gathering 
strategies. The main focus and core questions did not change however.  
4.5 Reflecting on Ethics and the Researchers Role 
4.5.1. Ethical Considerations  
As all scientific research, studies in social science should be guided by principles and standards. That 
includes aspects such as data quality or reliability but should also include ethical standards (Lewis 2003:  
66-71; Christians 2011). While this should be needless to say and included in all research, I find it 
important to highlight the point of ethical considerations. Additionally, to the need to include ethical 
considerations in social research, my study is built heavily on first hand data, interviews and participant 
observations that I gathered while interacting with people in the focus areas and often concerned 
aspects that touched upon illegality. Therefore, it is important to highlight various aspects about the 
protection of anonymity, the measures to inform about my role and my study as well as the necessary 
steps to assure security. The research was guided by a do-no-harm principle and also by not interfering 
in local decision making processes by taken sides.  
To make sure people knew about the reason of my stay and the intention of my study was an important 
for my study in the region. A standard for social science research is a signed informed consent, which 
also includes the consent that the interview can be recorded. The consent should be given in a free 
and un-coerced manner and also based on the complete information what the study is about 
(Christans 2011: 144-146). To people I interviewed or those that participated in the survey I explained 
in depth my role and the research that I was doing. I also informed the local authorities about my study 
and in two occasions gave a small presentation in the comunities where I have outlined the purpose 
of my visits (Cumunpiari and Monzón). Thus, I ensured that people participated voluntarily and were 
fully aware of the study. Mostly because of the sensitivity of topics and the highly “politicized” region 
they lived in, a written informed consent was not always possible. Therefore, I asked for a verbal 
consent, stating the approval of the interview and recording. In cases where the consent was not being 
given I did not record the interview. There have also been situations where I received the hint of not 
asking further in a certain direction or that the interviewee did not wanted to answer the question 
because of security reasons. In this case I changed the subject. 
For reasons of anonymity some interview partners did not give me their full or even their first name. 
Local authorities and most academic experts I interviewed did so however. To secure anonymity is not 
a simple task and can probably not achieved for 100 percent. Because what is seen as an anonymous 
quote might be easily identified by an insider or local inhabitant. For this study I followed two steps 
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for anonymization. First I used codes when saving the interview files directly after the interview has 
taken place. For the analysis I assigned a unique code for each interview partner (see logic Annex). An 
essential aspect is to ensure the safety of the participants. While the research did not directly harm 
people, comments could have led to a negative outcome later on when for example somebody was 
criticizing a cocalero or giving details about the drug production chain. Therefore, I made sure not to 
share any information in particular no personal information or details mentioned during the interviews 
or what I observed. In some instances, I was explicitly asked about what a certain person has said or 
done; in this situation I declined to give information.  
Most of the information I gathered in the region depend on human interaction. In the interviews I 
made sure to take a neutral position. The topics raised in the interviews and the discussions are 
controversial and I withhold my personal opinion on the matter to influence the study. Nevertheless, 
I engaged in open discussions but where I acted more as a moderator instead of actively selling my 
own opinion. In the “micro cosmos” of a district or even a village comments that are made become 
public relatively easy, also the people one meets and talks to. My intention was to talk to as many 
people as possible, not only for formal interviews but informal chats and become active in community 
life and do not openly show preferences of whom to meet in order to not influence opinions. Hence, I 
generally tried to keep a neutral position, but there are some obvious aspects related to me as a 
person, which made it difficult to be completely neutral.  
Furthermore, I was able to realize various research stays in the region, which gave me the opportunity 
to include various rounds of analysis. The first stay in the region gave me the chance to get to know 
the environment “on the ground” and connect to authorities and the local population. Getting to know 
the “research environment” and the people allowed me to connect to the local population and offered 
an opportunity to them to get to know me. This proved to be important, since the skepticism towards 
me has been very high at the beginning and was particularly related to the illicit economy. During the 
second time, when I visited each region, I did most of my interviews and surveys which I was able to 
analyze before I entered the regions for a third time. During this final research stay, I could use the 
already analyzed information for focusing on specific questions and observations. Another very 
important aspect proved to be the presentation of preliminary findings to local authorities and the 
discussion of some of these findings. This gave an important feedback loop to my own research, and 
moreover, I got the opportunity to directly discuss information from my research findings with people 
in the region. Moreover, I was as transparent as possible with my findings, to state official, the local 
population, and local authorities. This has been a first approach of “giving back” some of what I have 
learned on the regions. Parts of this feedback round included: presentations in the DEVIDA headquater 
in Lima, in front of high ranking military officials in the VRAEM (Pichari), talks with DEVIDA officials in 
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Tingo Maria, with the mayor in Santa Rosa, the CAD president in Santa Rosa, the Juez de Paz in 
Llochgua, and the CAD president in Llochegua.  
 
4.5.2 Reflecting on Researchers Role  
The qualitative approach and the deep personal involvement in the analysis requires self-reflection 
from part of the researcher. Being aware of one´s role in the field, during observation and interviews 
is inevitable for preventing biased results as well as rash conclusions. This is even more important 
concerning the sensitive topic, which requires a sensibility of the researcher for the research 
environment. Following Virginia Olesen, reflexivity includes that the researcher as well as participants 
produces information and that reflexivity demands the recognition and discussion with the research 
dynamics, “in particular, acute awareness as to what unrecognized, elements in the researcher´s 
background contribute” (2011: 135). That entails the awareness of my role, which is, in a nutshell: A 
male European researcher, an outsider in the marginal region with a different cultural background, 
who might be perceived as potential threat, potential business partner, as someone that sticks out in 
the community and who has potentially a different understanding of norms and rules. All of this has 
the potential of changing dynamics in the region and should be involved in the reflection on the study. 
Other restriction included the immediate recognition as an outsider of the region or as “someone not 
from here”. In regions that until recently were very closed and difficult to access for strangers and 
which are still little frequented by outsiders, my presence was observed conspicuously in the eyes of 
local inhabitants. Being aware of these preconditions I attempted to confront the challenges upfront. 
In all focus areas of this study I stayed longer periods of time. The first person I addressed was always 
a local authority such as peace judge, self-defence force leader or local politician where I explained my 
intention for the research. Often this was followed by some advices to whom I should talk and what 
to avoid (although the latter were often very few aspects). Besides that, I showed presence and talked 
to as many people as possible. As discussed, my presence was not only easily visible but also spread 
fast. To all people I talked to I was open about my research.  
Presenting myself as a researcher in the region was essential for the possibility of doing research in 
the first place and not being shut out immediately. At the same time my presence as a researcher from 
the outside resulted in restrictions for both participant observation and interviews and surveys. The 
same holds true for social desirability of answers. Cross-checking the information provided in the 
interviews against each other, with the available literature and own observations also provides the 
possibility to get more “dense” evidence for social and political life in the region and how the illicit 
economy shapes it.  
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My role as a male researcher in the region predefined how people reacted on my arrival, how people 
behaved when I was present and which access I was granted (or not) to local social life. Whenever 
possible I tried to engage into community life which was not only helpful for a better understanding of 
local social actions but also create more trust and understanding for me as a researcher. While some 
doors were open and easily accessible such as an easy access to most decision makers in the region, 
or the frequent invitation of sharing a beer or the open conversation in groups of men such as taxi 
drivers. Others areas have been more difficult to access, including interviews of women or open talks 
in the streets with women, also, I was often mistaken an anti-drug agent (DEA or Interpol) or a drug 
trafficker – I was offered to buy and transport drugs several times in the VRAEM. Contacting men for 
the aim of research was much easier to realize than female persons for the interviews. Men have been 
mostly skeptical at the beginning but during the talk the skepticism became lower. Women on the 
other hand often remained very skeptical or refused to engage in a longer conversation or even a 
formal interview. Additionally, most authorities and “gatekeepers” have been men, which influenced 
the imbalance of male and female during interviews. In this regard, the survey was very helpful and 
there was an even group of male and female participants.  
Using an ethnographic approach includes the need of a distance between the researcher and the topic 
researched. Keeping objectivity while at the same time remaining open is not always easy as for 
example some encounters reveal personal tragedies or created sympathies. Writing a field journal 
helped to constantly reflect on my own role as well as on the information gathered during the day. 
Moreover, the exchange with researcher and journalists helped to reflect on the findings and 
experiences. Another important aspect is the reflection that as researcher I am not a neutral observer 
in the even though social scientist should be as neutral as possible. But we will always carry a bag of 
norms and cultural background with us that we should be aware of.  
 
5. The Bigger Picture  
The following chapter will explore the aspects that are relevant to understanding drug trafficking in 
the peripheral regions of Peru. To analyze the impact of the drug economy on local social order, this 
chapter will give an overview on the history of peripheral regions as well as on drug trafficking in Peru. 
I will give a summary of the historical development up until the beginning of the conflict with Sendero 
Luminoso, and I will stress the significance and the development of the illicit economy in the country. 
This historical analysis will form the basis for the case study by primarily investigating two main 
aspects: Firstly, I will show as to what extent these areas can be considered to be brown spots and 
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peripheral to the state. From this point, I will subsequently analyse the evolution of cocaine production 
in Peru. This second step also includes an assessment on how a commodity that was projected as a 
medical drug became an illicit product and a security concern. The chapter ist not an attempt to give 
a complete picture of the history of Peru from the mid-20th century. Rather, it aims to provide a 
fundamental understanding and background information for the argument that is the essence of the 
thesis. The chapter elaborates on the spatial power and outreach of the state and sets the basis for 
the following analysis. 
5.1 Periphery, State and Conflict 
During the first half of the 20th century, state power remained largely absent in the Amazonian and 
Andean regions of Peru. Provision of services, construction of streets, communication networks, or 
judicial institutions and hospitals were confined mainly to the coastal areas and primary economic 
centres in the Andes (Hau and Biffi 2014: 203; Contreras and Cueto 2015: 247-304). The role of the 
state intensified under the Leguía government (1919-1930), which included pronounced investments 
and an expansion of the bureaucratic sector. The budget of the Republic grew from 66 million soles in 
1919 to 149 million in 1930 (Contreras and Cueto 2015: 247). However, the spatial grasp of the state 
remained limited, was scattered regionally, and state influence was largely absent in many of the 
Andean and Amazonian areas. After the Second World War, the country witnessed a boom in industrial 
development and agricultural exports, even though compared to other sectors, the relative 
importance of agriculture declined. Investments in infrastructural investments increased at the same 
time (Cotler 2005: 248-255).58 The stimulus for agricultural development and migration came mainly 
from rubber or coffee: the production of rubber soared from 65,000 kg in 1941, to 1,420,000 kg in 
1944 (Contreras and Cueto 2015: 296). Nonetheless, the development of the “Selva” was not a priority 
for the Peruvian governments until the 1950s and the colonization of the Selva regions were rather 
spontaneous. Other than the construction of roads such as the one built in 1943 from Lima to Pucallpa, 
a town in the Amazonian region of Ucayali, the process of modernization of the jungle regions 
remained slow. This phase also coincided with the emergence of local groups and interests (Ibd.).  
During the second term of Manuel Prado (1956-1962), interest in the Selva region intensified. As a 
result, in 1959, the Prado government created the first ever commission to study the possibility for 
agrarian reform (Mayer 2009: 47; Aramburu 1982: 4). The Belaunde administration (1963-1968) 
intensified colonization and infrastructural development as a means to the integration of the marginal 
areas of the country. During Belaunde’s first presidency and under his credo “Conquest of Peru for the 
 
58 Another dramatic increase during this time was in the education sector (vom Hau and Biffi 2014: 203-205; Vergera 2014: 
31-32).  
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Peruvians” (“Conquista del Peru por los Peruanos”)’, he attempted to extend the agricultural frontier 
and sought to foster an inclusive ideology within the country. A program intented to develop the 
country’s interior, promoting peripheral regions as a haven for starting a new life at a time of growing 
urbanization and growing difficulties of life in the the cities.59 The program included the construction 
of highways to enhance accessibility to the regions. The “Marginal Highway”60 (Carretera Marginal) 
integrated the regions in the country and was more than just a project when compared to expansionist 
projects in neighbouring countries. It was a response to internal pressure and subsequently became a 
symbolic narrative for the reach and scope of the Peruvian state (Kernaghan 2009: 8). The construction 
of the Carretera Marginal, which made Amazon regions accessible with modern asphalt streets, was 
developed as a special project. As a result of the expansion of state, the law 15600 was passed also to 
encourage development in the Amazonian regions (Cotler 1999: 113). The program encouraged 
settlers to be at the forefront of colonisation of remote and “unpopulated” territories with the 
potential of a better life. It also encouraged agricultural and infrastructural integration (Aramburu 
1982; Kernaghan 2009).  
However, it migration to the peripheral area was a hard sell. The economy at the time was based on 
the export of primary goods and biased politics that favoured the urban elite over the rural peasants. 
This contributed to the growing inequality and impoverishment of the rural population. Prior to the 
agricultural reforms of the Velasco government, the periphery saw aspects of autonomy with regard 
to local and regional elites (Vergara 2015). Most of the agricultural regions functioned under a 
hacienda system in which large extensions of land had been in the clutches of few families.61 The 
distribution of land was highly imbalanced and in 1961, around 0.2% of the landowning population 
owned around 70% of the land (Contreras and Cueto 2007: 335; Velasco et al. 2008: 129).62 In regions 
that had low levels of state control, hacienda owners had a lot of influence of social control and acted 
as intermediates of  the state. This practice changed after the coup d’état of 1968. 
The military government of Juan Velasco Alverado (1968-1975) anticipated a “revolution from above” 
and deprived regional and peripheral elites of concentrated power. At the time of a financial crisis, 
Velasco implemented an agrarian reform that included the exile of landowners who possessed 
 
59 In 1950 Lima reached one million inhabitants and only 12 years later counted two million, while the coastal regions 
already combined 39% of the population (Contreras and Cueto 2015: 314-315). 
60 It was later renamed as the Fernando Belaunde Terry Highway. The road project was furthermore promoted by the USA as 
an attempt for promoting development and fighting communist movements (Kernaghan 2009: 11). 
61 Douglas North and colleagues write: „The export of English land law to the American colonies is a centerpiece of most 
economic histories of the New World. English land law provided an institutional and legal basis for a relatively equal 
distribution of freehold land in the American colonies, while Spanish and Portuguese land law led to the creation of large 
estates and unequal distribution of land throughout what would become Latin America.” (North et al. 2009: 77) 
62 Before the land reform in 1969, small landowners, accounting for 859,000 hectares (around 1.6ha / farm), managed over 
503,000 farms, while 6,177 landowners had 10,034,941 hectares, and the 1,000 controlled around 60% of the arable land. 
(http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAG974.pdf) 
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exorbitant volumes of land, the haciendas. The agrarian reform attempted to bring about a change in 
the unequal distribution of land. Within a decade, 15,826 properties and nine million hectares of land 
were expropriated and the power of the old oligarchy was dismantled (Mayer 2009: 53). The land 
reform of Juan Velasco Alvarado demolished the hacienda system and instead created a system of 
different cooperatives.63 Until 1979, 9.1 million hectares were expropriated from a total of 30 million 
hectares of agricultural land, nationally (Contreras and Cueto 2015 348). The new system included land 
distribution endorsed by the Velasco administration and the promise of better opportunities in the 
agricultural sector, prompted migration into the area beginning in the 1960s. All the same, the intent 
of getting more people to possess land and curtail the influence of the landowning elites, fell short of 
its expected promise. The 1969 agricultural reform was not able to reduce the disconnect between the 
agricultural production areas and the consuming urban centres (Cotler 1999: 103-107; Kláren 2004). 
Additionally, the Velasco regime based the foundations of its power on the military rather than the 
elite. Elites in the periphery of the state did not gain political influence with the result that there was 
no alternative political influence (Vergara 2014, 2015: 232). The land reform also failed in an economic 
sense and led to a breakdown of the periphery politics in t the state. The failure of the agrarian reform 
and a lack of political integration and organization, weakened the peripheral areas. This is when the 
conflict spread-out in the Andean region of Ayacucho. The conflict had devastating effects and left 
behind a periphery that was disintegrated politically and was ruined economically (Scott Palmer 1992; 
CVR 2003; Theidon 2012). 
The left–oriented, anti-oligarchic military government stayed firmly in place until 1980. However, 
economic pressure led to an end of the military rule and led to the re-election of Fernando Belaúnde 
Terry, who had been ousted 12 years before. Besides the economic and political integration, Belaúnde 
had to confront a growing threat during the course of his second term (1980-1985): the guerrilla group 
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). The guerrilla group was formed at the end of the 1960s, by the 
philosophy professor, Abimael Guzmán, in Ayacucho. The burning of ballot boxes during the national 
elections of 1980, in Chuschi (Ayacucho) was the first violent act of Sendero Luminoso (CVR 2003 Tomo 
II). The political establishment did not take the group serious in the beginning and Sendero Luminoso 
extended their influence soon after the first few incidents (Chávez Wurm 2016).64 In 1981, as the 
growing influence of Sendero Luminoso became more apparent, as did the incapacity of the state 
security forces in dealing with it, Belaúnde declared a state of emergency in several districts in 
Ayacucho. This included restricted civil rights and greater powers for the state security forces. A state 
 
63 „628 agrarian production cooperatives (CAPs), 58 social interest agricultural companies (SAIS), 13 rural social property 
companies, 1075 campesino groups and 345 native communities in the jungle were created.” (Brombacher et al 2012: 40, 
own translation). 
64 More on Sendero Luminoso and the conflict: Palmer 1994; Stern 1998; Gorriti 2013; Degregori 2010; Theidon 2012 
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of emergency was declared in Ayacucho from October 1981 and was implemented partially in the 
beginning. Initially, there was no harsh reaction from the state until 1983, when the army took charge 
of internal order in Ayacucho. At the same time, the police assumed more responsibilities to combat 
the guerrilla group. This was also the beginning of one of the most violent and bloody phases of the 
conflict, with the highest numbers of death and disappearances occurring in the department of 
Ayacucho (CVR Tomo III 2003). It was also the start of a “dirty war”, awash with human rights 
violations, that targeted largely the rural peasant population (Obando 1998) and that led to the 
formation of self-defence groups. Under the presidency of Alan Garcia (1985-1990), the state of 
emergency was extended to more departments and districts65. In stark contrast to what Garcia had 
promised during the election campaign, under his presidency security forces used violence against 
civilians as well (Obando 1998; Oettler 2003). The conflict and financial crisis that erupted under the 
Garcia administration left the country in a difficult situation. By the end of the 1980s, Peru was a 
fragmented country with a politically feeble regional elite. Additionally, Peru also reeled from the 
growing internal conflict that resulted in many parts of the country to coming under military control. 
The subsequent attempts at decentralization in the 1980s failed, while at the same time revolutionary 
and violent forces were on the rise. The periphery was, as Alberto Vergara notes, a “political wasteland 
after the disappearance of traditional oligarchic ties and the loss of legitimacy of the anti-oligarchic 
elite parties after a decade of disastrous rule that eroded their already weak links to society” (Vergara 
2014: 37). 
In light of the devastating economic situation and the prevailing internal conflict, a new government 
came to power, led by the dean of the University of la Molina – Alberto Kenya Fujimori Fujimori. The 
Fujimori administration further centralized power and dissolved the periphery politically (by 
disbanding the regional governments in 1992) and economically, by cancelling tax revenues earmarked 
for the regions. It also provided funds to the municipal level through state funds (FONCOMUN). 
Similarly, the number of congressmen reduced from 240 to 120. Fujimori’s stringent policies weakened 
the regional powers and fostered an unavoidable dependency on Lima. There was now no viable power 
structure in the periphery that could have countered this (Vergara 2014: 38-41). Economically, it 
followed a neoliberal policy. Fujimori undermined democratic power with his “autogolpe” (self-coup) 
and established an autocratic regime. Fujimori also restructured the military and the security sector 
on the counsel of his closest adviser, Vladimiro Montesinos, who exercised extraordinary influence in 
this administration (Degregori 2000; Kláren 2004: 497-502; Quiroz 2014: 355-401).66 Montesinos had 
a key role in Fujimori´s Peru, and operated in the shadows through a devious network of corruption 
 
65 See on changing civil-military relations Obando (1998) 
66 Montesinos became an essential figure during the Fujimori administration and also for the growth of drug trafficking in 
Peru (see below). 
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and violence. The military became the most important element in securing and sustaining Fujimori´s 
power. Besides the instances of human rights violations and the demolishing of a democratic state 
structure, the Fujimori regime also saw less integrated peripheral regions (Vergara 2015). A massive 
spying and corruption scandal that erupted around his influential advisor Vladimiro Montesino, led to 
the resignation of President Fujimori, which he comunicated via fax while he was in Japan.  
Interestingly, despite the autocratic nature of the Fujimori government, many people in the Alto 
Huallage or the VREAM today, salute the Fujimori government as the regime that stood up to the 
guerrillas and ushered peace into the region. Common expressions of support for the regime include 
statements like, “He was the one that pacified the region”. However, the main cause that brought 
about the end of the conflict against Sendero Luminoso, was most likely the incarceration of its leader. 
After the imprisonment of Abimael Guzmán in 1992, the Sendero Luminoso lost its leadership and 
most of its members surrendered shortly afterwards. Up until 1994, between 4,000 to 8,000 people 
surrendered under the Ley de Arrepentimiento (Chávez Wurm 2016: 293). Only certain factions of the 
guerrilla group stayed active.  After the capture of the head of the Junín fraction, Óscar Alberto Ramírez 
Durand (comrade Feliciano), in 1999, Sendero Luminoso seemed to be finally defeated. Nevertheless, 
two separate groups remained active; one in the Alto Huallaga under Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala 
(Comrade Artemio) and another in the VRAEM led by Víctor Quispe Palomino (Comrade José). Their 
main source of income emanated from drug trafficking (see below). 
Fujimori’s resignation and the political changes that followed marked the end of a violent and 
autocratic phase in Peruvian democratic history. It was also the beginning of a transitional of justice 
process. This process aimed to clarify and analyse the events that took place between 1980 and 2000 
(Oettler 2003).67 In 2003, the Truth Comission (Comission de la Verdad y Reconciliación, CVR) published 
its final report. Although urban areas were also affected by the conflict, the majority of victims were 
from the rural areas, especially Ayacucho (CVR 2003). The CVR (2003) estimates that 70,000 people 
were victimized by the conflict. The majority of victims were not only the rural but also the indigenous 
population. Even though Sendero Luminoso was the main perpetrator, the state security forces are 
said to be responsible for about 30% of the casualties among the civil population. As will be elaborated 
in the case studies later, the conflict also played a decisive role in the aggrupation and organization of 
local communities in the VRAEM and the Alto Huallaga. In this situation, the new millennium began 
with attempts at re-democratization. However, because of on-going structural deficits, the inequality 
 
67 At the GIGA a doctoral thesis that deals with the Transitional Justice Process and its effect on social cohesion by Elisabeth 
Bunselmeyer is to be finished in 2017.  
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in coastal areas in relation to the rest of the country, and corruption and drug trafficking scandals that 
seeped into the highest political echelons, trust in the political institutions are still at a very low level.  
 
5.2 Local Rule 
This sub-chapter attempts to give an overview on local powers in the Amazonian region, with emphasis 
on the VRAEM and the Alto Huallaga. As explained before, there was no strategy for the successful 
integration of peripheral rural areas in Peru.  Haciendas and economic ties had created a link to the 
coastal areas. However, the agrarian reforms of Velasco that followed, demolished the old Hacienda 
system and with it, the local structures and rules. There was no alternative social structure that could 
be substituted   for providing order. Alternative structures gradually evolved and are partly in place 
even today. Other structures and institutions gained importance as the old order collapsed. 
For example the appointment of a Juez de Paz (“peace judge“). These judicial authorities were an 
offshoot of the colonial times, installed to provide a nature of rule that would be mainly based on local 
practices. Until the agrarian reform by Velasco in 1969, the Jueces de Paz were often closely related to 
the wealthy hacienda families and therefore were often predictably biased when it came to judicial 
rulings (IDL 2005: 40-43; Barrera 2016: 186). After the dissolution of the hacienda system, Juezes de 
Paz held an important role in exercising judicial control and are often responsible for various 
communities. Most cases that the Jueces have to confront are the ones that deal with domestic 
violence, petty crimes or the like but they also handle other disputes. Van Dun (2014: 11) describes a 
situation wherein the Juez de Paz had to deal with an issue of stolen coca. Since the coca was illegally 
produced, the victim could not go to the police and instead had to consult the Juez de Paz. They are 
familiar with established local norms and are highly respected members of society with a lot of social 
credibility and legitimacy. They are often trusted with “minor” disputes such as family violence or fraud 
that are mostly resolved by coming to a mutual consensus. Jueces de Paz are not paid a salary for their 
services, but have the option of retaining a service fee (IDL 2005).68 
A particular form of a peasant based-organization is the rondas campesinas, vigilantes, that at first, 
focused on cases of cattle robbery but soon extended the ambit of their influence to other conflictive 
issues within the community. Later, they also took on representative and administrative tasks. The first 
rondas were reported to be active in Cajamarca, in 1979 and soon could be found in other provinces 
too. During the conflict, they played an important role in self-preservation, when the rural population 
 
68 Prices often depend on the value of the case resolved or the financial opportunities. During my field work I found that 
peace judges were given presents for their work, and some openly talked about it. Most jueces de paz live a precarious life  
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became increasingly vulnerable to violence from Sendero Luminoso and from the state security forces. 
Considering this situation and the evident lack of trust in the state and its limited reach, communities 
organized themselves in groups in order to defend themselves. They became more vital as part of the 
counterinsurgency strategy and Alan Garcia was the first to incorporate them in his strategy against 
the guerrillas (1986). Under the Fujimori administration, these self-defence forces were officially 
endorsed as comités de autodefensas (CADs). Later they were also provided with weaponry and 
military training, though not all of them joined in (Degregori 1996; CVR 2003 Tomo II: 449-475; Zech 
2015).69 Also after the conflict the CADs still have a dominant role to play. The law 27908, passed in 
2000, legally reaffirmed that these self-defense forces were allowed to solve conflicts and implement 
justice.70 
Besides these two important institutions, in many regions, the gobernador and its deputy (teniente 
gobernador) or the mayor assumed further important roles. The gobernador is an official 
representative of the Peruvian president, elected by the local population. As Barrera writes, from 2002, 
the state promoted juntas vecinales de seguridad ciudadana, citizen security groups. These comprise 
elected members of a community and are responsible for preserving order and prevention of crime 
(Barrera 2016: 193). These are some of the particularities in the peripheral areas of Peru. The concrete 
powers and individual influences of these authorities might vary among different communities, 
depending upon the character of the person in question. The chapters 6 and 7 will give an overview 
on the particular power structures in two regions. 
This chapter gave an understanding of the country’s relationship to its peripheral regions and its forms 
of (dis)integration. The infrastructural scope in Peru has been very limited with particular reference to 
the selva. Also limited was its capacity to implement laws and to have a connection to the local 
societies. In the words of Mann (1993: 53), the Peruvian state had low infrastructural power. In this 
regard, the development of the Peruvian state is similar to other instances of state formation 
experienced in the region. The Peruvian state was relatively late in implementing infrastructural 
projects that would reach the Amazonian region. Even after their implementation, the extent of its 
infrastructural power remained weak, as in many other Latin American countries (O’Donnell 1993; 
Soifer 2008; Soifer 2015). The colonization of remote Amazonian areas came somewhat late as well. 
The reason as to why the reach of the state remained weak and why state formation was not defined 
clearly could be many, such as the sheer size of the territory (Herbst 2000). It could also be the costs 
of state extension because of the terrain involved. For example, Peruvian cities in jungle regions were 
 
69 In the VRAEM region, the groups became known as the DECAS (Defensa Civil Antisubversiva) before they were also 
renamed to CADs and became arguably the most fearsome of the self-defense groups. 
70 The rondas and CADs as well as the jueces the paz can be seen as a form of legal pluralism in Peru (Barrera 2016) 
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not connected to infrastructure development for a long time, because of their remoteness. However, 
these aspects do not sufficiently explain variations in state reach. There was also the question of a 
comparatively strong state reach in Chile or Mexico notwithstanding its geographical and territorial 
challenges (Soifer 2015). Nevertheless, several influxes of people were related to this colonization, in 
particular driven by agricultural development and infrastructural improvements in the regions. 
Nevertheless, integration of these areas in the margins has not been very successful in Peru (Vergara 
2015).  
The weak regional integration in the marginalized regions resulted in them becoming dependent on a 
commodity that was defined as illicit by the state, coca and drug production. Hence, the coca and 
cocaine industry in Peru developed in the marginalized regions of the country and state interest in 
these regions was decreasing. The cocaine boom in the 1980s provided essential opportunities for 
generating income in these regions. The following will highlight how coca and cocaine became an illicit 
good and what this means in terms of these marginalized areas. 
 
5.3 Peruvian Cocaine  
When it comes to illegal drugs and illicit economies in Latin America, attention has been concentrated 
on Colombia or as more recently on Mexico (among others Thoumi 1995; Snyder and Martinez 2009; 
Mejía and Pascuale 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2009; Duncan 2013). Even though Peru has consistently 
played a major role in the cocaine business, academic research has shown comparatively little interest 
in this country. Studies focused mainly on a historical (Cotler 1999; Gootenberg 2008) or an economic 
perspective (Dietrich 1998; Leyva and Mendoza 2016). In recent years, the number of studies on the 
impact of drug trafficking in Peru increased (Bernex de Felen 2009; Felbab-Brown 2010; Garcia and 
Stöckli 2014; Zevallos 2016). However, there are still relatively few studies on this topic and even less 
in context of social order or state formation.71 This is in spite of the fact that right from the start, 
Peruvian cocaine was the primer source for producing legal drugs with medicinal purposes. Even today, 
as a major producer of coca and pasta basica de cocaina (PBC) for illicit purposes, Peru is central in the 
international cocaine business. To put it in more precise terms, Peru is the first step in a global illicit 
value chain.  
Planting coca is neither very care-intensive nor are the initial investments very high. Coca can be 
harvested three to five times a year, and like most other illicit crops, it is economically much more 
 
71 In a recently published edited volume on the current political, economic and cultural situation in Peru (Paap and Schmidt-
Welle 2016) there is no chapter on the coca or drug economy in Peru.  
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rewarding when compared to conventional crops. What became even more significant was the fact 
that laboratories for the production of PBC were located nearby and therefore transportation was not 
necessarily an issue.72 Hence, coca proved to be the perfect crop for a marginal jungle area that had 
low infrastructural capacity and limited access to the legal markets. Despite certain challenges for the 
cocaleros and PBC producers, coca regions in Peru emerged as major producer of PBC and became 
vital for the growing international cocaine industry.  
Before it became the basic ingredient for cocaine, coca was a traditional crop. A survey by the Peruvian 
statistical agency found that around 4 million traditional users of the coca leaf exist in Peru (Rospigliosi 
2004: 94). It is utilized mostly in the form of tea or for chewing the leaves (the traditional “chaccheo”). 
The plant grows below 2000 m in subtropical climates. Until recent times, the use of coca was not 
branded as illegal. The production of coca per se, is also not illegal, but is only regulated. The following 
chapter gives an overview on the development of coca, its production, and its derivatives. It also 
explores how it became an illicit good in the country and the regions. 
 
5.3.1 From Medicine to Illicit Drug: A Short History of Coca and Cocaine in Peru 
It all begins with the coca plant. The traditional use of coca goes back for centuries, already used in 
pre-Incan times, before it became a sacred plant for the Incas. For the Incas, the coca was a divine crop 
and its usage became a privilege only to the nobility. When the Spanish conquistadores controlled the 
Andean region, they at first had no use for the plant. But it did not take them long to discover its effects 
on the work performance of the indigenous people. The Spanish conquistadores noticed the beneficial 
effects of the crop such as the feeling of physical strength it gave, controlled appetite, and reduced 
fatigue. They thus promoted its usage for work in the fields and in the mines, in a bid to boost 
production and lower costs. The payment made out to workers was in the form of coca instead of cash. 
Hence, while coca was a prerogative of the elite in the Inca society in earlier times, its usage became 
more widespread among the indigenous society (Gootenberg 2002, 2008). The usage of the coca crop 
was adapted by a large part of the indigenous population, and until this day, the Andean peasant 
population practices its traditional use (Parra 2014). Gootenberg writes on the cultural importance of 
this crop: “Coca use is seen as a ritual and spiritual act, as a cultural affirmation of community trust 
and ethnic solidarity, and as a coveted good of social exchange tha t integrates the scattered Andean 
ecological archipelago” (Gootenberg 2008: 16). Among the non-indigenous population, coca was 
utilized exclusively for scientific use and did not become part of the elite culture in the coastal regions, 
 
72  On how the trade was organized see below 
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but was debated as such. While some argued that it was part of national ethos, others stated that the 
coca culture was merely an indigenous culture and prevented the assimilation of indigenous 
population (Durand Ochoa 2014: 35). The reason coca came into discredit is mainly related to the 
production and the rise of cocaine as an illegal drug. However, before it became a globally illegal drug, 
the habit of using cocaine legally was widespread.  
The extensive history of cocaine production in Peru starts at the end of the 19th century (Gootenberg 
2008). The first case of isolation of cocaine in 1859, by the chemist, Albert Nieman, was followed by a 
worldwide resounding success. In 1884, Karl Köller successfully anesthetized the human eye using 
cocaine hydrochloride. This had an impact on the medical use of cocaine and led to subsequent 
research on the same. The German pharmaceutical firm, Merck, produced cocaine on a  large scale.73 
In the  decades that followed, the drug was increasingly used as an anesthetic as well as a treatment 
for alcoholism, depression and prolonged fatigue, in the United States and Europe (Gootenberg 2008: 
23-30; Durand Ochoa 2014: 37).74  Moreover, cocaine was used as an ingredient in the production of 
wine (Vin Mariani, Vin du Coca du Pérou de Chevrier), crèmes and pills to name a few. Peruvian cocaine 
became an essential commodity for the country, which was traded on the world market (Gootenberg 
1999, 2008; Cotler 1999: 22).  
In 1905, Peru exported 1,600 tons of coca and 5 tons of cocaine, which accounted for roughly half of 
the total worldwide production. Exports were made mainly to Germany, the USA and to France. In 
1901, the USA for example, imported 863,252 kilos of coca and 461 kilos of cocaine. However, only 
eight years later, the volume of Peru’s export diminished significantly. From 1890 until about 1912, 
when Java took the lead, Peru was the world’s leading producer of coca and industrial cocaine 
(reaching 10t in 1901). The Dutch colony found more efficient and innovative methods to produce 
coca. The success of the coca crop and the huge global demand for it, led European powers to plant 
coca in different locations worldwide. The Dutch experience in Java was the most successful in this 
regard. This led to a drastic reduction in the number of coca plantations and the export of cocaine. In 
1913, Peru exported 3.3 tons of cocaine and 393 tons of coca, and two years later, export stood at 1.4 
tons of cocaine and remained at 393 tons of coca (Cotler 1999: 22; Gootenberg 1999: 48-49; 2008: 
158).75 A bigger impact came in the 1960s, when coca and cocaine became a globally banned good.  
The increasing international prohibition on the use of coca and cocaine resulted in an overall decrease 
in the production of cocaine, and predictably influenced the Peruvian production as well. The 
 
73 There are two species of coca used to produce cocaine: Erythorxylon coca which has mostly been planted in Peru and 
Erythroxylon novogranatense which is mainly planted in Colombia. 
74 Among others, Sigmund Freud became an advocate for coca and coca (Gootenberg 2008: 26).  
75 Julio Cotler estimates 200 tons of coca and 2.5tons of cocaine for 1913 (Cotler 1999: 22) 
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international commitments forced the Dutch to withdraw their highly successful coca and cocaine 
production venture in Java.  International pressure also brought the Peruvian cocaine production into 
a crisis. Production now remained consistent only on the regional levels. The international drug regime 
gathered more and more global political consensus on the ban of cocaine. Ironically, the phase when 
the global prohibition regime was in place from the 1960s was also the time when cocaine became a 
“global drug” (Gootenberg 2008).76 
 
5.3.2 The Development of an Illicit Good 
We can subdivide the development of illicit drug trafficking in Peru in three different phases: 1960 to 
1979; 1979 to 1999; and from 1999 to 2012 (Antezana 2008, Cotler 1999).77 
In the first phase, the year 1960 to 1979, coca production mainly fueled local traditional consumption. 
This phase was marked by key political circumstances both national and international. International 
anti-drug policies drove the process of coca expansion. With the USA as a driving force, an international 
prohibition regime came into existence in the 1960s.78 The UN single convention on drugs ratified in 
the year 1961, in Vienna, was followed by internal drug regulations in Peru, in 1964. In 1971, US-
President Richard Nixon, declared an all-out war on drugs.79 In a politically centralized Peru, the coastal 
elite, centered in Lima, mainly drove the course of prohibition. This elite not only prohibited cocaine 
but also aimed at a more restrictive policy against coca. The latter was, not surprisingly, driven by 
feelings of resentment towards indigenous culture and customs (Cotler 1999: 78). The official 
“declaration of the war on drugs” made the illegal trade even more profitable. There were 
considerable risks associated with the dealing of cocaine, which consequently translated into higher 
“street prices”. It did not take long for smugglers to make good use of this newfound opportunity, 
including Peruvian pioneers in what was soon to become the most lucrative illegal industry in the world 
(Gootenberg 2008). Thus, international pressure caused a global drug to turn illegal, and had a 
significant impact on the local coca economy. By the time the global cocaine market changed, causing 
rising demands, the majority of coca was produced in Peru, primarily in the Alto Huallaga Valley. 
Additionally, there were international factors at play along with the national ones. The possibilities for 
 
76 On the development of Peruvian cocaine also with regard to international and national laws see Gootenberg 2002 (in 
particular 157-241). 
77 For an excellent overview on the history of illegal cocaine see Cotler 1999 
78 For a detailed and fascinating analysis on the shifts of coca and cocaine production as well as the international dimension 
of it see Gootenberg 2008 (especially pg. 143-291). 
79 USA was for a long time a major importer of coca and cocaine. However, as reports on dangerous side effects of cocaine 
grew, the USA banned cocaine 1914 Harrison Act 1922 Jones-Miller Act. While Peru at first refused to sign international 
agreements against drugs, it later gave in to international pressure. (Gootenberg 2008: 190-226; Durand Ochoa 2014: 39), 
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controlling the marginal areas of coca production were low after the coups d’etat of Juan Velasco 
Alvaredo in 1968. Thereby, government action against drug trafficking was restricted. The agrarian 
land reform act, spearheaded by the Velasco regime, also played a key role. Instead of improving the 
agrarian situation, on the contrary, it contributed to an impoverishment of the agrarian population 
(Mayer 2009). Under these exceptional circumstances, the developing cocaine industry, promoted by 
Colombian smuggling networks, provided income opportunities for peasants in the marginal areas of 
Huánuco. 
During the regime of the Peruvian military government headed by Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-
1980), several restrictions against drug trafficking began to be put into place. The Decreto Supremo 
254, implemented in in 1964, already limited coca production zones to some areas in Cusco, Ayacucho 
and Huánuco. However, a new law against the illicit trafficking of drugs was approved on the 21st of 
February, 1978 (Decreto Ley 22095 o Ley de Represión al Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas). This law backed 
eradication operations Mar Verde I and II, campaigns that came under fire for human rights violations. 
These campaigns also provoked a reaction from the cocaleros especially in Huánuco, San Martín and 
Ucayali, where the «Comité Regional de Productores de Coca de la Provincia de Leoncio Prado y 
Anexos» was formed, presided over by Tito Jaime Fernández (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 336; Durand Guevara 
2005). 
The second phase in the development of an illicit good spans from 1979 to 199980. It became the first 
coca boom, which was essentially connected to the increasing cocaine business and the making of a 
“global drug” (Gootenberg 2008). However, there was also growing pressure against coca farmers. The 
growing demand for cocaine in the USA, and the rise of the Colombian smuggling networks, 
contributed to a rise in the demand for Peruvian coca and its derivatives. Cocaine became even more 
popular, particularly in the East coast and the night clubs of Miami. This coca boom would change and 
influence the Andean countries in the years to come.  
The international market had a stimulating effect on Peruvian coca production and the proliferation of 
PBC. The growing demand for cocaine and the expanding smuggling networks coincided with internal 
political and economic factors. A foreign debt crisis that affected most of South America was 
particularly painful for Peru from 1983 onwards. The Peruvian GNP dropped 12% while inflation was 
up to 250% (Dreyfus 1999: 376; Fonseca 1992: 510). In part, the informal and illegal economy absorbed 
unemployed dwellers, impoverished peasants and those seeking for new opportunities and financial 
outcome. Because of the growing demand for coca leaves in the production of cocaine, working 
 
80 The exact end of the first coca boom is debatable (eg. Antezana 2008 sets it in 1998), but it is obvious that from the mid-
1990s onwards, the production of coca and PBC decreased substantially, a fact which will be explained later in this chapter.  
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opportunities increased even more. Prices for coca were high and since transportation was provided 
by smuggling networks, the crop could be planted in remote areas. State services as well as access to 
the licit markets in these remote areas was difficult, thus coca provided a good and probably the only 
source of income. A contributing factor was the national conflict and the fight against the guerrilla 
groups, which in particular, led to an upsurge in coca production in the VRAEM and the Alto Huallaga. 
The national and international dynamics influenced coca production and increased it tremendously. 
Numbers vary with regard to the extent of coca production. However, it grew steadily from the 1970s 
onwards: In the early 1970s, coca production was about 10,000ha, while in 1979, it was already at 
65,000, before it reached between 120,000ha and 200,000ha in the mid-1990s, 55% of these in the 
Alto Huallaga (CVR 2003 IV: 312; McClintock 1988: 128; Dreyfus 1999: 376).81  In the 1980s, Peru 
became the primary producer of coca worldwide, constituting for approximately 65% of the global 
coca production (1985: Bolivia 25% and Colombia 10%) (Bagley 2009: 25). The national debate on the 
cultural base for coca production and its consumption, changed into a discussion on drug trafficking, 
driven by an international discourse (Cotler 1999: 86). 
The lucrative illicit trade had an impact on the colonization of marginal areas of the state. In 1974, 54% 
of the coca producing areas were in Cusco, 24% were in Huánuco, and only 1% was in San Martin. Eight 
years later overall production increased and diversified. The share of national coca production in Cusco 
fell by 13%, it increased to 36% in Huánuco and 45% in San Martin, in the Alto Huallaga (Cotler 1999: 
118). The rising demand for coca gave rise to a parallel demand for peasants or workers who would be 
experienced in the process of harvesting coca leaves. Workers would have the opportunity of earning 
three to five times more than what they would have earned in the Sierra. The estimates for the early 
1990s suggest that up to 175,000 people worked in this commodity sector, which was about 7% of the 
economically active population in the rural areas of Peru (Ibd.: 119-120). Consequentially, attracted by 
“easy money”, more people began to migrate into these areas, particularly in the AHV, which was the 
center of coca and PBC production during this time (Ibd.:117-123). This industry also proved to be 
profitable for bigger firmas or cartel members. Likewise, because of the increased demands for coca 
and drug production, a new industry evolved, providing opportunities for working in the coca fields 
and in related sectors. Hence, in turbulent periods, during times of economic calamity and the 
unfolding conflict, the coca and cocaine industry helped to mitigate through the crisis (Durand Ochoa 
2014: 55-56). 
The cocaine boom was marked by the involvement of international drug networks that bought PBC 
and transported it mostly northwards to transform it into cocaine hydrochloride. During the first coca 
 
81 These numbers have to be considered with caution as they are very difficult to verify and the measures as well as the data 
can be put into question. However, they give an indication on the massive growth of coca production during that time.  
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boom from 1970 to 1996, the dominant Colombian “cartels” from Medellin and Cali indulged in large 
scale smuggling operations by the end of the 70s. At the beginning of the 1980s, they created new 
smuggling opportunities – the main producers of the raw material for cocaine during the time were 
Peru and Bolivia (Thoumi 1995, 2006; Gootenberg 2002). The Colombian cartels did not just 
revolutionize drug trafficking, but also dominated the international trade.82 This made traffickers like 
Pablo Escobar and Jorge Luis Ochoa, some of the richest men on earth. They primarily relied on the 
proliferation of the raw material coming mainly from Peru. Production sites for coca, cocaine 
laboratories and landing strips were built in the peripheral areas. Especially in the Alto Huallaga, a 
region, that had historically less control by the state. Given the lack of other opportunities, the coca 
industry was the means to a lucrative option to make a living. Hundreds of people were thus able to 
earn money playing the roles of producers, smugglers, cocineros or as pilot (Monunm; Vrapolm). At 
the beginning of the 1990s, Peru produced about 129,000ha, becoming the primary supplier of coca 
for the illicit drug industry (UNODC 2005).  
Nevertheless, the boom ended in the mid-1990s, and coca cultivation and the production of PBC 
decreased substantially. The reasons were attributed to state intervention, changes in the 
international cocaine business and a fungus (Fusarium) that destroyed vast amounts of coca crops 
(García and Antezana 2010; Marcy 2010; Zevallos 2016). Furthermore, the regime of Alberto Fujimori 
started an unprecedented campaign that employed several combative measures against illegal coca 
plantation. A key factor was the disruption of the “air bridge” (interdicción aerea). Planes suspected of 
transporting PBC or cocaine could be shot down by the military. The second approach was to step up 
the eradication and destruction of coca plants. With the legislative decree 635 of 1991, four additional 
articles concerned illicit drug trafficking in general. Aggravated forms, possession for illicit trafficking, 
distribution of small amounts of drugs and possession for personal use were exempted from penalty. 
The penalties included prison sentences that could extend for up to 25 years (Soberón 2011). 
During the same time in the north of the border, the biggest purchaser of Peruvian PBC, the “cartels” 
of Medellin and Cali, suffered major hits. The manhunt for Pablo Escobar ended with the death of the 
drug capo in 1993, which also signaled the end of the Medellin cartel. This and the subsequent 
dismantling of the Cali “cartel” transformed the Colombian drug trafficking scene for years to come, 
and resulted in a massive change in the international cocaine trade (McDermott 2013; Bowden 2012). 
Because of their global importance, the killing of Escobar and the disruption of the Cali cartel by the 
mid-1990s had a major impact on the international drug scene. After the disruption of both major 
Colombian cartels, the prices for coca and PBC were dwindling in the production regions. Initially, there 
 
82 Partly, the growth and importance of the Colombian cartels was driven by their geographic location, smuggling expertise 
and industrial crisis – in Medellin for example (Thoumi 1995). 
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were only limited options for selling the products. Moreover, the disruption of the air bridge during 
the Fujimori administration interrupted the constant flow of illegal flights that transported PBC out of 
the Alto Huallaga or VRAEM. Mexican cartels became an increasingly important player, with the result 
that the Peruvian traffickers began to sell their products to Mexicans (Dreyfus 1999: 379; Insight Crime 
2014).83 
Another important aspect was the fungus Fusarium Oxysporum that destroyed most of the coca 
plantations at the beginning of the 1990s. As a result, coca production shifted northward towards 
Colombia. Furthermore, international support for fighting drug trafficking increased considerably. The 
US backed funding for fighting drug trafficking increased from 11 million USD in 1989, to 75 million in 
1999. In the early 1990s, about 80% of US-cooperation was foreseen for the economy. By the end of 
the 1990s, 40% of the funding was allocated to narcotic control (McClintock and Vallas 2003: 6-7.) Peru 
also created a new agency for the fight against drugs (CONTRADROGAS – literally meaning “against 
drugs”) in 1996. Finally, in spite of the dismantling of bigger cocaine cartels, the coca production in 
Colombia remained stable at the beginning of the nineties. According to the UNODC, this was followed 
by an extremely prolific period in 2000, when production expanded to 163,000ha (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Coca Cultivation in Peru (1980-2010) 
 
                      Source: ENLCD 2012 
 
From the mid-1990s until the end of the decade, cocaine processing and coca production declined. For 
a brief period, it seemed the strategy focused more on alternative development and the integration 
 
83 There has never been a big cartel in Peru such as in Colombia, one that controlled production, and transportation to the 
consumer markets. Although big cartels such as Demetrio Chavez Peñaherrera, alias El Vaticano, played a huge role in 
providing drugs for Colombian cartels, the latter had control over the last part of the production chain until the mid-1990s. 
Later, Mexican drug traffickers played an increasingly important role. Nevertheless, there has always be an influence of the 
illicit economy on politics. During the Fujimori regime, the involvement of the state became more ambiguous. (Insight Crime 
2014: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/peru-drug-traffickers-political-broker-vladimiro-montesinos)  
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of cocaleros than on repressive means. In 1991, the Fujimori administration decriminalized illegal coca 
plantations, the cocaleros became accepted interlocutors, and there were signs of an integral anti-
drug policy. However, shortly afterwards and perhaps because of pressure from the USA, drug policies 
became more repressive and led to an increased role for the military in the fight against drug 
trafficking. It also led to the resignation of Hernando de Soto, head of the Peruvian drug control policy, 
who advocated a civilian based solution (Rojas 2005: 191-194; Durand Ochoa 2014: 60).  
Coca producing regions suffered because of the above-mentioned reasons and suffered an abrupt 
downfall. While the 80s and early 90s are comparable to a gold rush in the coca growing areas, the 
second half of the 1990s can be better described as an economic crisis in the coca producing regions. 
Not only did the production decrease, but it also resulted in the sharp decline of prices for coca and its 
illicit derivative. The prices of PBC fell from 850 USD to 100 USD, while a kilogram of coca sold for no 
more than 0.40 cents in 1995, coming down from the earlier price of three USD (Cotler 1999: 129). The 
Fujimori administration was praised for its efforts in fighting drugs and for the ensuing reduction in 
coca production, even though it was the result of many different factors such as the fungus and 
fluctuations in international drug trafficking (Rojas 2005). Moreover, even though the Peruvian 
government received international praise for reducing coca production, in the 1990s there are various 
accusations of state officials in the highest levels of the Fujimori administration and the military being 
involved in the drug business. 
While the volume of drug trafficking decreased, it certainly did not cease. Interestingly, the Fujimori 
government was maligned by rumours of high levels of corruption and the involvement of the military 
in drug trafficking. During the Garcia and Belaunde administration, the involvement of the military and 
police officials in the drug trade was very much apparent. However, during the Fujimori administration, 
the level of corruption was astounding. Fujimori appointed Vladimiro Montesinos as special adviser 
and head of the SNI.84 Since Fujimori was an outsider in politics with no links to the higher ranks of the 
Peruvian military, he chose former army captain Montesinos in an attempt to get more control of the 
military. Montesino relentlessly amplified his power and essentially controlled large fractions of the 
military and police (Obando 1998, Rojas 2005). As a US cable reads: “There is no one who stands toe-
to-toe with Montesinos in the Peruvian government, and nothing that the government does on 
intelligence, enforcement and security issues occurs without his blessing” (cited from Insight Crime 
2012). The USA supported Montesinos until the end of the Fujimori-regime (see Rojas 2005: 208). 
Several accusations, that include Montesino’s direct involvement in orchestrating large-scale drug 
 
84 On Montesinos see Rospigliosi (l2000);  
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trafficking, hold up to this day (Rojas 2005; Cawley 2014).85 One of the biggest Peruvian drug 
traffickers, Demitrio Limoniel Chávez Peñaherrera also known as El Vaticano, claimed in his legal 
proceedings that he had to pay 50,000 USD as a monthly fee, for transporting Drugs out of the Alto 
Huallaga (El Comercio 2012). Additionally, El Vaticano testified that he paid 3,000 to 5,000 USD per 
flight, for 280 flights between 1990 and 1992.  
Montesinos attained considerable success in the fight against the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso, 
and was effective in reducing the volume of coca production and drug transportation. However, on 
the other hand, there were the several alleged links that associate him with the drug traffickers. 
International intelligence was aware of his increasing power and its role in Peruvian drug trafficking, 
but hailed the success in the fight against Sendero Luminoso (for an excellent overview see Rojas 2005; 
Quiroz 2013). Montesinos’ power increased consistently, with the result that he monopolized 
intelligence and drug control, obtaining thus considerable influence over the armed forces.86 
Involvement in drug trafficking was only one aspect of Montesinos’ portfolio of illicit activities. Among 
others, these included arms trafficking to the FARC in Colombia. Furthermore, the CVR concludes that 
the SIN was deeply involved in drug trafficking by that time! “el SIN, según múltiples evidencias, un 
actor mas en la marana corresiva del narcotráfico” (CVR Tomo V 2003: 768). A cable of the US 
ambassador in Peru reads:  
“Former President Alberto Fujimori´s (1990-2000) intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, for 
example, collaborated with top army and other security officials to develop a web of protection 
for favored drug traffickers while cooperating with U.S. Officials to combat others. To many 
observers, that was Peru´s “heyday” of narco-corruption (…)” (cited in Durand 2014: 61).  
Several cases against members of the state security forces which were accused of being involved in 
drug trafficking, including generals in the AHV during the Fujimori government, support this claim (CVR 
766.). In the aftermath of the elections of 2000, a video was released that showed Montesinos bribing 
an opposition lawmaker. Montesinos was arrested in 2001 and faced several charges that included 
arms trafficking and corruption. It was probably the presence of Montesinos that prevented the 
formation of a big drug trafficking organization in Peru (Lijourm1). The Montesinos case revealed the 
existence of a far-reaching network of corruption, one that included political-military chiefs of the 
Huallaga Front (Obando 1998: 400).  
The period spanning the beginning of 1999 until 2012, marks a point of recovery for coca production. 
It also heralded the gradual increase of drug production in Peru up to the point that in 2012, the 
 
85 There are allegations that Montesinos recieved drug money before Fujimori was elected. Roberto Escobar claims, 
Montesinos received one million USD for Fujimori’s election campaign (NY times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/14/world/peru-congress-ousts-its-president-fujimori-ally.html) 
86 Decrees 25626 and 25635, 21 July 1992 El Comando Operativo del Frente Interno (cited in Rojas 2005: 196) 
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country became the primary producer of coca and cocaine (UNODC 2013). Again, international and 
national dynamics facilitated this increase, particularly, the stricter methods the military and Plan 
Columbia employed in fighting drug production in Colombia (Thoumi 2003; Mejía and Restrepo 2009; 
Mejía 2015.). Additionally, new smuggling routes and new distribution markets such as Brazil, created 
incentives for the fast-expanding production in Peru. The structure of smuggling changed considerably 
in comparison to the 1990s. The influencing factors were the dismantling of the big drug cartels in 
Colombia, and the intense involvement of Mexican and Bolivian trafficking networks. Moreover, local 
trafficking and production were more fragmented and diversified (see actors below). By the end of the 
1990s, the national agency that fought drug trafficking during the time, CONTRADROGAS, promoted 
eradication efforts, primarily in the Alto Huallaga Valley. The increasing efforts to eradicate coca, 
however, did not lead to a decrease in coca production but instead provoked resistance and triggered 
a radicalization of the coca farmers (see below “Cocaleros”). Changes in legislation, such as the law 
27,817, of August 2002, which modified article 298 of the criminal code and law 28,002 of 2003, 
complemented the legislation on illicit drug trafficking and selling in Peru (Soberón 2011).87 
Nevertheless, legislation could not prevent the further increase of coca and drug production in Peru. 
Instead of resulting in sustainable success, the state policies only led to a reorganization of coca 
production and drug smuggling.  
Although the intensity of coca production never matched the levels of 1992 again, the gradual growth 
of coca revived illicit opportunities. Prices of Peruvian coca increased consistently from its lowest level 
in 1995. The period also saw a resilient movement of cocalero farmers demanding rights to plant coca 
(see chapter below). Production gradually increased again, this time mainly because of efforts to 
destroy the Colombian coca production. On the other hand, Peruvian coca and cocaine production 
peaked in 2012, when Peru became the major producer of both (UNODC 2013). According to UNODC 
estimates, cocaleros produced 62.500 ha of coca in 2011 and 42.900 ha in 2014. The argument 
justifying this new decline was pointed to the extended eradication program that had varying degrees 
of success in different regions88. In recent times, the vast majority of coca, more than 87,000t, is 
produced exclusively for the illicit drug market (UNODC 2015).89  
The prohibition of cocaine illegalized not just cocaine, but largely, also the coca business. Numerous 
attempts at eradication failed to stop the illegal plantation of coca and the production of drugs. Entities 
fighting coca production in Peru, including the Proyecto Especial de Control y Reducción de Cultivos 
 
87 For a recent analysis of drug legislation and prison population in Peru, see Dammert and Dammert 2015 
88 more than 31.000 ha have been destroyed in 2014 (DEVIDA) 
89 Estimates for cocaine production are around 300tons following a WOLA analysis from 2012 
(http://www.wola.org/commentary/un_and_us_estimates_for_cocaine_production_contradict_each_other) 
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Ilegales en el Alto Huallaga (CORAH) might have been successful for a short time and from a regional 
perspective, but could not affect the overall national production level in a sustainable manner. Today, 
Peru is the second biggest producer of coca and cocaine after Colombia.  
5.3.3 What are the aspects of the illicit drug economy today? 
In Peru, coca and cocaine production are not the only illicit economies. Further unlawful markets exist 
in the country, such as illegal mining, illegal logging, counterfeiting, and other illegal sources of money. 
Often, these illicit markets are not completely detached from legal businesses. The entanglements are 
often difficult to observe, but important to understand, since they have far reaching social and also 
political consequences. Within the production chain of cocaine, there are several overlaps with regard 
to legality, informality and illegality. For example, chemicals used in the production of drugs are 
difficult to regulate because they are used for legal businesses as well. Moreover, cement, gasoline 
and lime are also import ingredients in the production of cocaine and PBC, but can be purchased 
legally.90 Additionally, the ingredients in the production of PBC and cocaine can be substituted because 
of diversification in the methods of production. As a police officer in the Alto Huallaga mentions to me 
during an interview:  
 [...] they did it with kerosene but now there is no kerosene, so they do it with ether, or gasoline. 
The chemical inputs can vary, because chemistry has an almost infinite range. […] Chemical 
inputs are also necessary to use in other areas such as agriculture, cleaning etc. […] you will 
need these supplies and gasoline right? Without it, the vehicles do not work. What would I do 
with a beautiful Mercedes Benz if I do not have gasoline. "(Agupolcm) 
For the analysis, we need to consider overlaps between legal and illegal markets, not only for the raw 
materials, but also for sources of transport, which involves legal as well as illegal means. The means of 
transportation ranged from hidden packs of PBC and Cocaine in “taxis”, to illegal landing strips. 
Transportation via planes and the carrying of PBC and cocaine by mochileros91 was another effective 
means of dispersing them. Finally, legal businesses also profit from the illegal businesses in the form 
of investments and because of higher income for their businesses. 
Unlike in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the production and retailing structure of illicit 
drugs is much more diversified today. Most actors who are involved are vertically less integrated and 
horizontally more varied. Each step, from the producing of the raw material until its commercialization 
in Rio de Janeiro, New York or Berlin, is part of a global value chain. It all begins in the coca producing 
valleys, where the raw material is produced. This initial step involves a high number of workers that 
 
90 On chemicals see Antezana 2010; Vizcarra 2014 
91 Smuggler of drugs who use backpacks (spanish: mochila) for transportation.  
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include owners of small parcels and farmhands who are involved with working in the fields. It also 
comprises a secondary work circle that includes agricultural chemicals and people transporting the 
coca leaves. The next step involves the refinement of the raw material first to pasta basica de cocaina 
(PBC), which is transported to the shipment points and further refined to cocaine before it is 
transported via a land route to the national ports at the coast or to illegal landing strips in the region.92  
Hence, on the national level, drug economy includes a variety of actors that include the ones on all 
levels of society, from the farmer on the local level, to the national political representatives and 
middlemen who facilitate the trade and the smuggling of goods. The state developed a dense system 
of different agents fighting illicit activities. However, several cases show a connection between the 
state agents and the drug trade (la Repulica 2014a; Vizcarra and Zevallos 2016). The relationship to 
the illicit economy might be because of the disregard for the law, for example, accepting bribes and 
not checking certain cars that clearly were being used for trafficking drugs (or controlling those 
indicated by traffickers). It might also be a direct participation in the trafficking of drugs, as several 
reports on cases of police and military involvement show (e.g. OjoPúblico 2017). 
Table 5 Groups and Actors in Drug Economy 
Type of Activity  Type of group and activity  Area of activity  
Agricultural  Peones (“farmhands”): usually hired for harvesting coca leaves in part working by daily 
agreements 
Cocaleros: coca cultivating peasants (large-scale and small-scale). Representation. 
Lo
cal/ D
istrict level 
Cocaine Processing  Pasteleros: processing coca pasta (professionals and peasant entrepreneur)  
Stampers: workers in maceration pits  
Chemists: using chemicals for the production of coca paste and cocaine  
Coca Gathering  
 
Acopiadores: coca pasta or unrefined cocaine gatherers  
 
Smuggling Burros: small-scale cocaine smugglers (independent or working for firma,  
road smuggling)  
Mochileros: small-scale cocaine smugglers Mostly young men. Carrying up to 20kg in back 
packs (Spanish: Mochila) (road smuggling or smuggling by foot)  
Pilots: cocaine smugglers transporting drugs in planes  
Smugglers of chemical: those who transport the chemicals needed for cocaine  
 
R
egio
n
al/ N
atio
n
al level 
Source: data based on own sources and van Dun 2009 
 
Since the second coca boom at the end of the 1990s, there was a fanning out of drug traders and 
diversification of transportation sites that shifted eastwards towards Brazil. Furthermore, new 
shipping routes via West Africa to Europe were discovered.  Different international players such as the 
 
92 For a detailed analysis of drug production see VRAEM chapter. On the value chain see also Vizcarra and Lopez 2012 
 
 
100 
Bolivians, Brazilian and Paraguayans also came into the picture (Vrapold). Gradually, cocaine 
production regained force, and family clans took control over local production. The Mexican cartels 
gained more importance in the drug trafficking business, and play an important role in the trade up to 
this day. New illegal airstrips had been built in areas that were relatively inaccessible, like in Pichis 
Palcazu and the VRAEM (DEVIDA 2014: 23). 
Today, family clans and smaller gangs run local drug trafficking in Peru. There seems to be no single 
person or group who dominates or controls large shares of the business: “They are all medium-sized 
businesses. Once they grow too big, they are either busted by the police, or move out of the region, 
buying property in other areas” (Interview UN official). After the collapse of the Colombian cartels, and 
a restructuring of cocaine trafficking, these local “firmas” took over. During the first boom of cocaine, 
leading members began theire smuggling operations from the 1970s to the 1990s (van Dun 2016: 5).  
These firmas rely on loose networks that involve different people in the production of cocaine.  
While the hectare size of coca decreased, the quality and production output increased (UNODC 2015). 
Moreover, the skills of chemists who were involved in the production of cocaine improved; they 
needed less coca to produce one kilogramm of cocaine, which is also a testament to the quality of the 
coca leaves in the area.93 The leaves contained higher amounts of alkaloid compared to the crop in 
other parts. Besides, the method of planting coca had diversified which allowed the farmers to plant 
more coca per ha. The production potential in the VRAEM is much lower. This means potentially less 
work for peasants, but still reflects decent earnings for traffickers and cocineros – diversification of 
production sites. Hence, actors, the value chain and production have diversified in the drug economy 
today and it will be further examined in depth in the analysis of the regions.  
 
5.4 Highlighting Actors 
Some actors with connections to drug trafficking and coca production were mentioned previously in 
the study. The following will highlight the roles of four diverse actors: the cocaleros, the guerrillas, the 
self-defense forces, and the state. All show a connection to the coca and a direct or indirect 
involvement in the drug economy. For our analysis, it is important to give a basic introduction about 
 
93 Due to the legislation, it is difficult to evaluate how much coca is needed to produce one kg of cocaine, but the estimation 
in 2008 by UNODC seems outdated. They estimated 375kg of dried coca are necessary to produce 1kg of cocaine. Interviews 
with “cocineros” suggest that this number is a lot lower today. However, valid data can only be gathered after restrictions for 
research on this issue are lowered (DEVIDA 2015: 25). 
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their role within the margins of the state and their relationship, with regard to the coca and cocaine 
economy.  
5.4.1 Non-State Actors 
Cocaleros  
The cocalero movement played an important role in the national discussion on coca and for local rule. 
In particular, from 2000 to 2005, they formed an influential front against the state and the strategy for 
eradication, with charismatic leaders at its front. Though the movement formed already in 1958 in 
Cusco, the importance of FEPACYL grew after the criminalization of coca in 1978 (Durand Ochoa 2014: 
55).94 The cocalero movement launched a number of strikes and protests, especially in the aftermath 
of the US-supported eradication campaigns of Mar Verde I, Mar Verde II, Bronco I, and Bronco II. 
Nevertheless, none of the movements were able to curb drug policies and decriminalize its national 
production (Ibd: 55). However, during the internal conflict, the fight against the guerrillas and their 
influence became the priority in the cocalero regions, and hence the coca movement lost its influence. 
Because of severe damage to infrastructure, and threats to lives, the political discourse on coca 
became less relevant.  
After the conflict, the fight for coca production regained momentum. Nationally, several organisations 
existed to support the cause of coca production, but they had different approaches (table 6). Their 
positions changed over the years and some ceased to exist due to state intervention.  
Table 6 Cocalero Organizations 
Organization Position Main demands 
FEPACACYL/ 
APOCAS 
(Cusco and 
Puno) 
- Influence from politically leftist parties (PUM and 
Patria Roja) 
- Connected to centres of peasants and to the CCP 
on the national level 
- Most importantly, demanding the extension of 
purchasing coca by ENACO including financing 
and incentives for peasants 
FEPAVRAE 
(Ayacucho) 
- Various positions, not restricted towards one 
party 
- Positions depend on leaders 
- Main projection entity is DEVIDA and agencies 
advocating for alternative development 
- Demanding a dialogue for “voluntary 
eradication” and the increase of prices for legal 
coca 
APHOC 
Tocache/ 
APAL-A 
(Alto 
Huallaga) 
- Radical positions, in particular, dismissal of 
foreign interest and promotion of coca 
production 
- Demands directed mainly towards the Ministry 
of the Interior and DEVIDA.  
- Argued for a stop of forced eradication and a 
replacement 
 
94 By then, they began to lobby for cocaleros, first under the FECACYL and then the Frente Nacional de Defensa de los 
Productores de la Hoja de Coca (– FEDNDEPCO) that united cocaleros from the valleys of Cusco, Sandia, Upper Huallaga and 
Apurímac-Ene (Durand Ochoa 2014: 55). 
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APAVM 
(Monzón) 
- Was one of the most aggressive groups 
- Radical view against the state and relative 
support of drug trafficking 
- Demanded  the state to immediately stop 
forced eradication and the penetration of the 
area 
Source: based on Durand Guevara 2005 and interviews during field work 
The CONAPA-Peru was formed in 1998 in Lima connecting eight different federations and groups such 
as APALP-A or the affiliated OARA (Ashánikas del río Apurímac) and four women peasant associations 
of the VRAE, Tingo María, Uchiza and Monzón (Durand Guevara 2005). The collaboration between 
these different sections has been difficult, but for a short period, they followed a concerted effort. The 
reason was the state policy and the threat of eradication. The growing efforts of CONTRADROGAS to 
eradicate coca increased the resistance of coca farmers. During the course of the Fujimori 
administration, growing protests against eradication in the Monzón Valley, Alto Huallaga Valley and 
Padre Abad Valley, forced the government to initiate talks regarding the eradication processes (Rojas 
2005: 213). The dialogue continued under the new administration, but there was no headway. At the 
same time, forced eradication continued. With the entry of Nelson Palomino in the VRAEM as a leading 
figure, came a new generation of leaders who were more aggressive and radical in their demands. In 
association with the influential leader of the Monzón Valley, Iburcio Morales, a new slogan was coined 
by the cocaleros: “coca o muerte” – coca or death. After the negotiations with the government failed, 
a nationwide protest began in June with the march in Lima. It was a major demonstration showing the 
strength of the movement and its capacity for mass mobilization. This resulted in a settlement with 
the Toledo administration (Durand 2013; Rojas 2005: 216).  
In January 2003, a national congress of the Cuencas Cocaleras took place in Peru and around 1,200 
dirigentes cocaleros participated. Among them were Nancy Obregón, Elsa Malpartida and Flavio 
Sánchez Moreno for the Alto Huallaga, and Nelson Palomino and Marisela Guillén for the VRAE. The 
most important outcome of this encounter was the creation of the Confederación Nacional de las 
Cuencas Cocaleros del Perú (CONPACCP) with Nelson Palomino and Nancy Obregón as secretary 
generals (O’Brien 2008: 43-44). Their demands included the discontinuing of eradication, the 
deactivation of DEVIDA, the validation of the coca leaf as a symbol of national heritage worth 
protecting, and the withdrawal of the 1961 UN single convention on drugs (Ibd.). The perception grew 
that the government would not comply with its promises. A majority of the farmers were unsatisfied 
with the participatory eradication program offered by the government.95 This led to renewed protests 
and precipitated clashes with security forces. Palomino became the most prominent cocalero leader 
in the VRAEM and within the country. His fluency in Quechua and his faculty for “dominating the 
masses”, fetched him widespread support initially in the VRAEM and soon after, nationally as well. In 
 
95 This program offered wages from US $16 per day, up to US $500, food packages and the possibility to get a job in 
infrastructure projects for coca farmers that would eradicate their coca (Rojas 2005: 219).  
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August 2002, he became the leader of FEPAVRAE. Between June and August 2002, FEPAVRAE signed 
an agreement with DEVIDA and the Ministry for Agriculture, for the gradual and voluntary eradication 
of coca (Durand Ochoa 2014: 66).  
Later, Palomino claimed he had never signed such an agreement. Instead, he used a more aggressive 
language against the state and agencies responsible for promoting alternative development. He 
prepared the cocaleros for a violent defence of the coca, although in contrast to the Upper Huallaga 
Valley, there had been no large-scale eradication in the VRAEM. On November 3rd, Palomino 
announced an indefinite strike if the DEVIDA, other NGOs and development agencies would not 
withdraw from the valley. Former Interior Minister Rospigliosi assumes that Palomino wanted to incite 
violence in order to disrupt harmony (Durand Ochoa 2014: 67). Palomino’s popularity rose further and 
soon he was projected as “the leader of the valley”. He also became the secretary general of the newly 
formed national representation of cocaleros in Peru, CONPACCP. As Palominos’s popularity and power 
grew, so did the suspicion and accusations against him. State actors were most emphatic in levelling 
these accusations. Palomino was incarcerated in February 2003, on charges of terrorism and drug 
trafficking among others. Although the charges of terrorism were later dropped, Palomino stayed in 
prison because of other criminal charges and in may 2004 he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. 
In response to Palominos’s incarceration, and as a form of protest against state actions, the cocaleros 
organized a protest march in Lima. The March of Sacrifice towards Lima, in April 2003, was one of the 
more well-known actions of the CONPACCP and was based on two main demands: the protesters 
wanted the state to initiate a dialogue with the CONPACCP to resolve a strike in Aguaytía and they 
wanted Nelson Palomino to be released.96 The incarcerations of Palomino severely affected the 
cocalero movement, even though they could organize the march in Lima and were able to mobilize 
support. With Palomino in jail, the cocalero movement had lost its most charismatic figure. No other 
leader could fill the void he left in the cocalero leadership, the VRAEM and even at the national level. 
Additionally, the national organization CONPACCP broke into two factions, in the process, losing 
momentum and national influence. The cocalero movement did not retain the same level of unanimity 
as before and cooperation with other peasant organizations and unions were rather declarative. The 
cocaleros did not get much support from other sections of the society either (Durand Guevara 2005: 
 
96 Two groups of about 6,000 people arrived in Lima. One group was from the VRAE and the other was from the valleys along 
the Alto Huallaga, Monzón, Aguaytía and Uchiza rivers. These two groups started to march from different areas and after 
meeting at a certain point, marched together to the Palace of Justice, demanding a dialogue with President Toledo. On April 
23, President Toledo met with a delegation of 32 cocaleros, Solari and the heads of DEVIDA and ENACO at the presidential 
Palace. The major result of that meeting was the formulation of a new law, Supreme Decree 044 (Decreto Supremo 044 – DS 
044) that foresaw among others, a gradual and concerted reduction in coca cultivation and the update of the legal coca 
registries of ENACO. As such, the cocaleros transformed from “illegitimate” to social actors, recognized as such by politicians. 
However, the movement did not gain support from important political and social leaders, and was not successful on the 
national level  (Durand Ochoa 2014: 71-74). 
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8).97 Moreover, the Toledo administration now followed a more restrictive course against the 
movement. Today, within the valley, and on a local level, cocalero leaders still have a prominent 
position.  
The movement was able to organize a second March of Sacrifice in 2004, but without being able to 
garner sufficient support and even without getting a chance to discuss their demands on a higher 
executive level.  Because of this, the movement split into two sections; One that supported the gradual 
eradication and another that was against it. Most of the Upper Huallaga and Aguaytía valleys 
comprised the first faction; the Apurímac-Ene, Monzón and La Convención and Lares valley formed the 
other group. Furthermore, because of the radicalization of the movement, the cocaleros lost 
acceptance from society. From the mid-2000’s, the national cocalero movement had no influence left 
anymore on a national level. Nevertheless, the cocaleros still wielded considerable influence in the 
regional and local level, for instance, in the valley of Monzón (Durand Ochoa 2014: 124-144). Today, 
cocalero leaders in the VRAEM enjoy a respectable reputation in society, and often hold a position as 
local authority as well. Consequently, even if their influence on the national level is low and they 
struggle to push for a national agenda, they still have considerable influence and support on the local 
level.  
The Guerrilla, the Coca and Illicit Economy  
The cocaine boom in the 80s also coincided with the guerrilla movement. While Sendero Luminoso 
(the Shining Path) was not interested in the drug trade at the beginning, the guerrilla movement that 
was active in the Alto Huallaga, was closely associated with drug trafficking and the production of coca. 
In the 1980s, the guerrillas moved to the Alto Huallaga, where coca farmers did not have   any form of 
protection, and were exploited by drug traffickers. The Guerrilla front of the Alto Huallaga offered the 
farmers protection. Subsequently, the income generated from the coca and drug trade helped the 
guerrillas to finance their fight against the state in the Alto Huallaga Valley as they also derived their 
income by imposing taxes on the drug traffickers (Gonzales 1994; Dreyfus 1999; Felbab-Brown 2008; 
Gorriti 2013). Until the capture of its leader, Artemio, in 2012, the Alto Huallaga front remained active 
in the region. In the VRAEM, the relationship between drug trafficking and the guerrilla was different. 
In the VRAEM, the drug trade financed the fight of the autodefensas against the Sendero Luminoso 
(see in the next chapter). During the course of several interviews, it has been highlighted that the coca 
and the illicit economy was indirectly responsible for the final defeat of Sendero Luminoso in the valley.  
Today, the remnants of Sender Luminoso are located only in the area of Vizcatán. They sought to profit 
from the militarization approach of the state and provided safe passage to drug traffickers. Under the 
 
97 This is also one major difference to the Bolivian case. 
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banner of Proseguir, the group launched attacks on government forces and in 2003, they kidnapped 
workers who were involved in the laying of the Camisea gas pipeline (Rojas 2005: 221). Although their 
attempts to endorse themselves as protectors of coca farmers against possible eradication was not 
necessarily successful throughout the whole VRAEM, they were still able to plan and carry out attacks 
on state security agents, as was seen in 2016 and in 2017 (El Comercio). The presence of the remnants 
of Sendero Luminoso in the VRAEM is the major reason for the region still being under a state of 
emergency.  
The connections of Sendero Luminoso in the VRAEM are agreed upon amongst analysts, reporters and 
police agents. In 2015, the US treasury had three leaders of the Shining Path on its list of drug 
traffickers; Florence Halla and the brothers Quispe Palomino, who operated in the VRAEM (OFAC 
2015). While Florence Halla was captured in 2012, the Quispe Palomino group is still active. Drug 
trafficking shifted to transportation through mochilleros over land and increased the need for armed 
protection against police patrols but also against other drug traffickers. Sendero Luminoso 
fundamentally became the armed shield for the narcotraficantes.98 
The Comites de Autodefensas (CAD) 
While one of the main assurances of the guerrilla had been to “free the peasants” from a system of 
exploitation, the actual rule of the guerrilla turned out to be rather brutal. The rule of Sendero 
Luminoso is still part of public memory for the people living in the region. This included public torture, 
a killings and strict regulation of movement that included closing down of roads and controlling 
entrances to villages (CVR 2003). The group gave out elite positions to people who would abide by 
their rules and norms, thereby, disrupting local governance structures (Degregori 1996). Compliance 
was demanded by the guerrilla group and was often enforced brutally (Bezan 2013). Till this day, many 
people in the regions I analyzed speak openly about the horrors of those times. Because of the 
atrocities, the local population formed vigilante groups and developed an armed opposition against 
the guerrilla group. By the beginning of the 1980s, peasants formed self-defence groups. The first 
groups had already been formed in Cajamarca before the conflict as rondas campesinas, and expanded 
rapidly due to insecurity and violence. There is a general consensus that these self-defence groups 
played a decisive role in defeating Sendero Luminoso (Degregori et al. 1996; Starn 1998; CVR 2003 
Tomo II 437-462; Zech 2015). 
 
98 In media articles and official statements, this guerrilla group is often labeled ”narcoterrorists“, which seems to be an 
oversimplifying term. While it is true that the Quispe Palomino group earn their money in relationship to drug trafficking, 
they nevertheless keep an ideological background. I think this is important to keep in mind when analyzing this group, because 
they are still able to recruit followers and keep them in line, even though with less success compared to the time in the 1980s.  
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There is a need to differentiate between the different types of self-defence groups in Peru. Three 
distinctive types can be found: the rondas campesinas in the departamentos Cajamarca, Amazonas 
and San Martín, the ronda campesina integrante de comunidades campesinas active mainly in Áncash, 
La Libertad, Lambayeque, Cusco and Puno, and lastly, the CADs in Ayacucho, Junín, Apurímac and 
Huánuco. (Defensoría 2010: 14). The first two groups primarily based their ideology on identity and 
communal autonomy, in relation with providing security, development and justice. The CADs on the 
other hand, primarily employed an anti-terrorist strategy, which was supported by the Peruvian 
military (Defensoría 2010: 14).99 The regions that have been studied for this thesis were mainly in 
Ayacucho and Huánuco. Therefore, I will concentrate on the CADs as a major force of selfdefense. In 
VRAEM, they were known as DECAS (Defensa Civil Antisubversiva), until they were formally identified 
as CADS in 1991. 
The CADs were officially recognized under the Fujimori administration in November 1991. The law 741 
recognized the CADs as an organization that encouraged the population to develop self-defence 
activities (Law No. 741). The institutionalization of the CADs allowed the use of weapons and they were 
“supervised” or were rather under the command of the military (Article 3). Nevertheless, even though 
they were connected to the state, they functioned independently and played a crucial role in fighting 
Sendero Luminoso and later took control of the areas. They focused on public security, acted as a quasi 
police force and were therefore, instrumental in preserving social order. Although the connection 
between the narco business and the autodefensas is not a simple or causal one, they are nevertheless, 
unquestionably linked. The drug economy helped in buying weapons and paying members of the self-
defence groups. Since they were peasants they needed to be reimbursed when not working in the 
fields. This point will be explored as we will see below. The specific role of the CADs differed in context 
of the regions in which they were operating. Therefore, I will highlight the specific aspects of these 
groups in the respective chapters. 
 
5.4.2 The State and its Drug Trafficking Policies 
The story of Peruvian cocaine and coca is also a story that has international dimensions. As discussed 
earlier, coca and cocaine production was legal and regulated for a long time until the mid-20th century. 
 
99 The CVR distinguishes two types of rondas: those in the departments of the North Cajamarca and Piura which have been 
recognized during the government of Alan Garcia Pérez with the law 24571 in 1986 as „rondas campesinas pacíficas, 
democraticas y autónomas“. The other group was understood as Comités de Defensa Civil or rondas contrasubersivas“ that 
defended themselfs against Sendero Luminoso (CVR 1991) the former was institutionalized with the ley 741 in 1991. 
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The production met the international demand for cocaine, which was used for medical purposes by 
that time. The international criminalization of drugs also had a huge impact in Peru. 
At the international level, there are three major conventions on the prohibition and regulation of 
narcotics: the UN Single Convention on Drugs of 1961, which was then amended by the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, 1971, and the UN Convention against the Illegal Trafficking of Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma 2008).100 In relation to some substances and 
regions, the convention leaves some room for interpretation and  explores possibilities for traditional 
and cultural use. These interpretations were supposed to be understood and applied by the state in 
question. In the case of coca, this includes a system for licencing of the coca leaf and monopolization 
of the industry. These international norms formed the basis for the national drug policies of Peru. 
Because of the UN Single Convention on Drugs in 1961, cocaine, coca and all related activities involving 
these substances such as commercialization, trafficking or consumption was regarded as illicit. This 
changed later, based on fresh international agreements. However, it initially mounted pressure on 
coca farmers, since the treaty upheld punitive measures against those without a license to grow 
coca.101 In accordance with the new international norms on the control of narcotics, Peru developed 
national strategies to control and fight drug trafficking.  
Part of the coca produced in Peru is licensed and falls under the purview of local regulations. It holds 
a monopoly on the business with coca. By the end of the 1940s, the “Estanco Nacional de Coca” 
managed tasks that dealt with the commercialization of coca. However, with the passing of Law No. 
22095, the job of licensing and commercialization was institutionalized. Since 1978, the Empresa 
Nacional de la Coca (ENACO) holds the monopoly on the buying and selling of coca. ENACO formalized 
the production of coca by registering all legal coca producers and is the legal entity that deals with the 
commercialization of coca. All coca producers who are not registered with ENACO are in fact, not legal, 
but this is de facto which is not punishable by law. Instead, growers who plant coca without 
registration, run the risk of eradication. The registration of 1978 is still a binding factor and was 
extended in the 1990s. There are 34,245 licenses which hold 22,323ha of coca (Zevallos 2016: 68). 
However, the production capacity of these registered coca plantations already exceeds the absorption 
capacity of the traditional market.102 Additionally, in 2011, merely 34% of the registered pieces of land 
 
100 For a detailed analysis of the historical development of the international prohibition regime see Gootenberg 2008; Paoli 
et al. 2012; Armenta and Jelsma 2015; Lessmann 2017. With a particular focus on the USA see Bewley-Taylor 2002. 
101 The UN Single Convention also included opium and cannabis and abolished all non-medical and non-scientific use of 
these plants. For a discussion on the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma 2011. 
102 Zevallos explains that in 2011 the capacity for the 22,434ha coca lies around 50,000t, which exceeds the absorption 
capacity of the legal market by 41,000t. Furthermore, the licenses have ben given out according to the pieces of land, with 
the result that 34,245 licenses have been given out for 31,886 farmers (Zevallos 2016: 68).  
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actively produced to sell their products to ENACO. As a result, only an estimated 1,7% of produced 
coca was sold in the legal market, while the rest was sold on the black market (Zevallos 2016: 67-69). 
A major problem of ENACO is that the black market is financially more attractive for coca peasants: 
ENACO pays for coca depending on its quality and rates it on three levels. For the best quality, ENACO 
pays no more than 70 Soles per arroba (around 12kg), and pays even less for lower quality coca. This 
turnout appears rather unattractive when compared to the competitive prices offered by the black 
market (90-120 Soles/ arroba). 
Following international conventions, the illicitly produced coca should be confiscated (Art. 23 and Art. 
26 UN Single Convention) and illicit plants and production should be destroyed (26 UN Single 
Convention). The cultural production and use of the crop should also be controlled (Art. 22). The 
eradication of coca is also based on international norms (UN-Single Convention) and met in Peru by 
the Proyecto Especial de Control y Reducción de Cultivos Ilegales en el Alto Huallaga (CORAH)103. 
CORAH operates in Aguaytía and the Alto Huallaga, but not in the VRAEM. Its task is to curtail the 
further expansion of coca crops. CORAH eradicated coca for the first time in 1979 and 1980, during 
Mar Verde I and II, in Alto Huallaga. In these two operations, CORAH destroyed 54,646ha of coca (CVR 
2003 Tomo IV).104 While the eradication prompted various peasants to join alternative development 
programs and plant crops other than coca (van Dun 2009: 263), its success in establishing a sustainable 
anti-drug policy is debatable. As discussed, changes in the international drug trafficking scene, the 
fungus and the growing coca production in Colombia, are factors that contributed to the decrease in 
coca production. It also triggered the growth of the cocalero movement and support for the guerrillas 
(Felbab-Brown 2010; Durand Ochoa 2014). In 1998, the forced eradication was considered less 
sustainable, even though coca should have been supplanted with options for alternative 
development.105 The chapter on Monzón will further discuss the effects of eradication. CORAH 
formulates an annual plan for eradication and explores its different aspects. According to DEVIDA, in 
2016 CORAH eradicated 30,151 ha of coca (DEVIDA 2016).  
In several international reunions since the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) 
international drug policies have been developed further even if the initial goal of eliminating illicit drug 
production including cocaine and coca has not been met.106 The discussion on eradication as a method 
of fighting drug trafficking, has changed, especially since 1988, considering issues of human rights, 
 
103 Special Project for the Control and Eradication of Coca in the Upper Huallaga: in charge of the eradication of the coca fields 
within Law 22095.  
104 Between 2007 and 2011, it eradicated more than 10,000ha per year, but only in a restricted area of operation. The 
eradication profoundly affected the coca producing communities in the Alto Huallaga. It also influenced the involvement of 
guerrilla groups in the region (see Alto Huallaga and Monzón chapter). 
105 UNGASS 1998. Supported 2009 
106 for a discussion see https://www.tni.org/en/primer/coca-leaf-myths-and-reality#cocacultivation (accessed 06.11.2017) 
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tradition, culture, and potential risks for nature. A concept that is reiterated is the idea of alternative 
development, which has at its goal to find alternatives to the drug economy.107 This aspect plays a role 
for drug production regions in Peru in particular and in other drug production regions in the world.  
The reference to alternative development is not a new aspect, the UN General Assembly recognized 
in its twentieth special session on September 1998:  
“a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotics and 
psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the 
context of sustained national growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking 
action against drugs, recognizing the particular socio-economic characteristics of the target 
communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to 
the problem of illicit drugs.”108 
During the discussions in the UNGASS in 1998, it was mentioned that eradication should be used only 
under certain circumstances. For example, when alternative crops are readily available for the region, 
or when the eradication does not jeopardize previous alternative development projects (Zevallos 2016: 
71-73). From 1988, the development of alternatives was part of the agenda for the international anti-
drug regime.109 This, in essence, meant the search for alternatives to the illicit crops and a more flexible 
law enforcement strategy. This approach became increasingly significant in 1998, when alternative 
development became an essential pillar for drug policies. Alternative development was officially 
defined by the Action Plan of International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on 
Alternative development in 1998. The official statement also stated that it should not only focus on the 
illicit crops itself, but also promote conditions for sustainable development.110 This action plan asked 
 
107 On the UN Principles of Alternative Development: The concept of alternative development 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.3/68/L.9 (accessed 27.10.2017)  
108 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/overview.html (accessed 27.10.2017) Alternative 
development continues to be recognized by Member States as a fundamental pillar of a comprehensive drug control strategy 
and plays an important role as a development oriented drug control approach” said Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of 
UNODC in 2014 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-development/index.html (accessed 27.10.2017) 
109 Following the definition in the UN-Resolution S-20/4 E Alternative Development is defined as „a process to prevent and 
eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed 
rural development measures in the context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable development efforts in 
countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular sociocultural characteristics of the target communities and 
groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs” 
(http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/20sp/a20spr04.htm accessed on 07.11.2017). 
Another term related to this is Alternative Livelihoods. This concept changes the focus on the human development side 
instead of referring directly to drug trafficking and focusing on the illicit crop. The aim is to change human conditions and 
possibilities of economic development that allows people (farmers) to find alternatives to illicit drug trades. It includes not 
only economic aspects but also tackles aspects on “life conditions” such as health, infrastructure or education among others. 
While the name Alternative Livelihoods is mainly not been taken up by Andean countries, ideas coming from that concept 
have been implemented here as well. (WDR 2015: 80-81). Hence, parts of the Peruvian government programs can also be 
put under the alternative livelihoods approach but to avoid confusion the following will stick to the official concepts.  
110 On the evolution of alternative development and further information on Alternative Development see UNODC 2015 
Annex I.  
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states to develop their own measures and an appropriate framework to implement alternative 
development in consistency with their national drug policies. In Peru, this proposal was progressively 
taken up from 2005, promoted by the UNODC.  From 2007, the aspect of alternative development 
became part of Peruvain national Anti-Drug Policies (Ibd.: 64-67).111 The UNGASS 2009 and 2016, 
reiterated the importance of alternative development and the need to take social factors into account 
(UN General Assembly 2016). Also the financial base of the local society and possibilities for economic 
development should be considered (Art. 7).  
The Peruvian National Strategy for Fighting Drugs (ENLCD, Spanish acronym), is based on these 
international drug policy norms. Every five years, a new ENLCD is published and aims to reduce the 
production and trafficking of illicit drugs while promoting alternative development. DEVIDA is 
responsible for the implementation of this strategy. Its core pillars since 2007, are Alternative 
Development, Interdiction and Sanction, as well as Prevention and Rehabilitation of Drug 
Consumption. This thesis will focus on the empirical part and for the analysis, will rely on the first two 
pillars. Particular focus was on the reduction of coca plantations as a result of the eradication efforts, 
as well as on facets of alternative development. The focus of state policies has been on repressive 
measures and the measure of success is questionable (Zevallos 2016: 66). The ENLCD during the span 
of investigation for this thesis was from 2012 to 2016 (DEVIDA 2012). The strategy involves a large 
number of state institutions that are related to the strategic fields of alternative development, 
intervention and sanction, prevention and rehabilitation as well as the international commitment (see 
Annex).  
The state strategy to tackle drug trafficking and drug production includes alternative development 
principles. In practice this strategy still has some shortcomings and it is a long-term endeavor, it 
produces less of a shock for the local population. However, in practice the focus largely remained on 
the forced eradication approach112 The illegalization of drugs and coca on the international level 
precipitated the same a similar development at the state level.113 The national perception on coca was 
 
111 A case frequently mentioned in this regard is the alternative development program of San Martin in the Alto Huallaga. 
Here, alternative products have been implemented to support the region, after coca was eradicated (van Dun et al. 2013). 
Success of these measures is not uncontested, since San Martin accounts for particularities, which cannot be found in other 
areas. One important aspect is local ownership and role of local authorities that have been supportive to the alternative 
development approach (A doctoral dissertation on this topic is due to be terminated, in 2018 by Frank Casas Sula at the 
PUCP in Lima).  The German Development Cooperation has also become an important partner for Alternative Development 
in the Alto Huallaga Valley  
112 See for example the remarks of the DEVIDA Chief Executive on potential eradication efforts in the VRAEM for 2018 (El 
Comercio 2017). Similar remarks told me a DEVIDA official fort he VRAEM including his personal view that only with 
eradication something would change (Vradev). 
113 For an analysis on the legal development of drug legislation in Peru see Soberón 2011 
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now related to the production scheme of cocaine. It also indicated an approach of criminalization 
(Soberón 2011). It also influenced in part, coca growing, while alternatives could not compete with the 
comparative advantages of coca. Coca offers a secure income and can be harvested after the first six 
months. The available alternatives such as cacao and coffee need three to four years until they can 
finally be harvested. In addition, coca can be harvested up to five times a year, can be sold immediately 
and is often picked up directly at the field. Alternative crops on the other hand, can only be harvested 
once a year and need to be transported to the market, which involves a more concerted effort because 
of the infrastructural situation. Additionally, the agricultural soil is worn-out by years of coca planting 
and the use of chemical products that in turn affect the agricultural output of alternative crops. Apart 
from these issues, one of the major reasons for the low success rate of alternatives is certainly the 
economic outcome. Prices for coca on the illegal market are many times higher, as compared to prices 
offered for coca and alternative products on the legal market. Therefore, this has led to protests and 
movements against state policies.  
Current anti-drug policies aim to reduce the expansion of illegal coca plantations. However, a reduction 
in hectares of coca cultivation does not necessarily imply a reduction in coca and cocaine. Methods for 
producing coca have developed, the production areas have diversified and techniques for producing 
cocaine have improved. Additionally, point out, the majority of funds are foreseen for the interdiction 
and the fight against terrorism and also the the cooperation among the high variety of state institutions 
is relatively weak (García and Stöckli 2014: 29; Leyva and Mendoza 2017).114 Nevertheless, the most 
visible state institutions in the coca valley are often inexorably related to the drug policy of the state, 
while other state activities fall short. As this thesis will show, this is also related with respect to local 
social order. 
In the regions that have low state involvement, non-state actors became an important factor in coca 
and cocaine production. The three non-state actors highlighted here; cocaleros, CADs and the guerrilla, 
emerged because of low state control and/ or low provision of services. In context of the coca 
economy, they took over important tasks within the local social order. The state on the other hand, 
was absent or only had a weak presence in the cocalero regions. State interest in the regions increased 
because of the conflict and because of the existence of the illicit economy. 
 
114 see Annex for an overview over the different state institutions involved in the anti-drug trafficking policies. 
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5.5 Concluding Bigger Picture – First Reflection  
The aim of this section has been to set the scene for the following analysis in chapter six and seven. I 
have highlighted two key aspects that are crucial in the further understanding of the thesis. The first 
aspect relates to the connection of the Peruvian state with its marginal regions, while the second 
aspect deals with the importance and the evolution of the illicit drug economy.  
The chapter gave insights into parts of the Peruvian state formation and established that Peru never 
had a cohesive control over its territories. Attempts to integrate the marginal regions came relatively 
late and the underlying motive the belated attempt of integration was the sought to profit 
economically from the region. These efforts were only partly successful. Furthermore, the agricultural 
reform destroyed former local order without supporting an alternative and without connecting the 
regions to the state. These marginal regions developed alternative structures basically without state 
interference or support. This was felt on the legal- and infrastructural- as well as the economic level. 
With the advent of the conflict against Sendero Luminoso, the state became more conscious of the 
marginal areas and encouraged the military to exercise control over the region. However, within and 
after the conflict, the level of control in these regions was only partial. Instead, local forces such as the 
CADs had formed. Moreover, even after the conflict, the state was not able (or willing) to integrate the 
regions.  
This lack of integration included low infrastructural development, minimal economic opportunities and 
weak implementation of state laws. As such, the integration of most Amazonian and Andean regions 
into the state was limited, with the result that the state had only little influence on social order in these 
peripheral, disintegrated regions. At the same time, there was no dominant “strongman” in most of 
these regions (Migdal 2001), instead, more disperse alternative local structures evolved which were 
however, poorly integrated into the state. Hence, social forces evolved in these regions and that 
developed relationship to each other and later to the state based on a local order. This goes in line 
with previous literature on Latin America and Peru in particular, on the variations in state capacity and 
path dependency for low state capacity (Centeno 2002; Dargent 2012; Kurtz 2013; Soifer 2015; 
Kurtenbach 2015; Vergara 2016).  
Limited state reach and the beginning of the internal conflict coincided with the growth of coca as a 
valuable (then illicit) commodity in the AHV at first, and subsequently in the VRAEM. After earlier 
limited attempts of integrating the periphery into state control, after a phase of centralization and 
after the conflict, the coca growing areas remained in the periphery. Drug production was already an 
important factor in the late 19th century, and had influenced the formation of local regions, particularly 
in the Alto Huallaga. However, from the late 1960s on, drug trafficking became even more important 
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for the economy, politics and infrastructure of the marginal regions. When drug production became 
illegal at the end of the 1960s, regions such as the Alto Huallaga continued producing coca and a (now) 
illicit drug economy evolved without much interference from state agents, in part state security agents 
were even involved in trafficking of drugs.  
Unlike a boom in legal commodities, that under particular circumstances result result in potential for 
an enhancement in state capacity (Saylor 2014), the boom in the illegal commodities coca and cocaine, 
did not result in the same. On the contrary, drug trafficking is interpreted as a challenge to the state 
influence that demands a restrictive reaction (Dargent 2015: 14). Coca and cocaine facilitated the 
growth of non-state actors and structures alternative to the state. While it is not necessarily the case 
that drug trafficking challenges state structures, as I have discussed earlier, in the case of Peru, it was 
perceived as such. As a result, the state took restrictive measures to fight drug trafficking. What this 
chapter has shown in addition, is that the state has successfully taken up norms, defined illegal actions 
and designed mechanisms to implement these norms. The drug policies and norms are defined in 
accordance with international norms. Additionally, state investments for fighting drug trafficking 
increased. However, they lack implementation on the local level.115 While the marginalized regions 
have developed in absence of the state or only with minor interference from the state, the following 
chapters will show how the illicit economy contributed to the development and the influence of local 
order in the regions and on the influence state intervention has on that in these regions.  
 
  
 
115 In a similar fashion, Dargant and colleagues (Dargant et al. 2017) have shown that the Peruvian state did increase its 
capacities in some areas during boom times. However, in others, its ability remains weak. Variations across space and time 
are relatively high, and the authors present a convincing argument that even if the state could increase capacity along various 
indicators (GDP, poverty, coverage of services, also coercive capacities), it does not necessarily lead to higher overall state 
presence, and  can even lead to strengthen state challengers.  
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6. Alto Huallaga and Monzón 
 
As the following chapter will show, the Alto Huallaga and Monzón is for many reasons a consequential 
choice for the analysis on the effect illicit economies have on social order in the margins of the state. 
The region has not only been without state control for a long time, but has historically also been the 
major producer for coca and PBC in Peru. Local rule was influenced and formed by different actors and 
circumstances and differed from state rule and the chapter will show that the illicit economy deeply 
affected local order.  
By analyzing these aspects, the following will also contribute to narrowing a research gap for the 
region. Although the region was at the center of international drug production and trade, the social 
and political consequences have not been analyzed extensively. Academic studies rather emanate 
from an anthropological angle (Kernaghan 2009; van Dun 2009; 2013) and highlight the form of state 
intervention from a rural development perspective and by evaluating anti-drug policies (Cabieses 
2010; Villarán 2012; Manrique-López 2015) Alto Huallaga is often defined by a view of danger, 
terrorism and violence by most of the academic research on this area, with some exceptions (e. g. van 
Dun 2009). The few studies realized on the regions after 2000 rather stressed on the potential dangers 
of the region even though most researchers did not go beyond the local hubs of Tingo Maria (Weinstein 
2007) or nearby in Aucayacu (Kernaghan 2009) for their research. A notable exception is the study by 
van Dun (2009). Even less research was realized for the valley of Monzón although it has been the last 
major coca production area in the region and one of the biggest production regions nationally for 
several years and only a few have included internal social or political structures with regard to state 
intervention (Zevallos 2016; Casas 2017; Heuser 2017).116 Monzón was for a long time a symbol of 
state “absence” and an illicit economy. Even today, the national media presents the AHV mainly as a 
former epicenter of drug trafficking, terrorism, and violence but often fails to highlight social changes 
or present a more nuanced view. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: Firstly, it will give an analysis on the influence of an illicit economy 
on local social order in the Alto Huallaga Valley (AHV), more precisely in Monzón. To this end, it is 
necessary to include the historical background and to give an overview on the evolution of the valley 
as a major provider of coca and PBC. While the main focus of my analysis will be on Monzón, I will also 
highlight the development within the AHV. This is important to understand the regional context, which 
 
116 A rather general study was realized by DEVIDA (2013) but given its institutional background, it had a rather subjective 
view on the successful state intervention and implementation of alternative development programs. 
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also had an impact on Monzón. Furthermore, I will present the socio-political consequences for the 
region as a whole, particularly the valley of Monzón. This analysis includes not only the economic 
development, but also closely relates it to the internal conflict. Secondly, I will analyze the impact of 
state intervention on local order, which had severe consequences for Monzón and for the local social 
order. We can divide social order into a time before eradication and after eradication; these two blocks 
allow us to analyze the importance of the illicit economy and describe changes closely. It will provide 
a deeper understanding on how power relations and social order changes once the illicit economy is 
destroyed.  
The basis for this analysis is secondary literature as well as interviews and participant observation 
gathered during my field work in Monzón, Subte de San Jorge and Huipoca. The main focus will be on 
developments in Monzón, and includes data gathered in Subte de San Jorge and Huipoca as a means 
of comparison and control of results. For the historical analysis, I include regional development since 
we cannot understand the local history of Monzón without including historical patterns of the region. 
It should be highlighted that the information gathered in the field are based on interviews, 
questionnaires, and observations. As will be explained later, the initial eradication and stronger 
presence of the state resulted in an emigration out of the valley. Those who left the valley were in all 
likelihood closely connected to the illicit economy and/or the coca economy, and did not trust the 
state or alternative development initiatives. In other words, those supporting coca and those who 
might have had a positive view on the social order might not be present anymore. This might lead to 
an unequal distribution of those supporting and those objecting the coca economy, which might be 
different to the time before state intervention. These structural differences will be taken into account 
in analyzing the historical context and when analyzing statements by local inhabitants. 
 
6.2 Socioeconomic Indicators 
The district of Monzón in the province of Humalies forms part of the department Huánuco in the Selva 
Central, and is in many ways an underdeveloped district in Peru. Until recently, access by road was 
difficult, and electricity or water supply is underdeveloped compared to the national standard. 
According to the national statistics agency, INEI, the poverty level before eradication was at 62,8% 
while extreme poverty accounted for 17,4% (39,3% and 13,7% respectively on the national level).117 
Even more striking is the rate of households without access to telecommunication services which was 
 
117 The entire department of Huánuco had very high levels of poverty: 64,9% and was lacking infrastructural investments 
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at a staggering 95%, while countrywide the level was at 47% (INEI 2007).118 Results for Monzón were 
on a similarly low level, the most recent data can be found for the department level by PNUD (2013) 
(see table 2). As the data shows, the department of Humalies stays in part well below the national 
average: the areas of education, health or sanitation the department. Consequentially, also the 
indicator of State Density119 is low, which gives an indication of state presence and service provision in 
the area. 
Table 7 Density of State Humalies   
 Peru  Huánuco Huamalies Leoncio Prado 
Population 2012  
inhabitants  
30.135.875 840.984 73.621 129.953 
ranking - 13 81 46 
Index of  State Density  IDE  0,7666 0,6222 0,5598 0,6803 
ranking - 21 165 68 
Medicals  for every 10,000 
inhabitants 
Ratio 22,7319 15,8583 11,3609 18,5407 
ranking - 11 80 28 
Assistance to secondary 
school ( 12 to 16 years) 
% 84,9884 78,2961 75,2894 91,4246 
ranking - 22 138 33 
Houses with access to 
water and sewage systems 
% 76,0128 48,7970 41,5260 51,5353 
ranking - 22 143 111 
Houses with access to 
electricity 
% 86,1116 61,2319 49,1445 70,8055 
Ranking - 25 175 110 
Source: PNUD 2013     
The peripheral Monzón district is a two-hour car drive over a gravel road from the regional hub Tingo 
Maria. The population survived mainly on the production of coca and PBC (cocaine basis paste – 
Spanish acronym), while there was no evidence of basic services provided by the state. The dynamics 
are similar to those in the rest of the Alto Huallaga Valley (AHV). Until 2012, Monzón was essentially 
the last major production area of coca and PBC, while in the rest of the AHV coca was already 
 
118 By time of research, newer data was only available as estimations. Therefore, I am refering on the district level on 
census data from 2007, which allows to classifiy and compare data towards the national level. Other data is for example 
available for the department level, Huanuco. Here, even today, only 8,5% of households in Huánuco have access to the 
internet, far less than the 23,5% on the national level (INEI 2014).  Only 10% had access to electricity and 22% to a sewage 
system. For three decades, the coca economy was by far the most important economic income in the area. 
119 This index is measured by UNDP, serves as an indicator for an overview on state presence and service provision in the 
region. It is a measure that indicates the provision of education, health, electrification, accessibility to drinking water, a 
drainage system, and personal inclusion in the state with passports.  
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eradicated. Surrounded by steep hills and only accessible by one road, the valley was like a natural 
fortress, eagerly guarded by the people of Monzón. A social worker who entered the area in 2009 said: 
“There was no access to the mobile phone network, nothing (…). People were completely isolated” 
(Monongm1). The following chapter will highlight the historical development of this region. 
6.3 Local Historical Development  
6.3.1 “Evolution” of the Region 
Given the lack of relevant studies on the history of Monzón, the analysis will combine the information 
on regional development with qualitative interviews of early settlers in Monzón. Main focus will be on 
the time after 1960, since it marks the beginning of a national colonization strategy that coincided with 
the first coca boom. 
The AHV can be labeled a frontier region (Kernaghan 2009); just behind the steep Andes, the region 
was the border for the administrative outreach of the government in Lima with the Amazon. Apart 
from some isolated smaller settlements, the state was more like a vague idea that lacked real control 
and was difficult to access. The AHV was mainly accessible by boat and via jungle paths until 1937, 
when a one-lane highway reached what was to become the settlement of Tingo Maria. Settlers came 
mostly from the highlands and brought along their traditions which included coca leaf chewing 
(Gonzales 1994). The area was populated slowly yet steadily from the beginning of the 1930s because 
of agricultural benefits and also because of possibilities for producing PBC. The region became the first 
center for the production of PBC and by then it developed a small industry for the same (Gootenberg 
2008). For many, this expansion sounded like the promise for a better, self-determined life and 
thousands of poor city dwellers and highland peasants followed this favorable opportunity (Dreyfus 
1999: 374). State programs facilitated this colonization into the Amazonian regions in order to profit 
from local resources and incorporate them into the national economy. Improvements in infrastructural 
improvements helped to facilitate this process. The Carretera Marginal of Belaúndes highway and 
colonization programs intended to promote colonization in marginal areas.  The Carretera Central 
reached Tingo Maria in 1937 and in what followed, Tingo Maria became the gateway city to the Alto 
Huallaga and a starting point for pioneers to the Amazon (van Dun 2009: 67). Until the construction of 
the street connection Tingo Maria-Aguaytia-Pucallpa in 1943, the main course of transportation was 
via rivers. State programs were not as successful as they were projected to be, and only one out of five 
migrants preferred to move to the Selva; the majority chose coastal areas or other cities in the sierra 
(CVR Tomo IV: 311). Increasing migration to the outskirts of the country and the constant flow of new 
people came especially through the 1960s and 1970s supported by state programs, infrastructure 
improvements and for the region in focus, primarily due to the economic opportunities offered by 
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coca. In 1940, 11,623 people inhabited the Alto Huallaga; in 1981, population was at 134,000 and in 
1988, the Alto Huallaga accounted for 200,000 inhabitants (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 383). 
The valley of Monzón in Humalies is an example of development, as part of the Alto Huallaga  
celebrates its 160th birthday in 2017.120 Founded in 1857, the natural wealth and rich soil had already 
made Monzón attractive to the Spanish. So, it was not an “undiscovered” area when early settlers 
came from the sierra mainly planting Cautchuk from the Chinigua and also sugar cane, coffee, and 
coca. However, it was detached from the Peruvian state because of the lack of institutions and 
infrastructural inclusion. As early settlers remember, the main product was sugar cane, under the 
influence of the hacienda system: 
“Here was planted only sugar cane, all those hills were full of sugar cane, the owner was a 
Chilean called Loli, he owned all those hills” (Monjurm1). 
Within Monzon, the first houses and a small path already existed by the beginning of the 20th century. 
But until the 1950s, there was no road access to Tingo Maria and agricultural goods had to be 
transported via pack animals through the sierra to Llata or Huacha, a market town where peasants of 
Monzón exchanged their products such as rubber, coca, sugar cane, and Aguardiente and bought salt, 
cheese, and meat, for example in Ancash (Moncamcm). By that time, coca served among others, as an 
exchange good:  
“[People of Monzón] already had coca from before for the exchange, for the chaccheo, they 
changed jamon, potatoes, the commercial exchange with the town of Áncash, the 
“conchucanos” came with their 15 mules, and they exchanged ham for an arroba [around 
12kg] of coca.” (Moncamcm) 
Hence, agricultural possibilities motivated people to move into this relatively marginal area of Peru. 
The opening and development of streets and particularly the development of the coca economy 
increasingly led to a population growth and growing immigration. In a majority, peasants populated 
different districts in relatively small groups. For example, Espinoza (2005: 294) holds that Monzón had 
less than 5,614 inhabitants by that time. 
To promote colonization, the Belaúnde government, identified 456,800ha in the Valley of Huallaga 
among others in the provinces of Leoncio Prado or Tocache. 3,794 peasants received 122,685ha but 
most of them had already resided in the zones of Tingo Maria, Tocache or Campanilla before the state 
project started (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 382; see also Fundacion para el Desarrollo Nacional 1981). The 
colonization project was not entirely successful among others because of missing or only slowly 
implemented infrastructure projects, lack of planning, and the attempt to implement agricultural 
 
120 There is no complete history of the region and thus the following is based on the review of documents and secondary 
literature as well as interviews in the region. 
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production in areas that mainly lived from forestation in earlier times. Consequently, the regional 
markets were not prepared to absorb the products coming from the settlements (CVR 2003: 382). Land 
issues arose; people occupied land but only few had official papers and there was no system to control 
or regulate them in the region. Struggles and vendettas were some of the consequences. Other issues 
included social consequences such as heavy drinking, prostitution, or criminality. Most men left their 
families behind in the hope to find economic opportunities in these peripheral areas. Instead, they 
often encountered daily struggle, uncertainties and violence (Van Dun 2009: 69; Morales 1996: 164).  
Due to international changes, the production of sugar and aguardiente became uneconomical till 
finally the production of sugar cane vanished from the valley. In this situation with no established social 
bonds, no regulatory or norm system, and limited income possibilities, one crop became the promise 
for an economic opportunity: coca. Furthermore, “hacendados” at this time started growing coca 
when it became the most valuable crop in this area.121 Although difficult to access, the region would 
become increasingly important and a center for the drug trade which became a major attraction for 
internal migration. The coca boom caused increasing migration into these areas at the margins of the 
state, that had a lack of institutions and where rules had to be implemented or even created (Dreyfus 
1999: 376; also van Dun 2009). The region surrounding the small town of Tingo Maria was already an 
important gateway to access the Amazon area even before the start of the cocaine boom, in the 
beginning in the late 1970s. But the coca and income from the illicit economy would transform the 
region and would bring in severe changes (for a detailed overview: Morales 1989).  
Four periods are particularly important in the historical development and the basis for social order in 
the Alto Huallaga and Monzón: The first period started with the coca boom in the 1960s that resulted 
in a population growth and increasing economic opportunities. The arrival of the guerrilla by the 
beginning of the 1980s marks the commencement of the second period. Sendero Luminoso 
increasingly gained power and influence on local order. As in other parts of the region, the guerrilla 
was first welcomed as a shield against the threat of eradication, but this quickly changed in light of the 
brutal rule of the guerrilla. It is not entirely certain when the guerrilla withdrew from the valley of 
Monzón, since there are recurring reports on the remnants of the guerrilla by that time. But many 
inhabitants indicate it was by the mid-1990s and most perceive the withdrawal of Sendero Luminoso 
as a salvation. Moreover, the restrictive measures of the Fujimori regime are perceived as a support in 
this regard. At the same time, drug trafficking and coca production came into a crisis during the mid to 
the late 1990s. The third period was shaped by the rule of cocaleros. It was the time when the people 
of Monzón stood united against a (perceived) common threat: the eradication of coca by the state. 
 
121 For example an interviewee mentions “the Radas, the Ramírez, the Rabelos” (Monjourm). 
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During this period, essentially no state agent or outsider could enter the valley without the permission 
of the cocalero leaders. This period continued until the eradication campaign started by the state in 
2012, which marks the beginning of the last period so far: Monzón under state control. The analysis 
will depart from the previous historical analysis, evaluate how coca and the drug economy became the 
decisive factor in the region, and finally show that eradication not only destroyed the local economy 
but had a key role in affecting local social order.  
6.3.2 The Illicit Economy “back in the days”  
The AHV was central for the cocaine industry, not only in Peru but internationally too. Following Paul 
Gootenberg it is the oldest cocaine producing region in the world. By the 1880s, laboratories were 
already producing PBC which supported regional development in the area of the then small settlement 
Tingo María (Gootenberg 2008: 47-54).122 Back then, production was supported by state credits and 
peasants sold their crops through the state installed estancos (van Dun 2009: 70). In the 1940s and 
1950s, immigrant families, especially from Japan moved to the “ceja de selva” to produce coca and 
PBC. Many migrants also arrived from the Sierra of Huánuco and Ancash as well as the selva of San 
Martín or Loreto to participate in the coca business and the legal PBC production (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 
310-312).123 In Monzón, an inhabitant describes the transformation of legal PBC production to illegal 
production and mentions, that there has been in fact a state owned factory producing PBC: 
“Yes, the drug factory was for the Peruvian State, but for licit things it would be, not for illicit 
things. They made a factory, (...) a single one. They brought chemicals so that they could 
make the drug and from there they took basic cocaine paste, from there they took it out but I 
suppose that for was legal things and not for illegal things.“ (Monjourm1).  
Though the production initially was legal, due to increasingly restricted legislation by the end of the 
1940s, the business became illegal. Reports present that illicit coca smuggling groups called 
pichicateros transporting raw cocaine to the sierra and costa regions, evolved around that time (van 
Dun 2009: 70). The increasingly restrictive policies against PBC could not prevent the production 
capacity from increasing rapidly in the following decades.124 
A contemporary witness describes how people accustomed themselves to the situation: As he 
describes further, people from Ancash initiated the process for the now illegal PBC production: 
“Then from 1966 the State says they are doing something illegal and that the factory has to be 
closed in 1966. […] then they fired the employees who were from Áncash, all the employees 
were ancashinos. When they were dismissed they went to their places of origin. And people 
could no longer sell their coca, because the factory had closed. [...] 
 
122 Mainly with the effort of German firms that make it a global drug.  
123 In the 1940s, immigrant families of Japanese descent were one of the first to produce PBC legally in the “valle of 
Pampayacu” with the aim for exportation (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 312). 
124 During field research, some people mentioned to me that the state helped build a PBC production facility in the 1960s in 
Castilla Ramon, Monzón Pistaloli (Moncamcm; Monjourm; Tijourm).  Even if the state’s involvement in setting up this 
facility could not be confirmed during field research, the several statements in Monzón describe the PBC production site. 
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They said that since there is no one to buy the coca and as people were used to selling their 
coca in the factory. That was when the man [of Ancash] thought of bringing one of the workers 
to teach him how to make the drug. Then his friend came, and in his house they made a small 
factory to make drugs. (...) Those former workers knew how to make the drug, because people 
did not know how to make the chemicals before, that's why these workers taught the people 
how to make the drug for a month, then the assistant looked, and then he was doing his own 
“poza”, the other assistant also went and did the same and so on. That is how it has multiplied 
throughout the valley. This is how the black market starts here in Monzón." (Monjourm) 
Coca plantation increased progressively from 1945 in the department of Huánuco; in San Martin from 
1960s, and in Ucayali from 1970. In these areas, coca production increased from 600ha in 1950 to 
100,000ha in 1995. In the department of Huánuco, cultivation multiplied tenfold from 1972 (2,460has) 
to 1985 (28,800has) (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 312). Coca plantation increased albeit in the presence of 
increasing state measures. This increase in production can be mainly explained by the international 
demand for cocaine and smuggling to the USA as the main drug market (see chapter 5 “Bigger 
Picture”). Another accelerating factor for the growth of drug production in the region was the failure 
of the agricultural reform by Alvarado, dismantling the hacienda system. The “cooperativas” were 
unprepared to manage production and commercialization. Additionally, a disease affected coffee 
plantations and destroyed big parts of the production. Coca on the other hand was more resistant. In 
1981, Monzón produced 10,725 ha of coca while production remained high during conflict as well: in 
1993, the valley of Monzón produced 11,425 ha (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 355). The AHV became the most 
important place for coca production and in 1995, 55% of all nationally produced coca (150,000 – 
200,000ha) came from this valley. It was at the forefront of a boom and became the main production 
site for raw cocaine in the world (CVR 2003: 312; Gootenberg 2008).  
The evolution of the coca and PBC economy in the region coincided with the emergence of Colombian 
cartels during the late 70s. These cartels revolutionized the drug trade in Latin America and the AHV 
profited from the increasing commercialization of illegal cocaine. In the AHV, Colombians played a 
crucial role in the development of the illicit trafficking chain. It was a value chain that began in the 
Andes and ended in the clubs of Miami and New York. International traffickers became frequent 
visitors in the production areas, organizing the trade and buying PBC from middle men. Colombian 
traffickers are frequently mentioned to having strong business ties to the valley.125 Although 
international traffickers had huge economic influence in bringing money into the valley, their political 
influence seemed to be restricted.  
“No, they didn’t not have much influence. They had no influence. The authorities were 
always present, only in a period was the presence of the state the police presence so that of 
 
125 Several rumours that Pablo Escobar himself came to buy the basic paste are still shared today in the valley. Even if this 
seems rather unlikely and “Colombian” might also be used as a synonym for international traffickers, the anecdote shows 
the auto-perception for being an important part of the international drug trade. 
 
 
122 
order was lacking. There was a time of terrorism, then here was violence. Sure they had no 
power but there was anonymous, secret violence. "(Monmunregm) 
The political power of international traffickers was restricted; nevertheless, they influenced local social 
order by introducing, for example, sicarios, hired killers, who would kill those not conforming to the 
business modalities (Interviews Monm1; van Dun 2009).  
Bigger international trafficking groups relied on connections to local groups or “firmas” for the 
organization of local drug production. On the micro-level, the local organization, there were several 
players involved, connected through a dense trade- and social network.126 The trade was organized in 
different layers. Smuggling and production of drugs was organized by small “firmas”. Within those 
firmas there were different levels, ranging from the patrons (local bosses) to traquetos (traffickers of 
larger quantities), to mochilleros or burros (van Dun 2009). These different firmas did not necessarily 
have a connection to each other and were relatively mild in the use of violence (Ibd.: 8-10)  
One of these bigger local narcos in the region and probably the most renowned of them was Demitrio 
Chavez Penaherrera - El Vaticano127. El Vaticano is considered to be one of the primary drug traffickers 
of Peru in the 80s and the beginning of the 90s. Although exceptional in the scope of his success in the 
drug economy, one can still read a lot from his story about the involvement in drug trafficking; the 
network surrounding local drug trafficking including the involvement of high ranking state officials and 
the military in times of internal conflict. He became a synonym for the successful drug trafficker, with 
links to the highest political ranks and earned the admiration of large parts of the population. El 
Vaticano was captured in 1994 in Cali and sentenced to 22 years of jail for drug trafficking, falsification 
of documents, and “daños contra la fe pública”.128 According to press reports, El Vaticano held 
connections in Colombia to the Norte del Valle Cartel, the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, and to Pablo 
Escobar (Semana 2000, El Tiempo 2007). An interesting anecdote about El Vaticano is his claims about 
his involvement in the business being purely circumstantial. In an interview with the newspaper La 
Republica, he mentions that he was a street vendor and was paid with drugs and came to realize that 
he could make much more money by selling drugs:  
"How did you become involved in drug trafficking?” 
“I became a drug trafficker due to the circumstances. I was a traveling salesman of the Galaxy 
brand, and traveled the country selling equipment to customers who paid in parts. I happened 
 
126 See also Kernaghan 2009 for the the description of coca and cocaine businesses in a region nearby Monzón. Another 
ethnographic analysis for the organization of the economy and moreover on the governing structures in regions of the Alto 
Huallaga with a dominant illicit economy see van Dun (2014). 
127 Other bigger local narcos include “El Vampiro”, “El Tigre”, “Machi”, “el Ministro” (IDL-R 2012) 
128 Today, traffickers transporting more than 20kg of PBC already risk serving 15 years in prison without the possibility of 
pardon. 
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to make a good sale, but at the moment when they were supposed to paying me they did not 
do it with money but with drugs instead. I was surprised, and at first did not know what to do 
with it, but I had to turn that product into money and so I looked for someone to sell it to. It 
was easy and I made a lot more money than I received when selling the Galaxy equipment. 
From there on I looked for a way to get into the business.” (LaRepublica 2016) 
Whether his remarks are completely true or not, by the time of Vaticanos first involvement in drugs, 
many seized the opportunity for earning money. These opportunities were taken up by actors as well. 
The rising external demand for cocaine, the resulting production of coca from the end of the 1970s 
until the late 1980s, and the constant inflow of money, created an El Dorado, while the rest of the 
country was ever more affected by economic crisis (de Soto 1986; Contreras and Cueto 2007; Gonzales 
2016). The majority of coca production was in the region of Huánuco and San Martin. 
“In the 1980s the valley´s name, but also those of Tocache and Uchiza, came to be intimately 
associated with the dark prosperity of the cocaine boom and with the reckless abandon of 
lifeways rumored to accompany it. For a new chance at life, for “easy money,” for good times, 
the Huallaga became the place to go.” (Kernaghan 2009: 11). 
Even if there is no local trafficker from the size of El Vaticano known in Monzón, several local traffickers 
have been active in the region and drug trafficking had similar impact on Monzón as on other sectors 
in the region. Even forced eradication could not change the situation for a long time even though these 
actions had severe consequences, as the following will show. 
 
6.3.3 The State´s Reaction129 and Conflict  
In the 1970s, the state had already begun to launch campaigns to eradicate coca, following the 
agreements being made internationally in the UN single convention on drugs of 1961. Several attempts 
of eradication were promoted in the valley. This was also encouraged by international pressure, mainly 
from the United States. As the drug flow into the United States was on the rise, so was the pressure 
on the Peruvian state. During the Morales Bermúdez regime, attempts of auto-eradication were 
unsuccessful in convincing peasants to voluntarily swap their coca plants for legal crop. Thus in 1978, 
the Decree Law 22095 was created which included the creation of a number of institutions: a 
specialized police force, the Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural (UMOPAR) to fight drug trafficking, a 
program for eradication and substitution of coca in the Alto Huallaga Control y Reducción del Cultivo 
de la Coca en el Alto Huallaga (CORAH) and also the creation of ENACO. The latter became the entity 
for buying coca legally.130 But the Bermudez government did not stop here; instead it launched a first 
 
129 For a closer look into the states policy towards the Alto Huallaga Valley until the 1990s, see Cotler (1999) 
130 And replaced the former estancos  
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eradication campaign in 1979 called “Verde Mar I”. Reports of confiscation, imprisonment, destruction 
of coca plants, and violation of human rights overshadowed this campaign (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 336). 
In 1980, during the second eradication campaign – “Verde Mar II” –state forces detained peasants on 
charges of drug trafficking – as the only option to avoid judicial charges, they were forced to plant 
alternative legal crops. These actions were supported and promoted by the US agency for 
development cooperation (USAID) (Cotler 1999: 145). The police confiscated goods, destroyed 
livestock, and affected mainly campesinos. Drug traffickers remained largely unaffected by these 
measures, even when it came to violent clashes between the firmas and state authorities. The firmas 
were essential for the economy in the region and were also closely linked to the PCP-SL and the military 
(van Dun 2009: 72; CVR 2003 Tomo V: 745-767).  
In addition to these punitive methods, the second Bermúdez administration (1980-1985) prohibited 
ENACO´s legal activities in the Alto Huallaga (Decree “ley 22927”), which had a major impact on illegal 
coca cultivation. Instead of decreasing illegally produced coca, it actually increased it (van Dun 2009: 
72). Since there was no legal entity to sell their coca leaves to, the campesinos sold to the ones who 
were able and willing to buy it– the drug producers and drug traffickers. Consequentially, the black 
market was growing and not shrinking as it was envisaged by the Belaúnde government. It was only 
after protest by campesinos that ENACO was able to buy coca again. Even when the ENACOS activity 
was legalized again in 1982, the situation did not change, also because no new registrations of coca 
plantations were allowed. Consequentially, the majority of coca farmers still produced coca illegally. 
Coca production shifted to other areas and was protected by guerrilla groups.  
Additional approaches included the promotion of alternative development programs since the 1980s, 
with support from the USA, included financial funding and training (Morales 1989: 156). They 
experimented with maize, coffee, rice, citrus fruits, and other grains, but neither of them was as 
profitable as coca. Also, these other crops were more difficult to plant and required different skills to 
be acquired by the peasants. There was also no access to a potential market. These approaches proved 
to be widely unsuccessful and could not reduce illegal coca production. The programs eradicated 9,783 
hectares of coca between 1983 and 1990, but rather than being successful against drug trafficking they 
alienated the population further from the state (Cotler 1999: 145). The repressive methods against the 
population led to several complaints and cocaleros protests, which resulted in violent confrontations 
in1982 (Ibd.: 148).131 The eradication and aggressive actions by the state led people to search for 
possibilities for defending their coca plantations; a cause that found support in the guerrilla. 
 
131 For more information on the militarization of the AHV especially in the aftermath of Fujimori see Rojas (2005) 
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6.3.4 Sendero, Coca and the Conflict 
The drug trade and the repressive reaction of the state are important in understanding why the region 
became involved in Peruvian internal conflict. Sendero Luminoso132 began their campaigns in the area 
by the beginning of the 1980s. As the CVR reports, after the eradication campaigns Verde Mar I and II, 
cocaleros looked for support by the PCP-SL in Ayacucho. The growing pressure by the state on the 
guerrilla in the region of Ayacucho from the beginning of the 1980s, influenced the decision of Sendero 
Luminoso to become active in other areas (CVR 2003; Gorriti 2013) Sendero Luminoso extended its 
presence to the valley while the coca and cocaine economy financed its fight against the Peruvian state 
(Felbab-Brown 2010: 44-50). Although the guerrilla was first critical of the growing of coca and the 
production of drugs, they soon realized that it could be a useful tool for winning the support of the 
population. The local population relied heavily on the coca and cocaine industry but came under 
growing stress from state actions. Pressured by the United States, the Bermúdez administration 
launched eradication campaigns and the departments of Huánuco, San Martin, and Loreto came under 
a state of emergency. The guerrilla offered protection against the threat of eradication. They also acted 
as regulators for the local drug industry by acting as middle men between drug traffickers and 
producers, and also by reducing violence (Durand: 2014: 56).  
In the early 1980s, the guerrilla had already entered the Alto Huallaga Valley, most likely in the area of 
Aucayacu, which had influence on the local order. The CVR describes: “Los pobladores de Aucayacu, 
como también autoridades municipales de ese entonces, mencionan la huelga de cocaleros en 1981 
como el acontecimiento que contó con presencia oculta de cuadros senderistas por primera vez.” (CVR 
2003: 746). Thus, the expansion of the guerrilla was partly made possible because of the earlier 
eradication campaigns by the state. This gave the guerrilla the chance to act as supporters and 
protectors of the coca industry and present themselves as an ally of the peasant population.  
The first armed attack by the Sendero Luminoso was on the Policia Forestal Paucayacu in 1982. The 
expansion seemed to go from south to north and included the reorganization of local order (Bezán 
2013). The first group of Sendero Luminoso entered with 60 men in 1981 into the valley of Monzón 
(Paucar 2006: 55). The guerrilla supported the cocaleros by offering security against state eradication, 
organized armed resistance, and violent attacks. These attacks included the assassination of 19 
workers of the eradication agency CORAH, on the 17th of November 1984 in Cornivilla, Monzón (CVR 
2003 Tomo IV: 341). Thus, the eradication efforts by the state in fact had the unintended consequence 
of supporting the guerrilla. At the same time, Sendero Luminoso used this support to widen its control 
 
132 As Sendero Luminoso became the dominant guerrilla force in the region and had a more important relation to the coca 
economy, the following analysis will focus on Sendero Luminoso and does not involve MRTA.  
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over the territory and for “establishing” their rule in the region (Gonzales 1994; CVR Tomo IV 2003; 
Paucar 2006; Felbab-Brown 2010; Gorriti 2013).  
By defending and taxing coca and drug production, Sendero Luminoso, under the command of comrate 
Artemio, created a balance within the drug trade in Alto Huallaga (IDL-Reporteros 2012a). Earnings 
from the illicit economies were a major reason to uphold the strong faction of the Sendero Luminoso 
until the capture of comrade Artemio in 2012 (e. g. Gorriti 2013; Zevallos 2016). Kernaghan describes 
this as follows:  
“Shining path offered the farmers protection from police raid and government efforts to 
eradicate coca, as well as from the economic exploitation of the town-based cocaine firmas 
(firms) In exchange, farmers had to submit to the dictates of Sendero´s Maoist state project 
and ongoing armed struggle (…) the Party established rules of play for the drug trade: setting 
pricing standards arbitrating disputes, and charging taxes for its services. In this way, Sendero 
generated an alternate form of legality around the market of raw cocaine (Kernaghan 2009: 
13). 
The presence of the guerrilla secured the illicit economy at the beginning. In the 1980s, the guerrilla 
controlled the town of Uchiza, which by that time was known as the center of drug trafficking in Peru.  
The involvement of the guerrilla movement in the drug trade brought several changes. At one point, 
the guerrilla controlled 120 landing strips in the region, and charged Colombian traffickers between 
3,000 and 15,000 USD per flight (Durand 2014: 56). By imposing a five percent tax on the PBC, Sendero 
Luminoso was able to make 30 Million USD per year (Felbab-Brown 2005). This financial bolster 
allowed them to finance and expand their operations, including the purchase of new and better 
weaponry. The economic possibilities of the drug trade were one reason for the better equipment of 
the guerrilla. The cooperation with local firmas resulted in other benefits such as the acquisition of 
weapons from Colombia, reported for the area of Tocache where Senderos changed their weaponry 
in 1987/88. While they mostly used revolvers in earlier times, after 1987 they were equipped with 
automatic rifles, grenades, and rocket launchers: AKM, FAL or RPG (CVR 2003 Tomo V: 751). The 
proliferation of weapons in the Sendero Luminoso, is also highlighted by the history of David Bazán 
Arévalo, mayor of Tocache. He was captured in July 2017 for allegedly colluding with Sendero 
Luminoso (Ojo Publico 2017). 
In an interview with investigative reporters, collective IDL-Reporteros Shining Path leader in the Alto 
Huallaga, Artemio, said that the guerrilla supported peasants and that they acted in consent:  
“How is that situation in which it was said that the Communist Party put the scales to 
regulate the purchase of intermediaries of large firms? 
Artemio: No, look, it was a demand from the coca farmers, who, as you know, at that time 
there was no cocalero organization. There was no one who supported their demands and 
complaints against the abuse and exploitation of drug traffickers against coca farmers. So, 
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they asked for it to be united, for them to control a scale, the peasants themselves, to unite a 
single price (...).” (IDL-R 2012, own translation) 
According to some statements from the traffickers of that time such as Vaticano and Feliciano, the Alto 
Huallaga front of Sendero Luminoso actively controlled the drug business in the area, and received 
money from the local firmas as well as from different trafficking sources and different regions, for 
example, from the valley of Monzón (LaRepublica 2011). Artemio has always negated accusations of 
being directly involved in drug trafficking. But even if the guerrilla was not the major driver behind the 
drug trade, it surely supported it by defending it against state interdictions. Furthermore, the guerrilla 
involvement led to an ordering of the drug trafficking structure. It was not just coca farmers, but also 
narcos who had to pay the guerrilla (“cupos”) in order to make business. By this, the financing of the 
guerrilla by the illicit economy had consequences: In the AHV, the illicit economy was fought by 
government forces – which resulted in an illicit economy in the shadows. Local order was dependent 
on both cocaleros and the guerrilla.  
Instead of being directly involved in the trade, the guerrilla saw themselves as providers of order, which 
included the dispensing of justice and the appointment of local authorities (IDL-Reporteros 2012b; 
Meza Bazán 2013: 129-150). In this sense, the guerrilla policies are similar to the way the FARC 
operated in Colombia (Youngers and Rosin 2004; Felbab-Brown 2005; Ávila 2009).133  This resulted at 
first in closer connections between the Senderos and the local farmers. But due to its brutal rule this 
relationship changed. 
The rule of the guerrilla was ambivalent; initially they became providers of social services, education, 
and health services while at the same time the Senderos acted with brutal force in case of resistance 
or non-compliance to their rules or norm structure. Part of their rule was the castigation of 
homosexuals, drug addicts, robbery, and infidelity in marriage (Meza Bazán 2013: 129-190; also 
Felbab-Brown 2010: 46-51). Castigation was brutal and harsh particularly during the 1980s, and today 
many refer to the times of Sendero domination in the region, with horror (Monm1; Monlocp1; 
Monjourm; Kernaghan 2009.). This included the assassination of those opposing or non-conforming to 
the guerrilla rule. The guerrilla rule is still present in the “collective memory” (German: Kollektives 
Bewusstsein) including memories of killings or public corporal punishment. PCP-SL imposed brutal rule 
on the area, in which instances of non-compliance was punished severely (McClintock 1998; Gorriti 
2013; Meza Bazán 2013). Violent incidences and juicios populares that ended with the deaths of 
several people still linger in the communal memory: “Si no les hiciste caso te llevaban al río” (literally: 
“they took you to the river” – they [the guerrilla] killed you and threw your corpus in the river if you did 
 
133 Felbab-Brown (2005) provides a comparison between Colombia and Peru. 
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not follow their rules”). The CVR reports 198 deaths or missing persons for Huánuco and 44 deaths or 
missing persons for Humalies between 1980 and 2000 (2003 Tomo IV: 328). A school teacher 
remembers an incident with Sendero Luminoso:  
"That of the guerrilla if it was a true delay for Monzón. Many years we have been completely 
in trouble when terrorism existed. In those days I lived here in the Monzón. Even at night you 
were taken out at 7pm from your house and you were standing all night in the Plaza de Arma. 
I was a school director at that time. One day when I came with my students from Tingo María 
they wanted to take my students away because they said they are not students but they are 
soldiers and that is why they wanted to kill them "(Moneduf1) 
Most interview partners refer to an incident in the village Bella and other villages in 1993, when 
Sendero Luminoso killed 24 people with machetes, knives and axes, the cruelest incident in the valley 
of Monzón (see also CVR Tomo IV 2003: 356).  
“At that time, although people had money they were afraid at the time. They did not want to 
live like this. At 10pm, 11pm the guerrilla came knocking on the door and you had to go to the 
meeting, whether you wanted or not.” (Monresm1) 
In Monzón, interviewees told me that the presence of the guerrilla in the valley was not constant, but 
that they appointed authorities who were loyal to them, not necessarily out of shared principles, but 
rather out of fear (Monm1; Monegobm). The group targeted local leaders, policemen, and common 
people while the police or military could not provide sufficient protection. As the people of Monzón 
recall, on the first day the columna of the guerrilla held a reunion and executed six people after a 
“juicio popular” (which they apparently had brought with them from the highlands). The guerrilla 
raided the Banco de la Nación and made it clear that the population should follow the guerrilla rules; 
they also almost killed the local authorities, but were prevented by the local population. Sendero 
Luminoso did not have constant posts in the area, but came back regularly in a few weeks and held 
“juicios populares”.134 Although the guerrilla did not install a constant post in the valley, they left the 
population with a feeling of horror and were determined to show who the authority was. Among the 
rules was also the necessity to make contributions to the guerrilla: 
"For example the mayor was subject to the drug traffickers or the guerrillas, so he had to 
obey to give something in exchange for not being killed, not to disappear, not to attempt 
against them, more than anything they asked for a quota those who had little chance, for 
example to a salesman, you are carrying so much, bring your truck you are going to 
collaborate with the party, and 5 sacks of rice were dropped, 5 sacks of sugar so the guerrillas 
asked them and if you did not do that It was likely to kill you, or there was the possibility that 
you could no longer work. Then you for the need to work and quietly you had to collaborate 
"(Monresm1) 
 
134 These public trials also served sometimes as a tool to solve personal vendettas. On justice by PCP-SL see Meza (2013); 
Gorriti (2013); CVR (2003) 
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From 1984 until 1993, the guerrilla followed a strategy of terror, installed local informants, and 
controlled the areas without holding a permanent post. With this strategy of “a thousand eyes and 
ears”, they sowed distrust among the population, as nobody could be certain if their neighbor was an 
informant.  
A representative of Sendero Luminoso in Monzon, Juan Lugana Domingues “camerada Piero”, was 
captured in 2008. Still, until the capture of Artemio in 2012, the Guerrilla visited the valley several 
times and held influence mainly to collect “cupos” for drug trafficking (Monexgobm). Until the capture 
of Artemio in 2012, Sendero Luminoso remained an important factor for securing the drug trade in the 
area. But in Monzón, their influence had already decreased. 
"In the Monzón it was another reality, here practically since the years, 2000. 2001, 2003, 
2004 they wanted to infiltrate but we have confronted this. The population found an answer 
against this. "(Mongobcm). 
 
6.3.5 State Security Forces, Local Order and Drug Trafficking 
During the first coca boom, state presence was very low in the main producing areas. The state could 
not hold many outposts against the influence of the guerrilla. It needed to withdraw and was only able 
to hold some centers in the AHV, such as Tingo Maria. While nearby villages had been under the 
influence of the guerrilla, Tingo Maria stayed under state control and some analysts called it the “last 
secure outpost of the state´s political, legal, and military authority” (Kernaghan 2009: 13). In Monzón, 
the police withdrew and left the valley shortly before a Sendero Luminoso group reached the city in 
1986.135  People still remember this as a case of the police leaving them alone. In fact, after the police 
left, there was no state authority providing security in the district of Monzón. Only a few days later, 
the Sendero Luminoso arrived in Monzón.  
"Previously the police had a bad reputation. When Sendero entered [the valley] the police 
escaped from Monzón, they left even though they had their place and everything. There was 
a National Bank but when Sendero arrived the police escaped. When Sendero comes in, it 
takes the Bank's money and they destroyed all the things of the Bank. "(Moneduf1). 
The Peruvian government declared a state of emergency in 1988 to fight insurgents, but it also 
triggered an involvement of state officials in the illicit economy and corruption (see below: security 
forces and drug trafficking). Kernaghan writes: “As the cocaine trade began to dominate life in the 
valley, the Huallaga became an outlaw realm where people could go to escape the jurisdiction of 
Peruvian law and where both the police and military implicitly had license to do as they pleased.” 
 
135 According to some statements, the police left dressed as women to prevent detection (Monedum1). 
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(Kernaghan 2009: 17). The Peruvian army arrived in 1988 in Monzón, and established a post directly 
at the Plaza de Armas. Even with the presence of the armed forces, the guerrilla presence in the area 
was still felt.  
The Peruvian army might have controlled the urban centers, but the road towards Tingo Maria was 
still not safe. One community leader recalls that instead of taking the road and travelling directly to 
Tingo Maria to visit his family, he had to take another hidden way that took three days. As a leader, he 
received threats and expected to be on a “death list” of the guerrilla. During the nights in the 
community, he often slept in the bushes of the hills out of fear of being ambushed by Sendero 
Luminoso who would come and take them while sleeping (Interview Tijourm). Particularly for 
community leaders and authorities, the presence of PCP-SL became dangerous. Right from their 
arrival, the guerrilla installed their own authorities who were in line with their ideology. 
“They were authorities imposed by terrorist groups. They were not elected, but they were 
authorities imposed by force, against their will. [...] 
These authorities were imposed by force. So as I was saying, after that little by little, the State 
begins to take its place. Then they started by building schools. They began to build 
educational centers. "(Monedum1) 
After the arrival of the military in Monzón, local order was defined by them. Only a few open 
confrontations took place between Sendero Luminoso and the military, in the valley of Monzón. One 
of these took place in 1988, when 13 soldiers lost their lives (CVR Tomo IV 2003: 356). Even today, the 
inhabitants of Monzón reckon that the military freed them from the despotism and brutal rule of the 
guerrilla: "It became peaceful when the armed forces was there, that was the change" (Monmunregm). 
Authority was thus defined by the military and territorial control was imposed by several road controls. 
This could not stop Sendero Luminoso from being active in the region, but could control the urban 
centers. While the military officially controlled the region by the end of the 1980s, the guerrilla 
managed to maintain its influence. 
The position of security forces towards the local economy changed during the 1980s, and this position 
changed several times in later years. By the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the 
government’s approach was to eradicate coca and to be tough on the illicit economy which led to a 
general mistrust and adversity of the local population towards state security institutions. The 
eradication strategy also played in favor of the Guerrilla, who promoted themselves as a shield against 
eradication. This changed, when General Arciniega arrived in the Huallaga region. While military 
activity expanded, Arciniega also advocated for concentrating on the fight against the guerrilla and not 
on cocaleros. He was trying to improve civil-military relationships, since the General recognized that 
there was a high risk of driving cocaleros into the arms of Sendero Luminoso, once the state tries to 
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eradicate (Gonzales 1992: 130-138; Durand 2014: 57). The state’s strategy changed in the following 
year, not focusing on a repressive act but rather on winning support of the people. The approach was 
based on the idea that Peru could live with the threat of drug trafficking, but not with the threat of a 
guerrilla group destabilizing and openly confronting the country (Durand 2014: 58, see also Cotler 
1999: 169-174). This ease on fighting coca production brought much criticism, especially from the USA. 
Arciniega was accused of receiving drug money which he denied, but he had a powerful counterpart, 
the state secretary of the United States for the fight against drugs, Melvyn Levytski (Gonzales 1994; 
Cotler 1999: 171). In 1989, Arciniega was reassigned to a political post in Lima. The state measures 
against coca and drug production increased again which ultimately had severe consequences on coca 
prices. Greater difficulties in the transport of drugs out of the region resulted in an overproduction of 
coca and prices for the coca leaf fell from mid-1989 to mid-1990 (Felbab-Brown 2010: 57). 
Several anecdotes suggest a deeper involvement of the state security forces in drug trafficking. Some 
go so far and use the term “narcopolice” or “narcomilitary” describing an institutionalized relationship 
between the state security forces and the drug economy (CVR Tomo V 2003: 739, 763-770). These 
terms are of course reductionist and generalizing. They cannot adequately describe the relation 
between the drug economy and the respective actors. They are even more inadequate when it comes 
to describing the relationship towards markets of drugs and illegal goods. But they do stress on a 
certain importance of the respective actor to the drug economy. In the AHV, the Sendero Luminoso, 
the police, and the military had decisive influence. While the guerrilla used the illicit drug income to 
finance their insurgency, state institutions gained monopolistic strength in the region while there was 
low control at the same time. The lack of control and accountability opened up possibilities for getting 
involved in the drug trade with the result that the military, police, and the judicial authorities became 
increasingly involved (Gorriti 1988; Cotler 1999). As one person in Monzón told me: “The armed forces 
were taking their [the guerrillas] place. But drug trafficking continued and the military itself was 
involved. It was not a change we wanted.” (Monedum1).  
Later during the Fujimori regime and under the “Rasputin-figure” Vladimiro Montesino, drug trade was 
supported and even orchestrated from the highest political level.  As head of the national security 
service (SIN as Spanish acronym), Montesinos was de facto in control of the drug trade by taxing 
traffickers for their transportation (Quiroz 2013: 392-395). According to the CVR (2003 Tomo V: 763), 
in 1993, there existed at least 18 illegal landing strips in the Alto Huallaga that were established near 
a military base. These landing strips were sometimes in the middle of the road, not controlled by the 
police (Monunm1). One of the most important landing strips in context of the amount of drugs 
transported, was the one in Campanilla run by the famous drug trafficker Dimitrio Chávez “El 
Vaticano”. Owning such a landing strip was highly lucrative but it also meant bribing local military 
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officials: 4,000 USD per flight, with around three flights per day which meant around 10,000 USD per 
day (CVR 2003: 765). “El Vaticano” said during his court hearing in 1996 that he had to pay a monthly 
retainer of $50,000 to Montesino for operating the lucrative landing strip in Campanilla. He also 
indicated that Alberto Fujimori knew about these deals. When released from prison in the beginning 
of 2016, El Vaticano revealed some interesting insights about his connection with the Peruvian state:  
 “If I became big it was because Fujimori and Montesinos supported me in exchange for a 
monthly amount of 50 thousand dollars. I became great during the Fujimori government. Peru 
was a narcostate at that time. Narcostate because it was with the help of the Army that in 
January 1990 we started the construction of the airstrip in Campanilla (district of the province 
of Mariscal Cáceres, department of San Martín) and on March 15 began to operate and began 
to enter the light aircraft (to pick up the drug bound for Colombia)). It was the military who 
provided the roller and the front loader to build the track. In addition, the soldiers of the Base 
of Punta Arenas, with authorization of their chiefs, helped me to raise the drug to the airplanes. 
The military obeyed Montesinos. The time of Fujimori was a narcostate. Fujimori was fully 
aware of narco activities and this also appears in declassified US documents "(LaRepublica 
2016b, own translation) 
State security forces rapidly extended their presence in the Huallaga, with bases in Uchiza, Palma del 
Espino (Santa Lucía), Tocache, and Madre Mía and also strengthened their presence in Aguaytia.136  
The improvement of state presence led to a shift in the drug trafficking networks to Bajo Huallaga 
(Juanjuí, Bellavista, Picota) and particularly towards Aguaytía and Pichis-Palcazu. Hence, as several 
charges against former officials reveal, the military even facilitated drug trafficking instead of fighting 
it (CVR Tomo V 2003: 762). Even if the military was involved in trafficking, people recall that the 
Fujimori administration brought more stability into the region. For example, the Autodefensas worked 
closely with the military from 1992, and unlike in the VRAEM, the formation of Autodefensas was 
initiated by the state, and weaponry and ammunition was given to the groups.137  
In Monzón, there was no state security actor stationed in the area until the military installed a base in 
1988. The conflict had a lasting effect on local order, state presence, and the illicit economy. When 
Sendero Luminoso entered Monzón, it destroyed the main connections to the state, the police as 
provider of local order, and the Banco de la Nación as access points to the banking system. After the 
conflict, it took nearly 30 years to restore both in the valley. The reason for the lasting absence was 
not the conflict, but as we see below, the growing influence of cocaleros during the second coca boom. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the area represented the nexus between the coca and drug economy, 
 
136 Two of the more important figures were General Jaime Ríos Araico and General Eduardo Bellido Mora, both accused of 
drug trafficking and having connections to the regional drug capo Demitrio Chávez Peñaherrera alias “Vaticano” (CVR Tomo 
V 2003: 771-773). Bellido Mora was not charged supposedly because he was the brother in law of Hermoza – a Fujimori 
intimus in the military (Enrique Obando 1998: 400). 
137 As Alejandro Palma, CADs leader of the Alto Huallaga autodefensas recalled, the ammunition was bought by the 
autodefensas themselves and were reimbursed for it afterwards (Ahvcadp).  
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and the military and Sendero Luminoso. It resulted in a balance that sustained the presence of drug 
trafficking as well as the presence of Sendero Luminoso. The guerrilla group was still able to demand 
“cupos” payments from traffickers and cocaleros (Tijourm1, Paucar 2006, CVR Tomo V 2003) 
 
6.3.6 Coca Highs and Lows 
While conflict and the guerilla impacted the security in the valley, the AHV was the largest supplier of 
PBC in the world. At the peak of coca production in 1992, estimations indicated that the Alto Huallaga 
produced 61,000ha coca which was around half of the total national production by that time (INEI 
1993). This amount exceeds today’s national production by far (around 42,000ha – UNODC 2016) and 
had consequences for the local population.  The prospects of economic opportunities resulted in 
migration waves, during a time of recession in Peru. People benefited economically and furthermore, 
recent migrants could directly survive on what they earned in the Coca and PBC producing industry. 
As farmer, coca picker, and producer or retailer of PBC– the Huallaga became popular for those seeking 
new prospects. The new settlers were therefore called “buscavidas” (literally: life seekers)” (Kernaghan 
2009: 11). Soon, businesses that benefited indirectly from the economy also grew in the area. 
Restaurants, bars, hotels, and brothels could be found in the Alto Huallaga. According to the census of 
1993, the population of Huánuco grew by 35% from 484,780 in 1981, to 654,489 in 1993, and at the 
same time in San Martín, the population increased 74% from 317,751 to 552,377 (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 
309). The rate in population growth was around twice as much as the national growth rate (See table) 
and even higher among the younger population: between 1981 and 1993, the population between the 
ages of 15 and 34 years grew 41% in Huánuco, 90% in San Martin and 64% in Ucayali while the national 
growth rate was at 36% (Cotler 1999: 121-123). 
In the mid-1990s, several aspects contributed to a sharp reduction in coca plantations. More restrictive 
state policies such as the inderdicción aérea (air denial) had a major impact. It allowed the Peruvian 
military to shoot down planes which were suspected of carrying drugs. Even though the task was still 
not impossible, it became riskier to transport drugs out of the valley. The consequential closing of the 
air bridge showed its effect, but the reduction was probably also caused by the fungus “Fusarium 
Oxysporum” – that destroyed many of the coca crops. Additionally, the disruption of the Colombian 
Cartels resulted in a reshuffling of the international cocaine market, which also affected coca regions 
in Peru. From 1995, Peruvian coca cultivation decreased significantly. Cotler reports that from three 
USD per kilo of coca, the prices fell to 40 cents and for PBC, the prices fell from 850 USD to 100 USD 
(Cotler 1999: 129). Others, such as an investigative journalist from the region, who wrote extensively 
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about this topic, calculate that between 1995 and 2000, the “arroba” coca (around 12kg) cost no more 
than 10 soles (Tijourm). 
Consequently, in the 1990s, there was a significant reduction in coca production in the Alto Huallaga, 
and Peru stopped being the premier producer of coca and PBC. The shock of losing the primary source 
of income is still remembered today by the people in the AHV, since it affected not only the coca 
production itself, but the region as a whole (Kernaghan 2009; Marcy 2010: 220). While production 
recovered in the following years, it never reached the levels of the first coca boom. Instead, production 
shifted northward and a considerable amount of coca was now produced in Colombia and demand for 
Peruvian coca and PBC fell. Consequentially, prices for coca dropped and the production soon became 
unprofitable. At first this was an economic disaster mainly for traffickers and coca growers, but since 
all legal business depended on the illicit economy, soon the whole region was in the grip of economic 
trouble. In 2000, the region produced only 13,600ha of coca, while at the same time Colombian coca 
production reached its peak in 1999 (UNODC 2003).  
However, the following years showed the volatility of coca production. After the fall of coca 
production, the region recovered with the beginning of the new millennium. Pressure on coca 
plantations in Colombia in relation to the Plan Colombia, brought changes in the international 
proliferation of cocaine production. Internally, the democratic transition in Peru shifted interest away 
from the coca producing areas. Under these circumstances, coca production recovered from the end 
of the 1990s onwards.  
6.3.7 Conclusion Historical Development  
Summing up, the historical development of the Alto Huallaga is closely connected to the evolution of 
the illicit economy. Right from the beginning of the 1940s, coca and later the illicit economy of 
production and trafficking of PBC dominated the area. The boom of cocaine resulted in an increasing 
migration into the area. Colonization came alongside coca growing opportunities and therefore 
working possibilities. From the early days, coca and cocaine played a substantial role and created 
powerful non-state groups who maintained their positions because of the illicit trade. Coca had a 
dominating role and the valley was the historic center for cocaine production.  
Until the 1960s the state did in fact benefit from the coca production, it was again the state that led 
to a change from the late 1960s. Restrictive state policies facilitated the development of an illicit and 
therefore more profitable economy in the first place. Moreover, it gave PCP-SL the opportunity to 
present themselves as a defense force for the population, against state actions. Paradoxically, the 
state´s role against the coca economy became a key aspect for negative perception of the state. State 
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actions therefore underlined the “marginalization” instead of the integration of the region. In other 
words: Instead of being able to implement rules, the restrictive policies alienated the area from the 
state. As a result, the reach of the state included selective coercive measures against the coca 
economy, but there was no political or territorial integration of the area apart from hub cities such as 
Tingo Maria. In Monzón, the perception of not being integrated or of staying in the margins was only 
exacerbated by the police leaving Monzón only days before the arrival of Sendero Luminoso, thus 
leaving a bitter sentiment in the minds of the population towards the state.  
The organization of the drug trade was relatively peaceful at the beginning. There was no real 
competition among the drug firmas, and only a few had simple guns (van Dun 2009: 71; Kernaghan 
2009). Everybody profited from the production while violent encounters were rare. Reports reckon 
that with the arrival of international traffickers, the rules of the game changed and they introduced 
the sicarios; threatening to kill those who did not comply to the operational rules they imposed (CVR 
2003 Tomo IV: 384; Van Dun 2009: 71). But it was not necessarily the Colombian cartels that inserted 
violence in the area; rather it was a combination of different security actors, with overlapping zones 
of interest and influence. Sendero Luminoso, drug traffickers, local authorities, and state forces 
resulted in a violent mix of uncertainty and the expression of “tierra de nadie” – no man’s land. To be 
more precise, it was not the land of no one but the land of many; rules imposed by different actors, 
but no comprehensive control by one single actor, least of all, by the state. That was similar to other 
regions in the AHV, Kernaghan writes: “Prior to the late 1990s, Peruvian procedural law had been at 
best a distant spectre, one that at times appeared to be approaching and gathering strength and that 
locally had at best a weak, objective presence” (Kernaghan 2009: 16). In this environment, the main 
focal point was coca as the driver of colonization, migration, and ultimately local social order. Hence, 
the historical development set the basis for the construction of a region in the margins based on an 
illicit good. These structural preconditions fully unfold in the “Second Coca Boom”. 
 
6.6 The Local Order during the Second Coca Boom  
6.6.1 The Coca Economy  
After the economic down fall in the mid-1990s coca production increased again by the end of the 
decade. In 2003, Monzón already accounted for 78 percent of the total production of coca in the Upper 
Huallaga Valley. From this production, only one percent was sold to ENACO, the national agency for 
the commercialization of coca. The rest was produced for the black market, for the production of PBC 
and the production for mostly drug trafficking groups (Durand 2014: 120). The drug production could 
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rise and in spite of selective interferences and the destruction of production facilities during the second 
coca boom, the state remained a mere chimera in Monzón. The police left during the conflict and there 
was no police post or infrastructural development in the valley. Consequentially, there was neither a 
control that could have penalized the illicit actions nor a rewarding alternative to the coca economy. 
Hence, coca production remained high and had economic and social consequences in the margins of 
the state. 
The economic reasons for the production of coca remained the same and similar to other regions: 
ENACO pays prices depending on the quality of the coca leaves while illegal coca sells for approximately 
double the price that ENACO is paying for most of the leaves138 (UNODC 2012; Interviews Mopop). 
Additionally, in Monzón, there are limited possibilities for alternatives: steep hills limit the space for 
agricultural land and therefore limit the extension of agricultural fields. Coffee and cacao need more 
space to be profitable. In Monzón, illegal coca and drug production operated for a longer time than in 
other areas of the Alto Huallaga.139 The economy was based on coca which allowed harvesting up to 4 
or even 5 times a year and resulted in the highest prices for dried coca nationally. This was an indication 
that it had higher levels of alkaloids as compared to the coca of other regions.140 A common mode of 
payment was in US Dollar as this was the currency used for buying PBC. Prices for PBC in Monzón were 
on an average higher than prices in the rest of the Alto Huallaga. One kilogram of PBC, cost around 816 
USD in 2008 and 832 USD in 2011. The average price in the region of Alto Huallaga and Apurímac were 
732 and 815 USD respectively and moreover, the prices for cocaine were highest in Monzón (1,021 
USD/kg. UNODC 2011: 51). The business with PBC was performed openly during this time: 
“The coca leaf, that was the only source of income, and that is because our authorities saw 
coca as the only product, because it was easier to work with the coca, because it provided you 
every three months [enough income], and after that you had time to relax.” (Monmunm1) 
The money came directly from drug traffickers who bought it from a middleman or directly from the 
farmers. Some people who were interviewed even indicated that the US-Dollar was the main currency 
in Monzón. There are no records about the volume of incomes at that time, but statements indicate 
that there was a constant income because of the coca economy: “Before there was a lot of money. A 
lot of [US]Dollars” (Mondedum2), “They [the population] bought everything no matter what. There 
was money” (Montienm2).  
 
138 ENACO pays 95soles for the best coca leaves, 80 soles for second best leaves and 65 soles for the least good quality coca 
leaves. The categorization very much depends on the local employees of ENACO. 
139 System explained in previous chapter. 
140 In 2011 the highest average price for coca of US$3.6/Kg was registered in Monzón and the lowest price was registered in 
VRAEM with US$2.8/Kg (UNODC 2011) 
 
 
137 
Furthermore, in the nearby city Tingo Maria, business was booming precisely because of the coca and 
the cocaine industry. People invested in hotels and restaurants, spent money in brothels, and bought 
clothes and motorcycles (Interviews TIycofm2; Kernaghan 2009). The repercussions of the illicit 
business could be felt in the city but due to the strong presence of state security forces in Tingo Maria 
unlike the other areas in the AHV, it was never performed openly. Hence, there was no open selling 
and buying of PBC as in other regions nearby. Instead, economic earnings from the illicit economy were 
reinvested in the legal market.  
The constant inflow of drug money from international traffickers and the dependency on one 
economic source resulted in increasing prices for consumer goods and services, while other sectors 
did not develop at all. The boom in coca and the cocaine business resulted in particular in growing local 
consumption, bigger festivities, increasing alcohol consumption, and luxury goods such as cars, 
motorcycles and clothes (CVR Tomo V 2003: 746). The boom in the illicit economy and the resulting 
migration flows came along with severe social consequences. The constant inflow of new migrants 
meant challenges for the internal organization and the Alto Huallaga became a melting pot of different 
players related to the illicit economy. The availability of money and the evolution of a “narco-
economy” had other social consequences. Alcohol abuse (“borracheros”) and prostitution. became 
part of everyday life.  
“Yes, a lot of prostitution. Colombian, Brazilian women came. All paid, because there was 
money"(Monenm1) 
"They already had a lot of money then they got drunk on the streets, until another harvest." 
(Monmunm1) 
At the same time, even today, the region has weak infrastructural, with low levels of education and 
basic services (INEI 2007). As mentioned before, there was no phone service, no regular running water 
or electricity and till this day, the waste water system is not working (Interview Monngom1, Mnpop.). 
Similar social developments can be found in comparable regions, for example, in the work of van Dun 
(2013) and Kernaghan (2009). 
Vivid memories of this time still linger. The owner of a grocery shop, who formerly owned a bar in 
Monzon, remembers: “During these days we had everything, we offered everything, girls from outside, 
whiskey, you ordered and we could provide it, without question (…) Even women from Colombia” 
(Montienm2). His bar was essentially also a brothel and at this time, he made huge financial profits, as 
did many others. But only a few invested in the stable businesses or houses. Money was spent as easily 
as it came but did not improve living conditions; instead people still recall heavy drinking and the 
availability of expensive clothes and motorcycles (Interviews Monpop; Mongom2). “I drank one box of 
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beer every day, every day you could have party, people lying around, drunken in the street (…) now I 
don´t drink anymore, I can´t”, told me a former cocalero (Monpopm4). Because of heavy drinking in 
the past, his liver is damaged. He tells me how some people spend 100 USD for one night with a 
prostitute. Economic and materialistic possibilities dominated the region while few other topics played 
a role:  
"Before, [people] used to be more interested in more money, work and fun, other things." 
(Monresm1) 
Prostitution and drinking are reported by all interviewees and explained with the relatively easy 
access to money:  
"They are badly accustomed. How many years have they lived of that nothing more? From 
the easy. You know, waiting and getting used to that kind of life is a bit difficult. Here is 
another kind of life than to get drunk and dance.”(Monenm1) 
A former teacher and current worker in the municipality mention the consequences of the “easy 
money”: 
"Our authorities saw the coca as the only product, so it was easier to work with coca, because 
it provided [income] every three months, and after that you had time to even sleep. Then that 
has been incubated in society, delinquency, vagrancy. 
Why was there delinquency? 
Because they had enough money, then they got drunk on the streets, until another harvest." 
(Monmunm1) 
For young people growing up in this environment, trafficking drugs or working on coca fields became 
a viable opportunity to make money (Novak 2014). Driven by economic hardships, youth became 
involved in the illicit economy. Once part of it and given its materialistic attraction, young people did 
not have the motivation to study but were more hung up on the idea of being able to spend money 
such as getting a motorbike or a car. Becoming part of the illicit circle promised some of these aspects. 
Education on the other hand was not the primary focus and coca was the dominant factor: "Some have 
invested in their children but others said as I am not professional my children will also continue to sow 
coca."(Monmunm1). The coca economy promised economic outcome and attracted people into 
migrating to these areas. This led to a diverse and young cultural basis with different actors, whose 
main connection was the coca economy.  
6.6.2 Actors in the illicit and coca economy 
Following an analytical structure of analyzing local social order, we need to account for the role of 
different illegal actors, who do not only seek to generate economic benefits, but also lower the risks 
of getting caught. Finally, the long history of drug production and trafficking in the Alto Huallaga 
resulted in specific social norms and rules. On the macro level, four players are important for the trade. 
Until in the 1980s and 1990s: international cartels. After the disruption of bigger cartels, other actors 
became more important: local firmas, the Sendero Luminoso, the Cocaleros, and the Peruvian state. 
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The internal turmoil and restructuring of the Colombian drug trafficking scene had consequences for 
the international drug trade. For one, Mexican cartels became more important, and the trade also 
diversified and local actors played a more dominant role at the local level (van Dun 2009; Felbab-Brown 
2005, 2010; McKlintock 1998).  
Reconstructing the local business formalities of the drug trade is difficult. There are obviously no 
official agreements, and arrangements depend on the local circumstances. An important change 
brought about the decreasing influence of Sendero Luminoso in the valley, which initially led to an 
arrangement that was based more on personal initiatives:  
"After the guerrilla left it was different already. Rather, each one was looking for their own work 
environment. They dedicated themselves to the marketing of drugs. It was sold like bread. Grab your 
backpack put 10 to 15 kilos and go to another point to negotiate (the selling). And so you traded as if it 
were something very common – that´s what it was like."(Monresm1) 
For estimation on how the drug economy was organized, we can follow the presentations of van Dun 
(2009) and the CVR (2003). The drug economy can be described as a form of division of labor between 
local actors who produced drugs, those who were involved in trafficking, and foreign drug traffickers 
who transported drugs out of the country. The local organization was in the hands of the firmas´ who 
collaborated with the local and regional elite and negotiated on the prices with the campesinos. At 
first, the firmas “divided the control over the gathering of coca and the production of the bruta among 
the present groups as part of a “Pacto de Caballeros [Gentlemen´s Agreement], whereby the different 
firmas operated in restricted areas, and confrontations where rare” (van Dun 2009: 71). Within these 
firmas, different actors had specific tasks. Van Dun (2009) distinguishes two types of small scale 
smugglers, burros and mochileros.  
Burros smuggled small amounts of cocaine on a regular basis and bought it from local firmas. They 
worked independently. They were often familiar with the firma and were often long-time residents of 
the area. They engaged in the business only when in need for money. Besides this, they were engaged 
in other activities, such as the cultivation of coca. They would also sell the drugs for their own profits 
after buying it from the narcos. 
Mochilleros smuggled once or twice in small quantities for a firma. Often new to the area, they were 
migrants who were not involved in other activities. They paid a fixed price that transported the illicit 
goods mainly in Peru, often paid in US Dollar. The large sums they carried, therefore made them 
vulnerable to abuse by the police: “If, during a police search, a peasant or woman was found with a 
large amount of cash, the currency was often confiscated without any explanation or accusation” (van 
Dun 2009: 6).   
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Besides these small-scale traffickers there were traqueteros. These large-scale smugglers were on the 
higher echelons of the firma and earned a great deal of money. Within this group, there were smaller 
factions on different levels. Small scale traqueteros smuggled a few kilos in cars and worked officially, 
for example, as taxi drivers (van Dun 2009: 8). They were constantly on the move. 
And than there were the patrones: They held the highest positions and were the most important 
individuals. They were the ones running firmas as bosses – seen as self-made men by the population 
and respected as such. They mostly lived a modest life. They maintained an inner circle of traqueteros 
organizing and holding good relationships with the inner circle of people – often involved in trafficking 
of larger quantities. They would be living in the areas and holding close relationships. 
There were up to six different drug trafficking clans in the municipality of Monzón: “Los Rambos”, 
“Scich”, “Chilcano”, “Lucho Flores”, “Shiun”, and “Dionisio”. In the whole district of Monzón operated 
four more clans. Each had a local position and transported their drugs to different locations. For 
example, Los Rambos had Monzón as the center of operations but transported drugs primarily to 
Bolivia and Chile. Other clans included the sons of a former mayor of Monzón. The production and 
exportation capacities ranged between 200 and 500 kilos of cocaine per month (IDL-Reporteros 2012; 
Interviews MoPo1).141 Transportation from the valley was mainly via Mochileros, cars or air 
transportation. One inhabitant of Monzón mentions how drugs were sold in the streets like an ordinary 
commodity and transported directly out of the valley: “Yes, there were direct buyers. Down here from 
where you come from they made flights. From Cachicoto [village in Monzón Bajo], there was a landing 
strip. Light aircrafts landed there"(Monenm1). For each drug flight leaving the area, money had to be 
paid to several actors: the army, the mayor, the gobernador, and the organization of the cocaleros 
(2,000 Dollar each) – the CVR also mentions the payment of 3,500 Dollars to the PCP-SL (CVR Tomo V 
2003: 763).142 
Cocaleros 
Beside the actors directly linked to the illicit drug trade, another group had an influential part in the 
local economy: the organization of cocaleros. Although as an organization they were not directly 
involved in drug trafficking, the cocaleros became an important institution for the valley of Monzón, 
the organization of the region, and also for the facilitation of an illicit economy. The cocaleros have an 
ambivalent role with regard to the illicit economy in the Alto Huallaga and even more so in Monzón. 
On the one hand, they are representing the rights of the coca peasants but do not restrain officially 
 
141 This form of organization resulted in “localized drug industries”. It created narcopueblos, offering many possible income 
opportunities (van Dun 2014: 14). A good example for this is the small town of Campanilla, that was home of el Vaticano and 
that honors the former drug patron until today (abc.es 2011; La Republica 2016a)  
142 Similar can be said about Campanilla as epicentre of drug trafficking during the first half of the 1990s. 
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from the drug trade: “We are selling to whoever pays best” (Interview Moncolm). When state action 
against coca increased, entities formed to support and campaign politically for the cocaleros. The first 
organization representing the cocalero interest in the AHV formed in 1964, after the state enacted the 
Supreme Decree 254, which limited coca production to certain districts of Cusco, Huánuco, La Libertad 
and San Martin (Durand Ochoa 2014: 55). This led to organized protests against state actions and 
eradication campaigns, but they could not stop the eradication efforts. With the appearance of 
Sendero Luminoso and the internal conflict the movement lost its momentum. Only after the end of 
the Fujimori regime and after the fading influence of the guerrilla at the beginning of 2000, the 
organization of cocaleros regained strength. At the same time, they transformed nationally into a social 
movement promoting the legalization and the traditional use of coca (Ibd.: 55-78).  
As state actions towards the valley of Monzón were primarily perceived as a threat to the coca, 
cocaleros became organized in the Poderosa Federación de Cocaleros del Valle del Monzón and came 
together with Aucayacu, Leoncio Prado and Yanajanca in the Central Nacional Agropecuaria Cocalera 
del Perú (CENACOP).143 The CENCACOP became a counterweight to the CONPACCP and became the 
most radical cocalero organization in Peru. They neglected the agreement on gradual auto eradication 
made earlier between the Toledo government and cocaleros in 2003 (Decreto Supremo 044-
2003PCM). With its slogan “coca o muerte” (coca or death), CENACOP advocated the free production 
of coca and had its most significant mobilization in 2007, when they went for an indefinite strike in 
Tingo Maria. They managed to have a dialogue and could at least stop eradication in the valley of 
Monzón, but they lost strength on the national level (Durand 2014: 133). Locally however, and 
especially in Monzón, the cocaleros remained an important and powerful institution. CENACOP has 
been accused of holding close ties to Sendero Luminoso, however evidence of a close institutional 
cooperation was missing (van Dun 2009: 328). The most influential figure was Iburcio Morales, who 
became nationally known as dirigente cocalero, coca leader, and later the mayor of Monzón. He 
became a fierce opponent of state intervention and a leading figure of the cocaleros.144  
The role of the cocalero organizations was ambivalent since they were fighting for their right of 
planting coca legally, but they also knew that the majority of the production was destined for the illicit 
market. The majority of the population in the region depended on coca and the organizations of 
cocaleros fought for their right. In a region where coca became a defining role for the society, cocalero 
 
143 Earlier, the different coca growing regions in the Upper Hullaga, Monzón and Padre Abad formed the Asociacición de 
Agricultores y Productores de Hoja de Coca del Alto Huallaga, Monzón y Padre Abad (AAPHC-AHMPA) (van Dun 2009: 201) 
144 There have been sporadic contacts with state institutions by cocalero leaders but these were in order to defend the coca 
production rather than an attempt to accept state development and state rule in the region. The alternative development 
and eradication of coca was not up for open negotiations. 
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leaders thus held a particularly powerful position and assumed political positions as well. They also 
collected “taxes” and used coercive measures to get support: 
“We lived in a fear here and each one had to take care of themselves, take care of your life, 
your home, because there were no guarantees for your life if you said and proposed that 
alternative products must be cultivated, they told you that you were a traitor, and only allowed 
you to plant coca. But they also did it with the purpose of stealing, because all the people who 
planted coca had to give a Sol by arroba [around 12kg coca], and the one that had 100 arrobas, 
had to pay 100 Soles, then the leaders lived from that money.” (Monmunm1) 
The last three mayors of Monzón have also been cocalero leaders. The mayor elected by the people of 
Monzón played an essential role. After the guerrilla left and lost influence in the valley, the mayor was 
seen as the most powerful authority figure – the “leader of the valley” (interviews Monpop.). He was 
also a cocalero and the main representative of the valley towards the state. The importance of Monzón 
as a production site for extra-legal coca fueled the importance of the mayor’s role as “representative 
of the valley”. Spearheaded by cocalero leaders, the valley of Monzón was a closed region and by being 
united, managed to withhold external pressure and maintained an economy based on coca and drug 
trafficking. The cocalero leader Iburcio Morales became mayor in 2007 and is still seen as the true 
leader of the valley. Morales was arrested in 2010 along with 42 others because of alleged cooperation 
with terrorists (Inforegion 2010). Morales died in prison in 2012. The president of the autodefensas in 
Monzón said: "Estamos dolidos por la muerte de nuestro líder" („We are in pain because of the death 
of our leader“) (Correo 2012a). The cocalero leaders should not directly and generally be related to 
drug trafficking, but in the valley of Monzón, they were facilitators for an economy based mainly on 
the production of coca as well as the production and trafficking of drugs. 
Economic, political, and social influence cannot be completely separated. They are very much 
intertwined since the economy was mainly based on one (mainly illegal) product. People who 
controlled bigger or important parts of this economic chain had higher levels of influence. Several cases 
reveal the interrelations between political leaders and leading drug traffickers. Sometimes local 
politicians played both roles at the same time. Political leaders supported the illicit economy to secure 
an economic outcome for their people. At the same time, illicit actors depended on their political 
support to be able to enter the valley of Monzón. 
 
6.6.3 Security 
This section analyses the security situation during the second coca boom and until the destruction of 
the illicit economy. In accordance with the theoretical analysis, security and security provision is one 
key aspect of local order. The following analysis is mainly based on statements of local inhabitants and 
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shows the actors who have been present, their relationship towards the illicit economy, and what the 
security perception was like before the destruction of the coca economy.  
In Monzón, after an uncertain security situation which was characterized by guerilla, narco, and state 
violence, the situation stabilized with the increasing importance of cocaleros and the shrinking direct 
presence of Sendero Luminoso. Risks of bigger confrontations between different security actors and 
even massacres were banned. “Todo tranquilo” – everything was calm here, is one of the main 
expressions in Monzón for the time after 1995; the time when the guerrilla left. However, several 
quotes give examples of interpersonal violence and people give mixed answers on the levels of 
personal security and crime. During field work, people told me about the risks of getting involved in or 
experiencing violence through gun battles, the danger of getting caught by the police, and 
imprisonment or robbery by other traffickers or even the police.145. A UN staff member promoting 
alternative development in the lower parts of Monzón, and a former authority remember that even 
free speech was dangerous:  
"The social situation in those times was terrible. You could not say anything because there 
were people behind you and warned the "traqueteros" who buy drugs and they somehow 
gave you the hints, the threats. That time was not easy. In this environment has worked with 
all the risks. "(Monunm1) 
"I was governor of Monzón and when I left office they [the cocaleros] went on strike, I did not 
agree to this strike. I did not agree to that strike because this strike made no sense. Then a 
group of strikers came to my house, they cut my wife's arm. Then they told me this is 
betrayal. I was grabbed and kidnapped. I denounced them for kidnapping for terrorism, 
because they came masked. Because everyone who comes like this, hooded, for me is a 
terrorist. They took me two blocks away and they hurt my wifes arm. (…) All this traumatized 
my son. "(Mongobcm) 
Some mentioned the lack of control of delinquencies as reason for the risk of violence. A person who 
tried to plant licit goods instead of coca reckons:  
"It was very difficult, there was no police, there was no prosecution. the presence of the state 
was null here at this time. (...) Naturally Monzon was a shame because they killed anyone I 
was threatened with death so I asked for guarantees [for security]. It was given to me by the 
province, not even the local governance gave them [the guarantees] to me"(Moncamcm) 
For people unknown in the valley it was dangerous to enter the valley, because of the potential 
danger of being a state agent. 
"It was quite dangerous for unknown people to enter because they thought he was a cop or 
snitch. It was very delicate for unknown people to enter. That's why only familiar people came 
in here. Unknown strangers could not enter like this without problems "(Moneduf1) 
Some described violence as a consequence of the illicit economy: 
 
145 Van Dun (2009) describes a period in a particular village in the beginning of 2004 of an eruption of violence- mostly on turf 
wars and trafficking routes which led to a circle of revenge and the arming of citizens out of fear of getting involved “…gunfire 
was heard – and murdered corpses were witnessed – on a daily basis (9). Van Dun describes direct involvement of local firmas 
in the order of a village – including the assassination of a local gang leader by sicarios of a patron.(11)  
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"It was because of drug trafficking. It was no longer terrorism. Account adjustments, assaults. 
Bone where there is drug trafficking there necessarily has to be assaults, that type of deaths 
was, it was not because of the guerrillas. "(Monedum1) 
Other quotes suggest different local organizations have been able to control violence:  
Who organized security? 
“The population, together with the authorities and the autodefensas, if we found a thief we 
got him to the sports court and called their relatives or if not we sent him to the competent 
authority. That was a function for the teniente gobernador who at that moment had their 
position. "(Monexgobm) 
 
If there was a robbery what happened to the thief? 
“In that case the person was only warned, although before there were no robberies. There 
were no robberies, you left your door open and nothing happened, there was no violence, no 
robbery. There was no need to report to the police that kind of people would be taken down 
to the river because these people were not worth anything. Criminals are detrimental to the 
well-being of the community.” 
So what did the people do if there was repeated robbery?  
“They threw him into the river, they killed him when he committed robbery. Mostly that was 
[the punishment for] robbery, not so much for those who committed violence." (Monmunm1) 
There is an ambiguous memory concerning the personal security situation in the valley of Monzón. On 
the one hand, people describe the internal control of violence by autodefensas and through social 
control. On the other hand, violence was related to drug trafficking, vendettas, the potential dangers 
for outsiders entering the valley, and open violence related to drug trafficking on the street. 
Interestingly, people with a rather negative view on the coca economy and the cocaleros, tend to 
highlight violent encounters, while those with positive memories stress on the internal order and 
leadership of cocaleros and internal control of violence.  
6.6.4 Coca Rule  
Two lines of arguments dominate the memory of the coca boom and its implications for rule and 
power: one that remembers most of all coercive rules and another that recalls coca as a positive 
binding factor for society, which was able to provide for an adequate economic outcome.  
When asking the population specifically for their perception on rules and order in the last 15 years, it 
is difficult to get straightforward answers. “Tierra de Nadie” – No-man´s-land became a frequent 
description of the region. This expression described more a state of uncertainty than an actual state 
without rules. Rule setting and rule implementation were alternative to state legal procedures and 
structures and beyond the legal frame of the state. The perception on what is right or wrong was 
mainly based on local standards, instead of state rules (see also Kernaghan 2009). However, when 
asked about how the region was organized under which rules they lived, nearly all referred to the 
domination by the guerrilla, which has been mostly based on brutal interference with non-compliance, 
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public, and corporal punishment and forced public meetings. But at the same time, the majority 
referred to the time back in the 1990s. When asked more directly on how local rule and organization 
was after the guerrilla left, answers revolve around the expression: “todo tranquilo” – everything was 
calm – because the population was organized comes as an additional answer. This perception is 
similarly ambiguous as we have seen in the previous section on security.  
Getting information on the previously defining rules in Monzón is relatively difficult, not only because 
of the not unproblematic “reconstruction” of the past, which might get blurrier over time, but also 
because no documents can be found that give an unbiased report on rule in Monzón. Only few 
newspaper articles give insights on the valley, but mainly focus on anti-drug raids of the police than 
the internal rule of the region (eg. Caretas 2003, 2005). However, a recurrent aspect that can be found 
in official reports (DEVIDA 2015), which I also found during interviews was the importance of coca and 
the close relationship towards it. In fact, after the guerrilla was gone, local rule was constructed around 
the coca and implemented rules were in relation to coca and drug trafficking, accepted by the 
population. A NGO worker who was a frequent visitor at the time remembers: 
"The subculture of drug trafficking created its own rules its own ways of living without the 
presence of the state. The population followed, not happy perhaps but getting used to it, 
adjusting because it was there for something like thirty years. Then people had adapted and 
defined this status quo, right? "(Monongm1) 
This also included local authorities and politicians, which needed to follow rules by cocaleros as a 
former school director explains:  
"On the subject of drug trafficking authorities were always a bit pressured by the simple fact 
that drug trafficking dominated almost everything. And the authorities as there was no 
endorsement of the state. There was no police. They were afraid of drug trafficking 
authorities. Then they submitted to them, they had to follow the consequences, they had to 
obey."(Monedum1) 
The illegality of the local economy made the inhabitants of Monzón very suspicious towards people 
from the outside. When asked about the most important rule during the time of the second coca boom, 
a former cocalero said:  "The important rules were that you have to be known to enter the valley, if you 
are not known someone has to guarantee for you to enter and the rest was something that they [the 
cocalero leaders] decided and imposed their popular justice" (Moncamcm)". The reason for this caution 
and for the skepticism against strangers was mostly the fear of eradication. This led to the situation 
that before the eradication only a few people from outside could enter Monzón. Since the Peruvian 
state followed the international drug prohibition regime it was perceived to put the livelihoods of the 
local population at risk. This created an exclusive rule and an insider-outsider rationale, wherein 
people felt they needed to defend their livelihoods against strangers. Monzón was a closed region. 
Unknown people could enter only with permission. Entering without permission would have carried a 
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great risk – especially for state agents. Foreigners that were accepted were linked with being involved 
in the drug economy, thus drug traffickers.  
The economy also resulted in social pressure for participating in the process of coca and PBC 
production that evolved alongside coca. An important rule was the participation in community actions, 
especially demonstrations against state plans for eradicating the coca. Being against the social basis of 
the region could have harsh consequences. This pressure could be felt especially by those who tried to 
plant different crops. One inhabitant of Monzón describes the consequences of a campesino who 
changed his coca crops to coffee:  
(...) the cocaleros told him traitor, (...) they said that he is not son of the Monzón, because the 
encouraged to sow things lawful. It was a great change, he was now only planting coffee, 
because he knew that the drug would not go well, because all his brothers were in jail for 
drugs." (Monradm) 
Those who were against the illicit economy or those who voiced their wish for change were confronted 
with social degradation or suffered financial losses when their crops were destroyed as a form of 
punishment. Often this was being done in a collective manner. Punishment for non-compliance with 
cocalero rules involved, for example, the destruction of crops and corporal punishment. “When they 
wanted you to go on a demonstration, you had to go. If you don´t go they destroy your field and they 
threaten you and your family” (Moncamcm). 
"The cocalero leaders never allowed the government to reach Monzón. Because the cocaleros 
said: if we let professionals enter the state is going to eradicate the coca leaf.” (Monexgobm) 
These rules had an impact on the possibilities for the state to take action and were in this regard 
quite successful. Durand cites DEVIDA official: "Nobody goes into the Monzón; the state does 
not exist there. The only institution that has been able to enter the PEAH, which began water 
and sewage works and this took place only with the permission of cocalero leaders." (Durand 
2014: 120). 
Hence, the exclusive economy created an inner and an outer sphere: while in Monzón, the coca and 
drug economy was dominant, guarded by cocaleros and the local population, at the same time it was 
condemned by state laws. The common perception in Monzón was that the coca needs to be 
protected, which resulted in an identification with the valley, even if this was about to change later 
(see “State Intervention”).  
Van Dun describes for a similar region: “The domination of the cocaine industry establishes social 
networks wherein everyone has direct or indirect relations with drug traffickers, insurgents and state 
actors” (van Dun 2014: 14). With constant pressure from the state, as an external force threatening 
illicit activities and thereby the local economy, the coca was a primary source for internal cohesion. 
But, not all supported this economy as a form of local order and collective punishments have been the 
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result. Furthermore, social pressure was high to plant coca and to support the “common course” of 
defending the economy against outside intervention. The most important rule was the support of the 
coca economy and the defense of it. Coca was the focal point of the society and in retrospect, this 
resulted in a circle of low educational alternatives, a materialistic society, high levels of alcohol abuse, 
low development opportunities, and social pressure against alternative structures.  
6.6.5 Powerful Actors in the Coca Society146 
The majority of the population lived off the illicit economy either directly or indirectly and supported 
leaders who defended this economy on the local level and were also against the state. After the 
guerrilla lost influence, those who had a bigger say in the illicit economy and the protection of coca 
became the most powerful people in Monzón; in particular, the cocalero leaders (see also Durand 
2014). The cocalero leaders had an exceptional role to play during the time of the coca boom. The 
main power of the cocaleros depended on social, economic, and also coercive capital.  
“The leaders were at this time Iburcio Morales, or Ticeran, they were all the leaders. They 
owned the valley. 
And who were the authorities? 
“The authorities were the mayor, the governor. But they did not paint anything [they had no 
influence] but the cocalero leaders. You did not like it or you were doing something, the 
cocalero leaders were threatening you immediately. You had to listen to them. They were the 
owners.” (Monexgobm). 
"One thing is the authorities, elected by the popular vote and another thing are the leaders in 
local election that make (pause) the subculture, I tell you. And they were the ones that 
controlled. And the one chosen popularly by the rules of the state. They tell me that they did 
not want electricity because if that came the coca would go down."(Monongm1) 
The cocalero leaders had a dense social network and decisions being made for the community needed 
to have their support. They acted as a political authority and were essentially the most powerful actors 
in the region. Since everybody depended on coca and on the economic possibilities, most of the 
political power relied on their leaders. Coca farmers trusted their leaders in context of representation 
towards the state. Also, the economic capacities of cocalero leaders was relatively high. In a region 
that was impassable for outsiders and mainly financed through the production and selling of illegal 
goods, it is difficult to account for the exact volume of income in the region. But the cocalero leader 
stood at the top of the coca producers and received a form of “tax” from the coca growers. As we have 
seen, in all likelihood, they also profited (indirectly) from drug trafficking in receiving a share from 
traffickers. Nevertheless, their economic income did only lead to the accumulation of relative wealth. 
A particularly influential leader of the cocaleros was Eduardo Ticeran. He was also a cocalero leader of 
 
146 Part of this chapter has been published in Peru, Heuser (2017). 
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the CENACOP and incarcerated in 2011. When he was released in 2017, a welcome reception was 
organized and well-attended in the lower parts of Monzón, showing still his popularity. 
The position of the mayor was often mentioned as the the most important actor. Especially when 
Iburcio Morales was the mayor of Monzón. At the same time, he was a cocalero leader and focused 
primarily on supporting and defending the coca economy. On this premise was his social capital based. 
He was able to unite the people of Monzón behind the common goal of defending coca. The role a 
charismatic leader played for the valley and its importance for valley became visible after the 
incarceration of Iburcio Morales, when the cocalero movement suffered from his loss. Iburcio Morales, 
was incarcerated and charged with connections to drug trafficking and alleged support to Sendero 
Luminoso in 2010 (Ojo Publico 2017).  
The relationship between coca, drugs and local authorities only visible Monzón. In Tocache, another 
stronghold of drug trafficking in the Alto Huallaga north of Monzón, the then-candidate for the mayor´s 
office, Bazán Arévelo, revealed during his election campaign in 2010:  
“I heard they are saying that I am a trafficker (traquetero). I have never denied that I was living 
from trafficking (traqueteo). Why denying the good or the bad that we have experienced? We 
left school and started mashing coca. The one [saying] he did not live from coca is a liar.” (Cited 
in Ojo Publico 2017, own translation). 
Later, Bazán Arévelo was incarcerated in 2017 for his alleged connection to Sendero Luminoso. Reports 
on the mayor include expensive parties for several 1,000 USD, providing of ammunition to the guerrilla, 
and a close relationship with Sendero Luminoso. Charges against the mayor include the close 
connection to the guerrilla and attacks on state security forces. Furthermore, he is charged with being 
part of a drug trafficking firma that moved 600 kilos of PBC weekly, between 1987 and 1992. For the 
right of using illegal landing strips, they are said to have paid 10,000 USD to the guerrilla group (Ojo 
Publico 2017). He is not the only local politician or mayor who is alleged to have a connection to 
Sendero Luminoso. Various other mayors have been captured because of (alleged) links to drug 
trafficking.147 Uchiza is another example for the influence of a drug economy on a whole community. 
The mayor, Demitrio Díaz Guevara, was accused of being involved in drug trafficking; for example, 
renting landing strips to drug traffickers such as “El Vaticano” (La Republica 2005).  
Besides the cocalero leaders, and mayors, other actors also assumed power in the coca society but to 
a lesser extent. Those include the autodefensas, that were basically responsible for providing security 
in the area and therefore assumed coercive capital. The Juez de Paz assumed the role of the local legal 
 
147 Wilder Miranda Odonez, mayor of Aucaycu, faced similar charges along with Ableardo Payano, mayor of Puerto Pizana, 
who transported around half a ton of drugs in 2012. Alan Valdivia the mayor of Daniel Alomía, was captured in 2010. 
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authority. But also this authority could not protect people who were not conform with coca rules as a 
coffee farmer tells me, who also wanted to plant coffee during the coca boom (Moncamcm) Also the 
Gobernadores also had important roles, although to a lesser extent. Basically, all of the population 
lived off the illicit economy either directly or indirectly. Thus, they supported leaders who did the same 
on the local level and provided a potential shield against the state. In the case of the gobernador, 
people have been more skeptical because of their connections to the state.  
 “Drug clans” and “local firmas” organized major drug trafficking operations and PBC production. 
During the interviews, no drug trafficker was mentioned as an important person who executed direct 
power and influenced local order directly. Their power was based on money and selective use of 
violence, but they did not have a direct political agenda (interviews Monpop).  
During the cocalero rule, the illicit economy was accepted and promoted by the local authorities. It 
was part of daily business and daily life. The narcotrafico brought in a couple of other groups important 
for the illicit economy which became influential besides the cocaleros. Even if their basis of power 
might have differed, their attitudes towards coca and the state was the same (Table 3). All supported 
the coca economy and all had a negative attitude towards the state.  
 
Table 8 Powerful Actors in Monzón Before Eradication 
Actor Role Main sources of 
Capital 
Attitude 
towards  
coca 
Attitude 
towards the 
state 
Guerrilla Mainly Shining Path. Exert political control 
over the region until the end of 1990s. 
Social, symbolic, 
(coercive) 
Supportive Negative 
Autodefensas In response to the Guerrilla. Self-defense 
group against the threat of the guerrilla. 
Provision of order. 
Social, symbolic, 
(coercive) 
Supportive Negative 
Cocaleros Influence on local politics. Often also mayor of 
the district. Violent punishment for non-
conforming with rules 
Symbolic, social, 
economic 
Supportive Negative 
Mayors Local governing authority, often cocalero 
leader at the same time 
Symbolic, social Supportive Negative 
Juez de Paz Local legal authority Social, symbolic Supportive Negative 
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Local Firmas Drug trafficking organization economic 
pressure 
Symbolic, social Supportive Negative 
Foreign Cartels Not residing in the area but frequent visitors. 
Economic power. Use of violence in order to 
control their business (sicarios – hired killers) 
Economic, 
(coercive) 
Supportive Negative 
 
The most important actors in the local order is based on their role within the coca economy. Bigger 
drug traffickers mainly gain more power due to their economic power. Similar can be said about 
cocalero leaders who earned from the direct sells of coca but also from monies of the cocaleros in the 
valley. Economic outcome depends mainly on the production of coca and PBC and also the production 
and smuggling of drugs. Social capital – this essentially depends on the role they play within social 
structures and decision-making processes, mainly through formal channels within the cocalero rule 
such as in reunions, where people could raise their voice and speak. These reunions were dominated 
by cocaleros (Monexgobm, Mondevj). Furthermore, there is coercive capital, which can be based on 
the ability to force someone to follow orders by using direct violence such as by the use of firearms; 
several remarks on violent incidents and homicide are related to this. The other form of coercive power 
in the valley of Monzón, was the ability to enforce orders by the “control of the masses”, which was 
mainly related to the way autodefensas castigated crimes or how cocaleros punished non-obedience. 
Finally, within a coca society whose culture is mixed because of high rates of migration, cultural 
foundations are relatively weak; again, the binding factor is the illicit coca economy. 
When we reconstruct the power relations in Monzón on basis of “capitals” we see that actors with less 
power have also been less supportive and were even against the coca economy. The relationship 
towards the illicit economy became a precondition to gaining power. The most powerful actors were 
those who could also politically support the coca economy. After the guerrilla was gone, the cocaleros 
became a powerful group. According to interviews in the valley, drug traffickers also needed to 
cooperate with the most influential cocaleros. But at the same time, cocaleros depended economically 
on drug trafficking as well. 
Hence, according to different sources, the cocaleros were the most powerful actors in the valley in 
combination with drug traffickers. But the final decision came from the cocaleros. An example given 
by a UN field worker gives insights. In the southern part of the valley of Monzón, the UN financed a 
development program which promoted among other things, the production of rice in the area. Jorge, 
who had been working for that the project in Monzón, describes how the cocaleros feared the 
development of alternatives to the coca and how they reacted:  
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“There came a time when the cocaleros began to see us and the rice project more critical. They 
said we were dividing them. And that was true because many people no longer sowed coca, 
they were producing products to trade, or they were engaged in farming or began to plant 
cacao, or they did reforestation, there was also breeding, the project provided them with 
income. Then comes a moment when Iburcio Morales pressured the managers, the institution 
with which they worked. Then there was a moment when they said: you know gentlemen up 
until here and no further. [Decide] or you are with the United Nations or with us. (…) And there 
was a strong support. Luckily in the square of Cachicoto we were told nothing more, the United 
Nations needs to go (...) There nothing else Iburcio Morales came and they were merged (there) 
Morales as cocalero, plus an armed group, along with drug traffickers. Because at that time 
there was a lot of coca. There were drugs even for pleasure so support for it was huge. 
(Monunm1) 
The pressure from the cocaleros and the drug trafficking firmas became too much to bear. In order to 
stay safe, the UN workers had to do as they were told and leave the valley. They left in a rush and were 
not able to take everything with them:  
“Then we got a period of one week to leave all of us. All the workers and we left. All of us 
went out and took a truck, the other truck stayed there, the tractors remained as well. Then 
what has happened is time. They started to sell the fertilizer we had a lot and they could sell 
all the fertilizer in no time" (Monunm1) 
Within the coca rule, cocaleros were able to lead these kinds of actions like the expelling of UN workers 
not only because of coercive measures, but because the foundation of power was based a collective 
understanding that alternative development was a threat to the region. 
Figure 2 Coca Field of Power 
 
 
As the campesinos produce coca, the raw material and basis for drug production, they are an essential 
and by far the biggest group in the valley. However, they did not have much influence but was rather 
a slave of the system (“esclavos del sistema”) (Interview Mongom2). They earned far more than they 
would have earned with any other crop, but were dependent on the demand for coca in drug 
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production. They were the weakest part of the illicit economy. Hence, the only way of gaining power 
was with the help of the coca associations, as part of a system led by the cocalero leaders. Most of the 
campesinos did not accumulate wealth during boom times and could not make use of the economic 
power to gain more influence. 
During the coca boom, the state had essentially no direct influence in Monzón, even though a 
gobernador was present. But as residents of Monzón told me, the gobernador resided not always in 
the area and secondly could did not speak up against the cocalero until the leading figures were 
incarcerated. Since local order is based on local historical developments that influence practices and 
shared beliefs of the population, we can hold that the main driver of local development in the AHV, 
particularly in Monzón, was coca cultivation and the illicit drug economy. The peripheral region created 
its own rules, and it seems accurate to say that the coca economy and the “closed” region of Monzón 
represent a specific field that has a particular structure which is inseparable from the existence of coca.  
Summing up, local order and rule was based on coca and built on a threat from the outside. The illicit 
economy was a dominating factor in Monzón. It included the development of specific rules and 
practices such as the participation in strikes, and the support of the coca, which was the uniting factor 
in the area. This local order functioned autonomously from the rest of the country and had a particular 
field of power. The constituting factor of coca created the basis for power relations. Instead of one 
actor with absolute power to impose rules on society, the situation became more complex. While 
indeed cocaleros had a prominent role, there was a common understanding and acceptance of rules 
among the community and these rules and power structures were mainly based on the relationship to 
coca. The main driver for this development was the illicit economy as it resulted in a constant financial 
inflow. This situation changed when the state entered the area; it not only destroyed the local 
economy but also redefined local order. 
 
6.6.6 Conclusion: Local Coca Order 
The previous analysis has shown that the Alto Huallaga and particularly Monzón was in the margins of 
the state and that local order was mainly based on the coca economy. The state had a belated and 
incomplete control over the territory, and like the rest of the Alto Huallaga, there was a lack of 
economic and infrastructural development. Additionally, the conflict further disintegrated the region. 
In these circumstances, an illicit economy based on coca and PBC could emerge. Coca was the decisive 
factor for the society in Monzón. Right from the beginning of the late “colonization” in the 1940s, coca 
and later the production and trafficking of PBC dominated the area. Migration into the area came 
abruptly and created a relatively young and culturally diverse community. The main connecting factor 
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right from the beginning was coca. While the internal conflict plays a major role in local collective 
memory, coca and the illicit economy is the dominating topic throughout the years, with no or only 
low influence of the state. Thus, historically, coca and an illicit economy were influential in the 
constitution of the society and the production of local order. 
Connections to the legal frame of the state were only sporadic and the most noticeable encounter with 
state laws was the interference in the basis of the local economy, coca and PBC. As the coca economy 
became more dominant in the region, state actors were perceived as invaders rather than providers 
of order and development. After the guerrilla lost their influence and the threat of eradication or state 
policies against coca became more prominent again, people gathered behind the cocalero leaders for 
the defense of coca. In the end, cocaleros understood their marginalization as a necessity that helped 
them to defend the coca. When PBC and most of the coca production became illegal and was punished 
by the state, it created an inner circle that needed protection from the state that wanted to destroy 
this illicit economy. This common fight for coca provided unity and the coca and PBC business became 
not only the economic basis for the valley, but also its source of local identity. Rules in the area of 
Monzón and Alto Huallaga were defined by cocaleros and the relationship towards coca. The most 
important aspect of social control was to defend the coca economy against outsiders and state 
interference. Consequentially, power structures depended mainly on the relationship towards coca.  It 
evolved into an insider-outsider framework and therefore we can follow that the state itself increased 
the alienation of an already peripheral region. 
Hence, two standpoints on the region existed: an internal and an external one. Internally, the people 
of the region lived by local rules. In this complex local order which evolved around the coca and the 
drug economy, state involvement and development became understood as a threat and interference. 
This environment allowed creating a locked region wherein depending on the coca economy and 
isolation or underdevelopment was regarded as a necessary step to prevent the destruction of the 
local economy. These findings are supported by studies in similar contexts within the Alto Huallaga 
(van Dun 2009; Kernaghan 2009). On the other hand, there is an external perception of the region as 
“tierra de nadie”, particularly by those supporting an alternative development. Moreover, the external 
perspective of the state portrays the region as a dangerous zone controlled by an illicit economy, which 
was also impossible to enter. This ambiguity became a fundamental factor for local order based on the 
coca economy. Local order developed alongside and also because of the coca economy, in stark 
contrast to state development. As we will see in the following, the intervention of the state and the 
eradication of coca in Monzón and the incarceration of cocalero leader had severe consequences for 
local order in the region.  
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6.7 After the Boom 
The region of Monzón was for decades, de facto outside of the spatial and political control of the 
Peruvian state. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the absence of state control facilitated the 
evolvement of an economy which was considered illegal. A local order developed alongside this 
economy which was alternative to the state. The following chapter will show how the state intervened 
in the valley of Monzón, after which I will analyze the effects on local order.  
6.7.1 State Intervention - Changing the Illicit Economy 
Various reasons stand out for why eradication of coca and the illicit economy was possible and why 
local order in Monzón has changed. These reasons can be subsumed under political and organizational 
capacities as well as disruption of internal cohesion. Before the state entered and was able to secure 
its presence in the valley, the situation was tense and curbed through a longer history of resistance by 
the people of Monzón fighting against forced eradication and alternative development. Until 2010, the 
possibilities for interventions in the valley of Monzón were restricted, mainly because of logistical and 
economic restraints to confront the diverse challenges in the valley. Among these challenges were the 
cocalero rule, the presence of guerrilla links in the valley, and political aspects, all of which complicated 
the intervention in the valley (see also Zevallos 2016; Casas and Ramírez 2017). Therefore, the first 
step in intervening in the valley of Monzón was to diminish the influence of drug traffickers and 
insurgents. 
Before the major eradication campaigns destroyed much of the coca crops in the valley, a number of 
selective police operations were carried out in Monzón. For example, in the operation “Fierro” in 2003 
state forces entered with eleven helicopters and around 600 men to destroy local cocaine production 
facilities. They destroyed 76 cocaine laboratories, seized 1,450kilo of dried coca, and 1.2 tons of PBC. 
The Gobernadora, Alejandra Velarde, had to be evacuated after cocaleros accused her of cooperating 
with the police (Caretas 2003). Six bigger interventions followed (table 9). However, even if some of 
these missions included wide logistical efforts, their effects remained limited and the opposition 
against the state remained high. This changed in 2010, when the local cocalero leader and mayor of 
Monzón, Iburcio Morales, was incarcerated during the operation “Eclipse”. In all, the police detained 
152 people, among them were 41 cocalero leaders of the AHV, in Aucaycu, Tingo Maria, and Monzón 
and were accused of cooperating with Sendero Luminoso and for being involved in drug trafficking.148 
Moreover, other coca leaders in the valley fell into this category as well. In 2011, more cocalero leaders 
 
148 Some analysts regard the trial conditions as unfair and question the evidence for the strong allegations (Interview 
LiGom1). 
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were incarcerated in a large-scale police operation. Among them was Eduardo Ticeran, the leader of 
the Poderosa Federación Provincial de las Organizaciones de Productores Agropecuarios of the valley 
of Monzón and the CENACOP. Ticeran, Morales, and other cocalero leaders were incarcerated for 
alleged connections to drug trafficking and terrorism. Iburcio Morales died in prison, while Eduardo 
Ticeran was released in 2017 after spending six years in prison. 
Table 9 Police Operations in Monzón 2003-2010 
 
Operations Actions 
2003 
 
Operation “Fiero”: In a large operation, including 11 helicopters, the Police entered for the first time 
the valley in order to destroy drug laboratories and seize drugs. It was the first time the state launched 
such an operation in the valley 
2004 
 
Operation “Monzón”In five days more than 125 drug labs for the production of PBC were destroyed as 
well as around 2,500 kg of narcotics 
2007  
 
Operation “Huracán”: in Alto Huallaga with focus in Tingo Maria and Monzón, Capture of 27 persons 
with alleged links to drug trafficking and terrorism 
2009 
 
Operation “Detector”: Drug seizures on the road connecting Huánuco and Ancash 
2010 
 
Operation “Eclipse”: In Aucaycu, Tingo Maria and Monzón 152 are detained for allegedly cooperating 
with Sendero Luminoso and for being involved in drug trafficking 
2012 Capture of “Artemio” 
Destruction of 10 PBC- laboratories  
Source: IDL-R; Carretas 2003; LaRepublica 2004, 2005, 2007; Inforegion 2007; Peru21 2012; Casas and Ramírez 2017 
The police operation Eclipse in particular, debilitated the cocalero leadership. Since the majority of the 
incarcerated persons have been cocalero leaders from the CENACOP, the cocalero movement and the 
defense of the coca weakened distinctively. Images of the former mayor of Monzón and cocalero 
leader, Iburcio Morales, who was incarcerated and died in agony, circulated in the press in 2012 (La 
Republica, IDL-R). This image was devastating. “It really hurt me to see our leader like this”, a cocalero 
in the valley of Monzón told me (Moncoclm). The successors who took over the posts of influential 
leaders such as Iburcio Morales and Eduardo Ticeran, were not as effective in mobilizing support and 
shielding of eradication. The cocalero committees lost most of its authority. Finally, they could not 
prevent the CORAH from entering the valley, which undermined one of the cornerstones of their 
legitimacy, which was to make sure that no eradication campaign could enter. Furthermore, the 
national cocalero movement lost influence and lobbying capacities without the presence of 
representatives in the parliament from 2011 to 2016 (Zevallos 2016).149  
Another key factor that enabled eradication was the capture of the Sendero Luminoso leader in the 
Alto Huallaga, Florindo Flores Hala ”Artemio”, on 12th February 2012. Open confrontations with the 
VRAE section of Sendero Luminoso led to two assassination attempts on Artemio. Although these 
 
149 Two ex-congress women are currently accused of colaborating with Artemio and of drug trafficking (El Comercio 2017c) 
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attempts failed, it severely weakened the Alto Huallaga section of Sendero Luminoso. (Casas and 
Ramirez 2017: 50-51). Additionally, the success of the police strategy, who improved their intelligence 
work, successively restricted the options for Sendero Luminoso in the Alto Huallaga, until its leader 
was finally captured in 2012. The incarceration of Artemio dismantled the Comité Regional Huallaga 
of the guerrilla group in the region. Even if the group did not have a base in Monzón, there were well-
established concerns that the group had the capacity to react with violence on eradication efforts 
(Tijourm1). The de facto dismantling of Sendero Luminoso in the Alto Huallaga reduced threats of 
violent encounters with an organized guerrilla force substantially. With the incarceration of Artemio 
and the debilitating of the cocalero groups, the political and armed support for the coca-valley Monzón 
was irreparably damaged. A platform for the resistance and strengthening of internal cohesion was 
now missing. Additionally, because of growing pressure from the state and shrinking defense 
opportunities, drug traffickers and smaller drug trafficking organizations moved to other areas like 
Pichis Palcazu (Lijourm2). 
On the other hand, internal cohesion in the valley of Monzón was debilitated due to several state 
activities that became more coherent as before. At the same time, internal political alternatives that 
promoted alternative development emerged and gained support. An outstanding role in this regard 
was played by the Asociación Desarrollo y Bienestar del Valle de Monzón (Asociation for Development 
and Wellbeing of the Valley of Monzón) which confronted the cocalero leadership and gathered 
support (Monexgobm). At the same time to these movements DEVIDA activities were held such as 
reunions, discussing and promoting alternative development. Thus, before the eradication took place, 
the internal support for shielding of state programs and alternative development was already 
shrinking. DEVIDA officials mention that they had already started to communicate with the population 
before the eradication started in order to sensitize them to possibilities for alternative development. 
As one DEVIDA official stated:  
“I went there alone; we could not enter with a bigger group which would have raised more 
suspicion for the population that we would eradicate immediately. I went there and 
communicated with the people. We had very hard discussions. But in the end, I think they 
understood that something needed to change” (Interview Modevm1).  
Apart from the direct intervention and preparation from DEVIDA, private companies such as the 
Programa Nuevos Alternativas (NAV - New Alternatives) and development organizations such as USAID 
and UNDP played a role as well. The NAV in particular, worked on the community level, interacting 
with the local population, organizing reunions, and seeking to convince people to support alternative 
development programs. The coordination from DEVIDA with these counterparts proofed to be 
important factors for the intervention in Monzón (Casas and Ramírez 2017). Hence, even before 
eradication in the case of Monzón, there was constant penetration from DEVIDA and other actors in 
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the region which had influences on the position of the most radical actors and later on the 
transformation of the local order. These actions by local actors, DEVIDA, the military, and the anti-drug 
police DIRANDRO, contributed to a transformation from within before the state agents entered with 
force and enforced a constant presence of the police and DEVIDA.  
Gradually, some local actors changed their perspective towards coca and the illicit economy. Some 
argued that this was because of their families and because they did not want to go to jail (Moncamcm1) 
Others indicated they wanted the district to “improve” and that the leaders were unfair and bad for 
the society (Monexgobm).  This faction of internal cohesion was another factor for why eradication 
became possible. It was therefore a variety of reasons that allowed eradication and that would 
ultimately change Monzón. Finally, arguments towards the eradication were well-defined. Local 
authorities and the organization of cocaleros were against eradication, while state agents and 
development cooperation favored eradication. Cohesion of the state agents became an important 
aspect for the success of the eradication campaign (Zevallos 2016). 
In an interview with the Peruvian weekly Caretas, Carmen Masias, Director of DEVIDA, explains that it 
was indeed a coordinated effort by different state entities:  
“The first achievement was not ours, but of the Police, when they captured Artemio in 2011 
and 42 other terrorist leaders (...) This was crucial to start negotiating with the leaders and 
authorities of Monzón.” 
Masias also highlights the immediate consequences brought by the state intervention: 
“Monzón had 71% of poverty. The population had been between two fires: drug trafficking 
and terrorism. Then we entered and the State that had been absent arrived with us. The 
caravans were organized, and the first thing we brought was health, education, RENIEC, 
because in Monzón there was a large number of the population that had no registered 
identity. Then they could not enter the Integral Health System (or) to social programs” 
(Caretas 2017; own translation). 
Indeed, for the first time state actors and institutions could enter the region and provide basic services. 
Still, intervention came as a shock for the population and was not perceived as a salvation, particularly 
in the beginning. In various interviews, DEVIDA officials gave the impression of seeking a consensual 
development, in cooperation with the population. However, in Monzón, several remarks by the 
population revealed that there was no consensual plan for development and even less so for 
eradication: “They did not communicate anything. They did not talk to us” (Monlocpf1). In all interviews 
with local population in Monzón, notwithstanding the fact if they were in favor or against state 
intervention, this absence of consent is perceived as a major shortcoming by the state. People felt 
ignored and felt that their demands were not taken seriously. This added to the obstacles for state 
officials, who were perceived as invaders, and it was one reason why state intervention in Monzón did 
not go unchallenged.  
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In 2012, forced eradication began in Monzón and destroyed most of the coca crops in the valley. 
2,650ha of coca were eradicated in 2012 and in 2013, eradication campaigns continued and destroyed 
7,737ha (UNODC 2013).150 The eradication was not unchallenged by the local population and in violent 
clashes in 2012, two people were killed (IDL-Reporteros 2012c). However, there was no larger violent 
confrontation afterwards. As a former cocalero said to Caretas (2017): “The state came in. It took the 
decision for eradication. And you cannot do anything, with the military, tear gas bombs and the death 
of two or three. You have to decide. I can work and live. Dead I can not help my family.” (Caretas.pe 
2017). 
 
Figure 3 Deviation in Coca Cultivation 2011-2013 
 
Coca cultivation 2010 (Before eradication) 
      
 
Coca cultivation 2013 (After eradication)  
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Source: DEVIDA 2011: 21 and DEVIDA 2013: 25 
 
The eradication campaign continued and ultimately resulted in the end of the coca economy in 
Monzón. The graphic shows the extension of coca cultivation in 2010 compared to 2013, and 
represents a clear diminution of coca extension. The graphic not only shows the vast extension but 
also the dramatic change of coca production after the eradication. In 2012, the valley accounted for 
around 65% of all coca in Alto Huallaga, and around 11 to 15% of all coca production in Peru (UNODC 
 
150 In total, 14,234ha coca was eradicated in the region of Alto Huallaga and Aguaytía in 2012 (UNODC 2013) 
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2012). Eradication had a major impact as coca production reduced from 7,005ha in 2011, to 393ha in 
2014. This resulted in massive economic changes for most of the 13,000 inhabitants (INEI 2007). 
Table 10 Social Programs in Monzón151 
 Social Program Province District 
  Humalies Monzón 
Cuna Mas Children 0 0 
Families 1,014 88 
Juntos Affiliated Households  6,590 1,332 
Subscribed Households 6,176 1,267 
Pension 65 Receivers 3,439 489 
Qali Warma Children 12,283 2,988 
Educative Institutions  327 81 
Haku Wiñay Haku Wiãy – concluded projects 500 / 
 Projects currently executed 5 / 
Source: MIDIS (2017) 
 
The official story of the state intervention for Monzón conveys the story of a “rescue” of the people 
from violence and poverty. A similar story is told by the 2015 published brochure on Monzón (DEVIDA 
2015). In fact, today we find several state investments and agencies in the region. Public investments 
in the valley of Monzón increased from 2008 to 2012. While in 2008, the investment in the district of 
Monzón was at 6,5 million Nuevo Soles, the number increased successively to 14,5, million (2010) and 
19,8 million Nuevo Soles in 2012 (Garcia 2013). The valley of Monzón was for a long time inaccessible 
to state agents and also to state development programs. Consequentially, access to social programs is 
relatively new for the local population. Today there are several social state programs such as Juntos, 
Qaliwarma, Pension 65 or Cuna Mas. A broad variety of state institutions are now present in the valley, 
which include security institutions, education facilities economic agencies and social agencies (Table 
11). Hence, the attempt of including the region into state services was undertaken with high levels of 
investments and state projects. Nevertheless, public perception remains critical towards state 
 
151 Cuna Más supports families with children under the age of three for their basic necesities, Qali Warma forsees the 
alimentation for children in schools, Juntos, supports families fanancially with young children, Pension 65 is a monthly 
pension for elderly people; Haku Wiñay technical assistance and a small asset transfer to rural households. The Fund for 
Economic Inclusion in Rural Zones (FONIE) particularly features the affiliation to Alto Huallaga or VRAEM as a condition that 
enables them to profit from funding. FONIE inverted 440,000 Soles in 2017. 
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intervention and even if more money was invested, eradication extensively affected the valley of 
Monzón.  
Source: Own elaboration 
The possibility for the state to intervene in Monzón was based on a variety of reasons: on security 
reasons with the capture of Artemio, political reasons by incarcerating cocalero leaders, and also social 
reasons that led to an internal fragmentation. All of these factors improved the possibility for state 
intervention and lowered the risks for the state when intervening in the area. The intervention 
destroyed the coca economy and had further far reaching social, political, and economic consequences 
and consequentially for the local order. The following will analyze the effect of the state intervention 
on the local social order and the perception of local economic options. 
6.7.2 Post-Eradication Economy 
A particular challenge for this section was the availability of data. Since the latest economic data is 
either based on information from 2007 (INEI 2007) or 2012 (UNDP 2012), the time before eradication, 
the following will be mainly based on my own data collected during fieldwork.  
During a conversation, a DEVIDA official painted a very dark picture of the time before the state 
entered the valley: there would have been abuses against women and children, people getting drunk, 
no education, no health support, and a general underdevelopment of the valley. The entry of the state 
would now allow development for the first time in an abandoned region (Devof4m). While these 
aspects including the possibilities of state intervention and investments or infrastructural 
developments are certainly true, and as I have shown many social institutions now work in the valley, 
still many people in Monzón are disappointed with the state.  
 
152 Furthermore, I noticed the following non-state organizations, that have been or still are active in the Valley of Monzón: 
NGOs: Instituto de Cultivos Tropicales, Centro de Información y Educación para la Prevención y el Abuso de Drogas (CEDRO), 
Nuevas Alternativas (NAP). Private companies: ENEL Perú: Construction of powerplant Generación Andina: Construction of 
two powerplant, CASA: Firm that executes the pavement of the road Tingo María – Monzón – Casma.  
Table 11 State Institutions in Monzón after Eradication 
 Security Education Economic 
 
Social 
Institutio152 • Ejército Peruano 
Monzón, Cachicoto 
• Comisarias PNP 
Monzón, Cachicoto 
and Palo de Acero 
• inicial, primaria, 
secundaria. 
• Filial de la Universidad 
Hermilio Valdizan. 
facultad de agronomía 
• Instituto Superior 
Tecnológico Público 
Mariano Bonin 
• Agencia Agraria 
• Devida oficina de 
coordinación en 
Cachicoto 
• Banco de la Nacion 
• PROVIAS  
• Programa Juntos 
• Programa pensión 
65. 
• Quali Warma 
• Cuna Mas 
• Vivienda Rural 
• Puesto de Salud 
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After eradication economic consequences could soon be felt by the local population. The abrupt entry 
of the state came as a shock for the socio-political system of Monzón. While the eradication approach 
destroyed most of the illegal crops, at the same time, entering the formerly “inaccessible” valley with 
several government programs at once, gives the unique opportunity to study a region in transition and 
also to examine views on the state. Because of Monzón´s geographical location, there were only a few 
possibilities to hide coca fields or drug production facilities. Former coca farmers therefore had three 
options: stay and work within a government program for alternative development, stay and work on 
construction site that came along with state investments, or move and try to find another spot for the 
production of coca or PBC. A former cocalero said, that many he knew migrated to find another spot 
to grow coca: 
"Well, they migrated. From here they go out and go deeper [away from state influence] 
continue to plant coca and do the same thing. Because the production of coca is more profitable 
here in Peru, here in the valley. That's why they say that with one hectare of coca they already 
have to live. Instead, coffee is harvested once a year. And what do you do during the year? Also, 
when you are young, what do you do in those years? You have to wait 5 years. In those 5 years 
you eat. What you live from until than and the harvest is once a year. For cacao it is the same 
situation."(Monenm1) 
The economic consequences of eradication are openly visible. During my first visits to Monzón I met 
the owner of a small shop, Martha. Every day, except Sunday, Martha opens her small store early in 
the morning. She pulls up the roller shutter adjusting the counter where she is hoping to sell parts of 
her stock ranging from potatoes to sandals. She does not switch on the lights, “electricity is too 
expensive” she says (Interview Montienf). Then she sits down in her plastic rocking chair in front of the 
shop and waits for customers. “It is a typical start in the day”, she says, looking on to the main road in 
front of her shop; a muddy gravel road full of holes. Only a small group of middle-aged men in overalls 
and helmets walk by, heading to the new construction site of a hydropower plant. Besides these 
construction workers, there are few signs of any working activity. Although she opened her shop as 
every other day, Martha is not expecting anybody: “There are no people anymore and there is no 
money, people do not have money. The economy is bad (…) Because there is no coca anymore. 
Everything is really sad” (Interview Montienf). It is striking that only a few people can be seen in the 
age range of 18 to 35; most of them are working on the construction of a hydropower plant. The once 
busy center of the district of Monzón is now a quiet place and it is hard to imagine that this was once 
an epicenter of drug production and trafficking in Peru. 
In an attempt to analyze the local market, I counted the number of businesses close to the plaza central 
(Table 12). What came as a surprise during my first visit to Monzón was the number of hotels. I counted 
six and all of them were relatively old except one. During the time of the coca boom, there were more 
frequent visits by people doing business with PBC or Cocaine. When peasants from nearby villages 
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came after their harvest of coca to celebrate, they also stayed in the hotels. Finally, farmhands who 
helped in harvesting coca found a place to stay in the hotels, which were later used by NGO workers.153  
Table 12 Businesses in Monzón 
Hotel Bar Restaurant Grocery 
stores 
Clothing Beauty 
salon 
Bakery Stationers Church Tradesmen Butcher  Pharmacy 
5 2 8 18 6 (one 
year 
before 
10) 
1 1 2 4 3 1 2 
Counted within two blocks from plaza de armas 
 
Today, many of these hotels still exist. This time the hotels are booked not because of drug traffickers, 
but mostly because of construction workers of the hydroelectric power station in Monzón. The 
investments in the hydroelectric power plant and investments in infrastructure also explain the 
relatively high number of restaurants. These infrastructure and hydropower projects seem to be 
essential for the local economy. An owner of a restaurant told me that they depend on the investments 
because workers would be their most frequent guests. As I was told, one of the most obvious changes 
that was visible is the number of bars. During the boom time of the coca economy there would have 
been ten bars, now there are only two left. One of them opens frequently and is mostly empty.  
The survey conducted for this study in Monzón and in the nearby regions of Huipoca and Subte de San 
Jorge which experienced a similar history of coca dependency, gives some indications on the economic 
situation of the region. The two additional areas will be used as a means of control and comparison to 
the results found in Monzón. Huipoca is located in the nearby district of Padre Abad, half way to 
Pucallpa, also a former center of drug trafficking. Alternative development is promoted in forms of 
palm oil or cacao. Subte de San Jorge is close to Tingo Maria.  
Asked for their perception on the economic situation of eradication shows that the majority indicates 
they do not have enough economic capacities and are mostly disappointed with their own economic 
situation (Figure 4 and 5). 
 
153 As an NGO worker told me about the time he first stayed overnight: „I choose the hotel with the brick walls and in the 
rooms by the courtyard. The reason is that inside I felt safer and no bullets (“balas perdidas”) went through the walls.” 
(Interview Monongm). In fact, unlike wood or mud, concrete was impermeable by bullets. A fact that was also described by 
Kernaghan in the case of Aucayacu (2009: 170). 
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Figure 4 Perception of Economy AHV  
 
Figure 5 Economic Wellbeing AHV 
 
 
A survey conducted by DEVIDA in 2013 came to similar results and most people indicate their economic 
situation as to be worse than before. But at the same time, the survey indicates that they are not 
against eradication per se, but rather wanted a longer transition phase in order to be able to change 
their crops (DEVIDA 2013). When I visited the region on several occasions, I received similar answers:  
"Now they first eradicate, then they want to plant something else. For example, here in this 
valley you cannot produce cocoa, only coffee. Not even experiments have been done with other 
plants such as, lúcumas, avocados. Other plants that can be produced in the area. They have 
never made studies" (Interview Monenm2). 
These accusations are denied by DEVIDA officials, who state that they know what can be produced in 
the area and that it would be a question of the correct treatment. While a statement on the correct 
agricultural treatment of the fields lies beyond the study, it seems that there is a general 
disappointment by the population on the state. Furthermore, the statements recorded also of those 
that are part of a government program reveal dissatisfaction or even distrust to the state and state 
programs; as for now. 
The perception of the eradication seems to correlate with the economic inclusion and personal success 
after eradication. Those who were more successful in the time after the eradication were more likely 
to be positive towards the eradication and the entry of the state. I received the most positive remarks 
from people who actively promoted their coffee or cacao plantations. We can hold that today two 
groups of actors are present in the valley. Those who profited from the eradication campaign and do 
emphasize on positive changes. These include the changes in local habits, less violence, and more 
possibilities to develop for the whole district. This group consists mainly of cafetaleros with ambitions 
to export their products or people cooperating closely with DEVIDA. They do have explicit expectations 
from the state, such as the construction of a coffee roasting house for more added-value to their 
products or the improvements of streets to improve transportation capacities. The other group 
emphasize on the importance that coca had and see in the intervention a reason for all the bad –
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economically, culturally, and for security (theft, violence, changes of local habits). They have clearly 
opposing views on the eradication and the advent of the state. This group has mostly lost economically 
and more importantly, lost their influence as well. Mainly driven by economic uncertainties, their main 
complaints concern the economic downfall in the light of the loss of coca and that the alternative 
products did not produce alternatives to most of the people.  
DEVIDA provided seeds and technical training for planting coffee or cacao, which would provide 
peasants economic opportunities as alternatives to the coca. However, these crops require bigger 
plantations while most peasants in the Alto Huallaga have small parcels of land ranging from 0.25 to 
3ha. In Monzón, the average land holdings are even lower (Cabieses et al. 2013: 5). While coca offers 
a secure income and can be harvested the first time after six months, the provided alternatives cacao 
or coffee need three to four years until they can be harvested for the first time. Moreover, coca can 
be harvested three times a year and can be sold immediately and is often picked up directly at the 
field. Alternative crops on the other hand, can only be harvested once a year and need to be 
transported to the market which takes a bigger effort because of the infrastructural situation. 
Additionally, the agricultural soil is exhausted by the years of coca planting and using of chemical 
products, which affects the agricultural output of alternative crops.  
Paradoxically, in order to be able to plant alternative crops, some peasants still plant coca. While 
visiting two former coca farms that now receive government assistance for planting cacao, it was 
clearly visible that one was still planting coca because the freshly harvested coca field was just beside 
his new cacao plantations. When asked why he is still planting coca, one peasant answered: “We do 
not receive enough money for our products that is why” – And who are you selling the coca to? “Well 
there is ENACO” – And you are selling to ENACO? – No answer to the last question (Interview Mocacm). 
Also news reports affirm that the production of cocaine did not completely vanished from the valley 
and various laboratories for drug production and illegal coca fields have been destroyed also some 
years after erradication (Inforegion 2015, 2017). 
Similarly, in Aguaytia it became clear that the coca economy is not completely eradicated albeit in the 
presence of eradication efforts. During an interview, a police officer in nearby Aguaytia told me how 
drug trafficking still continues:  "From here a kilometer you could find a production facility where they 
produced the drug, now it is no longer there. One has to go look for it, with intelligence and with much 
risk of ambushes going into the jungle. Now you walk 6, 7 to 8 hours. More care is taken, for the 
eradication of the coca leaf since 2011, 2012, 13, 14 to minimized production, but drug trafficking 
continues. "(Agupolcm). People sporadically pay in US-dollar, even if it is not as common as it used to 
be. During field research, I experienced this form of payment twice. A woman paid in a small local 
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grocery store without any problem and no questions were asked with regard to a 20 Dollar bill in 
Aucayacu. In another instance, a man wanted to pay with a Dollar bill in a restaurant, which in this case 
was not accepted. In both cases, there was no expression of surprise, neither in the restaurant nor in 
the small store. Nobody replied when I asked if this happens frequently, or when I expressed surprise 
to see US-Dollar bills in an area with no tourists or any obvious source for US-Dollar. Also, my curiosity 
to what people would do with the US-Dollars (change it or pay with it themselves) was only answered 
with a smile. The persistence of drug trafficking in the wider region of Monzón and Aguaytía is also 
supported by recent reports on drug seizures in the area and even illegal flights for drug transportation 
(“narcovuelos”) (LaRepublica 2017; El Correo 2015; Gestión 2015). Drug trafficking still continues, but 
on a much smaller scale than before. 
State investments in the valley of Monzón are visible, streets are being paved, bridges are being 
constructed, and alternative development is supported. But three or four years after the eradication 
of coca in Monzón, it becomes clear that not everyone believes in the development alternatives 
offered by the state. The depiction by state officials to present Monzón as a success story and a form 
of humanitarian intervention is not shared by all inhabitants. Most of my interview partners highlight 
the importance of coca and do not refer to state investments as similarly valuable. On the other hand, 
they do not imply that they want to plant coca or produce PBC again, instead those who are more 
critical towards the state stress on the importance of more state investments. In other words, the 
population seems to are seeking more state integration and not less. 
 
6.7.3 Security and Security Perception 
For a long time, the valley of Monzón was seen as a dangerous place, due to drug trafficking and the 
presence of remnants of Sendero Luminoso in the region. As we have seen, outsiders could not enter 
without permission, there were reports on violence in relation to drug trafficking, alcoholism and the 
guerrilla was common and is still mentioned in recent reports and media articles. The following will 
analyze how the security is perceived today and how perception changed after state intervention. 
Secondly, I will analyze the security structure and trust in security actors in the valley (in comparison 
to Huipoca and Subte de San Jorge). 
Shortly before my first field work in the Upper Huallaga Valley at the end of 2015, comments from 
people in Lima stated that I should take care and be careful in this part of the country. Perceptions in 
the capital on the region are still dominated by its history of guerrilla domination and drug trafficking. 
Even in Tingo Maria, the bustling “hub-town” and last urban center on the way to Monzón, a hotel 
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owner voiced concerns the night before I went to Monzón. Arriving in the valley of Monzón, I 
experienced the opposite of what I was told, a very calm situation. People walked without signs of 
hectic rush during daytime, sitting in front of their houses talking. After sunset and on the weekends, 
I did not perceive many changes, the setting was rather quiet. During the nightly volleyball match in 
the central plaza (Plaza de Armas), parts of the population gather in front of the church. Again, most 
people mentioned that everything was calm around here (“todo tranquilo”), which I came to confirm.  
Yet, despite this calm atmosphere, the security perception is relatively low in my survey of Monzón, 
Huipoca, and Subte de San Jorge. At the same time the the perception of personal safety is very high 
(Figure 7), with more than 80% of the respondents in Monzón indicating that they would feel safe. The 
difference between personal safety and the overall security perception is striking. The interviews in 
the valley of Monzón indicate that there are two factors that stick out for the opinion of local security: 
the reference to coca and the drug economy as well as the reference to security institutions. 
Figure 6 Security Perception AHV 
 
Figure 7 Personal Security AHV 
 
N = 59 N = 59 
 
Still, security seems to be correlated to the relation with coca or the reputation of the valley. When I 
asked an NGO employee who works in the valley for two years if she feels safe, she answers:  
"At first no, I was not sure because there were people who called me a spy and I'm coming to 
see who is a cocalero, but maybe they said this because of their inexperience. But time has 
given me reason and it is not dangerous. Now for example I have students who are taking the 
courses that we give and we do well." (Monongf1) 
People relate the security situation to the economy, highlighting that poverty would translate to 
domestic violence. But at the same time, inhabitants report that homicides have gone down after 
eradication: 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Security
Security Perception
Monzon Huipoca Subde San Jorge
0
20
40
60
80
100
Do you feel safe in your Community?
Personal Safety
Monzón Huipoca Subde de San Jorge
 
 
167 
"In other words, there is more violence in the sense that there are more family problems 
because of economic problems. There is more violence in the homes. But there are no deaths 
without reason because the drug trafficking as there were. Adjustments of accounts, killed for 
money, assaults, different things back then." (Monresm1) 
Several interview partners highlight similar aspects and mention that life is much calmer as compared 
to the time before 2013, and that state presence lowered the threat of violence or vendettas:  
"To begin with, there are no assaults and if there is going to be an incident, a thousand one. 
Life can be fulfilled here in complete peace. We can celebrate a birthday, I sleep with my 
window open and nothing happens. Since the presence of the police has restored we have 
tranquility and peace "(Monedum1) 
Now do you feel safer that the police are present? 
“Sure, a little more because there is no fear that for a slander they kill you, without being 
tried. For no reason killed you” (Monresm1) 
 
Other remarks indicate that the fear of theft is growing in comparison to the time before. Many 
indicate that before there was no crime because the CADs would have punished the person harshly – 
now the police would be too soft and the judiciary is not working and is corrupt. Thus, they argue that 
with the arrival of the state, criminality is growing since the mechanisms of state forces are not 
sufficient to prevent crime.  
"Because they know very well, “Ah, the police are going to grab me, they are not going to 
charge me, they have no prisoners, they're going to leave me." In contrast, the people do not 
say that, on the contrary: you get caught and you get massacred (...) for example in the last 
year there were many robberies there were assaults. This is the issue now. People are aware 
that the police take them to the police station I give my statement and I get released. You can 
not touch this person because he is under the law. All thieves, the rats, know this. " (Monjuezm). 
Of course, these perceptions on security are subjective and taken in the comparison with the past.154 
But the number of violent encounters on the streets and particularly on the weekends seem to have 
not only decreased but disappeared. This was my impression also by night with only dimly lit streets 
and few people outside. On the other hand, the lower economic outcome is a recurring narrative 
concerning security and related to domestic violence or robbery. The perception of robberies and a 
higher possibility of petty crime is often also related to the security institutions. Hence, the perception 
of personal security is relatively high, while the perception of the overall, or we might say “public” 
security is only on a medium level. In part, this is related to the security actors present in Monzón. 
 
154 it needs be highlighted that sometimes it was not clear to which time people were exactly referring to. When I was 
specifically asking for the time between 2000 and 2013, follow-up questions revealed that the answers mostly referred to 
the time of the 1990s. These differences are important because it was the time of broader guerrilla presence that resulted in 
another type of rule and another type of violence. For the analysis, these particularities are taken into consideration. 
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Security institutions in the valley of Monzón include the police, the military, and the autodefensas. 
After eradication, the state quickly installed polices stations. DEVIDA praised the fact that local order 
could be reinstalled in the AHV region, which included the presence of 20 commissaries. In the valley 
of Monzón, there are three new police commissaries. The police station in the urban center of Upper 
Monzón was established in 2013 (Caretas 2013; Interview Monpolcom). Besides the three police 
stations there are two military posts, one in Chachicoto and another one in Monzón. In Monzón, the 
military is regarded as the security institution that “rescued” the region from the influence of the 
guerrilla. Based on this perception, they enjoy higher levels of trust than the police. Another institution 
is the autodefensas who have been important as providers of security. The autodefensas are still 
referred to as an important institution to keep order. However, since the police arrived in the valley 
their influence decreased considerably.  
Each police station is guarded at all times by a police officer, armed with a rifle. This security measure 
is also related to the status of the region as an emergency zone, which was lifted in 2015 after more 
than 30 years. Analysts regard this as a belated step, since the original reason for the emergency zone 
was to provide security in regions affected by terrorism, since after the capture of “Artemio”, this 
threat was essentially diminished (El Comercio 2015; Zevallos 2016).155 The police does not have a 
good reputation in the valley of Monzón. Many inhabitants of Monzón still say that the police 
abandoned the population in the past when the guerrilla entered the valley, and left the people alone 
during the 1980s (Interviews Monlocp1). Additionally, there are many complaints about police 
misconduct or corruption, these aspects lead to the negative understanding on the police: 
"The police always have a bit of a bad name they have never had a good reputation. Because 
the people here work in agriculture they do not work legally. They work informally. (...)They 
[The police] come here to make their rounds and people say they are bothering. Taxi drivers 
say they are bothering them. The police are always famous for asking for money. "(Monresm1) 
Corruption appears to play an important role in the region and is often mentioned during interviews.  
One experience during a shared taxi drive towards the valley of Monzón, showed this type of misuse 
of power and arbitrariness. The police stopped the taxi I was riding in, and the young driver, Manuel, 
had to step outside the car. It was just his third week working as a taxi driver and he mainly drove the 
way from Tingo Maria to Monzón and back. While I could not hear what they were saying, it was 
obviously a lively discussion between Manuel and the police officer. After several minutes, the officer 
took him to the back of the car. After a few minutes Manuel got back in. He told me that he had to pay 
20 Soles. “What was the reason?”, I asked. Manuel explained that there was no real reason and that 
 
155 Interview with Gustavo Gorriti: "Se han demorado en levantar emergencia en el Alto Huallaga". 
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he did not get a ticket. Instead, he explained that as he is new in the taxi business, the police officer 
demanded that he pay a tribute to the police so that the next time they would not control him 
anymore. There was not really a choice, Manuel explained, either you pay or you will get troubles. “Así 
son, así es la vida” (-That´s how they are. That´s life) said one of the passengers, the other passengers 
agreed.  
Besides cases of corruption, people tell me that the police are not reliable and are not helpful if 
something happens. The police seem to be isolated from the common population. When asked what 
they think about the state, common answers from the population included “They are only going after 
drug dealers, but here are none”, “they are annoying”, “they always want something” (Molocp). It is 
striking that the police make its presence felt by showing up for public events, or walking in big groups 
through town. During a talk with an inhabitant, a group of young policemen crossed the street, going 
straight through the village while people were looking at them. They were on the way to a football 
pitch nearby. The person I was talking to explained that they are generally seen in bigger groups and 
would not be interested in helping the community. I got the impression that the police in Monzón is 
still detached from society and that it will take some time to include them. 
When asked in a survey about how people perceive the work by the police, the perception is on a 
medium level (2.1 when 4 is the highest level and 1 the lowest). State security institutions do not enjoy 
a lot of trust – and I got to know about complaints regarding corruption and misuse of power.  
                        Figure 8 Trust in Security Institutions AHV 
 
                          N = 59 
Surprisingly, the majority of the participants in the survey in Monzón would go to the police when 
experiencing violence. 56% indicated that they would go to the police, while the next group, 
community leaders, was only named by 23%.  
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The relatively low perception of overall security does not necessarily represent a de facto increase in 
insecurity. But there is an indication that the growing presence of state security might lead to the 
perception of less violence but not necessarily to the perception of more personal security.  
The presence of the police, in combination with the eradication of coca has reduced the number of 
actors in the sector of security. There are no hitmen or guerrilla forces anymore, while at the same 
time with the arrival of state security forces, options for autodefensas to operate are restricted. The 
survey data indicates relatively low levels of trust for the security institutions (Figure 8), it is striking 
that neither the police nor the autodefensas enjoy high levels of trust. While many would go to the 
police either way when experiencing violence, it is not necessarily an indication of trust but of a lack 
of alternatives. One explanation for relatively low trust in autodefensas could be that with the 
presence of state security actors, they now have fewer options to operate. At the same time, state 
security actors still lack trust and are perceived rather critically by the population. The presence of 
state security actors implements a new security system that reordered the former security 
architecture, which is yet to be implemented. Thus, we can conclude that state security actors are not 
excluded as such but rather that expectations are not met by the state, which than in turn leads to a 
disappointment of the population and an understanding that security provision under the previous 
order was more accepted, when it was basically provided by the autodefensas or “the population”. 
This notion of low low police legitimacy and the presence of a variety of security actors is not 
uncommon in the Latin American context (Auyero 2007; Arias and Goldstein 2010; Müller 2012). 
However, in the case of Monzón after eradication we do not see an open contestation of the police 
power or entanglement with other actors, instead the case shows that the police were able to build 
an uncontested monopoly of violence in the region but it is still lacking in legitimacy. In the case in 
Monzón, three main aspects affect trust in the police: the focus on illicit economies and corruption as 
well as the low connection to the population. This in turn prevents the strengthening of security 
perception. 
 
6.7.4 Rule in the Post-Illegal Coca Boom 
In terms of the rules that were being implemented, there have been various changes in the post-coca 
phase in Monzón. Now that the state spatially integrated Monzón, rules and rule implementation have 
changed. Some interviews indicate that there are still people who do not know the rules and norm. In 
the survey realized in Monzón I asked what the most important rules are, 60% gave no answer and 
only 4% consider national laws as the most important rules in society. That can also be compared to 
the similar regions that are included in this study, close to Monzón. If we include Subte de San Jorge 
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and Huipoca into the analysis, areas that have already been eradicated before the survey, 53% gave 
no answer or said there does not exist any rule. Only 9% referred to the national laws as the most 
important rules for the society. 
Figure 9 Most Important Rules in Society (AHV) 
 
Figure 10 Most Important Rules in Society (Monzón) 
  
Survey N = 59 (Monzón, Huipoca, Subde de San Jorge) Survey N = 25 (Monzón) 
The effectiveness of implementation of state rules remain questionable, as a farmer in Monzón told 
me: “There are many people who do not know the rules laws maybe by ignorance or omission they can 
go against it.” (Moncamcm). Acceptance also depends on the local police chief who changes every 
year. The new police chief in Monzón, who I met in 2015, was pushing for a compliance with minor 
rules which includes the wearing of a helmet when driving a motorcycle. This is an example for a rule 
that simply did not exist before and brings even the local Juez de Paz to issue the following statement: 
“I am not wearing a helmet when I am just driving from one side of the town to the next. What for? For 
driving around the corner? That's insane” (Monjuezm1). These are common exclamations when asked 
about new norms and rules implemented after the arrival of the state.  
“You buy a motorcycle and you do not have a license plate, you do not wear a helmet, you are 
informal, you do not pay your taxes to the state as it should be. And the police come and have 
their standards and demands. It starts to annoy and makes the citizen uncomfortable. In that 
sense before we were better off without the police.” (Monresm1) 
On the other hand, there are also perceptions that there was a need to implement rules. Moreover, 
the Juez de Paz stresses on the importance of implying rules in society, but he also explains about the 
difficulties in doing so: 
“People feel uncomfortable, by the municipal regulations because the police are giving order 
now, that does shock them, no? All the life you have lived like this, you are well off, but now 
you have to change. So we are sensitizing the people, the police, the municipality, the court and 
the authorities we are sensitizing the people. You have to put them in order. Because before it 
was no man's land, Monzón was considered bad by society.” (Monjuezm1) 
no answer
43%
none  
10%
do not steal
16%
national laws
9%
other
22%
no answer
60%do not steal
16%
national 
laws
4%
other
20%
 
 
172 
The police chief points out that it begins with the compliance with minor rules to keep order in the 
district. The chief also does not deny differences with his predecessor, but highlights that given the 
long absence of state authorities, rules need to be implemented “little by little” (Interview Monpol1).  
The former president of the autodefensas said that before state institutions came into Monzón, there 
were fewer problems with robbery and petty crime. When asked why this was the case, he replied:  
“When there was a robbery the autodefensas searched for the rat (“ratero” – a word commonly 
used for thieves) and we found him. He never stole again because we hit him, we hit him really 
hard. Everybody knew that. Today nobody fears punishment by the state, the law is protecting 
the wrong people. (...) Human rights are a menace.” (Interview Monm1).  
“Here people did their own justice. They did not call the police because back then they did not 
exist. Each has his own justice and captured the thief. Then the thief was scared "(Monjuezm). 
It is frequently mentioned that the current judicial system is ineffective and that due to corruption 
many people are left unpunished. Most indicate that corruption is an easy way out for perpetrators 
and that therefore most do not have to fear punishment. That view is often contrasted to the times 
before state intervention, when rule implementation or punishment was perceived to be more 
successful. Consequentially, the state judiciary is only low trusted by the population, which is 
supported by the survey data. Figure 11 shows that Monzón had the lowest levels of trust among all 
regions in the study. In Monzón, they reached the value of 1.6 with 1 indicating no trust at all and 4 
indicating complete trust. The other districts included for this study show low levels of trust as well.  
Figure 11 Trust in Judicial Power AHV 
  
N = 59 
As the analysis has shown, after the influence of the guerrilla decreased, internal rules were mostly 
based on the premise of sustaining the coca business and it was the number one priority to keep this 
economy alive. Internal rule was based on keeping a cohesive front against eradication and supporting 
the coca economy. The precondition for this was an external threat of eradication from the state, 
which served as the foundation for cocaleros and powerful actors in the valley to establish rules. Within 
this peripheral region, corporal punishments or economic castigations, for example, in the form of the 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Monzón Huipoca Subde de San Jorge
 
 
173 
destruction of coca fields were commonly used to put internal rules into practice. All of these practices 
changed after the destruction of the coca and the establishment of state institutions, particularly the 
police bases. Sporadic contacts with state security forces in the valley of Monzón and the random 
contact with state rule changed to constant presence of state actors in the area. Today, after the 
destruction of the coca economy, state security forces do not represent a threat for the local economy 
and the former rule based on coca does not exist anymore. At the same time, it seems that people 
have still not internalized state rule and it is not perceived as beneficial for their lives. Additionally, the 
perception of corruption undermines the credibility of newly established rules.  
If we compare the levels of trust for different actors we find that trust in judicial power, in the police 
and in the state are the lowest in the region. The highest levels of trust we find for the family, the 
church and the neighbors. These findings from a survey with 25 participants, supports main aspects of 
my interviews and the observations I made in the region. Particularly that the state and state 
institutions are not trusted. A second aspect is that there is no high trust in other local actors in the 
valley of Monzón, besides the own family or the church. 
Figure 12 Trust Monzón 
 
N = 25 
 
There are two dominant arguments concerning increasing state involvement. Most interviewees 
indicate that they do not oppose the state as such - most welcome state agencies and state services, 
and also welcome the alternatives provided by the state. One school teacher states:  
“(…) Today, there is another mentality. Before it was all alcohol, party, not now. Now they 
abstain. There is a radical change, but the state must protect those changes” (interview 
Pedro Monm3). 
But there is also a perception of imperfect implementation of rule. Even though state presence 
increased in Monzón, in view of the second argument, people in Monzón are still very critical towards 
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the state, in spite of the new variety of state institutions in Monzón. Some of the most explicit criticisms 
towards the state concerned the perceived miscalculation for alternative development:  
“For example, they give you coffee, at an early stage, from macheateado (a planting clean of 
herbs and weeds) until it grows three years. That would be government support. What kind of 
support is it? You get a bag, a few coffee bags. The farmer will not be able to do anything; 
agriculture will not change. That's why you will not see a change.” (Monm1) 
Furthermore, trust in the state is generally low and related to low levels of development, which seems 
similar to other areas within the study and with data on the national level.  
“People do not trust the state. Because you have to think how many years of creation the 
Monzon has, look at what conditions we live in, we have no water, no drainage, its streets, its 
sidewalks, we are not developed at all. Then in the case of water and drainage, they promise 
already for two, three periods improvements, the mayor enters and it does not come true, so 
what can we expect?” (Monresm1) 
According to the official reading, the intervention has established “a rule based order” and that in 
earlier times, the region was a no-man’s-land (“tierra de nadie”), as indicated by leading figures of the 
anti-drug agency DEVIDA (Inforegion 2013). Reports on Monzón imply a social disorganization and 
potentially high levels of violence and suffering.  
Also, people from the outside and unknown to the inhabitants of the valley are still mistrusted today, 
strangers are closely observed. The first time I entered the valley during field research, people asked 
me several times if I worked for an anti-drug agency. Although I have been talking to local authorities 
and explaining to everybody in detail about what I was doing, during an interview, a former local 
authority told me right at the beginning, after I explained the purpose of my visit: “I know you. I know 
you are here walking around, talking to people. People told me you are an agent. There was another 
agent here walking around, just like you. They kicked him out.” “No, I am not an agent” “You work for 
the DEA, eh? For Interpol?” (Monexgobm). A situation that was repeated in one other occasion. 
Strangers now seen in Monzón are usually civil servants or working in the infrastructural projects 
launched by the state, but traditionally the population still regard them with suspicion. 
Summing up, the newly established rules are yet to be implemented by the state but also yet to be 
completely accepted by the population. People do not view the rules as being just and beneficial. They 
still feel alienated by the newly established rules and legitimacy of the state in the post-coca boom 
rule is still low. After decades of being outside of state control, the contact to state rule and laws is 
now real. Today, the state is not only a symbol that stood for the threat of eradication and neglect, but 
it became the most prominent actor in terms of rule making and rule implementation. Hence, state 
intervention not only destroyed the local economy, but also affected the previously existing local rule.   
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6.7.5 Power in the Post-Coca Local Order 
We have seen how state intervention affected the economy, the security, and territorial rule. Following 
our conceptual premise, these are key features of local order that are constituted by actors and 
institutions. The following presents how these changes played out for power structures in the region. 
After the eradication and state intervention, the preconditions for gaining power are reversed as 
opposed to the time of coca rule. Now actors who support the coca economy are those with less 
power. Having at the least a critical attitude towards the coca economy became a precondition for 
power. It becomes visible that state intervention created a new field of power which does now not 
depend on coca but on the state instead. 
After state intervention, some actors vanished completely, such as some powerful cocaleros because 
of factors like incarceration, death, or migration and also because campesinos changed their coca 
crops into alternatives. (Ex)Cocaleros are still present and are also organized, as it became visible in 
during a demonstration in 2015 in Tingo Maria as well as when Eduardo Ticeran was released from 
prison and a homecoming event was organized for him in the lower parts of the valley of Monzón. 
Numbers of drug traffickers also decreased substantially because there was essentially no major drug 
production anymore – at least not on a bigger scale. Other actors are new, state actors such as the 
Police, DEVIDA. With state the basis of capital changed and became more related to the state. Actors 
did not change entirely, however their position within the field and their basis of influence changed. 
Furthermore, some additional actors came into play like the police and others providing economic 
alternatives or holding up the pressure against illicit coca plantations. At the same time, the number 
of groups that use or could use violence, decreased significantly compared to the time before 
eradication, including narcotraficantes, firmas, and sicarios. Now, the police is the only institution that 
can effectively use violence and coercion.  
The overshadowing topic is the economy and missing financial opportunities since coca is gone. Thus, 
political institutions are evaluated in their capacity to promote economic development. When people 
were asked about the single most powerful actor in the interviews or the survey most either referred 
to nobody in particular (“todos somos pobres”) or named the mayor (see Annex). The new mayor is 
the first of the kind who has neither been a cocalero nor was in favor of coca production. Instead, he 
is an engineer who played an important role in bringing state investments into the area. One of the 
reasons he came into office was precisely because of his promise to bring jobs in the form of a 
hydroelectric facility. This is also reflected in the interviews. A prominent explanation for why people 
think the mayor is powerful relates to his position towards the state: “because he brings investments”, 
“because he negotiates with the state” (Mo4, Mo5) are representative remarks. Thus, his influence 
was mostly related to his connection to government funding and the possibility to advocate 
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infrastructure projects. People belief that this should be his primer focus and that is reason why he 
was elected. Frequently mentioned was the Juez de Paz, as a person worthy of trust and for settling 
disputes in society.  
Today the mayor and DEVIDA are influential because of their ability to bring public funding and 
investments (Monpop). In other words, they are now seen as influential because of state proximity 
and not because of the opposing position taken against the state as before. Powerful actors in the 
state as well as the supporting staff from the mayors’ office are now in favor alternative development. 
While before eradication and state intervention power depended mostly on coca, today it is the 
opposite. No supporter of coca now has a leading position within the community. Furthermore, instead 
of cocaleros, there are emerging groups such as coffee farmers (cafetaleros) producing influential 
figures, whose power is based on social connection and the promise for a striving alternative 
development.  
Table 13 Powerful Actors in Monzón 
 
Group Role  Power Basis Attitude towards 
coca 
Attitude towards 
state 
Police Security provision, control symbolic, (coercive) Negative Positive 
Mayors Local overning authority Social, symbolic Negative Positive 
Gobernadores State representative Social, symbolic Negative Positive 
Autodefensas Security provision (but due to 
the police decreasing role) 
Symbolic, social Supportive Skeptical 
Juez de paz Local legal authority Symbolic, social (Supportive) Positive 
Cocaleros Representatives of coca 
farmer 
Symbolic, Social Supportive Skeptical 
DEVIDA 
 
Private companies 
Promotion of alternative 
development  
Especially construction, 
provide job opportunities 
Economic 
 
Economic 
Negative 
 
Negative  
Positive 
 
Positive 
 
The long history of illicit drug production created social spheres in which people managed to 
accumulate power because of their role in the illicit economy on one hand, and on their will and 
capacity to use violence on the other. These powerful actors included cocalero leaders and important 
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drug traffickers. The former held important political positions such as the mayor’s office that gave 
authority to provide and shape order. Important drug patrons had subtle power and influence through 
money or violence. However, these two groups cannot be separated. They were closely connected. 
The analysis has shown how state intervention changed local order, and how it shifted power 
structures. The more powerful people today are those with the ability to apply for government funding 
(mayor) or those that have profited from the state intervention (cafetaleros).  
Figure 13 Field of Power Monzón 
 
Now most powerful actors act not only according to state rules but are influential precisely because of 
the state. The connection to the state and especially state funding also becomes a form to access 
capital. Those close to the state, economically or by providing security, do have more power. 
Underdevelopment had once been a necessary sacrifice for being independent from the state; 
however, now the expectation is that the state supports the development in the region. While in earlier 
times, the relationship toward the illicit economy was by far the most important way to gain social or 
economic capital, now the state, the relationship to state actors, and the access to channels of state 
investments have become essential for gaining influence. We learn how effective state intervention 
was dismantling and changing the basis of capital. But even if investments are high, new rules and 
structures are in place and the power basis has changed, so far the new local order seems not to be 
well established as levels of trust in the previous section have shown. 
6.8 Conclusion: Monzón – A region in transition 
By giving a detailed analysis, this within-case-comparison has shown us how state intervention not 
only changed an illicit economy but also a local order. I have analyzed the effect of the destruction of 
the illicit economy and the increase of state presence in the valley of Monzón. Following the 
conceptualization of local order in economy, security, rule, and power I have demonstrated in this 
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chapter how the local order was affected by the historical dependence on an illicit good. The presence 
of coca and the isolation of the region from state control created a quasi-autonomous local order on 
the basis of the coca economy. With the state intervention this has changed and this chapter presented 
evidence that the state intervention not only changed the local economy but also altered power 
structures, rules and the security environment, which ultimately resulted in a transition of local order.  
An important finding is that local order was not only controlled by coercive means before the state 
intervention, but also by the collective belief that the defense of coca was important and the 
opposition to the state a necessary sacrifice. This principle not only resulted in specific rule of and 
power for those with the closest connection to the coca production, but also promoted a closed system 
with no outsiders allowed. Thus, local order was defined internally through the relationship of different 
agents towards the illicit economy and secondly, it was defined against external interference which 
was seen as a threat to the internal economy and social order. Local actors knew that they had a lot to 
lose if they allowed outsiders to come in. The threat of eradication defined the way in which they 
perceived strangers and ultimately state agents. While coca and the illicit economy was the major link 
among the different actors within the society, state intervention and the destruction of the illicit 
economy destroyed this relationship. Instead of resolving a disorder, as implied by state agents, the 
intervention dismantled a local order and the consequences of it can still be observed today. 
The relationship towards the state today is ambiguous and can be seen as a result of changes in the 
economy and rule. The most striking effect of state intervention has certainly been on the economy 
which changed from being based on illicit commodities to a legally based economy. The economic 
consequences have been far reaching not only for the cocaleros, but also for other sectors such as bars 
or small shops and people describe that an economic crisis was the consequence. But even if the 
economic situation for most became unsatisfactory, most people do not advocate for the illicit 
economy. Instead, today these people point towards the state in the expectation of more economic 
development. This leads to the ambiguous situation that the state is accepted (and demanded) as a 
service provider and promoter of economic development but at the same time it is viewed critically in 
other sectors such as in the sector of security and rules. Monzón was basically a locked region when 
coca dominated the society and local rules depended on the preservation of this economy. After state 
intervention, local rules have changed and altered the security structure. The police is the dominant 
actor in this structure, but at the same time it is not trusted. This is due to misconduct and corruption, 
but also due to the type of rules implemented by the police, which are not completely accepted. 
We can argue that the region is in a period of transition. In this transition phase, there are two major 
opinions; those who benefited from the changes and those who now see themselves in a more 
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powerful position than before. The second group comprises those who lost economically and also their 
influence. Since everything depended on coca, it was the glue for the society, a source of capital, a 
connection between different actors or a differentiation to the state as a different local order. Hence, 
one can conclude that the coca economy produced a local field of power in itself, in which certain 
agents could gain power, but only through their relation to the coca economy. All was based and 
connected through the coca economy and supported by the image of an outside “enemy” – state 
agents. The illicit economy therefore created not only an economy highly dependent on coca, but also 
local rule, and power relations. With the eradication of coca, the main basis of capital accumulation 
fell apart. Now this accumulation of capital is mainly based on the relationship to the state. 
The official version for the case of Monzón presents a linear and positive development after the state 
intervention, towards a sustainable social and economic development (Devida 2015). Indeed, from the 
state’s point of view, the intervention in Monzón can be regarded as successful. Now there is a 
presence of the police and the possibility of providing services as well as setting up alternative 
development programs and destroying the illicit economy. Additionally, people refer to the state for 
getting more funding and demanding more infrastructural projects. We can interpret this as an 
indication for wanting more integration and not less. While these are successes as defined by the state, 
there is still a persistence of general mistrust towards institutions and state actors such as the police. 
Order that these actors represent are not necessarily shared as legitimate nor are the police perceived 
legitimate. The same can be said about state rules that are now being implemented in the region. The 
state is not perceived as a savior by the local population, its legitimacy now depends on the provision 
of services and economic development. 
Hence, while the state has been able to spatially integrate the region, the acceptance and therefore 
social integration hinges on the fulfillment of promises and expectations of the local population. At the 
same time previously powerful actors and local rules have changed due to the state intervention. This 
is why, state intervention not only demolished the existing economy, but created a new basis for a 
new local order, this chapter has also shown that the region is still in a transition phase, where local 
order has not yet been firmly established. 
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7. The VRAEM, Santa Rosa and Llochegua  
The VRAEM is a zone of special interest for the Peruvian state and primarily known for being the main 
drug production region in Peru. The valley is an interesting case to show how a society develops with 
a dominating illicit economy, how rules are embedded in this society and reflected in the local power 
structure. On the other hand, the region shows variances in territorial control and the difficulty of the 
state to adequately integrate the region. In recent years, there have been a number of studies about 
the region. Most of these analyses focus on the economic aspects of drug trafficking (López and 
Vizcarra 2012; Leyva and Mendoza 2017), the security aspects related to the internal conflict, and the 
remnants of Sendero Luminoso (CVR 2003; Calmet and Salazar 2014; Díaz 2015). However only a few 
focus on the implications at the local political level (López 2014; Vizcarra 2017). Finally, there are 
reports on development cooperation (Brombacher et al. 2012) and socio-economic development 
(MIDIS 2013). Recently Leyva and Mendoza (2017) published an extensive study on the VRAEM and its 
economy.156 Other studies focus on consequence of coca cultivation and drug production for health or 
nature (Villagaray 2014). Finally, the biggest newspapers of Peru such as El Comercio, La Republica, 
Peru21 frequently publish reports on this region with a focus on drug trafficking and the remnant of 
Sendero Luminoso. Hence, there is a growing academic public interest in the region. Most of the 
studies focus on a macro level and so far, there has been no study that analyzes the consequences of 
drug production and trafficking in the region on local order and its effects on state formation. The 
following chapter will contribute to narrow this research gap. 
The analysis will give important background information on the VRAEM because the region in its 
totality is a focus region for the state strategy against drug production and trafficking (D. S. 040-2016-
PCM). Nevertheless, given the socio-economic diversity (including language, history or economy), the 
following will focus primarily on the southern part of the VRAEM, where presence of state actors is 
lower than in the northern parts and that show similarities in the historical and the socio-economic 
background (Leyva and Mendoza 2017). Particularly, in the districts Llochegua in the province of 
Huanta and Santa Rosa in the province of La Mar are interesting for this analysis. These districts are 
two of the main areas for the production of coca and PBC within the southern zone of the VRAEM. 
They have similar characteristics and are therefore well suited to analyze the effect of the illicit 
economy and the state (UNODC 2016; see also Case Selection). Selecting two districts for the analysis 
allows to test the results against each other. During a three month stay in the area, I gathered data 
through participant observation, interviews, and surveys. Furthermore, I gathered data in the district 
 
156 Additionally, some insightful graduate student studies analyze particularly on aspects of drug trafficking in the VRAEM 
from a macro-perspective (e.g. Díaz 2015, Rojas 2015). 
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centres of Kimbiri, Sivia, and Pichari, which will serve as areas of control and comparison. Kimbiri and 
Pichari are interesting control cases because as part of Cusco, these districts profit from a transfer 
system that gives them economic benefits (Canon). 
The following chapter follows a slightly different outline than the previous chapter on Monzón. While, 
I gave a detailed within-case analysis on local in Monzón, this chapter presents the current local order. 
That is because the coca economy is still present in the VRAEM and in the focus districts. Thus, I will 
give a detailed historical analysis on the development of the region, but the assessment of local order 
will concentrate mainly on the present situation. The chapter unfolds as follows: after analyzing the 
territorial particularities and the socio-historical context, the chapter provides an analysis of the local 
order in the region today. It elaborates on the implications on local economy, the security and rule. 
Finally, I will analyse the resulting power relations in the region. The last section gives a conclusion of 
the case analysis.  
7.1 Socioeconomic conditions 
Named after the rivers Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro, the VRAEM is located in the Selva Alta and parts 
of the departments of Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Junin. The VRAEM was created by the D.S. 
N° 074-2012-PCM and is located in the eastern part of the Andes in the center and south of Peru. Since 
2016, the area consists of 66 districts in ten provinces, in the regions of Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, 
and Junin (D. S. 040-2016-PCM, see Annex).157 The National Statistics Institute estimates that 654,017 
people live in the VRAEM, which is roughly 2% of the Peruvian population (INEI 2015). The official 
population growth of this area is at 2.4% (1.1% on the national level) in variation from 2005 to 2015.158  
Since 2010, the VRAEM has the highest levels of coca production in Peru. While the official numbers 
indicate that around 19,000ha of coca grow in the area (UNODC 2016), unofficial estimations go up to 
30,000ha. The region has a great variety of flora and fauna and altitudes ranging from 300 to 3000 
meters above sea level. Remnants of the guerrilla Sendero Luminoso, hold refuge in part of this area. 
Their primary activity is the provision of security for the drug trade in the region. It is also the most 
militarized zone in the country, and the major production zone for coca and PBC in the country (UNODC 
2015; El Comercio 2014a). Even though the VRAEM is a vast territory with great diversity, it is often 
taken as a monolithic bloc. Media reports mainly cover drug related topics or violent assaults by 
 
157 Before that it was called VRAE but with the supreme decree of 2012, new zones of the Mantaro river region was 
incorporated. In 2015, the VRAEM combined 50 districts in 5 departments and 9 provincias, which was extended a year 
later. 
158 The northern part developed a lot faster than the southern part of the valley 5.8 to 0.9%(Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 59). 
The northern parts include Pangoa, Mazamari and Río Tambo, while the southern part consists of Llochegua, Sivia, Chungui, 
San Miguel, Anco, Santa Rosa y Ayna, Vilcabamba, Pichari and Kimbiri. 
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Sendero Luminoso, often without differentiating between actors or circumstances, whereas reports 
on aspects other than drug production or guerrillas are rare (for a critique on the media coverage, see 
Cabieses 2008; Díaz 2015).  
Table 14 Density of the State Huanta and La Mar 
  DEPARTAMENT Province  
  
Huanta La Mar  AYACUCHO PERU   
Population 2012 habitantes 102.619 87.160 666.029 30.135.875 
ranking 58 69 16 - 
State Density Index IDE 0,5971 0,4946 0,6433 0,7666 
 ranking 131 185 19 - 
Houses with water 
and wastewater 
system 
% 50 31 52 76 
 ranking 114 175 19 - 
Houses with 
electricity 
% 65 47 70 86 
ranking 132 180 22 - 
Assitancy in 
secondory school 
(12 - 16 years) 
% 72 62 78 85 
ranking 155 180 23  
 - 
Doctors per 10,000 
inhabitants 
Ratio 7.82 5.92 12.94 22.73 
ranking 128 161 15 - 
Source: PNUD 2013; Leyva and Mendoza 2017 
 
The region can still be described as being in the margins of the state economically, in infrastructure, 
and in the provision of basic services. The poverty level is very high for the whole region and according 
to official numbers, the overall poverty rate is at 67% and all of the districts of the VRAEM are either 
poor or extremely poor compared to 27% nationally (MIDIS 2013: 12) For 2013, it was estimated that 
the poverty level was about 42,9% while nationally it was at 23,9% (INEI 2015). In Llochegua, a district 
with around 13,339 inhabitants (UNDP 2012),159 36.8% lived in poverty in 2007, while the access to 
information services and communication was also very low. 95.5% stayed without access to those 
services in 2007 (compared to 46,7% nationally) (INEI 2007). Again, these numbers most likely have 
changed, but the census 2007 gives an indication of state presence and development. In Santa Rosa, 
where about 11,290 live, the poverty rate was at 62.7% and 73% of households were without access 
 
159 Here the projection might underestimate the number of people living in that area. It seems like there has been a strong 
movement towards that area in the last few years, mainly driven by economic opportunities (interview with UN official) 
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to information services (INEI 2007, Annex).160 In addition to the overall poverty level, malnutrition in 
minors aged five years, exceeds the national level of malnutrition. In consequence, the Human 
Development Index for the region and the districts in focus, are considerably lower than the national 
average (see table 14).  
During my research stay in the region, absence or low quality of services is frequently mentioned 
during most of the interviews and the official numbers show a region with many deficits. More than 
70% of the population do not have access to clean water (40% on the national level) and a similarly 
high number lacks services of a waste water system), and access to communication systems have been 
weak (Novak et al. 2011: 17 INEI 2012). Until the late 1970s, only one rural hospital with one doctor 
for the entire valley existed (Fumerton 2002: 109). Basic health service is still difficult to access for 
nearly 50% of the population (MINSALUD 2012).161  
Education is on all levels lower than the national average. 29% of the population between 20 and 24 
do not have primary school education (INEI 2015: 26).162  Lavado (2013) estimates that four out of ten 
juveniles, between 14 to 18 years, do not study because they are working. The coca economy is one 
of the main reasons for the low education rate, since many young people would drop out of school in 
order to work in the coca fields or in related areas of drug trafficking (Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 109; 
Novak et al. 2011:14-17; 32). Hence, there are low incentives for young people to seek for higher 
education, while jobs for unskilled laborers such as working as peones (farm hands) are readily 
available and economically more attractive. 
 
 
160 Numbers on the poverty rate differ according to different entities. The Plan VRAEM counts 76.1percent as poor and 50.1 
percent extremely poor. Also, the last census available for this research is from 2007 and the projected numbers might 
differ in the upcoming census in 2017, which was not available at the time of this research. In 2011 75% of the districts have 
a per capita/o family income of 55 USD or less. In comparison the average income level in Peru is at 123.73 USD (Ministerio 
de Salud 2012: 33) 
161 In 2011 only 5,5 doctors for each 10,000 inhabitants were available (Silva Pellegrini 2015; Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 
107). “I´m driving for hours to villages far away. Sometimes they have not seen a doctor in months. The situation there is 
devastating, really devastating because people do not know what to do and where to go (…). They do not trust me, they do 
not trust anybody unknown. They are sometimes afraid of taking pills because they fear I will poison them.” (Interview 
VRAdocm).  
162 See also an article of Mariano Aronés Palomino concerning the difficulties of teachers in the VRAEM: 
https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2015/11/11/a-que-se-enfrenta-diariamente-un-docente-en-el-vraem-un-antropologo-te-lo-
cuenta/danielavila/ and a presentation of Aronés: Ensenar y educar en una zona de conflicto: El caso de los profesores/as del 
Valle de los ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro, Ayacucho, November 2015: 
http://seminarioanual.cies.org.pe/2015/sites/default/files/mesas/ARONES%20FORGE.pdf (01.10.2017). 
162 http://elcomercio.pe/sociedad/peru/declaran-estado-emergencia-distritos-huancavelica-y-cusco-noticia-1930834 
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Infrastructure and accessability 
Infrastructural shortcomings are still a major obstacle. A narrow and curvy road leads into the VRAEM 
from Ayacucho, building a path between steep hills and deep abysses. Just until recently, there was no 
paved road connecting the valley with the city Ayacucho. From Ayacucho it took ten hours to get to 
the the central town of San Francisco as opposed to the four hours it takes now. During the rainy 
season, the road is difficult to access and constant landslides make it a difficult and dangerous 
connection.163 Economic connections and trade possibilities outside of the valley are therefore limited. 
The road is used to transport people, agricultural products, and drugs. At various control points, cars 
are searched sporadically. From the economic centers San Francisco and Kimbiri, one reaches the other 
areas of the VRAEM which are in part difficult to access. In general, from the VRAEM, the economic 
structures of the state are difficult to access, particularly in the rainy season when roads are flooded 
or landslides block the ways. In my first attempt to go into the VRAEM, a landslide stopped our journey 
abruptly. Behind the landslide, cars, pick-up trucks, and small buses queued up. Most of the cars 
transporting people and goods had to stop and wait. There were rumors that heavy machinery of 
construction firms nearby would clear the road. The firms had been contracted by the state to improve 
the connection into the VRAEM. However, it was a Sunday when the companies did not work and after 
four hours, people started to clear the landslide themselves. After another two hours, they managed 
to build a small way through the hill of mud so cars could pass one by one. Drivers paid some pesos to 
those who helped. On the way into the VRAEM coming from Ayacucho, several smaller mounds of mud 
and rocks covered the street. Earlier landslides that had not been cleared away are now part of the 
curvy road between the town of Quinoa to San Francisco. On the way back to Ayacucho, I had to stay 
several days in San Francisco until the way was cleared. 
The most important roads in the valley are the caretera nacional (PE-28 B) entering from Quinua and 
Tambo towards San Francisco 146,4km away. From here, the “vía departamental” (AY-101) leads south 
while the vía AY-100 leads northwards in the department of Ayacucho. On the Cusco side, the PE-28C 
starts in Kimbiri towards Pichari and Puerto Ene.164 From here, the connection further north is via the 
river Apurímac. The overall road system needs to be further developed and therefore S/ 500 million of 
 
163 During the time of research, two people died on the road, one because of rock fall. While driving from Ayacucho to San 
Francisco took around six hours in 2015, in 2017, the same route took 4 hours. More parts of the road are now further 
improved. Notwithstanding the improvements in the infrastructure, the condition of roads is still problematic, in particular 
during rainy season, when the risks of landslides and destruction of roads rises.  Given the infrastructural difficulties, there is 
a thriving demand for taxi drivers, driving mostly during daytime. Even if improvements become more visible, infrastructural 
shortcomings limit the development of a licit economy. 
164 See also PROVIAS: 
http://www.proviasnac.gob.pe/Archivos/file/Planes%20y%20Presupuesto/Ayuda_Memoria_Por_Departamento/2011/Abril
%202011/Quinua_San_Francisco_05_Abr11_final_.pdf 
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the project investments in the valley in 2016 (S/ 1,400 million), are for the transportation system. In 
the meantime, bad infrastructure results in relatively high costs of transportation (Leyva and Mendoza 
2017: 86-92).165 The distance from Huamanga/Ayacucho to San Francisco is about 190km. In a Toyota 
Hilux pick-up truck, which is one of the most common modes of transportation, it costs 60-70 Peruvian 
Soles (around 20 USD).166 Another access point is from Quillabamba to Kimbiri (approximately 280km) 
and from the cities of Satipo and Mazamari in Junin where part of the way is via boat. However, the 
most common and easiest way of accessing the valley is from Ayacucho to San Francisco. The districts 
in focus for this study are 22km (Santa Rosa) and 68km (Llochegua) from San Francisco (Minsalud 
2012).  
These Infrastructural and socio-economic aspects make it more difficult and costlier to sell agricultural 
products, since the main markets for selling licit agricultural products are outside of the area. The 
conditions of roads and climatic and geographic particularities make it difficult to access these markets. 
This in turn, has consequences for finding alternatives to the drug economy. Consequentially, this 
influences the economy and gives opportunities for the illicit economies, because transporting PBC out 
of the valley might be difficult, costly and dangerous. However, the aggregated value of the product 
still makes the business worth it (see below).   
 
7.2 The Government’s Approach 
The following section highlights the approach of the Peruvian government towards the VRAEM. The 
VRAEM has been in focus in the fight against drugs and insurgency from 2006. State intervention 
focuses on four different aspects: the reduction of poverty, inequality, fighting terrorism, and drug 
trafficking.  The government’s approach towards the illegal plantation of coca in the VRAEM area is 
different to that of Alto Huallaga and not based on forced eradication of the coca plantations. One 
reason for this strategy is that forced eradication is said to be too dangerous. The “social cost would 
be very high”, as a leading DEVIDA official puts it (interview Vradevj), meaning there would be turmoil 
and most likely violence in a region that still has lots of weapons left over from the times of internal 
conflict. But even without forced eradication, the Peruvian state tries to improve its presence with an 
investment program, whose approach is also debatable, since a big part of its budget is foreseen to 
finance the military and security component of the plan (Soberón 2013; Zevallos and Bouchert 2015). 
 
165 Further information: MTC (2009); PROVIAS 
166 I paid this amount in 2015, 2016 and 2017 from Ayacucho to San Francisco. 
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A broader state strategy for the Valley was launched in 2006, with the Plan VRAE. The plan had three 
major pillars: the military to fight remnants of Sendero Luminoso, the Police to fight drug trafficking, 
and the civilian pillar, improving development through public investments and alternative 
development under the auspices of the military. 
In 2007, the Ministry of Defense launched a Plan as “an option for peace and development in security 
for the valley of the rivers Apurimac and Ene – Plan VRAE”167 better known as the Plan VRAE (Decreto 
Supremo No. 003). This plan was intended to promote security in the VRAE, and reaffirmed the state 
of emergency in the districts that are included in the Plan (Mindef DS 021-2008-DE-SG).168 The plan 
analyses that the presence of the state is weak and there is the need for the promotion of economic 
and social development. It further states: “illicit drug trafficking exploits the situation of poverty in the 
area, generating problems of security, exploitation, criminality, violation of human rights, corruption 
of authorities, increased illegality and growth of terrorism and poverty”169 (Mindef 2007 cited by 
Zevallos and Boucher 2014: 73). Thus, the redefined plan outlines four main objectives: 1) fight against 
poverty 2) fight against inequality, 3) fight against illicit drug trafficking and criminal gangs 4) fight 
against terrorism. While the majority was foreseen for infrastructure170 executed by the Ministry of 
Transportation and communication. It is no surprise that this sector takes the biggest part of the overall 
investments since it is the most cost intensive. In 2011, the rest of the budget was spent mainly on the 
ministry of the interior and the ministry of defense, leaving only 44 million to civilian projects (Zevallos 
and Bouchert 2014: 75). As we can see, a major amount of the budget goes into the fight against 
Sendero Luminoso and therefore the lion’s share of budget for the VRAEM was destined for the 
military. While in 2007 the budget to fight Sendero Luminoso was at 10.7 PEN million only three years 
later, this budget was 466.9 PEN million. The sum decreased in the following five years but in 2015, it 
was still at 345 PEN million (Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 145). In 2012, the plan for the VRAEM was 
redefined. The plan focusses on four levels: 1) Poverty, 2) inequality, 3) illegal drug trafficking and 
criminal groups, 4) fight against “terrorism”. While this new plan of intervention focused more on the 
 
167 „Una Opción de Paz y Desarrollo en Seguridad para el Valle de los Rios Apurimac y Ene – Plan VRAE“  (Decreto Supremo 
No. 003) 
168 In 2009, they created the military region VRAE with the Decreto Supremo 001-2009-DE-EP. Before the area of the 
Mantaro was included. The states constantly renewed the state of emergency giving the Armed Forces control over the 
region. Decreto Supremo N.° 063-2008-PCM . Later the auspices of the plan was transferred to the PCM (Mindef 2009). 
169 Own translation 
170 On infrastructure check Provias as a decentralized agency from the ministry on transport and communications to build 
infrastructure in particular in the rural areas. – Program of investing in the VRAEM, which are the roads being build. 
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development of alternatives to drug production, and the reduction of poverty, it was still imbalanced 
towards the security sector (Leyva and Mendoza 46). 
For the development of the region and the fulfillment of the government plan important are: 
CODEVRAEM, DEVIDA and PROVRAEM. The Comisión Multisectorial para la Pacificación y el Desarrollo 
Económico Social del Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (CODEVRAEM) was founded as a 
coordinating and supervising institution for the different actors involved in the region and is therefore 
an overseeing agency (Decreto Supremo No. 074-2012-PCM). In 2016, the agency became 
subordinated to DEVIDA, which has the lead in anti-drug policies also on the national level. ProVRAEM 
is a coordination agency with the main task of promoting sustainable alternative development. 
PROVRAEM was created in 2014 (MINAGRI Decreto Supremo 011-2014), and expectations from this 
agency is very high. Its aim is to generate local opportunities for the economic development, with a 
focus on the households most in need. Tasks are manifold and seek to a) the formulation and execution 
of public investments that support alternative development, b) promote production cycles or 
innovation in technology and finance; c) Promote and articulate a territorial plan for “reconstruction” 
of the VRAEM d) the strengthening of institutional capacities of regional and local governments e) 
promote activities for social inclusion in the VRAEM. In total, PROVRAEM has 23 tasks to fulfill. But its 
power is restricted and relies on economic support.  
ProVRAEM also became a symbol of the alternative development program, that is negatively perceived 
in the valley “They [ProVRAEM] gave us some cacao crops and left (…) The alternative development is 
not working (…) no, we do not think their work will improve our lives” (Llcoclm). In particular, the 
program of gradual auto-eradication is criticized. In the VRAEM, the approach of “auto eradication” 
seeks the voluntary destruction of coca crops. Peasants who decide to eradicate their crops receive 
monetary incentive of 650 Soles (approx. 185 USD), technical assistance per eradicated hectare, and 
financial assistance for business concepts. Following Leyva and Mendoza (2017: 52), the plan of self-
eradication had several shortcomings: there is low control in the aftermath of eradication and a risk of 
replanting coca, many of the coca fields are already old and in the phase of becoming fallow land, the 
coordination and provision of supplies is weak and could lead to frustration among farmers and lastly, 
the initiative could be a perverse incentive to plant more coca in order to become a beneficiary 
(Interview expert). Furthermore, the population has a negative perception towards the state program. 
An employee of PROVRAEM tells me that the majority do not accept the programs and that they 
distrust them although they fulfill the goals (“piensan que vamos a erradicar zu coca”) (Provraf). 
Notwithstanding the growing investments and diversification of the anti-drug policies in the VRAEM, 
success in reducing drug trafficking is marginal (see also Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 148). 
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Different programs of the state intend to improve living conditions and lower indices of poverty and 
social inequality. Among them are programs of the Ministry for Development and Social Inclusion 
(MIDIS). Several of these programs can be found in the VRAEM (Table 15).171  
Table 15 Social Programs for Santa Rosa and Llochegua (June 2017) 
Social Program  Province District Province District Department 
  La Mar Santa Rosa Huanta Llochegua Ayacucho 
Cuna Mas Children 266 80 275 60 2,460 
Families 1,508 0  1,072 0 6,890 
Juntos Affiliated Households  7,858 894 7,505 624 40,154 
Subscribed Households 7,317 829 6,759 572 36,500 
Haku Wiñay Executed projects 800 400 812 2,388 6,862 
Concluded projects 915 0 323  3,039 
PENSION 65 Receivers 3,837 358 4,286 184 32,390 
QaliWarma Children 18,074 2,664 20,340 2,417 113,065 
 Educative Institutions  453 45 463 56 2,752 
Source: MIDIS 2017, June 2017  own compilation172 
 
Even if the original state intervention foresaw a heavy focus on the security sector, it has diversified 
more over recent years. The government offers alternative products to substitute for coca. Thus, we 
can talk about two periods of recent state intervention. The first, which in 2006 and is characterized 
by a heavy military footprint, while the current second period shows much more funding and 
involvement of the civil services. Nevertheless, a big part of the funding is allocated to the state 
security sector. 
The imbalance in public spending towards the security sector shows that the most prominent signs of 
state presence in the region are the state security actors. One of the main aspects of the Plan VRAEM 
and the principal objective of the state is the provision of security. State security actors in the VRAEM 
 
171 Cuna Más supports families with children under the age of three for their basic necesities, Qali Warma forsees the 
alimentation for children in schools, Juntos, supports families fanancially with young children, Pension 65 is a monthly pension 
for elderly people; Haku Wiñay technical assistance and a small asset transfer to rural households. One of the supported 
programs, FONIE, particularly features the affiliation to Alto Huallaga or VRAEM as a condition that enables them to profit 
from funding. The fund was in particular created in 2013 to include marginal areas into state structures (Artículo 23º de la 
Ley Nº 2995 Ley de Presupuesto del Sector Público). 
172 Data compiled at the end of field research and the end of gathering empirical data. 
(http://sdv.midis.gob.pe/Infomidis/#/) 
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enforce a state of emergency which gives them additional “authority” while the rights of the citizens 
are more restricted. The state of emergency became an essential tool and an extension of coercive 
power in order to fight drug trafficking and the clan Quispe Palomino (Decreto Supremo 031-2016-
PCM). However, some question the propriety of such an emergency zone and the use of it is debated, 
given that the potential threat by the Clan Quispe Palomino seems not to be an essential threat to the 
state (Calmet and Salazar 2013).  
The symbolic impact of a heavy security focus can be particularly seen in Pichari, a relatively 
prosperous city in the VRAEM in the Cusco department (Vizcarra 2017), behind four-meter-high walls 
and protected by several guards, is the headquarter of the Commando Conjunto, the center of police 
and military operations in the VRAEM. It is a big compound and is referred to by interview partners as 
a symbol of the state´s role in the valley: “Look, it´s like the base [in Pichari] you cannot see them and 
when they leave its because they will destroy la coca or lock up our sons” – So, you do not trust them? 
“Ah no, not at all” (Pitienm1). Even if a high percentage of the state investments in the area go into 
the security sector, it still shows high levels of deficiencies. All this is in light of the fact that the overall 
production of coca and PBC is still the highest in the country (UNODC 2016). The presence of state 
agencies became more visible in the last few years. However, the perception of the state and 
alternative development by the local population is still negative. This perception is connected to 
economic outcome  
"DEVIDA, is not doing a good job, they encourage you to sow more cacao, coffee but there is 
no market, you sow and you come with low price. Well, it does not provide [income] like coca, 
120, 130 [PEN] per arroba, and one hectare produces 100, 90 arrobas, you do the math. Every 
three months and cacao or coffee is only twice a year, so they have to look for other 
alternatives, with other products that are of greater production."(Llom2) 
Hence, even though state presence became more visible in recent years, it is mainly related to the 
provision of alternative development but even more so to the heavy presence of security actors.  
 
7.3 Local Historical Development 
The VRAEM has a vivid history. Discussing it in the analysis helps to explain not only the formation of 
the region in the margins of the state, but also the development and influence of the coca economy. 
This chapter gives an overview on the historical developments in the region and the districts in focus. 
Understanding and analyzing the history will give us the necessary background to understand the 
evolution of the illicit economy, security and rule structures, and finally local social order.  
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In contrast to the Alto Huallaga Valley, the VRAEM has not been a traditional spot for growing coca. 
There are several key periods that led to the local drug economy as it exists today. In line with these 
periods, we can also understand how local structures evolved. These periods are 1) the pre-coca boom 
from early “colonization” until the beginning of the 1980s, when the valley still had a minor role in the 
national coca production; 2) the beginning of the 1980s until 1995 including the conflict, which plays 
a major role in the development of a drug economy and a coca boom, which sets in after 1985. 
Production became more important and had an impact on local structures; 3) After a sharp decline of 
the coca in 1995, the region shows a slow but steady growth in coca production again between 1998 
until 2005 and finally, 4) the last phase ranges from 2006 until today, showing an accelerating of coca 
production and the growing influence of the state at the same time. Given the lack of extensive 
historical studies on the region, I will use different sources of secondary literature and interviews with 
early settlers to trace and tell the historical development in the region. 
 
7.3.1 Colonization 
Though the VRAEM is principally known for its coca economy today, the peasants of the valley relied 
on a diversified agriculture that evolved in a cyclical manner of development. For centuries, people 
from Huanta or Tambo grew coca but this was not the only crop in the valley (Fumerton 2002: 109). 
There are several “colonization waves”, which describe the process of colonization in the VRAEM. The 
valley was mainly inhabited by the Ashanikas, Matsiguengas and Shipibos (Arawac) who lived on 
subsistence agriculture, During and after the 17th century, Jesuits and Franciscans arrived in the valley, 
eager to Christianize the population (Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 40). They promoted cattle and 
widespread plantation of coca. Santa Rosa for example, was a settlement motivated by Franciscan 
monks. It became an outpost in the region of Palmapampa at the beginning of the 20th century (O’Brien 
2008). Later, migrants from the Peruvian highlands followed, hoping to find agricultural land and better 
economic opportunities. Early on, a hacienda system could be found in the southern part of the valley, 
which was marked by agricultural development and an unequal distribution of land (Zapata et al. 2008: 
129). 
The Apurimac valley, with its subtropical climate is a good spot for agriculture. In 1907, around 3,000 
inhabitants populated the valley and cultivated around 2,000ha of land: in these were 911ha coca, 
135ha sugar cane and around 1,000ha other diverse products such as fruits and coffee (O’Brien 2008: 
33). During the first half of the 20th century, people moved into the valley. When the government of 
Augusto B. Leguía (1920-1930) filed the decree of “mountain land” (Decreto Tierra de Montaña), an 
office for the legalization of land was installed in San Francisco and promoted migration into the “Selva 
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Central” (Durand Guevara 2005: 4). Following the estimations from Sala i Vila, around 10,000ha 
changed the proprietor and colons in Huanta. Huamanga and La Mar generally received smaller parcels 
(Sala i I Vila 2001). Migrants had the opportunity to move to these regions to start growing different 
type of crops like sugar cane, fruits, and maize. Unlike the Alto Huallaga, where migrants had diverse 
origins, migrants in the Apurímac region came mainly from north Ayacucho (CVR 2003: 86; Durand 
2005). Agriculture was a major lure for migration and development in the region. Different agricultural 
booms are closely related to the migration. Between 1950 and 1970, the extraction of barbasco or 
coffee promoted intense migration. Between 1970 and 1985, cacao and coca were the major 
agricultural activities that led to a migration wave to the valley (IVM 2008: 13). Sugar cane was another 
commodity extracted in the valley. 
Agriculture was organized mainly in two ways. One was a haciendas organization, large land ownership 
in the hands of a few families (such as the Riscos, Parodis and Justameites). Until the mid-20th century, 
81% of all haciendas in the department of Ayacucho could be found in Huamanga (120), Huanta (51), 
and La Mar (25) that includes the districts of Llochegua and Santa Rosa (Velasco et al. 2008). The local 
economy and land concentration resulted in the formation of an elite such as “wealthy” merchants 
and large landowners who made profits from economic prosperity. Early colonists claimed huge 
amounts of land and later bequeathed it to their kin, while peones and small-scale farmers suffered 
from economic and social inequality. During the agricultural reforms of the Velasco government (1968-
1975), land in the VRAEM was redistributed and led to a second form of agriculture, the minifundistas. 
Landowning elites gave up or lost most of their lands during the land reform and smaller cooperatives 
and minifundistas were formed.173 The Velasco administration cut state subsidies and support. Instead, 
local incentives to improve the situation were formed with the Valle del Río Apurimac, Unión Salvatica 
or El Quincacho cooperatives between 1970 and 1971 (IVM 2008).174 These cooperatives allowed 
minifundistas to access new financial and technical opportunities and provided an organizational hub 
for the peasants of the region. It coincided with a commercial boom in coffee and cacao.  
However, these cooperatives soon landed in financial difficulties because of organizational 
shortcomings and because they could not satisfy the needs of their associates (Mendoza and Leyva 
2017: 40). In 1975, an organization was formed that would also set a first basis for the later civic 
organization in the Valley: the Asociación de Pequeños Agricultores which was closely followed by the 
Federación Campesina del Valle del Río Apurímac (FECVRA) in 1979 which later became the biggest 
 
173 For example, in Santa Rosa: the families of Justameite and Risco donated 50ha to Santa Rosa because of the land reform. 
Another large scale land owner, Parodi, renamed its position “centro vacacional de Luisiana” (vocational centre of Lusiana) 
to avoid expropriation. On his ground, sugar cane was produced and later the airport of Luisiana was build (Sroprofm) 
174 The „Unión Selvática“ and „Rio Apurímac“ were installed with 1,356 and 1,500 members respectively.  CEPLAN. 
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organization of its kind in the department of Ayacucho (CVR 2003: 88; Durand Guevara 2005: 4). One 
of the motives of the FECVRA was to end the monopoly of bigger salesmen and to connect around 100 
cooperatives. Besides the economic impetus, FECVRA was also concerned with improvements in 
socioeconomic conditions such as the construction of schools, first aid medical posts, and solving 
domestic disputes (Degregori 1989: 28; CVR 2003: 88). This initiative also became necessary because 
the VRAEM was not the primary interest for the state, while in the 1970s and 1980s, other regions 
developed as agrarian production hubs. The focus of the state was the coca production areas of the 
Alto Huallaga and the suppression of drug production. The low interest of the state led to a greater 
autonomy of the agrarian groups organized by FECVRA, compared to other groups of this time. This 
development stopped abruptly with the beginning of the internal conflict and the influence of Sendero 
Luminoso and Marina, that led to the 1983 elimination of the federation (Durand Guevara 2005: 4 del 
Pino 1996).  
Until the conflict, the major drive for development was infrastructural improvements. The Ley de 
Conscripción Vial provided the basis for these in the jungle regions (1920-1930), including the areas of 
the VRAEM. Many highland colonists stayed in close contact with their families in the highlands and 
held properties in their regions of origin. They also conserved parts of their customs and values. The 
workforce, basically peones working in the fields, also came from the highlands (Del Pino 1996: 125). 
The land route, using pack animals, took around one week to get to the regional market of Huamanga 
(Ayacucho) and back (Sroprofm; Llexprofm; Brombacher et al. 2012: 40). Improvements in 
infrastructure increased migration and created new demand for land. Without state planning and 
oversight, the new arrivals occupied land, especially between 1965 and 1970 (Del Pino 1996: 125). 
During the Belaunde administration (1963-1968), the construction of a new highway from Huamanga-
Tambo-San Francisco in 1964, and two small airstrips in the locality of Lousiana and Teresita, improved 
the connection to external markets and fostered economic development in the region. The 
inauguration of the bridge of San Francisco in 1971, opened development possibilities and expansion 
of agriculture in the districts of Kimbiri and Pichari (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 87; Fumerton 2002: 109; 
Durand Guevara 2005: 4, Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 40). Villages and small settlements grew close to 
infrastructural opportunities near rivers, which served as a primary mode of transporting goods. Only 
later, roads replaced rivers as principle means of transportation. Even if infrastructural and economic 
opportunities were two factors for migration into the valley, the CVR estimates that by 1980, the total 
number of inhabitants in the Valley Apurímac did not exceed 100,000. However, since many farmhands 
came for seasonal work such as harvesting, the total number is difficult to assess (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 
88).  
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While there was a lack of political integration, infrastructural developments within the area are still 
regarded as essential for the area and are often referred to during the interviews. Llochegua is an 
example for the local development (based on interviews in the district). Motivated by the prospect of 
gaining agricultural land, people came into the area from the highlands of Huanta and Tambo. During 
the 1940s, small farms could be found in the area that is now known as the Llochegua district.175 People 
planted café, cacao, barbasco and coca. The development of Llochegua is exemplary for this time: 
“Everybody lived in one street no more. More or less 150 people in one street. All were 
merchants. Salesmen. Farmers lived separated on their farm. They came every Sunday bringing 
their product. Coffee cacao, coca, rubber. Agriculture produced enough. But there was nothing 
here [pointing on the houses and main plaza of Llochegua]“ (Llexprofm: 22 - 22). 
In the 1960s, Llochegua was a small point for shipping agricultural goods to San Francisco. Most of the 
farmers resided in small settlements or single houses dispersed through the countryside, and came to 
the shipping point of Llochegua only for selling their goods. The main connection from Llochegua was 
the river via small boats. In the following years, salesmen and shopkeepers built a small settlement for 
agricultural goods and trading with San Francisco. Families settled in Llochegua mainly from the areas 
of Huanta and Huamanga, and lived near the river by that time (Llexaup, Llexprofm). Hence, hose close 
to the river were mainly salesmen, who sold agricultural goods to San Francisco. The river served as 
the main mode to transport agricultural goods to San Francisco.176 Development in the area was very 
much related to the infrastructural possibilities.  
By the beginning of the 1960s, and after the construction of the highway from Tambo to San Francisco 
in 1964, San Francisco became a bigger hub for business. Like the other people of the region, peasants 
made use of this new opportunity by selling their goods directly in San Francisco. 1960 was also the 
time when Santa Rosa began to grow because of the construction of a road to Palmapampa (IVM-
VRAE). Workers and migrants settled in the area and began to plant different agricultural goods. 
Among these goods were yucca, peanuts, coca, ajonjoli, bananas, papayas or sugar. Organization of 
production was characterized by a hacienda system. The population stayed quite homogenous and 
small until the beginning of the 1980s. As in the rest of the valley, the beginning of the conflict changed 
the dynamics of these settlements.  
7.3.2 Conflict and Organization 
Until the beginning of the conflict, the dynamics for development were dominated by the 
infrastructural developments in the area. The conflict was an important period in the history of the 
 
175 Llochegua was formerly known as Yoshivia but the first settlers renamed it to Llochegua.  
176 In 1972, a flood destroyed the settlement and is still recalled by many of the older population. This is why the current 
settlements are far away from the river.  
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VRAEM, cuando las papas quemaron177. The conflict influenced the formation of villages, the economy 
and local power structures. Furthermore, it is remembered because of the way the population reacted 
to the conflict and today is a memory that evokes horror as well as heroics.  
Because of the conflict, many farmers fled from the violence abandoning their turf. Their fields were 
later used by the remaining population to grow food and coca (interview Llauexp1, Gorriti 2009). The 
arrival of the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso in the valley changed local order as they aimed to 
replace local authorities (Degregori 1998: 133). Their arrival also provoked a change in the local 
economy, structure, and fate of the region. 
Ayacucho was the most affected region during the conflict. More than 42% of all victims of the conflict 
between 1980 and 2000 were in Ayacucho and in parts of Apurímac and Hauncavelica (CVR 2003 Tomo 
IV: 15). Sendero Luminoso entered the valley of the Apurímac in 1980/1981 and with more strength in 
1983/1984, partly because their fight in the Andean zone was not as successful as they hoped it would 
be and also because they needed a zone for retreat and gathering strength (Gorriti 2013). As soon as 
they entered the valley, they imposed their rules and taxes. In the beginning, the guerrilla was not 
directly opposed by all of the population and as the state strategies against the guerrilla, which led to 
death and suffering among the population, made the guerrilla the “lesser evil”.178 But soon the strategy 
of hammering the countryside and the resulting ideological violence became visible (Degregori 1998; 
Gorriti 2013). The ideologically loaded violence alienated the guerrilla from local population and 
resulted in overt rebellion against the guerrilla forces. In 1982 the Belaunde administration called in 
the military to fight the insurgents of Sendero Luminoso and the “Infanteria” took control of Huanta 
and La Mar on the 21st of January. However, a decisive factor for the fight against Sendero Luminoso 
in the VRAEM became the autodefensas. 
The first civilian armed resistance is reported from the highlands of Huanta, where peasants ambushed 
and killed several guerrilleros in 1983 (CVR 2003 Tomo II: 437).179 In the VRAEM region, shortly after 
the incidence in Huanta, we see the formation of self-defense groups, as most of the population 
wanted to defend themselves against the guerrilla and their violent rule. In various villages, they 
formed “montoneros”, band of fighters, to prevent rebel incursions (Fumerton 2002: 115; CVR 2003 
 
177 The time “when the potatoes were burning” is a common expression in this region describing time of the conflict 
178 The conflict was in part also used by people for settling private vendettas with the help of the security forces or the 
guerrilla (Fumerton 2002: 109).   
179 The CVR first mentioned the CADs of Llochegua during the conflict, with the massacre of 37 inhabitants of Canayre 
through PCP-SL. Following testimonies, 300 senderistas entered the village and killed rondereos and demanded from the 
authorities a list of landowners. In a confrontation four months later, 3 ronderos died (CVR 2003: 37) 
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Tomo II: 440). They are also known under the name Comite de Defensa Civil (CDC) or Defensa Civil 
Antisubversivas (DECAS) before the Fujimori administration formalized the groups as Comites de 
Autodefensas (CADs) with the law 741 in 1991. The final report of the truth and reconciliation 
commission uses the latter to describe civilian defense forces in the valley of Apurímac (CVR 2003 
Tomo II: 440) and I will use this term in the following for a better readability. By 1983, the military 
began to organize the CADs which controlled the areas and reported back to the military base. One of 
first and most important formal self defence groups in the valley of Apurimac, formed on the 21st of 
June, 1984 in the centro poblado of Pichiwillca, close to Santa Rosa (CVR 2003 Tomo II: 441).180 The 
goal of the guerrilla was to destroy the peasant force and set an example to suppress further uprising. 
What followed was an extremely violent phase in the internal conflict, marked by direct confrontations 
and brutal display of dead bodies to discourage potential support for the self-defense forces 
(Llexaup2).  
While the formation of these groups was supported by the Peruvian military (e. g. Degregori 1989: 29-
30), it was initiated by the population. In this regard the previous agricultural organization supported 
this formation, for example, the FECVRA assisted in organizing the autodefensas (Fumerton 2002: 116). 
The influence of self-defense forces was crucial for pacification, extended later throughout the valley 
and was supported by the military. The Garcia government undertook the first steps of recognizing the 
peasantry militia, but it was the Fujimori administration that formalized the self-defense groups under 
the CADs in 1991. Gradually, the groups received more rights, ranging from the recognition of their 
role in the armed struggle, to receiving arms and reimbursement from the government (Fumerton and 
Remjinse 2004: 67). The military on the other hand, got less violent against the local population by 
1985, and moved towards “selective repression” (Degregori 1998). Despite their importance in the 
fight against Sendero Luminoso, and their cooperation with state security forces, many of the CADs 
interviewed in the VRAEM do not feel that their role during the conflict was sufficiently recognized.  
Life in the valley was dominated by the fight against the guerrilla. Working alone in the fields became 
dangerous and was only possible to do in groups, guarded by the CADs. In order to be able to fight the 
guerrilla, men also stopped working in their fields to concentrate on (military) training, patrolling and 
fighting with the CADs:  
“La vida fue organizada en función de la guerra; cualquier trasgresión de las reglas era 
drásticamente castigada. La vida del rondero era sacrificada. Los campesinos tenían que 
abandonar sus chacras y someterse a un régimen militarizado, con ejercicios, entrenamientos 
y caminatas de varios días, solos o al lado de los soldados. Vivir entre murallas que cercaron 
sus pueblos, hacer vigilancia todos los días en sus torreones, controlar la entrada y salida con 
 
180 It was led by Antonio Cárdenas, who had an extraordinary talent for military organization and who know is remembered 
as a hero throughout the valley. 
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pase, realizar la formación diaria e izar la bandero implican la incorporación de un orden militar 
con sus códigos específicos y alteraciones de ritmos de vida”(Zapata et al. 2008: 200). 
By the end of 1989, all of the northern provinces of Ayacucho (Huanta, Huamanga and La Mar) were 
organized by self-defense groups (CVR 2003: 445). They were better prepared than the Peruvian army, 
to move and fight in the jungle areas (Lijourm1, Llexaup). The self-defense forces of the VRAEM even 
helped to fight the guerrilla in other areas outside the valley. For example, in August 1989, 200 
“ronderos” from Santa Rosa went to support the reorganization of districts in the province of La Mar 
and were paid exclusively for the task (CVR 2003). By the end of 1991, the province of Ayacucho had 
around 836 communities with organized CADs. 280 belonged to the Valle del Rio Apurimac who 
controlled 95% of the valley (Del Pino 2008: 34; Diaz 2015). 
The CADs became essential for the provision of security and order in the valley.181 Their methods 
included public corporal punishment once guilt was established, as one ex-commander reports:  
"And at that time the order was handled by the self-defense committee, you know why; the 
year 84 practically all constitutional rights and all legal rights had reached zero, if you were an 
authority, Sendero would kill you, there was no order, people did what they wanted. Then we 
organized the self-defense committees, imagine that in a democratic country, with laws, we 
made our laws in our own way, we made a state within a state, and well if you were a tyrant 
you did things the wrong way, and if you were a kind leader you did the things benevolently. 
"(Llexaup2) 
These abuses were not highlighted by the interviewees or during the survey. The autodefensas 
assumed trust and respect among the population and gained the reputation for being the most 
effective force against Sendero Luminoso. 
The conflict in the valley was very brutal and memories still linger. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission estimates that at least 2,704 people were killed from 1980 to 2000 in the region, while 
other sources count 8,000 casualties between 1984 and 1993, which accounts for 10% of the local 
population. According to the CVR, the conflict affected Santa Rosa in particular. Of the 17 officially 
reported guerrilla actions in the valley in 1983, nine took place in the settlements north of Santa Rosa, 
five in Santa Rosa itself, and three in the southern communities of Palmapampa and Chungui. The main 
period of conflict was from 1980 to 1992, when 308 people were reported dead or missing in Santa 
Rosa. After this period, the violence decreased. Similarly, in Llochegua, in the same period, 71 people 
 
181 Despite their importance in the pacification of the valley, the final document of the truth and reconciliation commission 
recognizes that the statements on the autodefensas in the valley of Apurímac, were not all positive.  Some regarded them 
as arbitrary and not following any rule. There are also reports of non-voluntary participation in the self-defense groups by 
the military or the groups themselves (CVR 2003: 442-443). The CADs ensured (and enforced) local order and the districts 
were mainly controlled by the autodefensas, which became legalized in 1991, with the decrees 740 and 741. In the end, the 
autodefensas and the military successfully pushed the guerrilla out of the valley and by mid-1985, they controlled most of 
the valley (CVR 2003). 
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disappeared or died. The most violent episode for the VRAE was between 1984 and 1988. It was the 
core period of the conflict that included many extrajudicial killings and violent patrols of the Senderos, 
military, and the CADs (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 90-96; Gorriti 2013). During the conflict several atrocities 
were committed by all sides, which was also related to the difficulty of distinguishing between rebels 
and the population (Ibd.). Brutal confrontations affected the population and led to the formation of 
armed resistance by the local population and the creation of self-defence groups and a focus by the 
military to fight insurgents. Only at a later stage did the police become part of the security architecture 
in the VRAEM.  
Exposed to violent attacks, the conflict led to aggrupation in settlements and the growth of smaller 
towns. People from the highlands of La Mar, Huanta, and Tambo fled from the repressive violence and 
congregated so as to defend themselves (see also Del Pino 1996). Although the areas of Santa Rosa 
and Llochegua experienced different levels of violence, the consequences have been similar. People, 
who earlier lived far away from each other, now began to gather in smaller towns to prevent abuse by 
guerrilla forces (Strauex; Strapm; Llauex). As one member of the autodefensas in Santa Rosa recalls: 
“People had to form more villages, that's why I'm telling you that there are several towns, 41 
bases, 41 towns that have gathered here and formed several cities, because people used to live 
in different places, each one lived in their farms, before Sendero [Luminoso], and produced 
cocoa, coffee, peanuts, but because of Sendero [Luminoso] they have gathered and houses 
have been formed here and there, small towns "(Sroaupm). 
Similarly, until the beginning of 1980, Llochegua was not more than a small settlement of salesmen: 
"Before, everyone lived in their farm in a small house, with small animals, such as a hen or a 
pig. Because of the problem of the conflict people are grouped here and the committee of self-
defense forces formed. At that time, it was not called "village communes"(comunidades 
caserios) or "centro poblado", but rather clusters. The only one that called centro poblado was 
Llochegua. That is how the centros poblados were born" (Llauex) 
Hence, instead of being defenseless in their small farms, this aggrupation allowed for the organization 
of their self-defense.182 This was in part parallel to the formation of self-defense forces (Zamora 2017). 
At a later stage Santa Rosa became a district in 1992 and Llochegua became a district in 2000.183 Even 
if there are differences in their historical development, the conflict played a decisive role in forming 
districts and district capitals in both. The other decisive aspect was coca and the cocaine business.  
 
182 More on CADs and rondas see: Stern 1999; del Pino 1996; Gorriti 1991, Zech 2016. See also on the security aspect 
“Security” below. 
183 The areas of Kimbiri (1990), Sivia (1992) and Pichari (1995) all became districts in the 1990s. 
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7.3.3 Conflict and the Coca Valley 
The conflict had severe consequences for the local economy as well. Until the 1980s, local economy 
and development was mainly driven by legal agricultural products. Peasants planted and sold fruits, 
vegetables, or coffee and the relevance of coca production for the VRAEM was low by the beginning 
of the 1980, compared to other crops and in comparison to the national coca production (Soberón 
2013: 4). During the conflict, the local peasant organization, FECVRA fell apart. FECRVRA suffered from 
attacks by state security forces such as the Marina, which accused them of being involved in drug 
trafficking (Fumerton 2002: 110). Sendero Luminoso could not control the federation from within and 
so they acted against it. They saw the production of coffee and cacao only as a business for the rich 
class and their actions against these economies led to a profound economic crisis (del Pino 1996: 127). 
In the absence of other economic resources, coca became the major source of income. Coca 
production grew in the 1970s and drug trafficking already existed since the beginning of the 1980s in 
smaller scale. But by the end of the decade, drug trafficking and coca cultivation became the major 
sources of income. Many still highlight the importance of coca. A member of the autodefensas, told 
me: “The money from coca helped during these times to finance food, the weapons. With this one can 
fight in a war. Until now the coca continues to finance [us]” (Sroaulm). In some cases, drug traffickers 
and parts of the self-defense forces formed a symbiotic alliance in order to secure the fight against 
Sendero Luminoso (Fumerton 2002: 144). The rise of cocaine consumption, particularly in the USA, 
and the growing smuggling possibilities set up by international cartels, contributed to a rise of this 
commodity. 
By this time, the majority of coca was used for the production of drugs and thus, the unintended 
consequence of the arrival of Sendero Luminoso was the growth of drug production and the link to 
international smugglers. The PBC trade opened up the possibility to buy arms and to organize civilian 
defense against the guerrilla, which is different from the situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley. While 
in the AHV, the alliance was between Senderos and drug traffickers (Felbab-Brown 2009) in the 
VRAEM, drug money was used to fight Sendero Luminoso.  
Money from the drug economy allowed the groups not only to buy arms but also to be fulltime 
involved in the fight against the guerrilla (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 442; interviews StR., Ll, Pi).  In some 
cases, the whole community became autodefensas, including youth being paid to work full-time for 
the autodefensas (CVR 2003 Tomo IV: 101). Economic profits of the coca trade helped in particular for 
buying weapons or paying members of the autodefensas (“los tigres”). Where did the weapons come 
from? 
“[T]here were arms dealers here. Traffickers of armament, of carabiners, sporadic as I say. It 
was something surprising but if we get to have the weapons, we take it" 
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So the traffickers came here [to Llochegua] and asked: "Do you need guns?” 
"Yes,"[they said] you need guns? I'll provide them or my partners will.” In other words, there 
was arms trafficking in the capital of Peru in Lima that the army sold. In other words, the 
situation was a common disgrace. (…) I think it was difficult to bring them [the weapons] here, 
but the trafficker brought them and sold it to us." (Llexaup) 
Before the CADs received weapons from the government, connections to drug traffickers allowed 
them to finance their fight against the guerrilla. Those who remained in the region used the abandoned 
fields to grow food and coca and sold them with the intention of buying arms and paying members of 
the autodefensas for their “service” (Llocadexm; Gorriti 2009: 2): 
“We harvested on the abandoned land. But it has not only been coca. The three products 
were coffee, cacao and coca. But all the income has been to buy ammunition and weapons. 
That way we have armed ourselves. Nobody has given us a weapon (…) Of course the largest 
amount always came from coca. Because there was coca and it was sold. It was harvested 
and sold." (Llexaup1) 
By the mid-1980s, the valley became the second biggest producer of coca in the country driven by the 
conflict and the international demand for drugs. Between 1984 and 1990, these circumstances led to 
a boom in coca production that helped to push back Sendero Luminoso and sustain the population. 
After the capture of Guzman, and the intense control by the CADs and the military, only a fraction of 
Sendero Luminoso under the command of “Feliciano”, remained active in the valley. In most districts, 
there was no more politically motivated violence. After the guerrilla was pushed out from most of the 
valley, coca plantation increased. In 1991, peasants planted 12,000ha of coca, while four years later in 
1995, they planted around 21,000ha (O´Brien 2008).  
 
7.3.4 Coca Crisis 
The growing coca trade demanded the construction of several “simple” airstrips for the transportation 
of drugs, weapons and money, which was also organized by the CADs (Fumerton 2002: 144). Because 
payments were made in USD, the business with coca and PBC led to a “dollarization” of the region until 
1995. This resulted in a short-lived dynamism of the economy. Pamapampa, a small town an hour from 
Santa Rosa, became the center of the trade. The airstrip constructed here was highly frequented and 
also very lucrative (del Pino 1996: 170). “There were big parties during that time in Palmapampa” 
(Vrapold). Although some infrastructural improvements were made during that time, the town still 
shows many infrastructural shortcomings such as dirt roads, and problems with water and electricity. 
The airstrip constructed for narco-flights still exists, but now serves the National Anti-Drug Police 
(DIRANDRO) whose operational basis in VRAEM is located in Palmapampa.  
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In 1995, the coca economy of the valley was in a huge crisis because of growing pressure by the military 
on the local population. During the Fujimori administration, planes that allegedly transported drugs 
were shot down. One ex-leader of the autodefensas therefore mentions:  
"I do not know why Fujimori is called a drug trafficker because with Fujimori it disappeared 
completely, he stopped the drug trafficking, he closed all the borders, he put radars, even I cried 
because I had 40 arrobas of coca and could not sell anyone and when I did, I was paid five soles 
and that did not cover the work that was done." (Llauexp2) 
However, even though the fight against coca production and drug trafficking became more repressive, 
reports about involvement of state security forces in the drug trade emerged (Durand Ochoa 2014: 63, 
also “Bigger Picture”).  
In addition to the more restrictive state policies, the disruption of the big Colombian drug cartels 
influenced the decline of local coca and PBC production. The loss of this main source of income led to 
a financial crisis in the valley: “There was nobody for buying [coca] it was a big misery (una miseria 
grande)” (Stpop1). Prices for coca were as low as 0.40 cents per kg, which resulted in misery for the 
region that depended on coca (Durand 2005). Local cocaleros organized to advocate for coca 
production, against growing pressure from state forces and alternative development agencies. But 
even if the consequences were severe, they were short-lived.  
By the end of the decade, people started growing coca again as soon as the opportunity arose 
(Interview Analyst LAnt). After recovering from the conflict and the collapse of coca prices in the 1990s, 
by the end of the decade, the coca and drug economy revived and attracted migration into the valley 
again. The decision to plant coca again became possible because of a combination of factors like 
external demand, local skills, and lack of territorial control and coercive capacities by the state (see 
Bigger Picture). Campesinos also produced other crops like barbasco, pineapple, banana, and papaya, 
but coca was the dominant economic factor. In 2010, the region became the biggest producer of coca 
in the country (UNODC 2013).  
7.3.5 Conclusion History 
Summing up, the region of the VRAEM was not the primary interest of the state. Even if some 
infrastructural programs improved the accessibility, this did not integrate the peripheral region into 
the state. Moreover, the destruction of the territorial oligarchy reshuffled agricultural business and 
resulted in lesser political integration of the region. Local organizations and local structures were 
formed apart from state organizations and remained quasi-autonomous without a closer relationship 
to the state.  
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There are two core factors that influenced the historical development of the region and its relationship 
towards the state. The first aspect was the internal conflict, which had many implications at the 
organizational level. Autodefensas exercised more control and provided internal and external safety 
for the community. This role is still highly appreciated by the population and displayed in current 
narratives, even by those who did not live in the area during the times of conflict. This particular role 
of the CADs during and after the conflict is still a matter of self-esteem for the population, evident in 
remarks such as the often formulated “we won against the subversion”. Furthermore, in order to being 
able to defend themselves, the conflict led to an aggrupation and growing of settlements and thus set 
the basis for the growth of villages. In the absence of an effective state control, the autodefensas 
assumed the role of security provision and social order.  
The second major factor is the coca economy. Its development is closely related to the conflict but it 
remained important and constitutive afterwards as well. Before the conflict, the economy was 
diversified and based on agricultural products such as café, cacao, barbasco, and coca. Essentially, the 
financing of the anti-insurgent fight led to a growth of the coca economy. Coca and the growing PBC 
trade became a sort of “war economy”. In a sense, the VRAEM shows how a classical “war economy” 
transforms the local economy not only during times of war, but also dictates the economic structure 
of the region after the war. But unlike other cases, where easy to extract (‘lootable’) resources 
supported the rise of warlords (Ellis 1999: 164-180) or prolonged civil war (Ross 2004) such as for a 
decade long internal conflict in Colombia (eg. Chernick 2005), the coca economy in the VRAEM was 
not exploited by armed actors for personal financial gain or an insurgent strategy. It also did not lead 
to the suppression of the local population in order to extract economic rents. On the contrary, the 
economy was supported by the local population and provided the means for self-defense and 
economic survival in the valley. It became the primer source or income, which allowed the CADs to 
buy weapons which is different to the Alto Huallaga. The role of coca became the start of an essential 
crop and remained essential after the conflict. Coca remained the primer source of income in the 
region. In the margins of the state, the coca economy became a valuable resource that was able to 
bridge the infrastructural shortcomings and provided income for the local population.184  
Examining these aspects on the historical formation of the valley is important to understand the local 
structures in relation to the state. In the absence of a dominant state authority and without proper 
integration, the VRAEM remained an area in the margins, wherein people became connected to the 
 
184 These factors give some indication for other cases, in which the transformation of a “war economy” proved to be 
difficult and informality remains high in the years after war and conflict (Andreas 2008). 
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illicit economy, which was a source for ensuring survival. These factors set the basis for the local 
economy and the social order in the valley. 
 
7.4 The Coca Economy Today and its Implications 
7.4.1 Characteristics of the economy 
On the way into the valley, the sheer number of the latest Toyota Hilux 4x4 vehicles is remarkable. 
These cars, each costing around 20,000 to 35,000 USD, are mostly used by “taxi drivers” who transport 
people from Ayacucho into the VRAEM or even within the valley. A police officer tells me that the 
majority is financed by the narcotrafico (Vrapold), which is later confirmed by statements from shop 
owners, researchers, and even taxi drivers themselves, but only with reference to other drivers. 
Entering the bustling regional hub Pichari, about one hour from Llochegua and two and a half hours 
from Santa Rosa, the influence of the coca economy becomes visible through vast numbers of 
agrochemical-shops, expensive Toyota Hiluxes, and a big discotheque. Another feature is at the central 
plaza, a decorative piece that employs two-metre-high coca plants, which gives an indication of the 
significance of coca. In the valley, coca is more than just a crop. It is essential for the economy and is 
loaded with cultural symbolism.  
Today, the VRAEM accounts for 44 percent of the total coca production in Peru (UNODC 2016).185 At 
the same time, the efficiency of coca production has improved and more coca per hectare can be 
produced.186 Apart from PBC, cocaine production also started in the valley at the beginning of the 
2000s. The production capacities in the VRAEM are at 3,6t/ha compared to 2,4t/ha nationally. This 
results in the potential production of 66,494t of dried coca which is roughly 69% of the national 
production (UNODC 2016: 35). The majority of coca is produced in small scale farms of two hectares 
or less and is mainly destined for the production of drugs.187 The exact magnitude and dependency of 
 
185 Estimations are around 18,333ha of coca for 2016 in the VRAEM. Since my fieldwork started in 2015 the following will 
work with the numbers available by that time.  
Interviewees imply that the actual numbers may be a lot higher. Measuring difficulties via satellite cannot account fully for 
the coca plantations. Moreover, eradication figures compared to plantation numbers suggest a discrepancy. The latter is 
also related to the high amount of replanting coca after it was destroyed (http://www.insightcrime.org/news-
analysis/challenging-the-cocaine-figures-part-iii-peru)  
186 The UNODC estimates that in some areas, a coca plantation of one hectare can produce about 200,000 plants (UNODC 
2016: 35) 
187 Officially 35,6% do have 2ha or less in the Southern part of the VRAEM (IV Cenagro 2012). Another important aspect are 
land titles in the area: http://www.inforegion.pe/30823/cofopri-entrego-3-mil-619-titulos-de-propiedad-a-pobladores-de-
tres-distritos-del-vrae/ accessed on 10.11.2016. 
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the local economy is difficult to assess. In a recent study, Leyva and Mendoza (2017: 65) estimate that 
the majority of the economically active people in the valley, work in the agricultural business (70,2%) 
and that coffee (16,6%) and cacao (12,3%) occupy a bigger share in the licit economy. In Santa Rosa 
and Llochegua, the number is above 75%.188 However, these numbers do not reflect the economic 
basis of the valley. A leading police official said “We can assume that close to 100% are either profiting 
directly or indirectly from the illegal economy” (PolGP). While this is difficult to verify since the illicit 
economy operates in “the shadows”, based on the magnitude of coca and PBC production, we can 
assume that the economy of the VRAEM is poorly diversified and based primarily on the illicit economy 
(see also Brombacher et al. 2012).189 The prices of alternative products (cacao and coffee) in relation 
to coca, are very low in comparison to the licit coca sold to ENACO and even lower in comparison to 
the prices for coca sold on the black market (Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 14). It is no surprise that the 
economy is dominated by coca and it’s derivate.190  
Figure 14 Coca Cultivation Density VRAEM 2014 
 
 
District Hectares 2014  % ha VRAEM 2014  Var. % 2009-2014  
Santa Rosa  2461  13,1  -31,3  
Llochegua  2567  13,6  -16,8  
 
Source: DEVIDA 2015:38; based on UNODC 2010 and 2015 
 
 
188 Although there are around 19,000ha of coca in the VRAEM, coffee and cacao occupies in total more than 39,000ha. Coca 
is the dominating economic crop (MINAGRI 2012; Leyva and Mendoza 2017: 68, 200). 
189 Peasants also produce other crops such as barbasco, pineapple, banana, and papaya, but the economy is primarily based 
on coca. 
190 A study found that 90% of the local economy is based on coca (MINAGRI 2012), 6% on cacao and 2% coffee (InfoRegion 
2009, Pereyra 2009). 
Mapa 4. Densidad de Cultivos de Coca en el VRAEM, 2014
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As presented in the table above, the districts in focus produce a considerable part of the overall coca 
production in the VRAEM. There are several reasons for the dependency on the coca economy. 
Economically, growing coca has had the same benefits for peasants in the VRAEM as elsewhere in the 
country. Due to the economic benefits through the illegal market, peasants make more money with 
coca than with any other crop. In 2015, the price for one kilo of dried coca used for PBC production, 
was at US$3.2/kg which is around US$ 2 lower than in Alto Huallaga (UNODC 2016: 9). On the other 
hand, prices for PBC and cocaine in the valley are around US$745/kg and US$1,133/kg respectively 
nationally (UNODC 2016: 15; interviews Ll., Pi., Str.). The capacity for high resistance and the possibility 
to harvest every three months makes coca even more attractive to grow.191 However, the market is 
very volatile. 
The prices of coca in the last months of 2015, seem to have fallen from over 110 to around 80 Soles 
(ca. 24 to 30 USD) for one arroba (11.5 kg). One main reason is a shift in transportation from air-
trafficking to transportation via mochileros and cars (in a second step, PBC is transported by small 
airplanes). As a consequence, selling to ENACO becomes more beneficial since they are paying up to 
90 Soles, though only for the best quality. Most coca is sold as the second best (85 Soles) and third 
best quality (40 Soles). Table 16 shows this volatility in the coca market in San Francisco and Santa 
Rosa, for three consecutive years, compared to the prices for illicit coca, PBC, and Cocaine. I was able 
to access data on the coca acquisition directly at the ENACO offices in Santa Rosa and San Francisco 
for the months of November and December. As presented, substantially more coca was sold in 
December 2015, compared to the years before, suggesting that ENACO absorbs some of the coca that 
originally was produced for the PBC production. Hence, when prices on the black market are low, 
selling of coca seems to shift towards the legal market. An ENACO employee in San Francisco mentions 
that the coca market is very volatile and that changes between 7 and 20t coca per month would be 
normal. At the same time, interviewees tell me that for harvesting coca, people can easily make 100 
to 150 Soles per day. It all depends on the prices on the black market, where prices of PBC range from 
USD600 to USD830 per kg (Vrapolint; Llpopm2).192 
 
 
 
191 The production of PBC and the cultivation of coca has severe consequences for the natural environment, including 
contaminated rivers with lead, chromium or phosphate (DEVIDA 2013a: 34-35). 
192 The acquisition numbers are to a high extent based on estimations and can therefore vary (see Zevallos 2017 for a 
discussion), but still they can be used as an approximation. Prices depend on the quality. Price per arroba (11.5kg)/ per kg 
1st: 90/7,83; 2nd: 85/7,39; 3rd: 40/3,5 (PEN/ US$). Officially in San Francisco are ca. 5,040 and in Santa Rosa are 1,550 
registered producers. 
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Table 16 Acquisition of Coca by ENACO  
 San Francisco in t Santa Rosa in t Prices of Coca $US/ 
kg 
Price of PBC $US/kg Price cocaine $US/kg 
2013 November 7,9 
December 7,7 
November 13 
December 9 
3.6 838 1,240 
2014  November 7,5 
December 4, 7 
November 9 
December 8 
3.7 804 1,228 
2015  November 20,9 
December 35,8 
November 16 
December 19 
3.2 715 1,169 
Source: data gathered from ENACO Santa Rosa, San Francisco; UNODC 2016: 74-77 
Other than the market prices of PBC and the acquisition of coca by ENACO, table 16 also displays the 
effect on changes in the state strategy against drug trafficking. The decreasing PBC prices coincide with 
the destruction of local airstrips and the transition from air transportation to other means of 
transportation in 2015. The shift in drug trafficking routes might at first explain price changes, but drug 
traffickers have proven to be very adaptable, which balances out prices as long as external demand 
stays high. People are aware of this volatility but also highlight the possibility of rising prices. One coca 
farmer told me: “They [on the black market] buy your coca for 150 Soles. So, you as farmer, you will 
then not sell to ENACO. Prices rise until 200 Soles and ENACO still keeps the prices at 80 or 90 Soles, 
and ENACO selects only the best leaves, [whereas] the others come and buy everything. You, what do 
you prefer? (Llpopm1). These high prices are demand driven and people would find a way to transport 
drugs out of the valley as long as they get paid.  
Additionally, the following economic reasons for producing coca were mentioned to me in the 
VRAEM:  
• Alternatives such as coffee and cacao are the biggest legal crops in the valley but can only 
generate a fraction of what is being generated by coca 
• The coca economy generated an economically dynamic valley, which resulted in higher prices 
and relatively high costs of living in the area. Prices for farmhands are relatively high and the 
licit products do not generate enough money 
• The soil is relatively exhausted because of coca- and drug production. This has partly to do with 
the usage of agrochemicals that impacts the soil, and makes it more difficult to grow organic 
alternatives or to grow licit alternatives at all.  
• Missing market access, or bad infrastructure are additional challenges for finding alternatives 
to the coca 
Finally, there are few private investments in the VRAEM because of several reasons: 1) bad 
infrastructural conditions increase the relative costs for alternative products. 2) the reputation of the 
VRAEM as a dangerous and insecure region, 3) recent attacks of Sendero Luminoso on police stations, 
4) the need of paying “extortion money” to Sendero Luminoso, 5) the prevailing corruption, and 6) the 
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risk of social insecurity especially related to the possible eradication, restricts investments (Leyva and 
Mendoza 2017: 20-22).  
These aspects need to be considered alongside the geographic and demographic complexity of the 
VRAEM when analyzing why it is difficult to diversify the local economy. In consequence, the prevailing 
impact of the illicit economy is high, given that there are no alternatives. The structuring of the illicit 
economy moreover, involves many players, resulting in the inclusion of various elements of society in 
the illicit value chain. 
 
7.4.2 Organizing the Illicit Economy in the VRAEM 
This section will explain the present structure of the drug economy in the VRAEM. Information for this 
section comes mainly from expert interviews with local traffickers, the police, and police reports. Even 
though this analysis focuses on Santa Rosa and Llochegua in particular, the organization of the illicit 
economy is similar throughout the valley (Vrapolint.). Today, drug production and drug trafficking in 
the valley is organized by smaller groups and not under the umbrella of big drug smuggling 
organizations as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s.193 Three stages of the illicit drug chain can be 
found in the valley: production, distribution, and commercialization (Mujíca and Zevallos 2013; Rojas 
2016). Either directly or indirectly, the main source of income in that region is coca. This includes 
farmers, chemists, and smugglers. 
It all starts with the production of coca. Owners of coca plantations grow the crop by either planting 
seeds directly in the fields or by growing the coca in a seed bed before it is planted. The seed bed 
method is more common. After plantation, coca leaves can be harvested every 4 months. In larger 
plantations that have more than 3 hectares, “peones” or “farmhands”, are contracted to do the 
harvesting. In Santa Rosa, every morning reveals the same scene. At about 4:30am, young men gather 
at a particular corner just outside of Santa Rosa. These men are peones waiting to be picked up by one 
of the Toyota 4x4 vehicles.194 These workers, mostly young men from the region or migrants from the 
highlands (Sroresj), hover at the lowest level in the drug production hierarchy. They work on the fields, 
where they are paid on an hourly basis or depending on the kilos they harvest. Usually, workers earn 
around 100 to 150 PEN (30-45 USD). There seems to be a constant demand for day workers, since the 
 
193 One example of a drug trafficking ring is the case of Óscar Rodríguez Gómez (Turbo) 
http://www.inforegion.pe/36822/organizacion-de-narcotraficante-%E2%80%98turbo%E2%80%99-en-el-vrae-ahora-es-
manejada-por-su-madre-y-sus-tios/. Others are: Quispe Marmolejo, Yanarinri (Santa Rosa) or Turbo, Los Tibenqui, Barros, 
Vacochorro, Cordero, Papitas (Llochegua) IDL-R: Clanes cocaina (2012) https://idl-reporteros.pe/principales-clanes-de-la-
droga-en-el-vrae/  
194 I observed a similar scene in Palmapampa as well.  
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crop is produced throughout the year without a concrete time for harvesting.  
Once coca is harvested, it is dried in the sun. Driving through the VRAEM, drying coca laid on large 
plastic blankets is a common sight.195 Transportation of the dried coca leaves for the production of PBC 
is done by different actors. Dried coca leaves are mostly refined to PBC, to reduce transportation costs. 
This is done in ”laboratories” that are at or near the coca field and is often close to a river so that waste 
disposal is easy. In some cases, these laboratories are communal and used alternately by various 
producers. In other instances, coca is transported to other districts for further processing. Several of 
these production sites are in different spots of the valley. Mostly, leaves are picked up directly at the 
field, so the farmer does not need to bring his product to a market to find a buyer, an advantage over 
legal crops, which need to be transported to a regional market which is a four-hour drive away.  Coca 
is usually transported during the night. Since most of the coca farms are not officially registered with 
ENACO, the police would have the possibility to confiscate coca. Hence, during night time, Toyota 4x4 
vehicles drive sacks of dried coca to PBC production sites. The police are not actively looking to 
confiscate coca. “Seizures of coca leaves happen rather as a byproduct of other operations than by 
[actually] going after it” a police official said during an interview (PolMPa). 
The production of coca for PBC, works without a bigger management scheme and offers better paid 
jobs than agriculture. However, these people are still relatively poor. A prosecutor in the region tells 
me:  
“Everybody is poor, farm people, transporter, well at least that’s what they tell you. They are 
people who have been told “listen, take this package and I pay you 200 soles”, some said that 
if they knew that they were carrying drugs and that they needed money for their mother, 
sister, or for themselves, and others tell you they knew nothing." (Vrafim) 
Cocaine is produced either directly in the VRAEM or in other areas of Peru, close to or within bigger 
cities. Indeed, the transportation of PBC and refinement of cocaine close to big cities and shipment 
points, offers benefits such as the availability of chemicals and lower risk of losing the value added 
end-product. There are several possibilities in the production of PBC and cocaine and as in other 
regions, the process is constantly diversified, also as a response to state policies (on the production 
see also Mella 2012; Grisaffi 2014). The production of the required amount of PBC, involves the use of 
products and chemicals such as sulphuric acid, cement, kerosene or gasoline, sodium carbonate, and 
saltpeter. Regulating these substances would therefore be an important step to undermine drug 
production possibilities, but implementation is half-hearted (Vizcarra 2014) “Chemists” also use 
alternative ingredients in the production of drugs. These chemists have an important role since they 
 
195 There are also reports of drying coca in ovens and the use of fresh leaves directly for the production of coca derivatives. 
However, these are relatively new techniques and not as common in the VRAEM as the use of sun dried coca. 
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make sure that the produced drugs reach a high level of purity. Often, the involvement of people from 
“other countries” in this step is apparent.196 Colombians, Bolivians and even US-Citizens are mentioned 
during interviews with officers from the anti-drug police DIRANDRO and (ex-) traffickers.197  
Once there is an order for drugs, a contact person responsible for a part of the whole shipment informs 
different production sites within the valley (Vrapolexg, Strresm).198 Instead of one actor controlling the 
illegal economy such as the infamous “cartels” in Mexico or Colombia, smaller groups or family clans 
control parts of the illegal value chain which begins in the coca producing valleys. In 2012, at least 12 
family clans carried out larger operations of managing production and shipment of drugs (UNODC 
2015; IDL-R 2012). Production and transportation also diversified, and many actors are involved and 
control parts of the process, from the production of coca leaves to the production of PBC and finally 
transportation of drugs out of the valley.  The means of transportation have changed compared to the 
1990s, when international cartels were still present in the coca areas. Today, the “management” of 
the collection of coca leaves, the production of PBC and cocaine, and the transportation of the drugs 
to a shipping point leaving the valley, are all in the hands of local groups. These groups are smaller, 
more dispersed and are often related via family ties (UNODC 2016). 
The last and most value adding step is the transportation out of the valley. There are three main 
possibilities for transportation: by plane, by mochileros, or by car.199 Until 2015, transportation was 
mainly via small airplanes. Infrastructure was leased to drug traffickers for $10,000 to $20,000, renting 
an aircraft was about $20,000 to $30,000 (Insight Crime 2012). Every small plane could carry around 
300 to 400 kg of PBC or cocaine. The police destroyed most of the illegal landing strips near production 
points in 2015, which was a costly endeavor and involved both military and police forces. Nevertheless, 
illegal runways can still be found in the valley in areas difficult to access by state security actors, but 
they are not as numerous as before.200 During the time of research, transportation was done via land, 
either by car or by mochileros. Mochileros usually transport drugs in groups of 10 to 20 people, and 
 
196 A young smuggler in Santa Rosa told me that in the month before, two young men from the USA worked as chemists in 
the region. The young men told me with admiration that they achieved the highest level of purity he has seen in the drugs. 
197 This claim is of course difficult to verify, but it is an indicator that the production is quite lively and internationally 
connected. 
198 During my fieldwork in the VRAEM and various talks with current and former Anti-Drug police officers, I found that the 
majority of drug orders from the VRAEM and first step for drug transportation is Bolivia, before it will be further 
transported to Brasil.  
199 Mostly young men carrying up to 20kg of drugs in their back-pack (Spanish: “mochila”). 
200 Often, illegal runways are beside rivers, which is on the one hand, easier to construct and on the other hand, not always 
visible at high water level. 
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with armed guards for protection, to “shipping points” outside of the valley. These are either illegal 
airstrips with single engine machines flying the drugs out201 or cars carrying them out. Mochileros are 
typically young men around 17 to 20 years of age, strong enough to walk long distances with the cargo. 
Additionally, cars and pick-up trucks transport cocaine or PBC out of the valley, hidden in car tires or 
automobile covers. An increasing number of cars and transportation services in the valley make 
detection of drugs more difficult. Their destinations are cities outside of the valley, ports at the coast, 
and the border regions in Bolivia and Brazil. Several trafficking routes lead out of the VRAEM, which 
traffickers use alternately, to avoid detection by security forces. Transportation is the most critical part 
in the value chain before the drugs reach the shipping points since its more vulnerable to the police or 
attacks by other traffickers on the road. Thus, this step also demands security provision, organization, 
and informants to inform about the police or to influence their action. Former guerrilla fighters of the 
Sendero Luminoso, the Clan Quispe Palomino, serve now as security providers for these traffickers. 
Once the drugs reach a shipping point (another illegal landing strip, a port) or a depot, an international 
syndicate takes over the part of transportation, or another national organization manages the further 
transportation chain (Srresj; Vrapolg1; Papol1).  
Following these informations, the figure below schematizes the whole scheme (Figure 15). Neither the 
contact person for international drug syndicates nor other actors in the production process have full 
control over the production or transportation chain. Accessing the illicit economy seems to be easy. In 
particular, young people seem to be easily attracted by the chance of making “easy money”.  People 
know each other and even if there is no open talk about it, those involved are known to everyone. This 
is also true for the higher ranks in the drug business (Strresm.; Vrapold.; StrextJ). 
Figure 15: Structure of Communication within the Illicit Economy in VRAEM 
International Structure  Local Structure 
    
Own elaboration based on interviews and police data 
 
201 To Bolivia, Paraguay and finally Brazil.  
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Within this scheme, there are also different responsibilities regarding the control of police activity. 
Alongside other actors, there are also people responsible for controlling police activities, and others 
to secure the transportation of drugs. For each area, we find a similar organizational structure.  
Organized like this, many people are directly involved in the production chain, while nobody really 
controls the bigger parts. The higher the hierarchy, the less people are involved. Hence, the system of 
the drug economy produces a fragmented network and provides work for many people, while at the 
same time the communication structure is closed. This diversified production and commercialization 
scheme is also more difficult to detect and fight for the police. Economically, the biggest share of the 
income stays with the people at the top of the chain, while the lowest levels earn only a small 
percentage of the value, once it leaves the region of production. At this step, it is also important to 
note that there are rarely large confiscations of drugs (100kg or more)202. This can be related to the 
“layered” trafficking scheme, and also to corruption, as people tell me (traffickers and police officers). 
Thus, people incarcerated for drug trafficking offences are mostly the small fish (see also Social 
Consequences) (Interview Sroresm; Sroext). 
 
7.4.3 Economic consequences in Santa Rosa and Llochegua 
Entering the district center of Llochegua on a gravel road coming from the nearby river, one has to 
pass through the bar zone consisting of 33 bars (“cantinas”). These also serve as brothels. I entered 
during midday, heavy Reggaeton beats filled the air, and young men without shirts and obviously 
drunk, stumbled through the streets. During night time, there would be many more people and bars 
would be full, as a highly respected ex-president of the self-defense force of Llochegua tells me: “Every 
night this turns into Sodom and Gomorrah (…) it´s a disgrace, it hurts me to see” (Lloexaup). Once at 
the center, the number of clothing shops, small shops, and restaurants (19) is striking (table 17). Also, 
the existence of 13 hotels in an area with officially high levels of poverty is remarkable. 
As one police officer tells me, “All business here depends either directly or indirectly on the illicit 
economy” (Llpolm). An interview with a hotel owner who moved from Tingo Maria203 Two years back 
revealed that economic possibilities brought him into the valley. He claimed to earn enough to finance 
 
202 Larger amounts of drugs were ultimately found in the district of Santa Rosa 115 kilo of cocaine and PBC (El Comercio 
2017) 
203 He states that the economic situation in Alto Huallaga forced him to move in order for being able to provide for his 
family.  
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the education of his two daughters (Llhotm). When I asked him where the money is coming from, he 
only replies, “that is obvious, look around. I can´t tell you more than that”. Only minutes later, he offers 
to transport drugs to Germany. He knew very good chemists who would know how to make a suitcase 
out of cocaine or how to hide drugs within clothes “chemically”, which would not be detectable 
(Llhotm). Today, the district of Llochegua is seen as a major center for drug production and drug 
trafficking. Several illegal landing strips are detected by the police, while intelligence reports see high 
production capacities. The district capital alone has three gas stations, although two had to be closed 
since they operated without a license. Petrol is one of the main ingredients in the production of PBC.  
The same can be said about Santa Rosa. The capital of Santa Rosa is a clean and relatively quiet, but 
busy place with many people on the streets. The year 2000 saw an economic growth for Santa Rosa 
that included the construction of the plaza de armas – the main square. The plaza de armas is quite 
big with a fountain (though without water) in the middle, trees and plants, and is more a park than a 
plaza. The city is growing. In 2000, there was only one hotel while today there are eight. The 22 bars 
are also striking and most of them serve as a “meeting point for prostitutes”. During the weekends, 
these bars are well-attended from the mornings until night-time (see A night in Santa Rosa). The 
dominant businesses in the VRAEM are mostly based on bars, restaurants, and clothing stores.  
                 Table 17 Businesses in Santa Rosa and Llochegua 
  SANTA ROSA (CAPITAL) LLOCHEGUA 
 
C
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N
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M
IN
G
 B
U
SI
N
ES
S 
Hotel 8 13 (laut Plan 8) 
Shop 26 (28 21 
Clothing shops 12 
On weekends additional 
stands 
19 (33) 
On weekends 21 additional 
stands 
Restaurants 18 19 (18) 
Bar 22 33 – (laut Plan 42) 
Discotheques  2 6 
Beauty Salon 5 6 
 
O
TH
ER
 
 
Agricultural Shops 11 7 
Construction 2 1 
Pharmacy 7 4 
Werkstatt 9 10 
COUNTED WITHIN TWO BLOCKS AROUND MAIN PLAZA 
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Also striking are the agribusiness shops that sell agrochemicals and fertilizer. Moreover, high numbers 
of pharmacies stand out. Both can be linked to drug production. While agricultural shops are able to 
import fertilizers for agricultural production, especially coca, they can also import chemical ingredients 
for drug production (Vrapolint.; Lexp3). The same applies for pharmacies. In one parallel street of the 
central plaza in Llochegua, three pharmacies side by side, selling similar products with the same prices. 
Furthermore, construction shops and many small shops sell basics for the production of coca and PBC/ 
cocaine including plastic gallons and cement. 
As a prosecutor working on drug related issues says for Santa Rosa:  
"The majority of Santa Rosa are drug traffickers, especially from the populated centers but you 
know that of the 100% 20% are in the cities and 80% in the centros poblados. (...) The way to 
operate drug trafficking in Palmapampa for example is Hilux vans, Honda motorcycles, a place 
where I assure you that the owner is narco is where you find pools, a bar and some chefs, you 
arrive at that place and automatically the people who are there look at you weird. I was in 
Palmapampa for a course of investigation techniques, and there the ones from the DIRANDRO 
told us to come to that group, where there was a girl and guys with Hilux vans and youngsters 
from 19, 18 years on their motorbikes, and they told me that four months ago they had caught 
the girl who was pregnant, carrying drugs, but she did not need to explain herself, because she 
was released before she had been presented to the judge. The public ministry accused the judge 
and ordered that he had to be taken to court, but even worse then three months later he is 
free. […] All who are with her [the girl] are traffickers, and they are not to sell little quantities 
they distribute kilos and they are young the oldest will have 23 years, and that pickup-truck 
that they have I cannot effort myself" (Vrafim: 110 - 118) 
While the economic benefits of the drug business are quite visible in the urban centers, poverty can 
be seen in the margins of the districts and once one leaves the center. Houses are built with less 
sophisticated material and an employee of an international NGO describes the health and nutrition 
situation of the population in villages, with bad infrastructural connections as “catastrophic” (interview 
Liongrc). An employee of the municipality explains:  
"Because there is poverty, apparently because this is the jungle. There is drug trafficking so 
there is money? Well no. The ones who earn the money are those who produce cocaine, here 
the product costs a thousand soles and there how much does it cost? 70 thousand? Then 
there is no economic benefit, practically the farmer is a slave on his own farm (..) "(Llmunm1). 
Demands of the peones (farm hands or day workers) is constantly rising and in places where the daily 
payment for coca picking is high, peones demand higher wages for harvesting licit crops as well (Leyva 
and Mendoza 2017: 69). That is why also owner of larger coca fields not necessarily earn a lot of money 
since they have to pay higher wages for farm workers. Agricultural production with a lower turnout 
therefore, becomes even less profitable and leads to a low diversification of the local agriculture. Many 
products that could be produced in the valley are imported from other areas. Consequently, high costs 
of living and an even higher dependency on high profit margins are additional results of the coca 
economy. This leads to a paradoxical situation wherein the VRAEM produces a highly profitable 
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commodity, but at the same time most of the inhabitants are relatively poor, living in a precarious 
infrastructural situation. 
Economic effects even go beyond the VRAEM itself and a possible eradication would have greater 
influence beyond the valley as a former NGO worker in the VRAEM told me: 
"Look, here in the VRAEM if you want or not you are involved and you are involved in the issue 
of drug trafficking, directly or indirectly. The ones directly involved are the drug traffickers and 
the ones indirectly [involved] are the carriers, the merchants, the restaurants, and if there is no 
drug no money enters into the valley. And it not only provides for the VRAEM but other 
departments like Ayacucho, and others. In other words, if there is a radical intervention, 
everything will be reduced, there will be less transportation, less grocery sales, and if there 
were 50 people before then there would only be 15, 10, then everything will come down ... so, 
automatically, the coca goes down everything goes down. "(Vraexong) 
This dependency on the coca leaves results in a low diversification and also a big divide between the 
rural parts of the VRAEM and the urban areas (Leyva and Mendoza 2017; INEI 2015). Signs of relative 
wealth are quite obvious, but the official numbers indicate that poverty levels remain very high in the 
area. Moreover, the survey in Santa Rosa, Llochegua, and Cumunpiari, realized for this thesis, indicate 
that most of the participants do not earn enough money and tend to have difficulties in meeting basic 
needs. A second question focusing on the economic situation and wellbeing in the region indicates 
that most people are not satisfied with their situation.  
Figure 16 Income Satisfaction   Figure 17 Perception of Economic Situation 
  
N = 65 N = 65 
These numbers are supported by INEI (IV Cenagro 2012) who found that only 16.7% of households in 
the southern part of the VRAEM indicate that their income is enough to cover their expenses. The 
latter might be related to higher costs of living resulting from the coca economy. This ambivalence in 
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the economy is a characteristic feature of the southern VRAEM: expensive cars, the high prices and 
the availability of consumer goods, and in contrast, high poverty rates. 
An interesting aspect is that everybody pays in Soles. In the regions of San Martin and Alto Huallaga, 
people, including peasants, paid in USD which had been the main currency back in the days of the coca 
boom (Kernaghan 2009). People mentioned this to me during my stay in the region and even in 
Aguaytia, I saw people paying in USD (see chapter on Alto Huallaga). In the VRAEM however, everybody 
pays Soles, which is noteworthy because due to the illicit economy, most of the money came from 
outside of the country. The probability of a foreign currency, most likely the USD, being used for 
transactions is very high. Nevertheless, I have not seen anybody paying with dollars. The hypothesis of 
the military official is that money is changed in the many different banks in the valley and different 
“cajas”, involving a higher level of criminal organization (Polint). 
The economy of the VRAEM is an example in which the interaction between the illicit and the licit 
economy becomes visible. Instead of being two separate systems, they are deeply intertwined. One 
aspect is the direct investments coming from the drug production and trafficking business, into the 
circle of legal economy. Mainly, these financial flows are directed to consuming industries such as bars, 
discotheques, or clothing shops. While people indicate that their economic situation is not good, the 
price level is still high. Similarly, actors are interconnected when they sell, for example, agrochemicals 
to coca growers or ingredients for the laboratories, or by participating in both the licit and illicit 
economy. That would include for, instance, the owner of a restaurant who also owns a coca farm that 
sells his coca to produce drugs. Another example would be the taxi driver whotransports people by 
day and drugs by night, or even both at the same time.  
Dependency on the coca economy is not just restricted to people directly involved in coca or drug 
production, but results in a complex system that influences the economy on the local and even on the 
regional level. 
 
7.4.4 Coca as Binding Factor in Society – or “the right from wrong” 
In the cocalero regions of Peru, we see societies that grew in particular because of the coca and PBC 
production. After pacification, people moved to the region in the hope for a better economic income. 
The number one economy is still the coca business. Instead of single actors or groups in control of the 
illicit value chain, the society as a whole is either directly or indirectly included. Thus, many people in 
the society take part in illicit production and the smuggling process and therefore, consequences for 
society are visible.   
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The local economy is an attraction for migration into the region and the diversified production scheme 
offers several working opportunities, in the illicit economy or in related businesses. Like in the Alto 
Huallaga, the population is bound together by the economy. It has resulted in a dependency but also 
a common understanding about the importance of coca for the society. In every conversation during 
research, coca was the main topic, even if there was no specific aim to discuss the issue. It mostly came 
with reference to poverty and the importance of coca for the economy was constantly highlighted, 
pointing out that without coca there would be even more poverty and everything would collapse. At 
the same time, the public view on coca and the drug economy changed. A young person from Kimbiri 
mentioned that in the 1980s and 1990s, trafficking was more obvious and traffickers flaunted their 
wealth. “Everybody supported the other because everybody was obviously involved and everybody 
won. […] to be drug trafficker was socially accepted, it was just another work” (Vrapop3) Today, 
involvement in drug trafficking is less obvious and people in favor of the coca economy, deny the direct 
relationship to drug trafficking vehemently (“mira, estamos personas humildes, no estamos narcos”).  
The VRAEM had a more diversified income source than the Alto Huallaga, but coca was and still is the 
economic basis. Cocaleros have an important role in advocating the coca and combining legal and 
illegal activities. Durand (2005) describes their role in relation to state and non-state actors, their 
formation of institutions, and the economic control of the valley, within the institutional setting of 
different “agricultural organizations” such as the Federation of Agricultural Producers of the Valley of 
the River Apurímac-Ene (FEPAVRAE).204 Its main representative was the eloquent and charismatic 
cocalero leader Nelson Palomino, a primary school teacher with an exceptional talent for public 
speech. As described in “The Bigger Picture”, the cocalero movement lost strength nationally, after the 
incarceration of Palomino, but they maintained an important role in the VRAEM. They still have the 
capacity to unite local peasants and organize demonstrations in Lima, as was shown in July 2017.205 
Alongside their role as leaders, the cocaleros retain political positions like mayors and Juez de Paz. The 
Cocaleros’ role within the illicit economy is ambiguous. While they stand officially against drug 
trafficking, cocaleros sell the vast majority of coca on the black market. “We are selling to those that 
pay best. We are not responsible for what happens then.” (Vracocl, Vrafep). Still, coca is the basis for 
the production of cocaine. This ambiguity provokes criticism of the cocaleros and those advocating 
their cause.  
 
204 Other organizations included: FECVRA – Peasant Federation of the Valley and River Apurímac, FENDEPCO – National 
Front in Defense of the Producers of the Coca Leaf, FEPAVRAE – Federation of Agricultural Producers of the Valley of the 
River Apurímac-Ene, CONPACCP- as national organization to support the cause of cocaleros 
205 marcha de sacrificio July 2017 https://peru21.pe/politica/agricultores-vraem-llegaron-lima-solicitar-reunion-ejecutivo-
85798  
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The justification of the coca economy follows two major strategies; one is economical, arguing that 
there is no other opportunity that would be a real alternative to the coca. The economic value of 
alternative crops is lower than the value of coffee or cacao. On the other hand, the VRAEM produced 
several different crops that provided a living in the time before the coca boom. Cocaleros continue 
under this “double discourse”. The current leader of the local cocalero organization FEPAVRAE 
explained:  
"Let's see, I'm a cocalero. Thanks to coca I am trying to educate my children so that later my 
children will not be the same as me. I want to give the best quality of education to them and a 
better quality of life so that they will later be useful to society better than I. That is why we 
take advantage of this little budget that gives us the coca leaf we invest in our children and 
the family and many aspects "(Llfepm) 
This is a common description; the coca is important to have the financial means to educate their 
children. The second strategy relies on the cultural value of coca; the coca as a divine plant that has 
existed for centuries in the valley (see also Durand Ochoa 2014). Nelson Palomino, leader of the 
CONPACCP, said this: “When we defend the coca we defend the cultural identity of the “hombre 
amazonico” because its culture as the professionals of social science identify, in every history humans 
have culture” (Vracoclm). These arguments and the reference to coca as a source of “social identity” 
that needs to be defended, serves as a common rationale against state actions. However, the cultural 
argument is also not as simple as presented. It is true that coca has a century long history in several 
areas of Peru, but in its extension, the VRAEM can only be partly related to this history. Additionally, 
the coca culture was more present in the Andes than the Amazon region which is why the reference 
to the “hombre Amazonicon” (the Amazon man) is misleading (O´Brien 2008; Gootenberg 2008: 16). 
Both arguments can also be found in the Valley of Alto Huallaga. 
My overall impression is that the majority try to distance themselves officially from this illegal 
economy, arguing that it should not be allowed. On the other hand, the whole region depends 
economically on drug production and there is simply no way of not knowing that the majority of coca 
is produced for drug production. “No hay forma, no vamos a negar esto.” – There is no way to negate 
this (Llexp2). On direct confrontation, the obvious connection to drug production is not denied. But at 
the same time, the direct responsibility for the production of drugs is de-emphasized with reference 
to the argument that there are no alternatives and therefore people would need to turn to producing 
coca. Additionally, there is a second argument that does not acknowledge the drug production chain:  
"We as a farmer cannot do anything. Moreover, to my understanding as a coca farmer there 
was never a person who pressed me. I sell coca to anyone who offers me [to buy it] as any 
product [it’s a question of] offer and demand. So, the person who offers me a little more, I sell 
it to. But I do not know who he this person, he only comes in the night, he picks up the coca and 
leaves. "(Llfepm) Says the leader of the local peasant organization FEPAVRAEM. 
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What is interesting about this argument is that there is a consciousness about the illegal drug economy. 
People try to distance themselves personally from the drug economy and at the same time defend the 
coca economy either by pointing to the cultural heritage or the economic necessities.  
One interview partner made no attempt to distance themselves from the drug economy and even 
bragged about their position. The close relationship between the licit and illicit economy results in a 
network that connects actors involved in the drug economy with actors of the licit economy, and blurs 
the lines between legal and illegal spheres. It is a legitimization of the local economy, stating that there 
would not be any alternative to the coca. As one owner of a coca field said: “I know that I am doing 
something wrong, but not really wrong. (…) Look, there are simply no alternatives, if there were I would 
happily do other things but there aren´t.” (Sroresm). The connection to the drug economy is well 
known, but there is a need for justifying the illegitimate because of potential state action against it. 
“Legitimizing” the illicit is not explicit, there is no open support for the drug trade, but we see an 
implicit support for the cultural right and economic necessity of growing coca. Nevertheless, in the 
VRAEM, these two aspects of coca production and drug production cannot be simply separated. Also 
there are people migrating to the region precisely because of the possibilities offered by the illicit 
economy. The assessment of a policeman in Llochegua is similar:  
“To be honest, the whole of the VRAEM is influenced by drug trafficking (…) from my personal 
view the whole population is involved in one way or another. Firstly, the problem of drug 
trafficking begins with the coca leaf, because the coca leaf can be sold to a good price. This is 
why the peasant plant coca instead of cacao or coffee (…) and because the price [of the latter] 
is much lower and like every family father who has kids he wants that they go to the university, 
he wants to have a bit more and prefers to sell the coca leaf on the black market” (Llpolm1) 
With regard to the coca economy social consequences are described as well. Many describe alcoholism 
as a major problem in the district with bars and brothels bringing in booming businesses. The majority 
of the interview partners mentioned the abuse of alcohol and prostitution as the primary vices in 
society. In a district that has a total population count of 11,000 (INEI), the official number of bars in 
the capital of Llochegua is 52. Those bars also serve as brothels which are popular among the local 
population. As we enter the center of Llochegua, the ex-president of the autodefensas of the area says: 
"All bars are brothels. Look how the chibolos walk 16 years without shirt, drunk. This is one of 
the great pains that this area has. And this is because of the drugs. It cannot be denied, it is 
evident its undeniable. "(Llauexp1) 
Prostitution of underage women is frequently mentioned as a big problem. The effect on social life is 
particularly visible on weekends when people drink heavily in taverns. The number of taverns and 
brothels grew especially after the 1990s (Vrapop3). While I was talking openly about this with a 
member of the Autodefensas, the police seems not be aware of this situation – or does not want to be 
aware of it. In an interview, a high ranking police official claimed there are no more than 12 bars 
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without any kind of prostitution. When confronted with the abuse of under aged children working in 
these bars including the provision of sexual services, the local police commander replied: “what 
happens behind closed doors is private business” (Llopolcm).  
Youth are particularly affected by the drug economy in the valley (Novak et al. 2011) and mostly are 
seen in the lowest part of the drug trafficking chain. From an early age, the youth learn to harvest coca 
leaves, produce drugs, or transport them.206 Easy money has been mentioned several times and has a 
tempting effect “Youth do not want to study […] the only thing they think of is to grow coca or to 
become “Mochillero” [smuggling drugs with a bag pack]” (Lledujoum).  In particular, young men look 
up to those who seemingly make money easily. As a Fiscal working on drug trafficking issues put it:  
"These young people are the last of the chain, for example they are paid a money that is 1000 
soles or 800 soles, which in reality is not much to transport and they get caught" (Vrafim). 
The attraction of coca for the youth is twofold. Firstly, it is the financial attraction of coca and drug 
trafficking. Secondly, and maybe more importantly, youth are constantly exposed to drug trafficking 
and the illicit economy. During their childhood and youth, they can get easily connected to drug 
trafficking.  The Fiscal further explains:  
"So, why do you think these young people are participating in these illicit activities? 
"Because it is the only thing they have seen in their life, they have grown up in that world and maybe 
they have seen their father or grandfather do those things and they continue with that." (Vrafim: 59 - 
60) 
"An average man [in the VRAEM] is between 24 years old, sometimes with a complete primary or 4 
years of secondary school, who was a farmer and is now a transporter, but who never finished school 
the majority.” (Vrafim). 
As a young ex-trafficker explains: “look [when growing up] it was normal to see people selling drugs on 
the street. It was normal […] to see a friend of the same age driving a big car and everybody knew 
where the money was coming from. You get to the point when you want the same for yourself” 
(Srotram2). To understand the world these young men are born into, I will describe the “nightlife” in 
Santa Rosa in greater length. 
By measuring the levels of trust we can attempt to display the social relationships in the area 
(Gambetta 1990). Surprisingly, the numbers do not really differ when compared to when I asked “how 
much do you trust your neighbors?”. When asked why there is low trust in neighbors, some indicated 
that people are jealous if someone owns money and that “people are looking just after themselves”. 
Trust in the community and neighbors seems to be quite low. At the same time trust in the community 
is relatively low as well, which might be related to the fast-growing community, but also the conflict 
 
206 See a detailed description in the revista ideele: http://revistaideele.com/ideele/content/rescatados-del-vraem 
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might play a role in this regard (Bezan 2013). Low levels of trust are not untypical for postwar societies 
(e. g. recently De Juan and Pierskalla 2016) but in the case of the VRAEM evidence suggests that this 
can be also related to the illicit economy and incidences of “betrayals”, which is related to the activities 
of the anti-drug fight by the state. Mistrust in neighbors and the community also be because of the 
fear that people would cooperate with the police in the fight against drug trafficking and thereby 
betray their own community. In this regard, DIRANDRO indicates that they get useful intelligence about 
the drug business from the population itself. This has been confirmed by traffickers who indicate that 
people sell out their friends to the police because of money or because they envy the other’s success 
(Interviews Sroresm; Srotram2).  Hence, while the reference to coca seems to be a binding factor in 
society the illicit drug economy seems to have opposite results.  
                  Figure 18 Trust in Family and Neighbors VRAEM 
                   
  N=65 
Even if the system works for some, it results in misery for others. During a prison visit in Ayacucho, a 
young trafficker tells his story. In Ayacucho many of the drug traffickers from the VRAEM are 
incarcerated, in the heavily overcrowded prison. I visited the prison two times in 2016, when I talked 
to Carlos207. Carlos’ career as a drug trafficker was very short, caught at his first attempt to smuggle 20 
kg of cocaine. When he was caught, the police knew exactly where to look for the drugs in his car. He 
says that it was a set-up. Even if his life as a trafficker was very short, his story tells a lot about the 
system. He was initiated into it by “friends” who were all involved in smuggling and showed off their 
wealth. He wanted the same. One day he was asked directly if he wanted to do it. He accepted it even 
though he was scared. Two days later, he was ordered to drive and got caught at a police control point 
(in Machente). There are several stories like these, an anti-drug policeman tells me (Vrapolm). Often, 
young men are caught and used as pawns and they are in fact set-up and the police know exactly when 
they pass a control point and where to find the drugs. These captures produce good news for the police 
 
207 Name changed. 
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while on a parallel, a bigger transshipment of drugs passes uncontrolled. For Carlos, this set-up 
resulted in 12 years of prison in Ayacucho. 
7.4.5 One night in Santa Rosa 
A young former trafficker, Ruben208, agreed to show me the typical night out and the life of young 
traffickers. We start by going to a bar. Bar visits are popular during both night and day, especially on 
weekends. But during the night time the two discotheques are also busy places. At 7:30 PM, we are 
heading to one of the 22 bars near the center of Santa Rosa. These establishments are all to find on 
one street and for the foreign eye only difficult to distinguish from the other “normal” houses. No 
windows, no brick walls as most of the housing in Santa Rosa; just a wooden wall painted in green and 
a big “Pilsen” emblem, a famous Peruvian beer brand decorates the bar we are about to visit. 
A colorful, yet dirty sheet is covering the entrance. We enter and a big, simple room awaits us inside. 
Faint light from some light bulbs dimly illuminate the room. Small dirty tables with simple but solid bar 
stools stand in the room with no obvious order. The floor is tampered soil. The tiled urinal is on the 
right side, central of the bar with neither a door nor wall in front of it. Just besides the entrance there 
is a simple bar with one young woman behind the counter and two young women leaning against it, 
the waitresses. In various discussions, I was told that these bars all over the VRAEM employed minors 
younger than 18. Ruben tells me that they are not only waitresses, but also offer sexual services. When 
asked, Ruben told me that the “waitresses” are older than 18 – but I guessed that they could not be 
much older. 
Some tables are already occupied; all men. One bigger group of six and two groups of three men lower 
their voices when they recognized me and suspiciously watch us while we sit down. Ruben knows a 
group and briefly greets them with a smile. After we sit down on the left-hand side of the room, Ruben 
quietly tells me not to stare at the other table and not to look around because it would make the men 
nervous. “Que no hagas algo estupido” – Don´t do anything stupid, he tells me. I nod – not that I was 
planning to do something “stupid”. Ruben orders a big bottle of beer for both of us. “Is there anything 
else than beer one could order?” I ask him – “Sure, Whiskey, Pisco, Rum and Coca Cola to mix” “Nothing 
else? Non-alcoholic?” “No, my friend, people come here to drink.” Besides the national beer one could 
also get international beer (“Corona”). One of the young women brings the beer and asks Ruben where 
he has been so long. He replied that he had to work a lot. She opens the bottle at our table and we pay 
directly. 
After around fifteen minutes one of the men Ruben greeted beforehand stands up, comes to our table 
and shakes hand with my companion. He wears white white sneakers, jeans-shorts and a dark t-shirt 
 
208 Name changed. 
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and on his arms he wears a silver bracelet and a silver watch. He nods at me “Que tal?” “Que tal?”. 
After a short chat he lowers his had and whispers into Rubens ear, who shakes his head and says “No”. 
Now it is Ruben that whispers something while the other listens. After he finished, they look each other 
in the eye for a few seconds then the young man starts smiling greets again and leaves. “What was 
that about?” I want to know – Ruben explains that the young men said that he hopes Ruben will not 
sell him out, implying that I would be from the police. Ruben assured him that I am a scientist writing 
a book and that he has nothing to fear. I ask again if I would bring Ruben into trouble if they see us. He 
assures me that everything is alright, because he is well known and his family is well known and 
respected, that is why I would have nothing to fear as well. “I also have a lot of information from many 
of those guys, they will not risk anything.” he added but did not elaborate on that when I asked him 
what he meant by that.  
After we finished the beer, we go to one of the night clubs. Only a small group of five people are there 
in the first discotheque. Besides them two beer cases. Ruben says it is still too early and that this would 
be the reason why not many people are there. Ruben is annoyed by one person of the group who does 
not greet him. Instead, the whole group left ten minutes after we came into the club, without finishing 
the beer. “I knew him when he had nothing, now look at this. Not greeting. That´s lack of respect…”. I 
ask Ruben if that might be because of me. He answers that this is a possibility. We change over to the 
other club at around 9 pm. Here, many young people gathered in a very loud atmosphere. People 
order boxes of beer or bottles of whiskey. In front of the club are several motorcycles, one Toyota 
Hilux and one VW pick-up truck. Ruben says most of them are narcos. Some are trying to show off or 
to get the right contacts, as he describes it. We stay for two hours before I decided to go back to my 
hotel. 
The next day, a young man on his motorcycle stops me on the street, a young woman sitting behind 
him. He said he saw me in the club and wanted to say hello. Are you here for “la blanca”? For business?” 
He wants to know. “No, I am a scientist, I am writing a book”. “Everybody comes here for la blanca” he 
says as if he did not hear what I just said and continues by talking about some US-Americans, chemists 
who are able to produce the highest quality of cocaine. They came a couple of weeks ago, he says, 
that’s why he thought I was one of them.  
7.4.6 Conclusion: The Coca economy 
In the beginning of its colonization, the valley had a broad diversity of agricultural products. The local 
economy developed over time and shifted dramatically towards a coca-based economy during the 
conflict. It was a ‘lootable’ resource that supported the fight against the guerrilla. Moreover, after the 
conflict, due to the external demand for drugs, coca production resulted in an economic stability. This 
stability can also be observed in other post-conflict contexts (Andreas 2009; Snyder 2006). Even if 
 
 
222 
numbers for drug production are declining in recent years, Peru remains important in the international 
cocaine trade209 and the VRAEM is an essential region for drug production in the country. Today, the 
coca and drug economy is by far the most important driver of the local economy in the VRAEM. The 
coca economy also was an impetus for the formation of the valley, as people migrate into the valley 
because of the opportunities by coca.  
For our analysis, it is important to link the significance of coca in the local economy back to our 
theoretical argument on local order and state formation. The economy is an integral part of society, 
an arc that can bind together different social groups and makes a heterogeneous region more 
homogeneous (Ozlak 1981). The integration and extraction of various forms of economies is an integral 
part of classical state formation theories (Weber 2010; Moore 1966; Tilly 1985) and the extraction of 
resources plays a pivotal role that might also include the extraction of illicit resources (Baker and Milne 
eds. 2015; Meagher 2014). Coca and the illicit economy are a common ground in a socially quite diverse 
population in two ways: first, economically, as only possible income source; secondly, the coca 
economy seems to result in a common “identity”, which is defended against changes coming from the 
outside. While the political authority defines what is legal and illegal, in areas where this authority is 
contested or where it has restricted influence, this regulation of legality becomes more difficult 
(Mayntz 2017). In the VRAEM, with its historically low state presence, the economy is based on an illicit 
source. The drug production and trafficking already involves a high number of participants (especially 
young men). An even higher number of the society profits indirectly from the illicit economy, and we 
see an implicit connection between legal business and illegal drug trade. Hence, the discussion about 
the legality of the local business results in the justification of the economic behavior. Even if the 
majority understands that involvement in this illicit economy is legally wrong, they argue that morally 
it is not. Instead, because there is no economic alternative, there is a common understanding that the 
coca (and implicitly also the drug production) is a necessity. More precisely, it is understood by many 
as an evil necessity (“un mal necesario”).  While the economy is an integral part in the formation of the 
state, in the case of the VRAEM, the coca economy seems to be a bonding factor for society in the 
region. Similar results have also been found in other regions (Grisaffi 2010). At the same time, it is also 
the main reason for the refusal of state policies. People who accumulate more economic capital are 
mainly those involved in drug economy and/or in the consuming industries, which directly depend on 
the volatility of the prices of coca and the external demand.  
Although state presence increased in the last ten years, there are no substantial changes in the amount 
of coca and drug production in the valley. State policies that aim to change this economy without 
 
209 Latest reports suggest even a rise in production (La razon 2017) 
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providing a viable alternative are more likely to be perceived as an outsider’s interference which might 
increase local resistance instead of improving development. This “insider-outsider” situation seems to 
result in a strengthening of local bonds. In consequence, the coca economy resulted in an alienation 
towards the state and a strengthening of local economic structures. This alienation of the local coca 
economy from the legal economy proves to be a core problematic for integrating the VRAEM into the 
state since from side of the state more integration would lead to more agitation against the coca 
economy.  
Table 18 VRAEM Economy (focus Llochegua and Santa Rosa) 
Basis of the local economy involvement of population Relation of Legal and Illegal Economy  
Dependency on the coca and the illicit 
economy 
That includes practices directly 
connected to the coca and drug 
economy but also the majority of other 
businesses such as bars, hotels etc. 
High number of “consuming 
businesses” 
The majority is either directly or 
indirectly involved 
Wide acceptance of drug economy 
among the population 
In particular, young men are involved in 
drug production and trafficking 
 
Entanglement of legal and illegal practices 
Including the production process of drugs 
(which includes legal products) 
Including a combination of work: eg. a taxi 
driver that also transports drugs; or a salesman 
of agrichemicals who also imports products for 
drug production 
 
7.5 Security 
Besides coca and drug trafficking, the security situation is typically the single most discussed factor in 
the VRAEM. The area is perceived as being dangerous because of drug trafficking and the presence of 
the Clan Quispe Palomino. However, the first impression I got while driving into the region is quite 
contrary to its common image. The urban centers of Llochegua, Santa Rosa, and Pichari seem well 
structured and safe. People are waiting in the shadows, hiding from the burning sun, buying in the 
markets or driving in moto-taxis without any signs of rush or fear. Also, after sunset I got a similar 
impression. During interviews, the calm in the region is highlighted as well. These personal impressions 
serve as a first indication. The following analysis seeks to analyze the security in the region more 
closely. Official crime data is incomplete and therefore, the following is mainly based on qualitative 
data gathered in the region (interviews, questionnaires and participant observation). I will first present 
the local security perception before I will analyze the security structure including actors and the 
provision of security 
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7.5.1 Security Perception  
The perception of the security situation in the VRAEM is fundamentally different outside the region 
compared to the internal perception. Newspaper articles and reports typically portray the VRAEM as 
a very dangerous place and not only dominated by drug trafficking, but also by terrorists and violent 
gangs that would frequently kill people; especially those coming from outside. Before my research and 
subsequent stay in the region, I received various warnings and during several discussions with 
colleagues and friends, it became clear that most people assume the region is a very dangerous place. 
Most indicated that the only information they had on the region is from reports on drug trafficking and 
assaults of Sendero Luminoso on the police. But as it turned out, knowledge on the VRAEM did not go 
further. The image of the region is dominated by news on drug trafficking, the confiscation of drugs, 
destruction of laboratories, and violent confrontations of the police with remnants of the Sendero 
Luminoso. The public discourse on the VRAEM and the media coverage portraits the VRAEM as a 
dangerous place. However, while being in the region, I got another picture, which is unlike the violent 
portrait of the Valley. A common perception of people in the VRAEM is that “media and politicians” 
demonize the valley. When talking about the security situation within the VRAEM it was defended with 
the words: in the VRAEM “todo es tranquilo” (everything is calm) and often contrasted with the 
security situation in Lima: “Mira a Lima, es un infierno“ (Look at Lima it´s hell).210 
The analysis of the survey and the interviews show mixed results on security perception. Of those 
interviewees that talked about security, the majority mentioned incidents that pointed to security 
threats, but none felt personally insecure. Furthermore, the presence of state security actors does not 
translate into feelings of more security.  During the interviews in Santa Rosa and Llochegua of those 
talking about security 72% mentioned situations or experiences that described insecurity that 
happened within the last year while only 15.6% explicitly described secure situations. These insecure 
situations included assaults, domestic violence, bar fights or even killings. On the other hand, nobody 
said that they felt personally insecure or described situation of personal insecurity. Not everybody 
talked about the security situation in the region and some interview partners mentioned secure as well 
as insecure situations and instances. Therefore, a comparison with the survey helps to clarify the 
perception of security. Here, we find a similar pattern.  
 
210 Moreover, people interviewed and participants of the survey indicated the reports on the VRAEM would exaggerate the 
security situation. In fact, they perceive the security outside of their communities worse. Again, the argumentation might 
give an indication of a common identity of the local population against external definitions.   
 
 
225 
Figure 19 Security Perception VRAEM 
  
 
N=65 
Figure 20 Perception of Personal Safety 
 
 
 
Figure 19 shows the overall security perception in the communities. While 4 indicates an excellent 
security situation, 1 means the perception of a bad security situation. In the sample, people perceive 
the security as average, neither good nor bad. All three areas are located in the VRAEM and are defined 
as major drug production spots (DEVIDA 2015, Vrapol). In Santa Rosa as well as in Llochegua, the 
majority indicated that they felt personally safe in their communities (Figure 20). The average security 
perception on the other hand was on a medium level. Generally, security is related to petty crime such 
as robbery and bar fights and assaults that typically happen on the connecting roads between different 
villages. It is also often related to the police and their inability to provide for security. The other relation 
is drawn to drug trafficking and people from outside. 
"There is too much insecurity on the streets, the government must invest in security. In the 
VRAE there is a very important peculiarity, when one is not in the [drug] business, it only puts 
a little bench and nothing happens, that is to say there is honesty here in that sense you do 
not need a lock. But as the town grows, cameras are already used, you know that people 
come from other places and the town is growing and there are also thieves "(Vraperiom) 
This quote is emblematic not only for the VRAEM, but represents a national discourse that is 
dominated by the perception of insecurity, even though levels of actual victimization are relatively low 
(Mujíca et al. 2016; Latinobarometro 2015). Understanding that insecurity is a concept much broader 
than the mere presence or absence of crime, and that it is also determined by the perception of 
institutions and social factors (Dammert 2011; Dammert and Lunnecke 2002), the VRAEM could serve 
as an example in which the actual experience of insecurity is different to the perceived levels of 
security. 
The relationship towards coca and the illicit economy might be another factor that comes into play. 
When relating the interview data on security perception to the perception of the coca economy, we 
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find 28 persons in Santa Rosa, Llochegua that have talked about both aspects in the same interview. 
We find a correlation between those having a positive view on coca and those who identify positive 
personal security situations. On the other hand, there is a correlation between those who regard coca 
as a negative factor and those who perceive insecurity. However, in direct conversations, no incident 
of insecurity was mentioned that can be directly related to the drug trade. Even if the numbers to low 
to give a statistical significance, it can give an indication for our interpretation: It seems that there is a 
tendency that those who want to “sell” their positive view on coca tend to highlight the positive 
aspects of security and vice versa. In other words, people with a negative view on the coca economy 
tend to be more inclined to describe situations of insecurity.  
Another aspect for the perception of insecurity can be related to low levels of trust in state security 
institutions. In all areas, the police presence is mentioned frequently as the main reason for low results 
in security perception. These state institutions not only fail to prevent and punish crime, but they are 
also believed to curb the possibilities for castigation. Additionally, the perception on corruption and 
extortion can serve as an explanation for why this is the case. This relationship and perception to 
security actors will be evaluated in the following. 
 
7.5.2 Security actors 
The security sector in the VRAEM is a complex structure which involves different state and non-state 
actors. The analysis includes the security actors, their relationship towards society, their role in the 
illicit economy, and their relationship with the population.  
As in other parts of the country, particularly in Ayacucho, the violent history of the conflict is still 
omnipresent. The brutal fight between the guerrilla, the CADs and the military and the resulting grief 
of the local population is engraved in collective memory. These historical conditions have an effect on 
the perception (and acceptance) of security actors in the VRAEM today. here are four actors to be 
considered in the analysis: The autodefensas (CADs), the remnants of the guerrilla group Sendero 
Luminoso known as Clan Quispe Palomino, the police and finally the military.211 
Self-Defence Groups in VRAEM 
In the towns and smaller villages (centros poblados) in the VRAEM, the Comités de Autodefenas (CAD) 
are still omnipresent.212 Their historical importance is essential for the understanding of their present 
 
211 Serenazgo is another security actor in the VRAEM but will not be included into the analysis since they do have a role in 
the urban contexts but not for the overall security in the VRAEM. 
212 For a detailed analysis on self-defense groups in Peru see Del Pino 1996: 118; Fumerton 2002, 2004; Gorriti 1999; del 
Pino 1996 order under the DECAS Fumerton 2002: 142 
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role. Formed as self-defense forces first under the name of Defensa Civil Antisubversiva (DECAS), their 
importance and influence grew fast and lasted long.213 The involvement of the region in the conflict 
began around 1983, the same year the self-defense force was formed. Initially, the autodefensas acted 
as providers of security and defense against the guerrilla. Soon, they also provided security within the 
communities. Untill today, these self-defense groups are a source for order and security. As I have 
discussed earlier, their high legitimacy among the population stems from their historical role in times 
of political violence: “Also, the army and navy were support, but they did not fight like the 
autodefensas, they knew their zone and they were more effective therefore.” (Srojuezm). The 
autodefensas provided to a large extent also control within the communities often by using drastic 
punishments including corporal castigation or even death penalties. Income was provided by the coca 
economy and allowed the CADs to finance their fight against the guerrilla.  Even if the finances of the 
Autodefensas were based to a great extent on the illicit economy, most ex-commanders did not profit 
financially from the drug trade. On the contrary, most still live in modest conditions or died in despair. 
Today, members of the CADs are often coca farmers at the same time or related to somebody who 
relies on the coca economy. 
The CADs are an important part of the society and its members are elected from society. When asked 
for the most important actors in the community, the CADs were among the most frequent answers, 
alongside the Juez de Paz and the mayor. In part this is related to their role in the conflict, which led 
to a heroic memory of the self-defence group. Additionally, as I discussed above, the conflict led to the 
formation of villages and coincided often with the creation of self-defence groups (Zamora 2017). This 
historical and present role, feeds into the respect and legitimizing of the CADs.  
They themselves did not show an active attempt to gain more control of the drug trafficking economy 
or the competition for territory for sole economic gains, except few examples. On the contrary, the 
autodefensas are still trusted precisely because their prime aim was to provide security and stability 
during the time of conflict. A former leader of the Llochegua CADs, gave precise information on the 
weapons bought with the money but was very cautious to say that the CADs formed part of an alliance: 
“we sold to the person who wanted to buy the rest we were not interested in” (Llauex) The same 
argument was mentioned in other interviews as well. That is an important difference from the other 
drug production hot spot in Peru, the Alto Huallaga Valley (AHV). While in the AHV the alliance was 
between Senderos and drug traffickers, in the VRAEM the connection until recently was between the 
 
213 I will refer to them as autodefensas, self-defence forces or CADs. 
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CADs and drug traffickers (see also Zech 2015).214 They officially cooperate with the military to achieve 
that stability and not for political or private economic gains from drug trafficking as seen for example 
in Colombia (Romero 2003; Chernick 2008).  
While this actor is by law more closely related to the military it provides also “police-like” services. 
Most of the security tasks within the community are taken up by the autodefensas.  Notwithstanding 
their importance for the pacification of the region, today their influence is shrinking. One person even 
told me “the autodefensas are deactivated” (Strpopm3). But even if their influence is not the same as 
it was before, the autodefensas are still seen as the predominant providers of security, even if they 
are cooperating with the local police forces.   
 “Narcoguerrilla” 
After the capture of Abimael Guzmán in 1992 Sendero Luminoso was substantially weakened and in 
1993 the guerrilla split into two groups, the “Acuerdistas” and the “Proseguir o Sendero Rojo”. The 
latter neglected the peace agreement by Guzmán and continued the fight led by Óscar Ramírez Durand 
alias Camarada Feliciano. They pulled back deeper in the jungle regions of the VREAM. However, by 
the end of the decade Sendero Luminoso in the VRAEM was very weak and in 1999 the leader of the 
Ayacucho fraction, Feliciano, was captured. The Quispe Palomino brothers took his place which is seen 
as the beginning of a new form of Sendero Luminoso – Victor Quispe Palomino as the self-defined 
successor of Abimael Guzmán. (Díaz 2015: 134). This new form of the guerrilla group got more involved 
into drug trafficking and some analysts claim that drug trafficking would be their only goal calling them 
“narcosenderistas” or “narcoterroristas”.215  
Today, Sendero Luminoso in the VRAEM is basically an armed shield for diverse drug trafficker in the 
region. A main drug trafficking route goes through a territory controlled by the Quispe Palomino, 
Vizcatán. Additionally, the group taxes traffickers of natural resources or illegal logging. They still keep 
an ideological façade; however, several intelligence sources doubt that this is just a pretext to lure 
peasants into their forces and get their support (Díaz 2015: 138). Strategically the group tries to win 
the support by the population by aiding for harvesting coca for example (interview police and local 
population). Notwithstanding from the discussion on ideology, remnants of Sendero Luminoso in the 
VRAEM might be small in numbers today (estimated 150 – 200 fighters), but they still have the capacity 
 
214 The case of Huayhuaco gave some insights on early development of the symbiosis from CADs and drug trafficking (Gorriti 
2009). During interviews with present and former commanders of the CADs, business with narcotraficantes was never denied.  
215 Already in 2005 their relationship towards the illicit drug trade became visible with an attack on the police in Palmapampa 
by which five police men lost their lives. The attack happened just one month after the installation of an anti-drug base in 
Palmapampa in November that year. Another connection of that attack with the drug trade was that Pablo Curo Gamarra, a 
renowned trafficker, was in that convoy (Zapata et al 2008: 202). 
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for territorial control in the remote region of Vizcatán and can orchestrate isolated attacks outside of 
the region of Vizcatan. They target state actors and institutions, as exhibited only shortly before the 
first round of the presidential elections in 2016.  In 2016 and 2017 several attacks on the police, for 
example in March in Cumunpiari close to Santa Rosa, are examples of their capacities.216 Only in 2017 
there have been six attacks on security forces by the remnants of Sendero Luminoso in the VRAEM 
(Caretas 2017b) These attacks are assumed to be a reaction on anti-drug operations that took place 
beforehand (Interview LAnt).  
The Clan Quispe Palomino does not have major support in the districts analyzed, nor are they feared 
or fought. During three armed attacks on the police that happened in the valley during the time of 
research, the population stayed calm and seemed not to be worried. There are also hints of acceptance 
of these actions. For the attack in Cumunpiari, the attackers lay in wait in a coca field beside a road. 
Since it is the only road between the centers of Santa Rosa and Palmapampa, it is frequently used not 
only by the police but also by the local population. Moreover, they attacked from an agriculture field, 
which leads the police to the assumption that peasants must have known about the planned attack 
(Vrapold). Two weeks later, I visited the area close to the attack and there was no sign of fear, anger 
or support among the population. It rather seemed that they were indifferent to what just happened. 
One taxi driver told me: “They [Sendero Luminoso] are fighting the police they are dangerous but not 
for us. We do not want to get involved.” (Vrataxm). It seems like a bizarre development: Today, the 
population do not show any fear but some analysts and police officials assume that the group received 
support from the population because they promised to protect drug production for the remnants of 
the group that terrorized the region in the 1980 (Vrapold).  
State Security Actors 
The state of emergency gives the military more authority, but the police have the closest relationship 
to the population.217 The police follows a plan for fighting drug trafficking that is organized through the 
Procedural Manual (MAPRO) and the annual Antidrug Plan of the Dirección Antidrogas. In addition to 
this, decentralized police stations develop their own operational plans based on the National Anti-Drug 
Strategy, while there is only one Anti-Drug base in the VRAEM (Rojas 2016: 69). The police in the valley 
 
216 La Republica 2017a http://larepublica.pe/politica/857315-tres-policias-mueren-en-ataque-terrorista-en-el-vraem); La 
Republica 2017b http://larepublica.pe/sociedad/881394-dos-policias-mueren-tras-emboscada-terrorista-en-el-vraem; 
http://cdn.elcomercio.e3.pe/peru/vraem/sangrientas-emboscadas-narcoterroristas-ano-427665) 
217 Work of government entities in these areas can become dangerous especially for state security actors, who are seen as a 
primary target of Sendero Luminoso. Several reports of attacks or threatening of government officials may serve as an 
example for this. When asked if he would not fear severe consequences, an attorney who works on drug related cases 
replied: “Of course I am afraid, it´s messed up. That´s why I will change the fiscalia here in Ayacucho but not as an anti-drug 
fiscal anymore (Vrafim). 
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needs to fulfill the difficult task of fighting the local economy and be a provider of security for the 
population. 
In Santa Rosa the police station is located in a street parallel to the main square. Upon knocking, a 
heavy iron gate opens a few centimeters. A young police man armed with a machine gun observes me 
critically. The entrance is only possible after presenting my ID and a paper that shows my affiliation to 
a research institute. Similarly, in Llochegua, the police are very cautious. The new police station resides 
outside the center from Llochegua and it takes around 10 minutes to get there by “mototaxi”. It 
resembles a military fort rather than a police station. It is surrounded by high walls and guarded by 
heavily armed policemen on small watchtowers, who eagerly observe every step made by the people 
approaching the police station. In a way, the police station is symbolic to what people told me when 
talking about the police, that they are unapproachable and not interested in cooperation with the 
population. 
On the drug economy, a leading police man in Llochegua says that he understands the necessity of 
getting involved in the illicit economy, but he also highlights how state security actors would diminish 
the illicit economy:  
 “(…) For example, before there was no military base, and people came to the village [of 
Llochegua] and sold their coca, they did whatever they wanted to do. But when the military 
came this vanished and since the police arrived you will not find anything. Only in the areas 
where remnants of Sendero Luminoso are, there is illicit production, or they rent their services 
to the drug trafficking for some money.” (Llpolm1) 
The assessment of the illicit economy by the policeman seems to underestimate the extent of the illicit 
economy (as I elaborated above) and he seems to overestimate the influence of the police at the same 
time. But still, his statement gives an example on the self-perception of the police´s ability in the 
VRAEM to decrease drug trafficking. 
The military arrived in the VRAEM in 1983 to fight Sendero Luminoso. Right from the start of their 
engagement in the valley, they coordinated (with) the autodefensas. Until today, their primary role is 
the fight against insurgents, the remnants of Sendero Luminoso. At the same time, they are supporting 
the fight against drug trafficking in cooperation with the police. Because of the particular situation in 
the VRAEM, police and military are connected in the Comando Especial VRAEM (CE-VRAEM) to 
coordinate operations based on the Law 2991. Still, the presence of the Clan Quispe Palomino is also 
a reason for the high militarization of the VRAEM. While under the Toledo administration, 
confrontations and counterinsurgency operations were sporadic, it changed with the government of 
Alan Garcia. In August 2008, the operation Excelencia 777 began and government forces were able to 
push the group out of Vizcatán and Bidón. Even if the initial operations showed military success, 
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government forces suffered severe setbacks and even lost a helicopter in September 2009.  Later they 
had to withdraw and Sendero Luminoso regained control on Vizcatán and Bidón (IDL-R 2015). Since 
2012, military operations follow a different strategy that relies more on cooperating with police and 
police intelligence. But they could not ultimately defeat Sendero Luminoso.218 
The main focus on fighting the Clan Quispe Palomino includes less interference from the local 
population. But besides coercive power, the military is also perceived rather positively. This is related 
to the fight against the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla and their cooperation with the CADs. Similarly, in 
the military, there are several reports of members of the military involved in drug trafficking (eg. El 
Comercio 2015; Lexp1), which is recognized by the local population: 
"Now that there are some helicopters that are used for the transfer of drugs, because not all the 
police are correct, not all of the soldiers are correct and here there are many bases (…)" 
(Llauexp2) 
 
7.5.3 Trust in Security Actors 
Diagram 21 presents a comparison of security institutions in the VRAEM. The autodefensas enjoy 
higher trust than the police or military. The higher the number, the higher the trust in the particular 
institution. Particularly in the VRAEM region, non-state actors are seen as the main providers of 
security. This perception is closely related to the experience in the internal conflict as autodefensas in 
the VRAEM and their role in pushing Sendero Luminoso back (Degregori 1996; CVR 2003; Zech 2014). 
Not only did they fight against the guerrilla, they also controlled the district centers and society rules 
during and after the conflict. These rules are still very important for society. The autodefensas are still 
perceived as an essential factor for local order and enjoy high levels of trust. Besides their present and 
historical role, a defining factor of their importance are statements like:  
“Who plays a very important role is the self-defense committee to give security to the entire 
population, there is a central self-defense committee and the fencing of the town of Llochegua, 
they are there 24 hours a day, when there are problems they leave, when there are assaults 
they leave, they handle weapons allowed by the state, simple but they are more effective than 
the policemen.” (Lljuezm) 
Nevertheless, the influence of autodefensas in the sector of security provision is decreasing, because 
of the presence of state security forces, especially the police. This affects the role the CADs can play in 
providing security and thus they cannot use force as before. Their activities are restricted since they 
now have to cooperate with the police and acts of corporal punishments are officially forbidden. But 
 
218 In November 2017, the congress decided the military should take a more active role in the interdiction of drug trafficking 
in the VRAEM (Peru21 2017b). 
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they still enjoy the highest levels of trust among security actors, reflecting their close connection to 
the population.  
Figure 21 Trust in Security Institutions (Santa Rosa, Llochegua, Cumunpiari) 
 
                                              N=65       
 
In the case of the military, perceptions are mixed. While the military mentioned their role in providing 
assistance to the population in terms of provision of health or construction of roads, this assistance is 
not perceived as such. While people acknowledge their role in the fight against the guerrilla during the 
conflict in the late 1980s and 1990s, they still feel that the military’s role in committing atrocities during 
the fight against Sendero Luminoso was ambiguous and is seen in connection to the drug trade.  
In the survey, the police have the lowest level of trust, which is supported by most interview partners. 
There are two expressions frequently used to describe the police. One is that they are seen as corrupt 
or unreliable, and the second claims that the police would only leave their base if they are hopeful of 
finding drugs. A major difference between the autodefensas and the police is that the former do not 
interfere with the local illicit economy, while the police target precisely that. In the perception of the 
local community, this becomes a problem since most people see the police primarily as an anti-drug 
unit. That is related to the negative perception and also because of the feeling that people would suffer 
if anti-coca and anti-drug campaigns took off.  
"Well we have a police station, we can say that it is not meeting expectations. Sometimes they 
come but they are more inside their establishment, rarely go out. In some meetings the 
community has told you very clearly that the police are not very useful here because they do 
not comply as should be (...)"(Lljuezm) 
"Look, I'm going to be honest, people here hate the police because they do not intervene when 
there are problems of robbery, but they intervene in drug trafficking issues and people live on 
that." (Llpopm2) 
There is even the perception that the presence of state security actors serves criminals rather than the 
security provision. Police presence was related to the increasing incapacity to punish wrongdoings.  
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"We do not have confidence in the police. Since I entered as president [of the CADs], I have 
already arrested two with a gun, with a pistol, and I hand them over to the police with their 
documents, four days later they are already free in the streets."(Sroaupm) 
During a conversation on crime and reaction on crime, a taxi driver gave another emblematic answer:  
"We do not trust the police. For example, if there is a robbery. You report allegations to the 
police. They ask everything, but if there is no witness they try to talk and from there they let 
them go. Nothing happens. There is no justice. (...) that's why sometimes it's better if you're 
among friends and you catch the rat [the delinquent], and you hit him very hard." 
(Llpopulcarro). 
Some specified: “the police do not leave” (Ll20). “They are in their base they do not leave. They don´t 
have dignity, they are corrupt (StR9). During my research in Llochegua and Santa Rosa, I did not see 
police patrolling on the street and heard constant complaints about police inaction. Hence, the 
population sees the police critical and as a threat to the local (illicit) economy. They are mostly seen in 
relation to corruption or that they only leave their base if they are getting a hint of finding drugs.  
"Now all that is corruption, as I said you can denounce but the police release him for money 
and in the end,  they send their hit men to kill me." (Llexalm) 
There are different police entities in the VRAEM but all follow the premise of fighting drug trafficking. 
The role of the police is ambiguous. While their primary role is to fight drug trafficking and several 
reports suggests that parts of the police are involved in the illicit economy, which includes a passive 
involvement, by not controlling or receiving corruption money (Rojas 2016). This claim is supported by 
other inhabitants and a public prosecutor.  
"A member of my staff [shop], a boy of school age, so I had a facility to get a scholarship from the 
regional government and gave scholarships to the police, this boy entered the police as a 
subordinate and they are receiving orders, then two people dressed as policemen, with police 
pants and other shirts and said they were carrying food and went to the pilot, but it was known 
that they were moving other things "- Drugs? "Yes Drugs" (Llauexp2) 
 
An anti-drug prosecutor for the valley describes: "There is a case, especially of young officers who 
rented their arms to backpackers. In the issue related to the police being involved in illicit drug 
trafficking is that I tell you that the police lent their armament to backpackers to transfer drugs 
that is the case here in Ayacucho, but at the national level there are coronels, commanders who 
are involved "- In the VRAEM I have been told that the police are the best drug trafficker" Sure, 
for example in the police they are paid quotas, that is the sad truth, I've seen ugly cases of known 
people involved, see them at trial and then arrested”(Vrafim) 
Antonio Cardenas, a well-respected figure from the CADs implies this when he talks about how the 
police is dissatisfied with efforts of the CADs to fight drug trafficking:  
"What happened is that an order came from the Peruvian state the police are going to 
control. They never told us to help, and if we help them with information, they tell the drug 
traffickers that we have been, then they fail us, they sell us. Then how do you think we will 
support if the police sell you for 500, or 1000 soles. "(Cardenas Sroaulm) 
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Based on the analysis, trust in security actors seems to be defined by four aspects 1) the (perceived) 
relationship towards the coca and drug economy, 2) the ability to provide safety 3) honesty and 4) the 
relationship towards society, which is related to the historic evolution of the security actors within the 
region.  
7.5.4 Provision of Security  
The provision of security is determined by the CADs and the police. The CADs are still an essential actor 
for the provision of security. During the conflict, it became necessary to coordinate among the 
population with regard to security because of the aggrupation of the population and the need for 
organization. The CADs took over this task. The Juez de Paz of Llochegua reckons that the CADs are still 
key factor for security provision:  
"The self-defense committee is basically the shield of the population, it has a history well-known 
nationally and internationally, it has been the one that has achieved pacification, isn´t it like 
this? In these very dangerous zones, the self-defense committee was always in front of the 
armed forces, they always went. Today no longer against terrorism but self-defense and the 
fight against common crime, which prevails in this area, that is good and helpful and the self-
defense committee will always be valued for that"(Lledujoum) 
When asked “Who would you turn to when you experience violence?” the majority indicated in the 
survey that they seek the help of CADs (27%) while 5,3% go to the CADs and community leaders. But 
also, many would turn to the police when experiencing a form of violence (Figure 22). Survey samples 
indicate that 20% go to the police and 8% go to the police and family when experiencing violence. 
Interestingly, only 4% mentioned that they would go to the police and the CADs, so we can assume 
that it is mostly an either-or-decision between these two actors.  
Hence, this sample indicates that two institutions dominate the security sector in the valley, the police 
and the CADs. For the CADs the relatively high numbers can also be supported by the high levels of 
trust to this actor. But this is different to the police. As described above that the police is associated 
with low levels of accountability and misbehavior and the levels of trust are the lowest in the sample.219 
It is not entirely clear why people even turn to the police when most do not trust them and find that 
they are not helpful in cases of emergency. It seems that there are two possibilities for this 
“inconsistency”. It might be a sign of social desirability in the answers for the survey. But against this 
first assumption stand the high numbers of negative answers concerning trust in the police. We can 
assume that if Social desirability is driving than the answers that the numbers in trust for the police 
 
219 A high-ranking anti-drug police official reckons: “Yes, there was a change with the arrival of the new boss has been 
inspected. Before here it was no man's land, one came and fulfilled his work to fulfill, was dedicated to take and create 
problem in the population, but that from 2014 has changed, so far for example there has been no case of drunkenness 
within the population. 
” (Palmpoldim)  
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would be also higher, which they are not. Therefore, a second reading seems to be more likely. We see 
that a high number of respondents would go to local institutions such as autodefensas (27%), 
community leaders (15%) or both (5,3%). What became clear during the interviews was that 
community leaders are working mainly with the CADs and functioning more as a sort of broker for 
security provision. On the other hand, stands the state security structure of the police. Following from 
this we can assume: 1. We have a hybrid security structure with traditional and non-traditional security 
actors and no unambiguous solution in case of violence 2. The autodefensas lost influence - because 
of the presence of the police they are not as effective as before the arrival of state security actors; 3. 
People are turning either to the CADs or the police, but seldomly to both. 
Figure 22: Who do you turn to when experiencing violence? in % 
220 
     N = 65 
 
During a talk, a leading policeman in Llochegua mentioned violence within families as the most 
important challenge in the region and also summarizes the difficulty of giving exact numbers on crime 
rates in the region:  
“There are weeks in which we have 10 to 15 cases of domestic violence (…) of the center of 
Llochegua which have the majority of the population, because I believe if we would go around 
and patrol for every little village I am sure that the index of domestic violence would be a lot 
higher.” (Llpolm1)  
For solving cases of domestic violence, the police work together with the municipality here and 
another in Sivia, where lawyers are able to get involved. In other cases, they would intervene directly. 
This includes robbery, assaults, and violence. Only a few people are incarcerated in Llochegua because 
of lack of facilities. Mostly, they are transported to San Francisco during daytime.  The police 
commander adds: “our capacities are restricted and we cannot pay attention to all of the cases.” 
 
220 For the complete list see Annex 
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(Llpocm1). Following his remarks, by the time of research there are only 13 policemen in the base, 
which would not be enough to react on all crimes reported. Therefore, he acknowledges the presence 
of the autodefensas as an important aspect that could get active where the capacities of the police are 
not enough. 
However, in practice the cooperation of state and non-state actors does not work entirely. Most of the 
patrolling and control of the bar area is in fact is being realized by the CADs. However, they see 
themselves subordinated under state security organs. What can be handled by the CADs themselves 
and what not was defined by the president of the autodefensas: “Once there are severe incidents we 
hand it over to the police all other cases we handle ourselves. We are working closely with the police” 
(Llcadp). An example for a severe incident would be murder as the president of the CADs in Llochegua 
mentions. Moreover, police commanders in Santa Rosa and Llochegua affirms to working together 
with the CADS in severe cases. But several interview partners indicate that the police do not leave their 
bases and would not be reachable. There is a predominant perception of low integration of police in 
the area even though their presence is growing. 
In Santa Rosa I was told by the police that from 2014 on, the police had joint patrols with the 
autodefensas on a regular basis. During an interview, the police comander acknowledges the help of 
the autodefensas because of their capacity for patrolling and also because of restrictions for the police 
to control the whole area. Police officials mention lack of manpower and structural problems. For 
example, at the time of research, there was only one vehicle in Santa Rosa to control the whole district 
(373 sqkm) and only one police station. In an area where infrastructure is weak and some smaller 
centros poblados, which are basically villages, are difficult to access, these restricted capacities of the 
police weakens territorial control. In these areas, people depend on the work by the CADs. For 
example, the police is not working with the CADs on cases that involve drug trafficking: “We [the police] 
work together with the CADs but not in cases that involve coca or drug trafficking, because the CADs 
might be involved or they do not want to act against their own people” (Sivpolco), says a police officer 
in the VRAEM. It even happened that CADs blocked the road so that no police vehicle could pass, 
allegedly at times when PBC is sold.221  
 
221 A major change in the tactics has occurred in August 2017. A new Juez de Paz was elected and also a new President of 
the CAD. These new authorities have been looking for closer cooperation with the police. This includes frequent reunions 
and closer cooperation in decision making. While there was no time to include these changes into the analysis, I have been 
able to contact the new President of the CAD. His plan was to regain strength for the CAD in cooperation with the police 
(Straupm2). How these changes are reflected in the local structure cannot be included in this study because of time 
restraints.  
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A similar approach of cooperation is officially applied in Llochegua as well. But an incident in Llochegua 
during fieldwork provides another example on this “imperfect” cooperation. On the dia de la madre 
(mothers day), CADs and Serenazgo222 were patrolling in Llochegua. The central market place and the 
city centre was full of people. The atmosphere was loud and amicable. The CADs were mainly visible 
and armed with pump guns. They were walking slowly in the heat of the day, in the middle of the 
crowd, talking to people or watching the women’s soccer tournament which takes place during the 
day. No policemen are seen at this moment “But we are in contact with them if something happens“, 
says the president of the CADs. At night, a party with live music plays out besides the center of 
Llochegua. A regionally known band is invited (the next day the nationally known band Papillon was to 
play). Ten members of the CADs and the president of the ”urban” CADs are responsible for security. 
The ten members are in part, very young 17 or 18 years olds. The president sits in front of the CADs 
office located right next to the main plaza. In one hand, he holds a cell phone and a rifle in the other 
hand. During the evening around 9:30pm, while the band is playing, the president gets a phone call. A 
woman on the other side of the line reports a fight in one of the bars in the area nearby. She describes 
that men are getting aggressive and that they have broken chairs and glasses. While the CADs 
president listens calmly, she asks him to send some of the autodefensas in order to ease the situation. 
The president apologizes and explains that he does not have enough men to guard the concert and to 
send to the bar area at the same time. He suggests that she should take names and go to the Juez de 
Paz the next day to report what happened. He apologizes again before he hangs up. After a minute, I 
ask him why he does not call Serenazgo or the police. He answers, ”Serenazgo does not have the 
capacity“. ”And the police?“ I asked. After a second, he nods, picks up the phone and calls the 
commander of the local police station. Nobody picks up. He dials again. After three attempts, he gives 
up. Does this happen frequently? I want to know. – ”They are not always available“ the president 
answers, adding that he was sure that they will be on patrol anyway. Only half an hour earlier he had 
told me that the police does not usually go into the bar areas. Even though cooperation is highlighted 
by various actors, in reality this cooperation proves to be difficult to implement.  
  
 
222 Serenazgos is an urban security provider created in the 1980s when the fight agains Sendero Luminos bound many 
resources and created the necessity for alternative security services. In the VRAEM they are paid by the state and unarmed 
in contrast to the CADs. 
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Table 19 Security Actors in Santa Rosa and Llochegua 
Security actor Function Collaboration with 
state institutions 
Relationship to illicit 
economy 
Trust by 
population 
CADs Securing local order, patrolling, 
defence force against Sendero 
Luminoso 
Yes, partly Financial basis during 
war 
Supportive or neutral 
today 
High 
Police Maintaining local order, leading 
fight against drug trafficking, 
providing and securing state 
monopoly of violence 
Yes Fighting against illicit 
economy 
Low 
Military Fight against Quispe Palomino, 
building and securing state 
monopoly of violence 
Yes Supporting the fight 
against illicit economy 
Medium 
Little contact 
Quispe Palomino Revolutionary Force/ Drug 
trafficker 
No, confrontation Drug trafficking is 
financial basis. 
Support for drug 
trafficker 
Low 
Serenazgo (Less 
influential) 
Supporting the provision of 
security in urban centres 
Yes Neutral Medium 
 
7.5.5 Corruption and Drug Trafficking  
A crucial factor besides the interference in drug trafficking, that affects the perception on state security 
actors is corruption, in particular by the police. After poverty, corruption is the second most important 
concern for the people of the valley (Leyva and Mendoza 2017). We can roughly distinguish two types 
of police corruption in the VRAEM: Small scale and large-scale corruption. 
The first one involves the payment of small amounts of money. When travelling into the valley on the 
only land road from Ayacucho drivers are paying between two to four Soles at every police control. 
There are four control points when entering the valley. I asked drivers on their opinion to this practice 
and one emblematic answer was: “They shouldn´t do it but we accept it. We are paying to keep a good 
relationship. If not, they [the police] make your life more difficult.” (Vrataxm). Usually cars are not 
searched thoroughly once a “coima” is paid (a small bribe). It shows a well-trained routine. With no 
questions asked, the money is usually passed through, along with papers of the car, even if there is no 
obvious reason for doing it. These coimas are barely hidden, openly visible and accepted by everybody. 
I witnessed this procedure three out of four times when driving into the valley and back. The only time 
when the driver did not pay a “coima” he had to step out of the car, explain why one of his front light 
did not work properly – which it did. The conversation with the police officer lasts four minutes when 
a higher-ranking official entered the scene and resolved the discussion. When the driver entered the 
vehicle again he reckoned that all of this happened “because he [the police officer] did not receive his 
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tip [su propina]” (Vrataxm2). Asked why he did not pay he replied “no tengo monedas” (I do not have 
any coins) pointing on the ashtray where taxi drivers in the VRAEM usually keep their coins for change.  
Another type of police corruption is directly connected to the drug trade. Traffickers pay larger sums 
for securing their shipments, getting information, or avoiding prison sentences. In an interview, one 
trafficker told me that he paid 10,000 Soles (around 3,000 USD) to avoid a 10-year prison sentence. 
(Lltrafm). During a talk, a young ex-trafficker told me that controls by the police could be prevented by 
paying 200 Soles (around 61 USD) (Srdrugex). It should be highlighted that participation in these 
activities are personal decisions by police officers and during the study no evidence was found to 
support the claim as institutional involvement of ties are personal decisions by police officers and 
during the study no to the contrary by the population and even by state agents. Within the illicit chain 
of drug production and trafficking, there are several risk factors for corruption, including the evasion 
of control, falsification of papers for licit production of coca, and the evasion of seizing chemicals used 
for drug production. On the other hand, as Rojas tells us, the institutional control mechanisms are 
poorly implemented (Rojas 2016).223 Hence, there is a high possibility that there are more corruption 
cases than those that became known: including the interception of drugs and reporting less than the 
intercepted amount while selling or the “renting of arms” to drug traffickers. 
A leader of the self-defence force of Pichiwilka mentions: "For example, many of the police are 
joining with the snitches (informants) to share the profits. The police find 200 kilos of drugs and 
distribute it, for the police 100 and for the informants 100. Then how can we´re going to talk about 
a real fight against the drug trafficker. So here in the VRAE the police are seen as delinquents, there 
is no respect for them." (Interview Cardenas Sroaulm). 
A high-ranking police official explains that there would be no interest in solving corruption cases even 
if there was proof for the same:  
"There is evidence but those are sensitive cases, at least we have issued reports of the 
irregularities that we have found to our commands, to pass them to the prosecution and the 
fiscalía who are responsible for such cases. But in 2014, 2015 of these alleged irregularities 
there is no action. So, from the part of the police and fiscal authorities there is no interest to 
resolve the cases. 
Are the police not interested in resolving these cases of corruption? 
Well the boss verifies those cases and controls them and informed the command. There have 
also been some irregularities in the prosecutor's offices, but apparently everything remains the 
same." (Palmpoldim) 
On police corruption I received several remarks from the population: One answer of a mechanic from 
Llochegua is emblematic in this regard:  
"Look here that there are two types of people in the VRAE who live directly from drug trafficking 
and who live indirectly from drug trafficking. There is nothing like “I work for the state or in the 
private sector”, that is the reality there is. For example, to say I am a drug trafficker and they 
 
223 On the internal mechanisms and effectivity of evading and fighting corruption within the police see Rojas 2016. 
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take me extort me for a while, scared me, charge me and then release me. And so, they do to 
several people. They know whom to catch. They have not come to put order, they have come 
to steal. That is known throughout the VRAE that with that the police create disorder, people 
know that. "(Llopopm) 
 "The majority is located in the coca plantation and sells it to anyone who buys it. Obviously, 
they are drug traffickers. The police sometimes take advantage of that and pay it off with their 
coca. And also they say this is corruption. These are corruption payments."(Llgobm) 
The second form of corruption can be detected for the military as well, that includes accusations of 
paying for their posts in the VRAEM because of possibilities to earn money (interview Lexp1). Several 
cases of military officials involved in drug trafficking in the VRAEM suggest that this might be a bigger 
problem (e.g. La Republica 2016a, b). This includes direct support to a trafficking operation, and even 
using military helicopters for drug trafficking (Caretas 2016; La Republica 2015; El Comercio 2016). 
7.5.6 Conclusion Security 
In this chapter I have analyzed the security perception, the security structure and the influence of the 
illicit economy. The analysis has shown an ambiguous situation in many ways. We do not see a clear 
domination of state or non-state actors, or an unequivocal perception of the security situation. 
However, I presented evidence for an influence of the illicit – directly and indirectly. Furthermore, the 
chapter has shown that the state intervention had an influence on the former security structure, which 
changed mainly due to the decreasing scope for action for the CADs. 
The security perception in the VRAEM shows that the opinion of personal security is on a medium 
level. Often people refer the bar areas and alcoholism as reasons for violence.  Paradoxically, a second 
theme when people talk about violent or insecure situations is mostly in relation to the police, their 
inability of preventing wrong doing and the curbing of possibilities for the CADs. Hence, the security 
perception is closely related to the role of the police and autodefensa, while there is no force can 
effectively challenge the state. Even if reports are dominated by the remnants of the guerrilla force, 
the “Clan Quispe Palomino”, their operational reach is limited and they are not able to effectively 
weaken the state security structure in the region – in particular not, in the focus regions of this study.224  
The police, as the most visible part of state presence, are restricted in their work by their role towards 
the illicit economy. Their role of mainly fighting the illicit economy does not leave enough resources 
for going after petty crime. The fight against the illicit economy seems to predefine their role within 
the society as an “outsider” that interferes with the local economic structure. Trust towards this actor 
 
224 Following the definition by Guistozzi we can hold that the state is able to maintain „monopoly of large scale violence“ 
(Guistozzi 2011: 7-10). 
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is not only low because they seem to be little responsive to the criminal behavior such as robbery or 
sexual assaults, but also because of their role in fighting drug trafficking. Instead of being perceived as 
a provider of security, people associate the police presence with corruption, misuse of power, and 
distrust. Corruption seems to be widespread in the VRAEM and instead of paying for services, people 
pay for avoidance of penalties like incarceration because of drug offenses or demanding a fine etc. 
Corruption has severe consequences for the perception and social acceptance of state officials and it 
not only influences the trust in these actors but also in institutions. This further undermines the role 
of the police. State security structures are not entirely accepted by the population because of their 
coercive measures and arbitrariness. Additionally, the lack of shared beliefs in the application of rules 
also lowers the legitimacy of the police (see also Tyler 2004).  
The CADs are the de facto providers of security in Llochegua and Santa Rosa, since the police only 
seldom patrol the area. That must not lead necessarily to a conflict in the relationship towards the 
state and state security actors, since the autodefensas are a formalized force that is already working 
in coordination with state security actors. In this sense, actions by the CADs in the VRAEM might be 
seen as a delegation of coercive power by the state which first helped in fighting insurgents and now 
is an auxiliary force to provide order; an arrangement that can also be observed in other contexts and 
might also strengthen the reach of the state (Jentzsch et al. 2015). However, the cooperation between 
state security forces, especially between the police and the autodefensas is deficient in terms of 
coordination and trust. In part, this is because of the relationship of the CADs to coca and to the illicit 
economy. In their historic evolution and current role, the CADs have a strong relationship with society. 
In fact, they can be seen as an active part of society composed by the very inhabitants of the region. 
While, the autodefensas still have an important role, the increasing presence of state security actors 
initially led to shock waves in the local security structure and curbed the “operational” activities of the 
CADs. Evidence suggests that this has contributed to a perception of general insecurity and a 
perception of increasing petty crime.225  
Coca and the coca economy have an indirect influence on security provision. The CADs are supportive 
of the coca economy and, at least implicitly, of the illicit economy. Some expressions by the 
autodefensas also suggest that they would support a potential fight against eradication, which is 
shared by the assessment of some state officials. Even if the relationship between the autodefensas 
and the police has improved in recent years (e.g. no more roadblocks against the police), it is still 
 
225 Similar changes can be observed in other post-war scenarios, in which increasing state presence led to an increase in 
insecurity, since they could not guarantee for safety (eg. Nussio and Howe 2014; Kurtenbach 2011). 
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fragile. A particular challenge is the historical and present relationship of the CADs with the local coca 
economy.  
Finally, the analysis has shown that the security situation is closely related to the coca economy, the 
illicit economy and the rationale of different security actors in the region. Both define the relationship 
towards society. The rationale for state security actors was and still is the fight against insurgents; in 
the case of the military and police it’s the fight against drug trafficking. While the role of the military 
is respected by most of the population, the police-society relationship is still dominated by skepticism. 
Corruption cases, unreliability and the focus on fighting drug trafficking makes it a problematic rather 
than a cooperative relationship. The police, as the state security actor closest to the population, might 
actually hinder a closer state-society relationship. The predominant task for state security actors is the 
fight against drug trafficking and the involvement in the fight against Sendero Luminoso. This does not 
only restrict their capacities for implementing other rules, but also results in the perception that they 
are primarily fighting against the local economy. 
Table 20 Security VRAEM (focus Llochegua and Santa Rosa 
Security structure Perception of security  Influence of illicit economy 
Hybrid: Cooperation of state and non-
state actors  
State security actors and autodefensas 
as providers of security 
Higher level of state security actors 
leads to the perception of more 
insecurity 
Low levels of trust in state actors 
High levels of trust for the CADs 
Decisive factor for development of security structure 
(non-state) 
Rational for state-security actors: as defining reason 
for its presence and work 
Incidents of state actor’s involvement in drug trade 
 
7.6 Rule in a Coca Society 
This section will display local rules and practices in the districts I analyzed. The history of the VRAEM 
in the last 40 years has been turbulent in light of the conflict, the growth of villages and settlements, 
the increasing dependency on coca, the drug economy and ultimately the noticeable approach of the 
state to install its influence in the valley. Implementation of state rule was for a long time non-existent. 
Today, based on the investigation in the valley, we can follow that rule is based on the relationship to 
coca and the state.  
Albeit to their diversity, the history of conflict and coca cultivation connects most of the areas studied 
in the VRAEM. This is also reflected in the rules of the society. There are clearly defined rules which 
are not only connected to coca, but also to the conflict-ridden history. 
A member of the self-defence forces explains the rules: “With not stealing, not being lazy we 
still get dirt out of people. Before we hit them with tres puntos - three points (whip) - to correct 
them and corrected the path they were taking. We apply the Andean law and the Ashaninka 
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law. (...) In the case of robbery they would be taken to the park and hit with the tres puntos, 
that scourge, sounded three times. "(Sroaulm) 
State rules are not the most important and instead the Juez de Paz of Santa Rosa explains how the 
communities are organized:  
“There are other laws, internal regulations we call it, but this is working in the communities, 
here in the district capitals only little anymore. Here there are already national standards, in 
communities if they are implementing let’s say domestic laws, communities outside the capital 
of the district are applying or drafting new internal laws for them only. If there are other people 
who have problems due to family violence or other factors, then they themselves apply that 
law. In other instances, they wrap them with nettles, these are internal laws, or they enter the 
“dungeon”, they are punished physically, these are internal laws that they have. At the same 
time the self-defense is in force, is always present, even if they are no longer with the same 
power as before (…) but the laws are very flexible while in the communities they have had a 
rough formation, (…), they have internal laws in the communities "(Srojuezm) 
Before the arrival of the police, corporal punishment was common. While in the outskirts, there are 
still reports that corporal punishments are still practiced, in the urban capitals these alternatives are 
still remembered but not practiced anymore. Today this form of punishment is prohibited by the police 
and the presence of the police makes these forms of punishments unlikely in or nearby the district 
capitals. That leads to expressions like “Human rights are a menace. They only serve the thieves and 
do no good” (Llaup; Cuauj). The police presence changes the way of rule implementation. As an ex-
president of the CADs mentions in Santa Rosa: 
“The law has put limits on us. For example, if self-defense forces capture a delinquent, that 
delinquent can denounce you for kidnapping. Now the self-defense groups no longer have the 
power to do justice, they no longer have that right." (Sroauexp) 
The police have another perception on rules in the region and perceive their influence as more 
important. A police officer in Llochegua assumes that the rejection has to do with drug trafficking: 
“Before [the arrival of the police] people stole, beat each other up, everybody made up its own 
rule, but now it is different, we leave on patrol in the district, we impose our presence and if 
there is a delinquent they go to the remote areas where we cannot intervene. However, people 
still reject us, we are rejected mainly because of their work [coca and drug trafficking]. But 
others already feel identified with the police, because they know that we are not here to annoy 
them but to have a better quality of life." (Llpolm) 
Differences in the perception of state actors and non-state actors are striking and can partly be 
explained by a lack of cooperation.  
Even though the state presence influenced the way of rule implementation, the perception of the most 
important rules is still very much based on local traditional rules. When asked about the most 
important rules in society, people named 144 rules but many of them (49%) were just named once.226 
 
226 Please refer to the Annex for the complete list  
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The question was open where people were asked to formulate their answers freely. That nearly half 
of the rules named in the survey were just named once, signals how disperse the perception of rules 
in the region is. “Not stealing” and “being honest” were the most common answers, both were named 
in 15% of the answers. None was referring directly to state laws even though state rules are now 
officially implemented in the region. While not stealing is of course also part of state laws, during my 
interviews it became clear that people are referring to “not stealing” being implemented by traditional 
rules, similarly to “hard working”. These main traditional rules were: not stealing, not being lazy and 
not lying.227 It needs to be highlighted that the survey was realized in the district capitals of Llochegua, 
Santa Rosa, Sivia, and in the nearby centros poblado Cumunpiari. In these areas, state rules are more 
likely to be implemented because of the proximity to state actors, even though acceptance of state 
rules is low (Figure 22). In the outskirts, the influence of the state implementation and acceptance are 
even lower, as the Juez de Paz of Santa Rosa explained, since state actors would only seldom reach 
these regions (Srojuezm). This low assimilation of state rules is also reflected in the interviews.  
                                  Figure 23 Most Important Rules in Society 
        
                                       Survey VRAEM (Santa Rosa; Llochegua; Cumunpiari) N= 65 
 
The reference to rules and practices for the time before a growing state intervention can be 
interpreted as an incomplete assimilation of state rules. A statement from the Juez de Paz in Llochegua 
can be seen as an example of the general perception on state rule in the VRAEM. He perceives that 
state rules bring even more crime:   
“Look, more presence of the state, more police, more militarization, prosecutors all that, but 
there is more crime today. Why is that? Because the law protects you. I cannot grab him [the 
“criminal”] firmly, or shout at him, then the law protects you, so criminals rely on their rights 
and quietly steal, now you as an authority have less attribution of correcting those people, but 
 
227 These are based on Inka rules, as I was assured in the region 
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earlier as I tell you again the internal status was present every moment and according to that 
they corrected people.“ (Lljuezm) 
While there have been harsh rules for stealing or violence, there was no rule against drug trafficking 
or drug production. On the contrary, as I have described before, drug trafficking and –production are 
an inseparable connected to the local economy and society. Until now, the fight against coca and drug 
trafficking is not in the interest of CADs or Juezes de Paz. The interest for the illicit economy is indeed 
a difference to state security actors and the population connects the police primarily to the fight 
against drug trafficking.  
                                Figure 24 Trust in State Judicial Power VRAEM 
 
                                      N = 65 
I have defined trust as another indicator for rule and I asked in the questionnaire and during interviews 
for trust in institutions and persons. Trust in the judiciary, which is often associated with corruption, is 
not high: "The one with money makes justice" (Cu17), "they only work when you give them money”(Ll 
20). At the same time, the historical development of the region plays an important role again. Many 
refer to the time before state intervention when people could be punished by the autodefensas, and 
regard the state’s judicial power as defective. This is an interesting factor because, as I mentioned 
before, also the autodefensas committed human rights abuses during and after the conflict, but this 
was not mentioned in none of the interviews. Instead, the conception that the “judicial services” of 
the autodefensas have been more successful is prevailing statement. People mention several times 
that the states judiciary would not be trustworthy. In consequence, many people still go to the local 
Juez de Paz to solve disputes instead of going to the police or filing a legal complaint.228 
 
228 When I asked the juez de paz in Llochegua and Santa Rosa on the number of people who would come to them every day, 
they calculated it as 10 per day. Sometimes they go and visit people in their homes as well, if necesary.  
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                          Figure 25 Trust in State VRAEM 
 
                              N = 65 
The perception of the incapacity of state actors is also reflected in the levels of trust in the state and 
its institutions. When we refer to the questionnaire in all districts that I visited in the VRAEM, including 
Kimbiri, Pichari and Sivia, we get a similar picture on levels of trust and the lowest levels of trust for 
state institutions. Reaction to the state and state rule remains skeptical. “Starting from the state [the 
situation] will never change. The state always steals” (StR 11). At the same time, the state is recognized 
as the one entity that can and should bring about development. This ambivalence, in the rejection of 
state rule on the one hand and expectations of the state on the other, are important features of the 
VRAEM. Hence, expectations are related to the infrastructural development, the provision of economic 
alternatives, and non-destruction of coca. While this seems contradictory at first sight, it becomes 
clearer when analyze these expectations further. During various interviews and comments, I got the 
impression that the population regards the main interest of the state to be fight drug trafficking and 
Sendero Luminoso, instead of supporting the population in the region. Additionally, experiences with 
corruption and the long-time negligence of the state lowers trust even further. As long as the provision 
of alternatives remains difficult and as long as the state is not trusted, the agitation of that state is 
rather perceived as a threat to the economic outcome than an improvement.  
Table 21 Perception of State and Non-State Rule VRAEM 
 Form of rule Reach Relationship to illicit economy 
Local rule In dialogical relationship: defined by people 
Executed by people (self-defence forces, Juez 
de Paz) 
Community level Supportive  
State rule Top down relationship.  
No participation of population 
Attempt: universal 
De facto: sporadic 
Negative  
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The arrival of state security forces affected rule in the area, mainly because it restricted the traditional 
forms of rule and rule implementation. That includes the prohibition of corporal punishment. The 
“reach” of state forces is mainly restricted to areas close to district capitals. Especially here alternative 
rule is still practiced. The implementation of state rule and the acceptance of this rule is very low and 
the perception of local rules are still mainly based on traditional rules.  
In this chapter I have also presented low levels of trust for the state or state actors. These low levels 
of trust are mainly related to the fight against drugs and the perception that state actors are not able 
or willing to provide for the population. We can further hold that the illicit economy had an impact for 
local rule before a greater state involvement and after the growing influence of state security forces 
this local rule was restructured. Before the arrival of the state the drug economy was a normal part of 
the communities and security actors did not interfere in the business nor did the illicit economy affect 
local rules. With a stronger presence of state security forces these aspects are changing. Today, one of 
the most important tasks of state actors includes the fight against and the change of drug trafficking. 
This focus negatively affects the perception of state actors 
 
7.7 Power in the VRAEM 
Based on the analysis, which has evaluated the historical development, economy, security, and 
territorial rule in the VRAEM, we can highlight several actors that are influential in the region. The 
concept of fields of power proves to be a powerful way of depicting of the power relations in the 
regions that I have studied. The concept allows me to include the various actors and, as I will show, 
their relation towards power sources and to each other. This sub-chapter will hence give an overview 
on the local field of power, the most powerful actors within this field, and analyze their basis of power. 
The analysis is mainly grounded on data from Llochegua and Santa Rosa, gathered during fieldwork.  
The analysis has shown that the VRAEM has clearly defined borders that are not just territorial. These 
borders were formed as a result of migration flows and agricultural opportunities, but were ultimately 
defined by the state in order to describe the territorial boundaries for state intervention. Another 
striking border however is non-territorial: boundaries of influence can also be defined with regard to 
the coca economy. The state´s definition of illegality does not necessarily resonate with the historically 
evolved understanding of the population of what is legitimate. These factors are the basis of our 
analysis of power in the coca society. 
 
 
248 
There are two important types of powerful actors in the VRAEM: those who support the illicit coca 
economy and have a rather negative attitude towards the state, and those who are against the illicit 
economy and support the state (table 22). In the VRAEM, ultimately, all forms of power depend on 
their connection with the coca economy – either negatively by fighting it, or positively by supporting 
it. 
Table 22 Powerful Actors in Santa Rosa and Llochegua 
Actor Role Power Basis Attitude towards 
coca 
Attitude towards 
the state 
Mayors Local governing authority, (often the 
same person as the cocalero leader) 
Social, Symbolic, Economic Supportive Acceptance 
Autodefensas  In response to the Guerrilla. Self-defense 
group against the threat of the guerrilla. 
Provision of local securty 
Social, Coercive Supportive Acceptance 
Juez de paz  Local legal authority Social, Symbolic Supportive Acceptance 
Cocalero Leader Influence on local politics. Often also 
mayor of the district. Violent punishment 
for non-conforming with rules 
Social, Economic Supportive Negative 
Local Firmas  Local drug trafficking organization 
economic pressure 
Economic, Social, Coercive Supportive Negative 
Foreign Cartels 
(until mid-
1990s)  
Mostly referred to as “Colombians” not 
residing in the area   
Selective use of violence in order to 
control their business 
Symbolic, Economic, Coercive Supportive Negative 
Guerrilla Clan Quispe Palomino. Mainly involved in 
drug trafficking. Active mainly in one 
territory of the VRAEM (Vizcatán)229 
Social, Symbolic, Coercive Supportive Negative 
Police Provide security, fight against drug 
trafficking  
Coercive, Symbolic Negative Positive 
Military Leading the fight against drug trafficking 
and against Sendero Luminoso 
Coercive, Political Negative Positive 
DEVIDA; 
PROVRAEM 
Leading state institutions for alternative 
development.  
Economic, symbolic, political Negative Positive 
Based on interviews and official documents 
 
The local authorities, who were interviewed, did not show a positive attitude towards alternative 
development programs or the state actors. On the contrary, they justified the persistence of the illicit 
economy often by pointing to the lack of viable alternatives. As the analysis has shown, in Santa Rosa 
 
229 In the focus areas for this study, their influence was rather sporadic. Their presence in these areas is also not constant. 
Instead there are reports of smaller entities (around 30 armed men), who are constantly on the move. 
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and Llochegua many inhabitants depend directly or indirectly on the illicit economy. But how does this 
illicit economy play out for the positions of the powerful in Santa Rosa and Llochegua?  
Most actors have an ambiguous position towards coca and the illicit economy. On the question “Who 
is the most important actor in society?”, the majority mention the mayor because he would be the one 
with the ability to guide development in the region and can also apply for funding to finance 
infrastructure projects. But at the same time the mayor in Santa Rosa and Llochegua is supporting the 
coca economy. When mentioning that the sheer number of produced coca suggests that most of it is 
used for PBC production, a mayor in Santa Rosa gives an emblematic answer: “Look when you talk 
about illegal economy to date most of the farmers in the VRAEM are in the illegal economy, but there 
are those who live legally because they are taking their coca to ENACO, so there are people that there 
are people who carry ENACO legally sells but there are people who are not.” (Sroalm). Authorities 
relativize the illicit economy. This argument is mentioned frequently when talking about the causal 
relation between the overproduction of coca and the drug trade. But the drug trade is easily visible 
and should make people aware of what their primary product is used for (see The Coca Economy).230 
Furthermore, as I have shown before (chapter 7.3), the selling of coca to ENACO is also related to the 
illicit economy and mainly used, when the prices on the black market for coca are low. The toning 
down of the importance of the illicit economy is also often heard by the mayors. Hence, people 
acknowledge the mayor´s role in getting government funding for the region, while at the same time 
the mayors in Santa Rosa and in Llochegua are defending the coca economy that the state seeks to 
destroy. Both mayors are also (ex)cocaleros. The mayor especially accumulates social and symbolic 
capital, which hinges on the support and the respect of the population. Therefore, he is acting 
accordingly and seeks to represent the interest of the population. At the the same time, as a 
representative of the district the mayor seeks to get government funding for local projects. This results 
in the difficult situation where he wants to satisfy his constituency and secure financial support from 
the state. A public servant calls it “double discourse” (Vradevj) that seeks to meet both ends of 
satisfying the local population and the state.  
The cocalero leaders hold most of all social capital as primer representatives for the coca economy. 
They are advocating the cause of the coca farmers and often hold political offices as well (the mayor’s 
office, or autodefensas). Their influence rests on the ability to unite people for a common goal of 
 
230 Mostly there are whole communities (“centros poblados”) involved in planting coca and refining it to coca paste and 
until 2015, the main way of smuggling drugs out of the region has been through small airplanes for which illegal landing 
strips needed to be built and rebuilt once destroyed by the police; an effort in which whole communities have been 
involved and paid for. Hence, the involvement in drug trafficking is obvious and well known. Nevertheless, influential 
supportive actors for the coca economy deny this obvious connection or at least downplay the knowledge about it. 
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supporting the coca. Demonstrations in 2001 and in 2017 show that they are still able to unite masses. 
Additionally, being the leader of cocaleros in a cocalero valley secures income. The cocaleros pay a 
“voluntary” tax, however this decreased in recent years. Today, the power of cocalero leaders relies 
mainly on their social and political abilities. 
The autodefensa´s position is mainly based on their historical role in providing protection and control 
during and after the conflict. In Santa Rosa and Llochegua it is a well-respected and trusted actor, 
accepted in the population who hold that they can use coercive means and can ultimately use violence. 
Many of the autodefensas are cocaleros too and their relationship towards coca is supportive, while 
at the same time they officially condemn the drug economy. Owing to a growing presence of state 
security forces, the influence of the autodefensas decreased because the police restricts their their 
influence, especially in the urban centers. Nevertheless, the CADs are still an essential aspect for the 
security architecture and are powerful actors in society. 
The most direct and potent impetus for drug trafficking comes from local firmas or family clans. Unlike 
the mid-1990s, international cartels have no influence on the local order. Instead, local firmas play an 
important role in the control of the local drug production and trade. Their specific role is difficult to 
assess and one needs to rely on police reports and interviews in the region. They are probably the 
most important actors for adding value to the most prolific product of the valley, but they are not the 
most powerful actors in the valley. Nevertheless, there are several reports on selective use of violence 
in the forms of killings related to the drug trade. There are reports of hitmen being hired by local drug 
trafficking organizations. People do recognize this sort of influence but stress, “If you don´t mess with 
them, you don´t have problems, you will have a quiet life” (“si no te metes con sus cosas, no tienes 
problemas, tienes una vida tranquila”) (Vrapopulcar; Vrataxm).  
Autodefensas, mayors, cocaleros and local firmas can be identified as the most important actors, 
relying on social, economic and coercive capital. What all of them have in common is a positive 
perception of the coca economy. Even if their source of power is different, the support for coca is a 
connecting factor. Another important actor is the Juez de Paz. As legal authority he is a well trusted 
and respected actor in Llochegua as well as in Santa Rosa. Due to his high social capital he holds a 
powerful position within the communities. 
On the other side are state and the state supportive actors. The police, which also holds coercive 
capital. The social influence is relatively low at the same time since their relationship with the 
population is restricted to the fight against drug trafficking (or the illegal participation in it). It is mainly 
perceived as an actor that seeks to fight drug trafficking and reduces the extent of coca cultivation. 
That is a contributing factor why their role in the region is not completely accepted by the population. 
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DEVIDA or ProVRAEM have a negative view on coca and seek to withdraw the illicit economy. They are 
two entities that hold economic influence and possibilities to support local peasants selectively, but 
are criticized by most of the population for not bringing a real support (see chapter The Coca Economy). 
State actors in the valley are against the illegal economy which is mainly based on coca and the 
economic revenues from drug trafficking. Nevertheless, they are influential actors even though they 
have only low levels of trust and acceptance among the population. After the state invested more 
effort and increased its presence in the region, which is visible by the number of projects and funding, 
it affected the local order which was dominated by the illicit economy. Today, state actors do have a 
presence in the area, and interfere in the illicit economy. But even if the state agents exist and interact 
with other actors in the VRAEM, they are still not completely part of the local order or at least are not 
able to influence it drastically. We might add those farmers that opted to change their coca crops to 
licit coffee or cacao or other crops that are promoted by the state. Even though their numbers are 
increasing, they do not accumulate a lot of capital. It also seems that they are on the edge of the field 
connected to the state to the traditional local field. In this “field”, state actors have a negative stand 
on coca and the drug economy, and their actions are guided by this relationship to coca  
Hence, in Santa Rosa and in Llochegua as well we see in fact two fields of power: One, that is dominated 
by state actors and the support of alternative development and another one, the traditional field, that 
is dominated by non-state actors and the support of coca (Figure 26). 
 
                       Figure 26: VRAEM Field of Power 
 
The various powerful actors are not completely detached from one another, but interact directly or 
indirectly. The main focal point is coca and the illicit economy: While state agents fight the illicit 
economy, local authorities and powerful actors are in an influential position because they actively 
support and accept the economy. The hierarchy among different actors has the same basis and relies 
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on the relationship to the coca economy. The power basis is diverse and distinguishes both fields from 
each other, but at the same time the reason for their position is their role in the illicit economy. While 
state agents in the VRAEM are mainly in the region to fight drug trafficking (and insurgents), other 
actors have a positive attitude towards coca and/or drug trafficking. It is striking that the dominating 
groups are either supporters of the coca economy or fierce critics of it. The polarizing influence of coca 
is a defining element of the fields and is a lot more complex where state and non-state actors and legal 
and illegal actors are entangled. This interplay of different powerful actors is more complex than 
merely the fight over an illicit good, but it is this illicit good that is a basis for the accumulation of 
power. In this sense, power is not about fixed influence but is relational and depends on the 
recognition of power and the acknowledgment from different agents. Bourdieu stresses the 
importance of the acceptance of powerful actors. This relational power structure in the valley is highly 
affected by the illicit economy. The support for coca, the participation in an extra-legal activity, and 
the fight against coca: all have the coca as their defining element.  
When talking to authorities in the VRAEM, a double discourse becomes evident; defending coca when 
talking to the population, while at the same time welcoming government help for alternative 
development and the destruction of coca when talking to government officials (also mentioned by 
DEVIDA officials: Vraunm; Vradevj). One reason for this double discourse is the need for investments 
and the expectations for changes in infrastructure and services. The reason why people think of the 
mayor as the most important person is because he is responsible for applying for investments and 
infrastructural development. The mayors govern within the state, applying for government funds, but 
at the same time defend coca and officially disregard the production of drugs. This is related to the 
perception by the population that service should be provided by the state. One statement of a shop 
owner in Llochegua is exemplarity: “I do not trust the state. The state does nothing” – But should he 
get more involved? – “Of course! Look at our streets, we do not have a waste water [system] or a nice 
market place […] the state is only interested in destroying our coca” (Ll 4). I would call this “conditional 
acceptance” of the state, which only goes as far as it does not interfere with the coca economy. Even 
though the state has had a low presence for a long time and even though the illegal economy is still 
widespread, people do not oppose the state presence per se, but want improvement in basic services 
and still being able to receive money from the coca economy. 
For state agents, on the other hand, it is difficult to reach out to the local population since local rules 
and practices are different, but also because their financial basis is often against the law. The power 
basis of state agents relies mainly on coercive and economic capital provided by the state. State actors 
such as the police and the military use coercive means and also economic incentives, which are mainly 
related to the activities of alternative development. Alternative development promotes those who are 
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willing to participate in a program for substitution, providing economic incentives and structural 
support, for example in agricultural training (see ProVRAEM). As a DEVIDA official puts it, these 
program paticipants should serve as a good example, as leaders of their communities who can 
advocate for change (Vradevj). From the state’s point of view, accessing the alternative economic 
programs or educational opportunities and accepting a new economic order controlled by the state 
should become a precondition for development. While its coercive means and the presence of a 
broader state security apparatus makes the state influential, its power is still limited because its 
activities against the coca. That is because, it creates a stark contrast between state actors and local 
actors as well as between state practices and local practices. This contrast limits the dialogical 
relationship to the population and consequently the acceptance and trust. Hence, these actors have 
power to fight drug trafficking, but not enough to effectively change the illicit economy or change the 
local order completely. They are trapped in their role of fighting the local economy and thereby raising 
suspicion among the local population that the state is a threat to their livelihoods. This in turn leads to 
low levels of acceptance among the local population.  
At present, there is a relatively peaceful coexistence between two fields and the powerful actors within 
those fields (“state and local traditional/ coca actors”). However, this might change when coca as the 
basis for the local economy will be destroyed. Once eradication campaigns start in the region, 
incidences of violent acts against state agents may occur and influence the stability in the. The 
equilibrium between non-state and state actors would most likely be destroyed and actors such as 
drug traffickers or autodefensas might support the defense of the coca violently.  
 
7.9 Conclusion: VRAEM 
This chapter has analyzed the effect of the illicit economy in the VRAEM, which is an example of a 
“brown spot” region with a dominating drug economy. This illicit economy was indeed a defining factor 
in the formation of a quasi autonomous region in the absence of an effective state control. I have 
presented evidence for the historical importance of the illicit commodity for the valley, its effect on 
the economy, security, rule and power structures. In short, the analysis in this chapter has shown the 
effect of a drug economy on the local order.  
Reflecting on the interplay of the illicit economy and the state, the chapter has given an overview of 
why and how the illicit economy got so deeply engrained in society and what influence it had in local 
power structures. Local structures are directly or indirectly affected by the illicit economy and 
dominate everyday life and practices. The illicit economy has an impact beyond the individual and 
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becomes a defining part of the local order. I have shown that local order is accepted and supported in 
the region, which was broadly affected by the illicit economy. In this environment, the increasing 
presence of state actors, who actively fight the illicit economy, results in a dichotomy: either rejecting 
or justifying the coca economy. Local power structures can be related back to this dichotomy and the 
relationship to the coca economy marks the distinction among state and non-state agents in the coca 
valley. Hence, coca and the illicit society construct a field in which positions and finally power is defined 
by their relationship towards the coca economy.  
All local authorities actively or passively support the illicit economy. While there is no necessary need 
to be actively involved in drug trafficking, there are clear signs that the majority accepts it. This results 
in a dilemma for the state: by trying to integrate the region into the state and transforming the region’s 
economy, the state´s interference actually supports the dichotomy of being in favor or against coca 
and the illicit economy. That in turn creates a symbolic struggle for the coca economy. A struggle about 
what we could call in Bourdieu’s words, a “legitimate vision of the world” (Bourdieu 1989:20): A vision 
by the state on the one hand and a vision by the majority of the local population on the other hand. In 
other words, it is the vision about the coca economy as an illegal good or as an integral part of society 
that needs to be abolished. Ultimately, this is reflected in the field of power. 
I have analyzed that the development of the illicit economy is connected with external demand and 
the internal conflict when it sustained the autodefensas in their fight against the guerrilla. During and 
after the conflict, coca and PBC became the primary sources of income for the region. The relationship 
to coca and also to drug production goes beyond mere economic gains and also resulted in a common 
understanding of what is “correct”. The state only recently established its presence with police, 
military bases, and increasing investments in infrastructure and services. However, as in other regions 
of Peru, in the years after the conflict, the incapacity of the state to confront the increasing boom of 
illegal products in its margins becomes visible (Dargant 2012; Vergara 2015). Today, the state engages 
more in the VRAEM, not only by directly fighting the illicit economy but also by investing in 
infrastructure and alternative development. But even if its resources are more diversified, the state is 
still perceived as an outsider in the region, which is related to the state´s approach. The main rationale 
behind the state´s outreach is the coca, the drug economy, and the fight against the remnants of 
Sendero Luminoso.231 The alternatives offered to the population do not leave much of a choice, can 
lead to the destruction of the local economy and put peasants under pressure. At the same time the 
chapter has shown that the state is not per se rejected but is understood primarily as a service 
 
231 One could argue with Mann that the attempt of the state is to broaden its infrastructural power but the population 
perceives it as an act of despotic power (Mann 1993), aimed at changing the economy. 
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provider. Expectations are clearly defined towards the state and include economic and infrastructural 
development and that coca is accepted, at least until a viable alternative is established. This affects 
the resulting power struggles and predefines the state´s role in the region. While growing state 
investments result in alternative opportunities, these are not sufficient to change the local economy. 
Instead, the provided opportunities result in a parallel structure and the illicit economy stays intact. 
This approach does not destroy the illicit economy but only weakens it without providing a sufficient 
alternative. The analysis has shown that instead of changing the local order, state actors are a part of 
it without applying effective measures to change the illicit economy.  
In this chapter I have identified two main sources of power: one based on the illicit economy as well as 
traditional factors and the other one coming from the state. Both however, take their legitimation 
from coca either by fighting it or by supporting it. Thus, coca is the dominating factor and the respective 
role defined with regard to this basis is different. Indeed, in every society there are struggles and the 
uncontested monopoly of the state is never complete, since there are always actors competing with 
it. But as Swartz put it: the state “is the ultimate referee of all classification of struggles” (Swartz 2013: 
142), the one that seeks to unify the rules of the game. In the VRAEM, there is an attempt to implement 
the state as a “referee” and changing the local order, which is only partly effective. In the agrarian 
society of the VRAEM, which is dominated by coca, the idea of receiving a better education, better 
streets or of getting support from the state and learning to produce good legal products, has shown 
some results. However, the expression of expectations of the state does not necessarily reflect a higher 
level of trust or acceptance of the state. Those who mainly produce coca still do not believe that the 
offered alternatives are working, which is why the majority keeps producing coca. Accepting the state’s 
role is conditionalized on its ability to provide for viable alternatives. One could also argue that the 
legitimacy of the state and of state rule hinges on the provision for economic alternatives in addition 
to the aspects of security and rules. 
When we understand the state as an actor, as a construction that needs to be recognized by the 
population, as an idea that is “incorporated” in the minds of the citizens (Wacquant 2005: 17), we see 
some success of the state’s effort at integration. The state gains symbolic and economic influence, but 
its agents are not accepted. In this sense, the state actions have been successful including the “idea of 
the state”, which can also be seen in demands towards the state. In accordance with the idea that the 
state is also the result of a recognition incorporated within the population (Bourdieu 2014), growing 
involvement of the state in the region could ultimately result in a “displacement of power” shifting 
towards the relationship to the state. On the other hand, demands by the local population and 
shortcomings in implementation make a successful integration more difficult. The presence of an illicit 
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economy results in a constant contradiction between the local population that relies on this economy 
and state agents that fights it.  
 
8. Comparison of Cases 
The following chapter will compare the cases analyzed and I will highlight the most important aspects 
for understanding the effect of illicit economies on local order and state formation. In the study I have 
analyzed two similar regions that are in the margins of the state and in recent times have experienced 
increasing state intervention. The key difference between these regions is the presence of an illicit 
economy. While in Monzón, coca has been destroyed and consequently also to a great extent the drug 
production, in the VRAEM (Santa Rosa and Llochegua), this illicit economy broadly stays intact. I have 
found that this also has consequences for local rules and the security. Moreover, it also results in 
different fields of power and in different dynamics within these fields of power in the regions. The 
destruction of coca did affect and reshuffle local order in Monzón. At the same time state rule 
implementation and acceptance are still at a low level. While the illicit economy remains intact in Santa 
Rosa and Llochegua, increasing state intervention created structures that are affected by state and 
non-state rules. This chapter will give a comprehensive comparison between my findings. It follows 
the same logic as the case studies, including the historical development, the economic consequences, 
security, and rule before highlighting the particularities in the fields of power. The last section 
concludes. 
 
8.1 Historical development 
The study has analyzed the historical development in both regions and the importance of the illicit 
economies. I have argued that the assessment of historical preconditions is essential for the analysis 
of order and the connection to state formation. 
Both regions developed alongside and in part because of the coca economy. The Alto Huallaga became 
the historical center for drug production not only in Peru, but also developed into the principal supplier 
for the basis of cocaine worldwide. The area was only recently populated and right from the beginning 
of the 1940s coca and later the illicit economy of production and trafficking from PBC dominated the 
area. The boom of cocaine attracted new settlers and resulted in increased migration. The conflict 
supported this development and provided the financial basis for the guerrilla. In the Alto Huallaga and 
Monzón the lack of state control facilitated this development in the region. The historical analysis has 
indicated that during the time of the second coca boom the state did not have influence in Alto 
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Huallaga and Monzón. At the same time, local order was constructed after the conflict and was 
primarily based on coca and the support of the coca economy. Right from the start coca and cocaine 
played a substantial role and led to the creation of powerful non-state groups that maintained their 
positions because of the illicit trade.  
In part, this development is similar to the VRAEM, in particularly in Santa Rosa and Llochegua. Even 
though the region yielded a diverse range of agricultural goods, coca became the dominant product. 
Again the conflict played an essential role in this regard, but in this case self-defense groups financed 
themselves by selling coca. Furthermore, it was also mentioned several times that the coca was the 
reason for “survival” of the people in the region. A particularity of the VRAEM is the evolution of 
villages and urban centers during the conflict. In order to defend themselves, people who in earlier 
times lived in relative isolation now started to together. The results were settlements and later district 
centers that needed organization and which evolved without greater state interference. In these new 
settlements local order in the margins of the state became more tangible. 
One major difference between the two regions is the role of coca and the guerrilla in the conflict. In 
the Alto Huallaga, the guerrilla was at first source of support for local coca farmers. Both stayed 
connected to each other for a longer time because of the coca economy. In the VRAEM, the coca in 
fact financed the fight against the guerrilla. Money earned from drug trafficking served to finance the 
Guerrilla in its fight against the state, in the Alto Huallaga. In the regions of the Apurimac River in 
Ayacucho, the income from PBC served precisely to to finance the peasants and self-defense groups 
who finally defeated and expelled the PCP-SL from the area (CVR Tomo V 2003: 739). Despite differing 
causes for the illicit economy, coca and the illicit economy became the basis for development in the 
absence of state control in both regions I have analyzed. 
 
8.2 Economy 
A second important factor in the analysis has been the local economic structure. I have analyzed the 
effect of the illicit economy on the local economy, the involvement of the population, and the relation 
between the illicit and licit economy.  
 
The most striking difference between Monzón and Llochegua or Santa Rosa can be found in the 
economic basis. We have seen that the economy in Monzón was primarily based on coca. For long 
time, Monzón and the Alto Huallaga constituted the epicenter of drug production and –trafficking, 
however this radically changed with the advent of state intervention. The destruction of coca and the 
drug economy reshuffled the economic basis and resulted in an economic downfall. Exemplary in this 
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are the low number of businesses and the personal perceptions of the people interviewed for this 
study. Several references to the time when coca was dominant in the region and the comparison to 
today’s austere economic situation are indicative of how the economy changed due to eradication. 
The lack of economic alternatives in Monzón is the most articulated complaint. 
 
N = 124 
 
It is striking that the personal perception on economic income in the VRAEM is relatively low as well, 
and that there is no considerable difference in the personal income perception in the two regions. As 
presented in the graph, perceptions on personal income are only slightly lower in Monzón, Huipoca, 
and Subde de San Jorge (light blue) as compared to data gathered in the VRAEM in Santa Rosa, 
Llochegua, and Cumunpiary dark blue). If we take a closer look at the economic structures however, 
we find several variances, for example in the number of businesses and the forms of businesses. In 
Santa Rosa and Llochegua, I found that the majority of businesses can be described as “consumer 
business” or “recreational”, in particularly bars and garment shops. The other main business type can 
be linked to coca and cocaine producing “industries“. Based on my interviews, this seems to be similar 
to what could be found in Monzón and the districts studied in the Alto Huallaga as well, until the 
eradication of coca changed the economy completely. Today, the number of businesses and bars in 
Monzón is reduced and the remaining business mainly stems from the construction works realized in 
the area. People express their disappointment because of the economic hardship that is prevalent 
today, after the coca disappeared.  
In both cases, the economy is the dominating factor in society. In Monzón, the decade long illicit 
economy resulted in a dependency on coca not only for the cocaleros but rather the whole economy. 
While this secured personal income, it did not lead to infrastructural development or investments. 
Something similar can be observed in the VRAEM. Direct economic benefits were the basis of support 
for the economy and those promoting it. The allegedly easy money also became also a pull factor for 
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migration and for getting involved directly in the illicit economy. Young people get introduced to the 
illicit economy by older peers or parents. This generational aspect might serve as a further reason for 
why people get involved in the illicit economy. The layered production and commercialization 
structure of the illicit economy provides economic income to a broad range of the population. The 
majority work directly with coca at the agricultural level. However, the connection to traffickers and 
drug producers is also widespread – often via family bonds. The experience of Alto Huallaga and the 
VRAEM shows how deeply ingrained the economy is in society – even though it was/is an illicit 
economy. Thereby, it is not only the direct economic dependency but the belief that nothing else 
except coca would grow in the respective regions. This thinking is widespread and besides the concrete 
and direct economic benefits of coca as compared to legal products, the belief that there are no 
alternatives becomes a basis of support for coca. 
Investments in infrastructure have been very low, so state involvement in Llochegua and Santa Rosa is 
partly seen as a chance for development and investment. At the same time, the growing state presence 
is perceived as a threat to the local economy. This results in a double discourse that on the one hand 
welcomes state investments but on the other hand wants to preserve the current economy that is 
based on growing coca. This is because people do believe in the current economy of their region as 
well as in the institutions, whereas they do not trust state promises and development plans. 
The illicit economy was in both cases a link for society that included most of the people economically. 
Moreover, it created an internal bond that connected the majority of the society in their support for 
coca in the VRAEM and in the Alto Huallaga as well. While this bond was destroyed in most of the Alto 
Huallaga and Monzón, it is still intact in the VRAEM. Some experts see different actors in the drug 
industry comprised of family groups. But the more likely explanation is that there are loose networks 
that produce and collect drugs on demand. Such a system with a diversified production scheme is more 
difficult to control by state security actors. Furthermore, the presence of international criminal 
organizations such as Bolivians, Colombians or Mexicans is rather volatile and not permanent. Thus, 
this fragmentation results in more difficulties for intelligence and state security in actually capturing 
those responsible for the trade.  
The perception of “we as cocaleros” that stand united against intervention can be seen in the VRAEM 
today and is also described in Monzón during the time before state intervention. Formal income 
opportunities are not perceived as a chance but instead are regarded as a potential threat for the local 
economy in Santa Rosa and Llochegua. In Monzón on the other hand, people are still skeptical about 
the capacities of alternative development. Notions of legality or illegality do not guide the perception 
for the local population. There is no perception of doing something illegal and therefore “wrong”. 
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Instead, I found the perception of what Renate Mayntz (2017) calls “legitimate illegality”. As we have 
seen, legitimacy is defined by social acceptance and the “belief” in the rightfulness of actions. In the 
case of the illicit economy to date in the districts analyzed in the VRAEM, and also in retro-perspective 
in Monzón, the high social acceptance of the illicit economy is important for understanding its 
dominance not only economically but also from a social view point. Finally, the coca is presented as a 
traditional plant which also supports the legitimacy of the coca production. However, the analysis has 
shown, that the majority of coca produced in Monzón was used for the production of drugs. Likewise, 
also in the VRAEM today, coca serves the primary purpose of producing drugs. 
This direct connection to the coca and the implicit relationship to the drug economy were visible in 
Santa Rosa, and Llochegua, and also in Monzón. In the districts of the VRAEM it was highlighted that 
the whole economy depends on coca while in Monzón people argued that the alternatives do not work 
and thereby stressed the importance of coca as well.  
 
 
8.3 Security and Rule 
In the theoretical chapter, I have discussed the variations in territorial control, security, and local rule 
of states. The security sector in the regions I have analyzed is also defined by the absence of an 
uncontested monopoly of violence and regulation from the central state. After the conflict ended, the 
main actors for security provision have been the self-defense forces that control and punish wrong 
doing. In the case of Monzón, the police have not been present until recently, after eradication and 
the installation of police commissaries. Also in Llochegua and Santa Rosa, the newly established police 
posts are not completely integrated, which is evident in many complaints from the population. In part, 
this is due to the different rules that are implemented and the lack of acceptance of state laws as the 
most important rules in society. These rules are affected by the historic experiences of state absence. 
As the results of my analysis show state rules are not fully implemented in either of the regions, despite 
the increasing presence of state actors.  
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                    N=65      N=59 
 
On the other hand, it is important to highlight the number of complaints against state actors because 
of corruption, and in the case of the VRAEM, because of the involvement of state actors in drug 
trafficking. In both region trust and acceptance in the police is very low and state security actors are 
rather perceived rather as a factor for disruption of local order than being of actual help. A 
complicating factor in the VRAEM is that the police is mainly perceived as a threat to people’s 
livelihoods, since many see them as acting primarily against drug offences and not against petty or 
violent crime.  
I did not find forms of illegal protection rackets in society apart from security actors in direct relation 
to drug trafficking. In both regions, the security is/ was not directly but merely indirectly linked to the 
protection of the illicit economy. Contrary to many analyses, on the topic, drug trafficking 
organizations do not have control over the drug production regions in the regions that I studied. They 
are able to use selective violence, and thoee violent attacks are mainly directed against state security 
actors or other drug trafficker. But these drug firmas are not able to effectively set or implement rules. 
This rule setting and rule implementation is provided by the self-defense forces as well as by the state 
security actors. Due to the lack of state control, traditional security structures were in place 
implementing traditional rule. These security structures did not interfere with the local economy and 
in fact profited from this economy as well. In the case of Monzón today, with eradication and the 
destruction of the illicit economy, there are no drug trafficking organizations with coercive capital and 
the autodefensas are de facto not active anymore even though they still exist. The police should now 
provide security, however, trust in the state security actors is low. In the VRAEM, the autodefensas 
still play an important role and cooperate with the police. But the analysis has shown a lack of 
coordination between these actors, partly because of the proximity of the CADs to the coca economy.  
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Even though the depiction of the regions as “tierra de nadie” and the necessity of rescuing those living 
there became an official rationale, it does not necessarily meet with the perception of the local 
population. Contrary to this, the population does not see an immediate link between the illicit 
economy and personal insecurity. Neither is there a general perception of insecurity. These findings 
make contributions to the debate on whether illegality necessarily leads to violence. The comparative 
analysis has shown that there was a control on violence and provision of safety despite the presence 
of a high value illicit commodity in both regions. The local security organizations have been crucial in 
this regard as well as their non-interference in the illicit economy. 
 
This mix of state and non-state actors with different and partly intertwined influences in the security 
sectors is a striking particularity in the VRAEM. However, not all of these actors have the same 
legitimacy nor do they necessarily stand for and defend the same order. Some of these actors rose in 
times of conflict and found their role in the post-conflict era. The illegal economy in part financed the 
fight against insurgencies. After the conflict, these illicit activities intensified and communities grew 
because of the illegal economy. Only recently did the state begin to build up its presence in those areas 
but still depends on the help of non-state actors to secure order. In Monzón, these non-state security 
actors have been the most important actors against petty crime and local violence, but lost influence 
upon the arrival of the state. At the same time, they have been strong supporters of the coca economy. 
The CADs are seen as an essential institution that helps in maintaining order. Methods included 
corporal punishment or incarceration. But after the state intervention, the police have taken up the 
main role for security provision but are less trusted and accepted than the autodefensas. In the 
VRAEM, there are high levels of trust towards the autodefensas, who still play an important role in 
providing order, particularly in remote communities. They also stand for the implementation of 
internal laws that seem to have higher values than the state laws for the local population. The 
autodefensas do not interfere with the illicit economy Some analysts also mention that they are still 
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involved in the illicit business or at least support cocaleros. The police on the other hand, fight the 
production of drugs and the population reckons that this is the only work they are involved in and that 
the police therefore neglect security provision. In addition, corruption and the perceived arbitrary 
actions in particularly by the police, contributes to low trust in state security actors as well. 
 Thus, the connection to the illicit economy plays an important role for local security actors and it 
essentially defines the relationship of these actors with the population in the region. In the VRAEM, 
the police are perceived as fighting mainly drug trafficking instead of controlling petty crime or 
supporting the local population. The drug economy was one of the major reasons why the state invests 
and intervenes in the regions. Incarceration of leaders and (alleged) supporters of drug trafficking and 
the guerrilla became the rationale behind state intervention. The autodefensas by contrast, support 
the coca economy and often hold parcels of coca themselves. Furthermore, during the conflict the 
drug economy served as an important resource for the autodefensas. Also in Monzón the police are 
not perceived as a support but rather as a disturbance. In both cases, trust in the police is low. This 
lack of trust in both cases and the interference with the local economy in the case of the VRAEM are 
two important reasons why the implementation of state rule proves to be difficult. 
 
8.4 Power 
The long history of illicit drug production in the margins of the state affected local fields of power in 
the respective regions, with specific rules not only for social life but also for the accumulation of power. 
In both regions, there is a particular field, which is consititutedprimarily by the relationship towards 
coca. Local rules and bases of power are decisively related to coca. The cases that have been analyzed 
show how these particularities also formed the relationship to the state and are affected by state 
intervention in the regions.232 For the regions with a dominant illicit economy, I defined economic, 
social, coercive, and symbolic capital as primary bases of influence in the field. The intervention of the 
state changed the basis of power and ultimately affected the local fields of power. 
For Monzón, we have seen that powerful actors have been clearly related to the illicit economy. 
Powerful actors included cocalero leaders and important drug clan leaders. The former also held 
important political positions such as the mayor’s office or high positions within the self-defense 
groups. Important drug patrons had rather subtle powers and had mainly economic or coercive capital. 
However, these two groups cannot be separated. They were closely connected. Following these two 
 
232 The analysis of fields of power implicitly followed the basis of a correspondence analysis (Korrespondenzanalyse) (see 
Diaz-Bone 2006: 47; Müller 2016: 88) 
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actors, there were the Juez de Paz or the gobernadores who had important roles, although to a lesser 
extent. The population lived from the illicit economy either directly or indirectly. Thus, they supported 
leaders who did the same at the local level and also against the state. Those who were against the illicit 
economy or voiced their aspiration for change were confronted with social degradation or suffered 
financial losses when their crops were destroyed as a form of punishment. Often this was done in a 
collective manner. We have seen in Monzón how the destruction of the coca and the illicit economy 
destroyed not only the economic basis of the region, but furthermore reshuffled power relations and 
in fact created a new field of power which is now related to the state. The new structure is still not 
strengthened, but has witnessed an important change. Accumulation of capital today is related to the 
relationship with the state and to the capacity for applying for funding. 
The accumulation of economic, social, coercive, or symbolic capital in the VRAEM depends on the 
relation towards coca on the one hand, and on the connection to the state on the other hand. Thus, 
powerful actors either support the illicit economy and the coca and therefore are part of the coca 
society, or they are against it and are related to the state and state programs. While we see important 
and influential figures such as the cocaleros or the mayor supporting the coca economy, they are not 
the only influential actors anymore. State intervention here meant that the old power structures 
(formed around the coca economy) stays intact but is supplemented by new actors and rules who are 
working against the illicit economy. These new actors form a second field of power in which the most 
important connections are state proximity and the attempts to change the illicit economy. This new 
constellation creates tensions, overlaps of spheres of influence and interactions between actors within 
this structure. Hence, instead of one actor dominating the region the complex interplay of power 
structures depends on the coca economy and includes a variety of powerful actors. The increase of 
influence was based on the support for coca, but was not based on singular criminal or drug trafficking 
organizations. Instead, cocaleros have been the most important actors in combination with 
autodefensas, mayors, and the juez de paz. Later this set of actors became even more diverse with the 
growing influence of state actors. In particular, none of the actors can act independently but are 
dependent on support and/ or acceptance from other actors.  
The major difference between the two regions in focus with regard to the power structures is the 
presence of the coca and the illicit economy. The absence of a dominating coca economy in Monzón 
changed the dynamics of capital accumulation and created a new “dependency” – this time on the 
state – with all the consequences on local order and state-society relations described above. In the 
VRAEM, the continuity of the coca and the illicit economy left the power structures intact and functions 
similar to the times before the growing state intervention. But a higher presence of state actors leads 
to an additional power structure and created new dynamics and overlaps in the areas of economic 
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actions and security provision. In the long run, that might shift capital accumulation to more state 
proximity and increasing the states role in the region, but only if this results in more benefits for the 
local actors. 
 
8.5 Conclusion of Comparison 
How do illicit economies shape or influence regions with low state control? The findings presented in 
this thesis suggest that there are influences at different levels concerning actors, the power structures, 
the economy, and rules. In the absence of an ordering state in “brown spots”, a complex structure of 
actor relations and institutions has formed. Partly these institutions are direct results of the internal 
conflict, and in part they are intertwined with state institutions and conserved an illicit economy and 
vice versa. The cocalero zones particularly show a resistance to change and have seen instead another 
form of evolution compared to the rest of the Peruvian state (see also Aroyo 2011:35). This evolution 
or “formation” of the society came with and in part because of the illicit economy.  
The analysis of both regions shows that the illicit economy was not something alien to society but was 
instead deeply ingrained into it. Coca formed the internal power structures and also the relationship 
with the state. The coca economy became the basis for social structure. Coca growing, drug production 
and trafficking, and illicit behavior was “socially embedded” in the local society, these were commonly 
accepted and social ties were constructed due to this social behavior (Bourdieu                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
1987/2016; von Lampe 2016; Beckert and Dewey 2017; Mayntz 2017). The consequence of the illicit 
economy in the regions I analyzed for this study was not necessarily more violence but included social 
consequences with more movement of money, growth of bars and brothels, and its own rules, 
practices and ultimately a local order different to that of the state. For the process of state formation, 
the understanding of these different factors is important. It has become clear in the analysis that the 
state had and still has difficulties in implementing rules. Even if state intervention was successful in 
including a new basis of power, the inclusion of those marginalized areas is a complex endeavor, not 
least because of the illicit economy and the particularities it implies for the field of power. 
In Monzón, the illicit economy was tied to coca and the absence of state institution. The destruction 
of coca and the installation of state security actors in the region ended the dominance of the illicit 
economy. The analysis showed that these were preconditions to restructure local order even if new 
powerful actors themselves were not perceived as legitimate. Eradication has left a society in transition 
economically, socially and politically while the population does not yet perceive state projects as viable 
alternatives and state actors as legitimate. In the VRAEM on the other hand, state investments and 
institutions became more visible only recently after the coca economy developed without greater state 
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intervention. While there are confrontations between drug traffickers and state security actors, there 
is no open confrontation between state security actors and participants in the illicit economy; this 
would influence local order or would become a threat for personal security of the local population. 
Instead, the VRAEM is an example of two structures that exists at the same time with selective 
interconnections. The presence of the illicit economy marks a major difference in the local order of the 
two regions and the state-society relationship. The analysis has shown that not only is the economy is 
widely influenced by the presence of an illicit economy, but the acceptance of security actors, rules, 
and power structures are affected as well. Hence, these factors are different in the coca society of the 
VRAEM (Llochegua and Santa Rosa) compared to the post-coca society in the Alto Huallaga (Monzón).  
In the analysis, I have presented that not a single criminal actor or group controls the region with far 
reaching power and dominance, as described by Desmond Arias (2017) based on urban examples. Drug 
trafficking organizations or family clans cannot be completely detached from the local order, but do 
not hold a decisive influential role in society. Power distribution is more dispersed and is also in relation 
to the illicit economy. Local institutions supporting the economy did not suppress the local population 
in the regions I have analyzed. Instead, in both regions, marginality and the illicit activities build the 
basis for local order and provided opportunities for many actors to gain power. They are supported by 
the local population, contrary to state actors who act against this economy. The provision and 
organization of economic outcome became a defining aspect for accumulating capital. In the analyzed 
cases, I found that the illicit economy is the basis for powerful actors and constitutes a local order. This 
implies that the eradication of coca and the immediate termination of the drug business would not 
only destroy the livelihoods of the population in these areas, but can also put the local order and 
stability at risk. In Monzón, this trend can be observed at the moment.  
The society follows a double discourse in the regions. On the one hand everybody knows that the basis 
of the local economy is against the law while on the other hand the majority is connected to the illicit 
economy and defends it. Thus, there is a fundamental difference between the state perception on the 
regions and the perception of the people living in that area. For the state coca and the illicit economy 
is a problem that needs to be eradicated. However, for the local population on the other hand it is 
their right to proceed with what they are doing. The population holds the view that the local order and 
institutions defending their economy are legitimate. This does not necessarily mean that they perceive 
the state as illegitimate, but that the particular policies and actors that stand against the drug economy 
are not accepted. In both regions, structures other than that of the state formed alongside the illicit 
economy. Furthermore, own rules and actors evolved which are perceived as legitimate in the region. 
In consequence, it seems like that there is an “insider – outsider” perception. Being the outsider, the 
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state is only accepted as long as it brings economic and infrastructural development, which takes time 
to implement in regions that have been in the margins of state control before.  
The growing state presence creates a dynamic process, which is different in the VRAEM as compared 
to the Alto Huallaga, because of the presence of the illicit economy. In the VRAEM, state intervention 
created a dynamic that involves local traditional actors and the state, while the illicit economy is intact 
at the same time. This implies divergences and potential conflicts between state and non-state actors. 
In Monzón, the limited scope of the state becomes visible in the difficulties that occur in reaching a 
sustainable outcome after decreased drug trafficking. The limited success also shows the restrictions 
of the state. As it has been argued elsewhere, an overstating of a “law enforcement” approach in itself 
can damage the state-society relationship, and harms the legitimacy of the state (Davis 2010; Arias 
and Goldstein 2010). At the same time, the international prohibition regime results in higher efforts to 
increase state reach in the marginal areas of drug production. The analysis has shown that state actions 
affect local order that until now had been neglected by the state in its attempts to implement state 
policies. State policies towards the regions are primarily shaped by the main aim of changing or 
destroying the illicit economy. Hence, these policies interfere with the basis of the local order. 
However, instead of an upfront rejection of the state, there is a negotiation process for further state 
integration. Local powerful actors react to these state policies, demanding specific benefits or 
defending the local coca economy. 
In the VRAEM we see a hybrid structure while the AHV is a region in transition. Both regions do accept 
the state only partly which can be related to the illicit economy and the historical development. In 
Monzón, the legal economy and a good relationship to the state are presented as the only viable 
options (mainly by state actors). There are only a few possibilities left to produce coca and cocaine, 
and the majority of the population is not involved in these activities anymore. The destruction of the 
local economy based on coca has redefined local order and the connection to the state. At the same 
time, the intervention resulted in mistrust of the state, particularly because of an economic collapse 
and changes in the security structure. State actions are perceived as invasive and results in low levels 
of trust or low acceptance of state actors are the result. In the VRAEM the dominant presence of an 
illicit economy affects local order and the constitution of power structures. In Santa Rosa and 
Llochegua we see the presence of two power structures that are connected, but each constitutes a 
distinct field on its own as well. The presence of the coca economy as the basis for negotiation is 
important because it establishes the rational for state intervention, while at the same time the coca 
economy is the basis of power for most of the local powerful actors. The results of these negotiations 
shape the changes in capital and finally upon the belief if the state and state institutions are legitimate 
actors. As the analysis has shown, this is due to local structures that are directly and indirectly 
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influenced by local economy. Hence, even if illicit economies did not erode the state and state 
influence, they do affect state intervention in the regions and predefine the dynamics of state and 
non-state interaction.  
9. Conclusion 
Insecurity. Violence. Conflict. Disorder. These are some of the common links drawn in reports on drug 
trafficking and regions in the margins of state control. This Book has shown instead, that the effects of 
both aspects are more diverse. I have deconstructed the consequences of illicit economies on local 
order and the state and by doing so I have provided evidence of how the drug economy essentially 
contributed to local order instead of provoking disorder and violence in the two regions of Peru. Thus, 
the illicit economy became far more than merely an economic basis in the respective regions and was 
instead deeply ingrained in the local social structure. I have further shown that this order affects state 
integration. While the resulting local order developed to a large extent without state control, both 
regions now experience a sustained approach of state integration for the first time. However, as my 
analysis has shown, the state´s approach towards the drug economy also affects this integration 
process negatively. The state intervention has clearly reshuffled local order in the case of Monzón, 
while it resulted in parallel structures in Santa Rosa and Llochegua. But even though the intervention 
had a decisive effect on local order, state integration remains scarce. This final aspect is closely related 
to the illicit economy and the state´s action against it. Hence, in this work, I have analyzed the notion 
that illicit economies are deconstructive and a threat to the state. Instead, I have provided a detailed 
analysis on how drug economies in fact, have a vital part to play in the construction of local order on 
what effect this has on the interactive process of state formation. 
I have bridged theories of local order, power, state formation, and illegal markets. With this 
combination of research approaches, this book has presented a novel understanding on the 
relationship between local order and illicit economies. From there I have focused on the comparison 
of the two regions and detailed the analysis at the district level and an in-depth empirical analysis. This 
study has followed a structured focused comparison of a small number of cases. Thereby, I have 
included qualitative research in the historical context, the economy, the security, and territorial rule 
as well as power structures in the respective regions. Given the scarce literature and lack of data 
availability, I have included ethnographic field research in the regions combining semi-structured 
interviews and participant observations with community members, authorities, state-, and non-state 
actors. The data collected during my field work in the Alto Huallaga and in the VRAEM provided the 
necessary information for the analysis for the research questions. Due to the complex and also because 
of the delicate nature of the research topic, I have used a mix of data sources, combining surveys, 
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expert interviews, and participant observation. Thereby I conducted 120 Interviews and 124 topic 
specific questionnaires have been filled out. In all I spent four months in each of the region.  
In the following, I will firstly discuss the main findings of my dissertation guided by the main research 
questions. Secondly, I will discuss the broader implications of those findings for theory and practice. 
9.1 Main Findings 
At the beginning of my research I set out to analyze 1) How do the externalities of illicit economies 
influence local order in the margins of the state? And 1b) What effects do illicit economies have on 
power structures? 
I have defined the main features of local order in context of the historical development, the economy, 
the security, and local rule as well as power structures. In the comparative analysis, I have shown that 
the illicit economy was not only a decisive factor in the historical development of the region, but was 
also highly influential in the evolution of a local order. On the economic level, the coca and drug 
economy provided the basis of livelihood for the majority of the population. But even more so, it 
created a closed region in which we could find rules and structures different to that of the state and 
that have a positive connection to the illicit economy. This did not result in a violent or coercive order 
but created an order that was accepted by and ingrained in society. In other words: the role of the 
illicit economy resulted in an unconscious process of “civilizing” the population in a given territory 
(Elias 1976).  
I was able to show how this economy created a dependency, which is still intact in Santa Rosa and 
Llochegua. In Monzón, this dependency only changed due to the destruction of coca and resulted in 
an economic crisis. Furthermore, the security sector and territorial rule are also affected by the drug 
economy. The acceptance of security actors is related to their ability to provide for personal safety and 
also with regard to their stand on the coca economy. Low levels of trust in state security actors are 
strongly affected by these two factors. Finally, the rules developed over time and were different 
compared to state rules. They were deeply affected by the internal conflict in the region. There were 
no direct restrictions on the production of drugs and even local authorities participated in the illicit 
economy. Thus, in the comparative case study, I have shown that firstly, local order is not only affected 
by illicit economies in the regions I have studied, but is also constructed by it. Local actors mostly 
depend on the support of the illicit economy. Secondly, due to the dependency on an illicit good, the 
attempts to destroy it affects state integration. With the arrival of state institutions, local rules and 
norms changed, while state rule is only partially accepted.  
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Today, state rule is dominant in both regions; however, implementation and particularly acceptance 
of these rules are still imperfect. I have presented that the main difference in the power structures of 
the analyzed cases lies in the presence of an illicit economy. What I have analyzed in this study is that 
the illicit economy is still present in the VRAEM, while it was destroyed in Monzón. Hence, in the 
VRAEM, the increase of state presence happens at the same time as illicit economies continue to exist. 
This setting creates a “second field of power“, which this time is basically constructed by state 
proximity. This second field of power in part overlaps with the previous field of power, which was 
constituted primarily by the proximity to coca and the illicit economy in the region. Following the 
concept of fields and capital by Pierre Bourdieu, I have identified that power structures are co-
constituted not only within those fields but also by the relationship between the illicit economy and 
the state.  
Even if no dominating criminal armed group evolved from the illicit economy to challenge state control 
as described by Desmond Arias (2006) for the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the coca and drug economy 
still draws a line between the state and the local coca growing regions. It created not only an economic 
sphere, but also local order in differentiation to the state. At the same time, local powerful actors and 
local elites based their power mainly on the relationship to the illicit economy and the absence of the 
state. Hence, those actors who gained power within the field of power had no interest in further state 
integration or were interested in it only under their own conditions. But the illicit economy had an 
influence that was beyond singular powerful actors: instead it constituted an accepted local order, 
based on the marginality and on the illegal economy.  
Hence, this work has shown that illicit economies can constitute its own field of power. This approach 
provides an opportunity to include the role of illicit economies in a relational analysis with the state. 
While in the VRAEM this former field of power is still widely intact and is now “complemented” by a 
second field dominated by the state, in Monzón, the destruction of the illicit economy and the growing 
influence of state institutions essentially destroyed the former power structure. In both cases, we can 
hold that the illicit economy influenced practices and ultimately local order in the regions. The analysis 
has shown that the presence of an illicit economy in the margins of the state had far more effect on 
local order than merely from an economic perspective. In short, I have given a detailed analysis and 
presented evidence that the illicit economy in actuality really became the basis for local structures and 
social interaction 
 
As a second main research question, I looked at how this local order links back to the state and state 
formation. The findings of this book can tell us about important parts of state formation with regard 
to marginal regions and the influence of illicit economies. Focusing in the analysis on the local level has 
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allowed us to zoom in on the state-society relationship and the dialogical process of state formation. 
The effect on state formation was included implicitly in the study in addressing the state’s anti-drug 
policies and in analyzing the dynamic state-society relationship. I have argued that to understand the 
state’s relationship towards brown areas within their territory, the comprehension of local social 
structures is essential. The argument of this book has been that the interplay between local order and 
“the state” is an essential feature for the understanding of state formation. Thus, I provided a detailed 
analysis on the relationship between a local order, an illicit economy, and the state.  
The first major finding is that even though the regions have developed in absence of effective state 
control and in relation to an illicit economy, they are not opposed to the state. I have not found 
evidence that in these areas local order has resulted in objection to the state but instead, I have shown 
that there exists a clear idea of what is expected from the state. This includes not only the expectations 
relating to the provision of goods and services, but also the recognition of local structures and practices 
by the state. In other words, the idea of the state (Bourdieu 1994) is well established, notwithstanding 
the deviations in rules or practices. This key finding implies that despite the weak presence of state 
institutions or services, the state remains a focal point. Focusing on this state idea in brown spot areas 
helps to understand potential repercussions of state integration of marginal areas in general – and in 
particular with a presence of illicit economies. 
Secondly, the study has found that the marginal position of the regions allowed the evolution of an 
illicit economy which resulted in local practices and a particularity of local order. These particularities 
have been key aspects for the alienation of the regions from the state. The presence of an illicit 
economy then became a key factor for state intervention in these margins of the state, besides the 
fight against remnants of the guerrilla. In the case of Monzón, state intervention destroyed most of 
the illicit economy while in Llochegua and Santa Rosa, state intervention did not destroy the coca and 
illicit economy.233 I have shown that the presence of an illicit economy affects the relationship to the 
state and that most of the distrust towards the state and state institutions is related to the illicit 
economy. In the VRAEM and in particular in Llochegua and Santa Rosa, state intervention is driven by 
the fight against Sendero Luminoso and drug trafficking. At the same time, there is a lack of social 
integration that encompasses dialogue with society, which I defined as crucial for building trust and 
legitimacy of the state. I have therefore argued that for the state formation process, acceptance from 
the local population is important. The observance and inclusion of local social preconditions, such as 
traditional rules and practices, is another important factor.  
 
233 However DEVIDA has mentioned that in 2018 eradication might become an option: 
https://elcomercio.pe/politica/probable-comience-erradicar-vraem-2018-noticia-467808 
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In this regard, it is important to note that the formation of the state and the integration of marginal 
areas is a process that interacts with the existent local order. The work has shown that the local order 
is broadly affected by the illicit economy, which needs to be considered for the analysis. Within these 
orders, people applied learned behavior and actors carried out “routine performances” which are 
labeled “illicit”, but in fact resemble what Bourdieu (2001) calls “practices”.234 These practices are 
implemented in every day life and also structure it; they become important elements for the local 
society. In consequence, they are not perceived as morally wrong but as a necessity. Moreover, these 
(illicit) practices serve as a binding element for society and results not only in a territorial 
marginalization, but also in a normative marginalization of the regions from the state. Furthermore, I 
have analyzed how the implementation of state practices and the installation of state institutions, 
particularly in the security sector, creates a shock for local order. Low levels of trust are in part, a result 
of the absence of state order and the illicit economies. State practices are primarily perceived as an 
invasion of the region and are related to the loss of economic opportunity and changes in rule. At the 
same time, the state is also regarded as being duty bound to provide for the region. Hence, while the 
construction of state presence could be made relatively fast, the integration of the region and the 
acceptance of the state and state actors as legitimate is a long-term process. In order to fully integrate 
these marginal areas, the “idea” of the state needs to be assimilated into the thinking of the citizens 
(Bourdieu 1994).  
Finally, previous to state interference, the regions formed alongside the coca and drug economy. Until 
recently, there was a lack of state integration which resulted in areas that developed their own rules 
and local order. As I have shown in the comparison of both regions, after the state intervention in 
Santa Rosa and Llochegua, the dependency on illicit economy still withholds further state integration. 
In Monzón, the former dependency on the coca economy influences perceptions of state even today 
which hampers the integration. The illicit economy and the resulting local order affect the state 
integration since it invokes further resistance from the local population. This makes it difficult for the 
state to strengthen its position, implement its practices, and increase the integration of these marginal 
regions. Even if the illicit economy is not the only factor, it is clearly the defining factor for local order 
in the cases I have presented in this thesis. By that, the illicit economy affects the state’s potential for 
getting more involved in the region.  
In consequence, the findings of this study present a profound dilemma for the state: Destroying the 
coca economy by force increases distrust among the population towards state actors. Leaving the illicit 
economy intact while at the same time creating pressure on the majority of the population because of 
 
234 See also Migdal (2001) 
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their economic basis remaining illicit, also results in high levels of skepticism and distrust. In both 
scenarios, the state remains an alien actor providing a hollow frame. And we might add a third aspect; 
the cooperation of the state with local powerful actors who might act as brokers for state influence, 
such as cocaleros. But this results in difficulties because of the opposing approaches towards coca 
production and hence is also not helpful for a deeper integration into the state. Nevertheless, the 
findings also point to a way out of the dilemma. As I have discussed, the local order and actors are not 
necessarily hostile to the state and the analysis has shown that there is a clear idea of the state and 
what it ought to do. Building on this knowledge and developing a coherent concept in connection with 
the existing local order instead of confronting it, will facilitate the state integration. Establishing a 
dialogical state-society relationship would enable the build of trust within the society and finally 
strengthen the state legitimacy within the regions.  
 
9.2. Implications for Theory 
The study has bridged various literature strands (sociology, state formation, illicit economies) which 
led to the conceptualization of the research topic. This hybrid theoretical stand put forward several 
contributions by connecting two broader topics in the analysis: illicit economies and marginal regions 
in the realm of state formation. I have proposed a conceptual framework that, in essence, deals with 
the social foundation of local order, analyzing the interplay between formal and informal, legal and 
illicit dynamics. Empirically, this work has provided the tools for analyzing order and power in the 
margins of the state based on core characteristics of local order (economy, security, rule, and power). 
I have applied these tools in the analysis of the two regions in Peru, and allow it to be replicated to 
other marginal regions (especially where there are illicit economies). Based on this conceptual 
framework, the study contributes to a wider literature on state formation, illicit economies, and on 
studies on stability in areas with low state control.  
An initial contribution is related to the study on the state and state formation. I have argued that for 
being able to analyze the formation of states, one should analyze them as they are and not how they 
ought to be, which includes the broad internal variations depicted by local orders. The areas in focus 
are characterized by low state control, yet they became particularly interesting for the state over time 
because of the illicit economies that developed there and due to implications of international pressure. 
By highlighting how these illicit economies affect local order as well as the relationship to the state, 
this work has contributed to the discussion on how states interact with marginal regions which might 
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be replicated in other cases not only in Latin America235, but also beyond in areas that show similar 
conditions for state formation today and/ or in the past. In many regions of Latin America, the state is 
unable (or unwilling) to provide for order, which results, for example, in brown spot areas (O’Donnell 
1993). The book has shown how alternative structures evolved in those areas with low state 
involvement and influence, which was mainly driven by the internal conflict and the illicit economies. 
Local orders have developed in those areas, autonomous from the state but still in relation to it. This 
work adds new aspects to recent studies that highlight the importance of local power and stress the 
variances of power within states – particularly in recent studies on state formation in Latin America 
(Kurtz 2013; Soifer 2013; Vergara 2015). The findings further this discussion by highlighting the 
importance of an illicit economy in the evolution of local order in the margins of the state legal order.  
As we have seen earlier, the state has limited implementation capacities of its policies in regions that 
have developed largely without its auspices. As Centeno et al. (2017) have recently argued, state 
performance “requires the analysis of state capacity alongside political actors and social forces”. The 
need to include alternative social powers within the margins of the states to the analysis and recognize 
the relational aspects have already been analyzed (Migdal 2001). Once the state decides to engage in 
peripheral regions, it has to engage with alternative local orders too. This dialogical aspect is largely 
overlooked and I have provided an analysis that it has to be be taken into account for an evolved 
reading of state formation over areas of illicit economy. The overall state formation is thus influenced 
by local order and by the reaction of state actors to this economy. The empirical analysis of the coca 
regions in Peru has shown that the state has long neglected the coca regions, and it became more 
involved due to anti-insurgency operations and more importantly because of anti-drug policies. The 
interplay between marginality and the illicit economy became an important feature in these regions, 
especially in context of an increasing state intervention. The resulting dynamics go beyond the 
economic aspects, and I have developed a conceptual framework to analyze these dynamics. 
Finally, this book has provided implications for studying statebuilding measures. The comprehension 
of local preconditions is essential for intervening in regions with low state control and for 
understanding the limitations of establishing a legitimate order. This is particularly true for the 
approach of a “domestic intervention” in peripheral state regions. Studies have already acknowledged 
the importance of state formation and local conditions in order to implement statebuilding measures 
(e. g. Schlichte 2005; Chandler 2006; Bliesemann de Guevarra and Kühn 2010; Bliesemann de Guevarra 
2012). I have shown that the same holds true for “domestic interventions” in the state’s territory, 
which gives an indication of how to analyze statebuilding in regions with prominent illicit economies. 
 
235 see also Eduardo Dargent discussing „the state“ as a research agenda on the state in Latin America (Dargent 2012).  
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This feature should be considered, considering that most of the present statebuilding interventions 
take place in regions affected by illicit economies (Cockayne 2008; IPI 2013). In addition, this discussion 
is in line with studies on the institutional capacity of the Peruvian state (Awapara and Dargent 2014) 
that does not have capabilities of implementing rules and laws in its peripheries. The illicit economies 
that evolved in this regard include not only drugs, but also illegal mining and illegal logging and human 
trafficking in areas with low state control (e.g. Novak and Namihas 2009; Mujíca 2014; Dargent 2015; 
Dargent and Urteaga 2016). This divergence between capacities and expectations of the state has been 
presented in this book. I have presented the resulting order and the interaction with the state. In 
particular, the recognition of the state in marginal areas and the interaction with illicit economies 
represent a key finding.  
In this line of study, the connection between security and statebuilding became even more prominent 
in recent years, as latest publications have highlighted (Bonacker et al. 2017). This has also been a 
dominating aspect in the areas analyzed as well as in discussions about illicit economies. The rationale 
of state intervention in the coca regions originates partly from the idea of providing security. By stating 
that the intervention saved the population from a “tierra de nadie”, from disorder, goes in line with 
this rationale. In fact, this follows an idea of the state as “protection racket”: the state raises security 
questions in the first place to present itself as the solution (Tilly 1985). The perception of the state as 
a legitimate actor that provides security is hindered however, by the fight against the illicit economy. 
This is because of the fact that the fight against the illicit economy also affects local power structures. 
Therefore, the local and historical conditions are crucial for the understanding of security, which goes 
in line with recent sociological and historical perspectives on securitization and statebuilding (Guzzini 
2015; Bonacker et al. 2017). 
The second bigger research strand is the burgeoning field of study on the effects of illicit economies or 
organized crime. This book builds on existing literature that contrary to common sense notions 
contends that illicit economies or organised crime can in fact, be a source of stability. I have shown 
how illicit economies in brown spot areas in a rural setting evolve and shape the structure of local 
order. Instead of being destructive, illicit economies can be a crucial factor in the construction of local 
order. This work has highlighted the need to understand the underlying causes of illicit economies and 
local order. The discourse about the influence of illicit economies was long dominated by a normative 
understanding of an illicit economy as being generally bad for society. Most of those studies followed 
the understanding of an ideal type state. This book has displayed that the discussion on Peru and the 
coca growing regions holds a stimulating contribution to this debate. The study has shown that in areas 
with low state control, alternative structures evolved and that the illicit economy facilitated this 
development for a long time before state intervention. With those aspects, I have argued that instead 
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of being corrosive to local order and undermining stability, illegal structures can indeed also be a 
contributor and guarantor for stability. These findings are supported by previous studies that highlight 
the relationship to violence (Andreas and Wallmann 2009; Snyder and Durand-Martínez 2009; Durand-
Martinez 2014) or on criminal governance in urban settings (Arias 2006; 2017; Duncan 2013). 
Another key aspect of illicit economies is that it is not solely about independent acts undertaken by 
single actors, but rather about structural changes within the society. Within an area lacking a clearly 
defined monopoly of violence and a centrally controlled bureaucratization, other structures evolve 
that take up these tasks. However, instead of merely concentrating on actors directly involved in illegal 
activities such as “mafias”, “cartels”, or traffickers, I have focused on order, the resulting structures, 
and how this is influenced by an illicit economy. This is not to say that criminal actors and criminal 
groups do not play a role or even result in being dominant ruling actors (Arias 2006, 2017; Duncan 
2013). But, as I have stressed, broadening the conceptual frame helps to identify a broader range of 
patterns besides the focus on actors. The concentration on various aspects of order opens up analytical 
possibilities to include illicit economies in the broader discussion on state formation. Hence, this 
recognition moves away from an exclusive actor-oriented view, i.e. a certain actor being in charge and 
controlling a certain system, also highlighting the interrelations between different actors. For instance, 
a pax mafiosa could explain moments of agreements between illicit actors and the state, but it fails to 
account for changes in power structures and the dynamics within the particular local orders. The 
inclusion of not only actors but also externalities of illicit economies and its effect on local order 
provides more analytical depth and the possibility to analyze power structures and the dynamism 
within the particular local orders.  
The focus of the study on drug production areas is the fourth contribution. By highlighting the 
particularities, I have presented a detailed analysis of the drug economy in the area. This analysis was 
helpful not only in assessing the effects on societies for Peru in particular, but can also be of use for 
further analysis in similar regions. Most studies on drug trafficking refer to macro-data on production 
sizes and the national or regional effects (e. g. Mejía and Restrepo 2013; Thoumi 2003, 2010). Few 
studies analyze the effect on the local level and most are written from an ethnographic angle (eg. van 
Dun 2009; Kernaghan 2009; Grissafi 2012). By focusing on the local level and by combining macro-data 
with first hand qualitative data gathered during field work, this work has been able to show the effects 
of an illicit coca economy on local societies and has highlighted the fact that these effects go beyond 
the economic sector. Furthermore, the presented analysis contributes to the scarce literature on the 
drug economy in Peru. In this regard, this book contributes to studies on the war on drugs. It stresses 
on the consequences that external demand had on local economies and the results of a balloon effect. 
This work has shown that the growing presence of state institutions does not necessarily lead to a 
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significant decrease in drug production. In fact, the experience of the VRAEM shows that the drug 
economy is still prominent despite increasing state intervention.  
Summing up, the merging of the two debates on state formation and illicit economies has revealed 
broad implications and connections. By showing the dynamic effect on societies in brown areas and 
by highlighting the dialogical relationship with the state, I have presented that illicit economies affect 
local order due to social and institutional aspects that are commonly neglected. This in turn does not 
lead to an outright opposition to the state, but affects the dialogical process of integrating these areas 
as part of the state.  
 
9.3 Implications for Policy and Practice 
There are two broader fields of policy and practice that this book will contribute to and from which 
several implications can be drawn: discussions on (dis)order and state building measures as well as 
drug policies and alternative development. 
This work has shown that state intervention can result in a shock for the local order. Statebuilding 
efforts should therefore proceed with sensitivity in areas with low state control and with a high 
prevalence of illicit economies. In some countries, illegal oil, drug, timber, and minerals revenues 
account for a big part of the economy – in some regions in the country, they account for even an 
essential part.236 It should therefore be considered that illicit economies do not only have economic 
implications. They can influence local rules and, in some cases, the security sector as well. These 
aspects should be taken into account when applying statebuilding measures in areas with high levels 
of illicit economies already in the design phase of policies. Awareness on the influence of illicit 
economies on the political and national level is growing, but the sweeping influence of illicit economies 
on the local level should be considered as well. The intervention in regions that have long been at the 
margins of the state implies changes in local rule and norms. Therefore, a thorough analysis before 
intervention in drug production regions is necessary to anticipate such a shock. This implies the 
understanding of economic dependencies as well as power structures and the effects on local rule.237 
More emphasis should also be placed on the legal implications of state intervention.  Regions in the 
margins developed traditional rules which need to be considered. Formal state rules are not 
 
236 For an estimation on the impact of illicit economies see Elgin and Oztunali (2012). 
237 A further aspect that can have an implication for policy is the effect of an illicit economy in and even more so after conflict. 
From these insights strategies towards these “war” or “post-war economies” can profit. More studies would be helpful that 
focus on the transition of war economies into peacetime Pugh et al. 2004. A current research project of Sabine Kurtenbach 
and Angelika Rettberg focusses on these aspects (https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/projekt/war-economies-and-postwar-
crime) 
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necessarily regarded as “correct” and formally punishable illegal acts are not necessarily regarded as 
“wrong”. The castigation of practices that formerly stayed unpunished has a wider impact on the state-
society relationship. New rules are implemented that in earlier times, did not play a role and it should 
be considered how this affects the perception of the state. Moreover, the punishing of common 
(illegal) economic practices restricts local economic opportunities and lead to a demand driven 
relationship to the state. Following the maxim: “if the state destroys our crops, it should provide for 
viable alternatives.” It therefore puts pressure on the state. The integration of society and social 
leaders in the respective regions could anticipate these potential conflicts by understanding local 
structures better before intervention. 
The second key contribution of this book in the field of policy is the aspect of local order and illicit 
economy. I have argued that we will gain from a more differentiated view on illicit economies, their 
effect on local order, and vice versa. I have further argued that we should rather focus on the 
externalities coming from illicit economies. Unlike the focus on potential threat, such a focus on 
externalities allows us to trace the effects on the local level and to highlight potential consequences 
of acting against these illicit economies and alternative structures. Only recently, Vanda Felbab-Brown 
and colleagues (2017) have published a book titled: “Militants, Criminals, and Warlords. The Challenge 
of Local Governance in an Age of Disorder“. The authors explore how non-state actors fill the gaps left 
by the state in areas with low state control. Contributions in this book also highlight potential threats 
and the urgency to counter them. I have argued that instead of focusing on potential negative effects 
such as violence or “disorder”, we should focus on a relational aspect of the state and alternative local 
orders. In other words, we should acknowledge local preconditions and include them into a thorough 
analysis instead of applying foreign (“western”) templates on local circumstances. Moreover, 
acknowledging existing local order and the various forms they affect, helps in designing and 
implementing more fine-grained policies. 
Additionally, this book has provided insights for analyzing the potential effects on the local level and 
has linked it back to the debate on the state. I have shown that an illicit economy can have broader 
effects on the local order that should be taken into account when analyzing the outcomes of an illicit 
economy.  The influence of illicit economies and organized crime on cities or states is increasingly 
discussed on the policy level (Kemp and Shaw 2012; Cockayne and Roth 2017). However, the growing 
recognition of the influence of these phenomena should not lead to rash conclusions on their 
potentially harmful consequences. A thorough analysis on this matter is essential for presenting 
tailored approaches in dealing with illicit economies and for preventing ill-conceived policy advice and 
government action. For instance, these economies often provide primary income to a large number of 
the population and not just to singular criminals or “drug cartels” or other criminal networks. I have 
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argued that we should use another lens for studying illegal economies and instead of focusing on the 
damaging potential we can gain by including the “productive” side of illicit economies as well.  
In terms of anti-drug policies, three aspects are important: the recognition of local order, “de-
demonize” of drug producing regions, and long-term commitment of the state. Peru seeks to 
implement the international principle of alternative development. The results of this study indicate 
that the illicit economy preserved not only economic outcome, but also alternative social structures. 
This implies that in the process of implementing alternative development approaches, the state needs 
to have this social and political structure in mind; including the involvement of local actors. Otherwise 
it might risk not only economic but also greater social problems in the respective regions. The inclusion 
of local authorities in the development process is crucial in this regard and also the recognition of local 
historical and social preconditions. This includes not only improvements in economic aspects and 
alternatives to the coca business, but also infrastructural and education as well as a close 
communication with local authorities. These are all aspects which are subsumed under the aspect of 
alternative development, but should also be implemented in praxis. This work has shown the impact 
of illicit economies on local order and the relationship to the central state. Keeping these aspects in 
mind should lead to an integrated development strategy, considering historical and social 
circumstances. An integrated approach should also aim for a participatory process for the local 
population. This cooperation with the population should start before illegal crops are destroyed and 
should include strategies for economic and social development. Otherwise the exclusion of the 
population from the process might undermine state efforts for alternative development and might 
provoke resistance and mistrust.  
In line with this aspect goes the “de-demonize” of the regions and actors in these areas. While this 
aspect is mainly transported via national media, state institutions can take an active role in highlighting 
opportunities instead of the difficulties and threats that are to be found in the region. An interesting 
approach can be seen in Bolivia, where the government of Evo Morales has implemented a cooperative 
strategy with regard to coca and cocaleros, while at the same time using restrictive measures against 
drug trafficking and organized crime (Ledebour and Youngers 2013). Cocaleros should be included as 
strategic partners and not as opponents to or mere beneficiaries of the state. Without the destruction 
of livelihoods and the risk for violent encounters, the development of a joint strategy might lead to a 
sustainable change in the illicit economy. Such a joint strategy and rather a promotion than 
demonization of the drug production area can help trigger investments, which in turn help to foster 
alternative development.  
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Finally, alternative development programs are long term endeavors. The often-praised successful 
instances of alternative development, for example, Thailand and its efforts to reduce opium 
production (Windle 2016; Felbab-Brown 2017), often show a long-term commitment to the process of 
alternative development. This commitment is vital to implement not only economic alternatives but 
also to create sustainable institutions in regions that have been at the margins of state control for a 
long time. This analysis has demonstrated that alternative products, such as coffee or cacao, need at 
least four to five years to produce sufficient outcome for farmers. In this regard, I have argued that a 
long-term commitment is essential for the success of alternative development programs, which should 
include training peasants and also improvements in infrastructure and the access to markets.  
A final comment must be made on the international implications of anti-drug policies. The 
international prohibition regime does have an impact on local traditional coca farming and on the 
discourse on coca. In recent years, a change in discourse can be observed. In particular, countries most 
affected by the negative consequences of the illicit economies are involved in this change of discourse 
(Mexico, Colombia and Guatemala in particular). The drug economy is a global phenomenon, and 
cannot be attributed to just a single country. UNODC estimated the absolute number of cocaine users 
worldwide to be 18 million people in 2014 (UNODC 2016). Thus, the global drug economy includes 
producing countries, such as the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia for cocaine, and it 
also includes consuming countries such as the USA. As long as demand and potential earnings are high 
due to a prohibition regime, production and consequences will be high as well.  
 
9.4 Outlook and Future Research 
The study has highlighted aspects of local order, including further facets on power relations, security, 
rule, and economic implications. By contributing to a deeper understanding of illicit economies in the 
margins of the state, this research paves the way for further research in the areas of illicit economies 
and state formation. In this book, I have highlighted various aspects that could give an indication for 
future research.  
Discussions of illegality or illicit economies are often led by the assumption of a state that coherently 
controls its territory and where local laws meet acceptance and legitimacy from the population. These 
assumptions are only seldom met empirically. As this analysis has shown, in many regions, formal state 
rules are not implemented. So far, we have a rudimentary understanding of the relation between 
formal and informal rules and institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006) and more research is needed to 
enhance our knowledge on this matter. Getting a more nuanced understanding on non-state 
institutions will be key for future analysis of local order.  
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As the analysis has shown, alternative orders can have severe consequences for power accumulation 
of local actors and relations with the state. In those areas, the illicit economies become more than just 
a financial basis. They do become a defining factor in the processoral creation of local order. The 
evolution of alternative orders can be seen in other regions without illicit economies as well, but it is 
precisely the areas where political and economic relations are very close, that are mostly affected by 
different rule and where order is produced. The aspects on power and local rule have been discussed 
before, particularly in their use of violence (e. g. Kalyvas 2006; Schlichte 2009). But more research is 
needed on the relationship of non-violent forms of legitimate rule driven by the presence of an illicit 
economy. An interesting field for further research would be to further investigate the role of an illicit 
economy and how it interacts with other forms of rule setting and rule implementation. In this study, 
I have presented the role of illicit economies in local order and the relationship to the state. Future 
analysis can learn from studies on the use of violence (Kalyvas 2006), or the role of rebels (Arjona 2016) 
and criminal actors (Arias 2006, 2017) for local governance. An important recent contribution was by 
Beckert and Dewey (2017) on the role of illegal markets. The results of these studies can provide an 
indication for future research that steers away from the destructionist towards a more productive 
understanding of illicit economies. A better understanding of the externalities of illicit activities on 
society will give us a better comprehension of the effects on order and the interrelation to the state. 
While I have highlighted the important aspect of how illicit economies in the coca growing regions 
have repercussions on the “overall” local order, it would be interesting to see how these economies 
play out in different social groups within the society. A bigger group that comes to mind is the affected 
youth. There was no opportunity to include the youth as a specific group in this study. Nevertheless, I 
have highlighted some indications that suggest how youth is affected by the presence of an illicit 
economy in the margins of the state (peer pressure, economic attraction, lack of opportunities, 
education). The focus on youth would be an important aspect for future research, as young people are 
perceived to be promoters of change.238  
In my analysis, I was able to show how illicit economies in fact, created a particular field of power and 
how capital are distributed within this field. Bourdieu’s understanding of the fields of power gives us 
a nuanced understanding on the powers of and within the state. The focus on the relational aspects of 
power relations has proved to be an enriching feature in the analysis of illicit economies. A 
consequential following study would be to focus on the habitus (Bourdieu 1984). How does an 
environment that is dominated by the illicit economy and where informal rules are more prevalent 
 
238 A research project on youth in postwar societies analized difficulties of youth for the transition to adulthood in challenging 
structural environments (https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/project/against-all-odds-youth-in-postwar-societies)  
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than formal state rules, reflects on the internalized practices of a person? And how do these practices 
change in case of state intervention? This can be an insightful approach for focus in future research to 
deepen our understanding of the influence of illicit economies.  
Finally, regions of alternative order are not reduced to rural environments. In fast growing urban 
settings, state control is often rather low, which opens up the possibility for illicit economies to thrive. 
Particularly in Latin America, research has increased in recent years (e. g. Muggah and Vilalta 2014; 
Arias 2017). A comparison between similarities and differences in urban and rural environment can 
lead to a more holistic picture on the influence of illicit economies. Results can also lead to a more 
tailored approach to drug trafficking and in the elaboration of alternative development programs. All 
of these aspects are closely related to the research on the state in combination with sub-national and 
national aspects. More research is needed in this regard to understand the complex interplay not only 
between illicit economies and the state, but also on the relationship of the state and marginal areas. 
This can lead us to a more tailored analysis of the state and the effects of illicit economies. 
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Annex 
 
Annex I Questionnaire  
 
Año y lugar de nacimiento (Distrito y centro 
poblado) 
 
Lugar de vivencia (¿hace cuándo?)  
Genero Masculino                     Femenino                     
  
 
GI1 ¿Vives con tu familia?  Sí                     No   
GI2 ¿Tienes hijos? 
Sí                     No   
GI3 
 
Si te gustaría tener hijos ¿cuáles serían los obstáculos con los 
que te enfrentarías? 
Situación económica  
No encontró la pareja correcta  
No tiempo  
Otro _______________________________ 
GI4 En tu comunidad ¿cuáles son los tres problemas más grandes? 
 
GI5 
En tu comunidad ¿quiénes percibes como modelo/ como bien 
ejemplo? (como buena persona, económicamente, justa etc….) 
 
 
__________________________________ 
GI6 ¿Donde trabaja esta persona?  
Estado  
Comunidad civil  
Organizaciones Religiosas  
ONG´s  
Otras   
GI7 En tu comunidad ¿en quiénes confías más cuando tienes 
problemas? (por ejemplo cuando alguien robó algo) 
 
GI8 
 
¿Todavía asistes a la escuela / universidad? 
Sí                     No   
GI9 ¿Cuantos años de estudios tienes? (incluyendo la primaria) 
 
EI2 
¿A que te dedicas? Por ejemplo agricultura, construcción, etc…) 
__________________________________ 
No Trabajo                      
EI1 
 
¿Por cuánto tiempo trabajas? 
Tiempo completo         Parcialmente    
EI3 ¿Donde trabajas? 
 
Negocio familiar      Empresa   
Sector publico   Negocio propio  
EI5 ¿A que te dedicaste hace cinco años?  
__________________________________ 
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EI4 
El salario que recibes ¿Le permite cubrir satisfactoriamente sus 
necesidades? 
Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar  
Les alcanza justo, sin grandes dificultades 
No les alcanza, tienen dificultades 
No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades  
PI1 
¿Estás interesado en temas políticas? 
Muy interesado                     
Algo interesado  
Poco interesado  
Nada interesado  
PI2 
 
 
 
Sin tomar en cuenta tu edad,  
¿participaste/hubieras participado en las últimas elecciones 
locales? 
Sí                     No   
PI3 
 
 
 
Si tu respuesta es no, ¿por qué no? 
 
 
 
No tuve tiempo    
No tengo confianza en políticos  
Otras razones  _____________________ 
PI4 ¿Vas a Participar/ participarías en las próximas elecciones 
nacionales? 
Sí                     No   
PI5 
Si tu respuesta es no, ¿por qué no? 
_____________________________________ 
NC ¿De las siguientes características cuáles son las dos más 
importantes para un líder de la comunidad?  
Sinceridad  
Económico potente       
Sapiencia/ conocimiento             
Autoridad             
Confiable             
Fuerza                      
exitoso laboral                    
Madurez  
soporte de la comunidad  
Cuidoso/ compasivo  
 Otro _________________________________ 
NC2 Estás de acuerdo con lo siguiente frase: ¿Los líderes políticos 
cumplen sus promesas? Sí                     No                  No sé 
 
GC Cuáles son las temas más discutido en su comunidad? 
(menciona las tres temas más importantes) 
 
GC/ 
AAL1 
¿Quien tendría que ocuparse con estos temas?   
AA1 ¿Quien piensas tu es lo más poderoso en tu comunidad? 
(nombre y posición) 
 
¿Porque es poderoso? 
_________________________________ 
 
__________________________________ 
AAL3 En tu opinión ¿Cuáles son los tres  reglas más importantes en 
tu comunidad? (por ejemplo: ser honesto, no roba etc.) 
 
AA2 
Por favor, mire a la lista en la derecha y marca (cruza numero), 
para cada uno de los grupos, instituciones o personas de la lista 
¿cuánta confianza tiene usted en ellas?:  
mucha (1), algo (2), poca (3) o ninguna (4) confianza en...? 
 
 
A Las Fuerzas Armadas/ 
Ejercito 
B La policía  
C Los Autodefensas  
D Los medios de 
comunicación  
E El poder judicial 
F La Iglesia  
G Estado  
H Sus miembros 
familiares   
I Sus vecinos  
Mucha   Algo  Poca   Ninguna 
1      2     3    4 
 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
 
1      2     3    4 
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AA3 Por favor indica en cuanto el estado debería ocuparse con los 
siguientes puntos. Marca en la escala: mucho (1), algo (2), poco 
(3) o ninguna (4) 
 
 
A Mejorar calles 
B Agua 
C Luz 
D Crear Trabajo 
E Salud 
F Seguridad 
G Oportunidades para 
recreación 
Mucha    Algo   Poca   Ninguna 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
1      2     3    4 
 
AL3  ¿Está de acuerdo con la siguiente frase?: Los autoridades 
respetan las reglas de la sociedad. 
Sí                     No                   No sé  
 
AC1 ¿Estas contento/ con las autoridades de tu comunidad? 
¿Por qué no/ sí? 
Sí                     No                   No sé  
 
_________________________________ 
AJ1 
Te sientas representado/a  de los actores más importantes de tu 
comunidad 
Sí                     No                   No sé  
Evaluando la situación en tu comunidad  
Por favor indica cómo percibes los siguientes indicadores en tu comunidad en una escala del 1 al 4.  1= mala; 2= 
moderada; 3= buena; 4= excelente 
  Mala            Moderada              Buena                Excelente 
SC1 Servicios policiales 1                  2                         3                        4  
SC2 Servicio educativo 1                  2                         3                        4  
SC3 
Servicios de salud  
(por ej. hospitales, medicos) 
1                  2                         3                        4  
SC4 
Servicios sociales  
(por ej. ayuda familiar) 
1                  2                         3                        4  
SC5 
Bienestar económico  
(Por ej. trabajo) 
1                  2                         3                        4  
SC6 Seguridad 1                  2                         3                        4  
SC7 
¿Qué grande es el abuso de sustancias (drogas) en tu 
comunidad? 
Muchísimo    
Mucho    
Poco  
No hay  
No sé  
SC8 
¿Tú o alguien que conoces tenía que pagar o dar un 
presente a un oficial (policía, servicio público) en los 
últimos 12 meses? 
Sí   cuantas veces ______ 
No    
Yo no pero un amigo  
Yo no pero un miembro familiar  
No sé  
SC9 ¿Porque tenía que pagar? 
Impedir castigos  
Impedir pagamiento de una multa  
Acelerar cosas  
No razón especifico – para quedarse en buena relación  
Otro  por favor precisa____________________ 
ALP2 
 
 
Por favor indica como la situación en tu comunidad ha 
cambiado cinco años. 
Ha mejorado mucho    
Ha mejorado un poco    
No ha mejorado  
Es peor como antes  
AJP3 ¿Quien esta responsable para mejorar infraestructura y 
servicios en tu comunidad? 
Estado  
Comunidad civil  
Organizaciones Religiosas  
ONG´s  
Otras  _________________________________ 
AJP4 ¿Que deberían los autoridades más importantes proveer/ 
hacer para la comunidad?  
  
________________________________________ 
SA1 ¿Caminas por la comunidad en la noche cuando no hay luz? 
 
¿Te sientas seguro/a en tu comunidad? 
Sí                    No   
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Sí                    No   
SA2 ¿Has sido o algún pariente (familia) asaltado, agredido, o 
víctima de un delito en los últimos doce meses?  
Sí                     No                     No sé  
 
SA3 ¿Fue un delito con violencia o sin violencia? 
 
Con violencia                     
Sin violencia                       
 
SA4 
 
 
¿A quién acudes/ recurres si experimentas alguna forma de 
violencia? 
 
Policía    
Familia   
Amigos    
Líderes de la Comunidad        
• ¿Cual?____________________ 
Otros_________________________________ 
SA5 ¿A quién nunca acudirás/ recurrías si experimentas alguna 
forma de violencia? 
Policía    
Familia   
Amigos    
Líderes de la Comunidad        
Otros_________________________________ 
AC4 ¿Crees que tú puedes cambiar/ mejorar algo en tu 
comunidad? 
Sí                     No                   No sé  
AC5 ¿Si tu respuesta es sí, en qué manera podrías cambiar algo? 
 
GI: General Information, E: Education, PI: Political Interest, NC: Rules Community T: Trust; AA: Actor Assessment, AL: 
Actor Legality; AJ: Actor Justification; AC: Actor Consent; GP: General Perception; P: Probe 
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Annex II nterview Topic Guide 
General Context 
Como se siente en la comunidad? 
Me podría describir su situación personal y su rol en la comunidad? 
Por favor describa brevemente los desafíos o problemas más grandes en esta región (Economia, 
seguridad, orden social etc.) 
Cuales son los temas mas discutidas en tu comunidad 
Cuales fueron los cambios más importantes en los últimos diez años? 
Que influencia tiene el narcotrafico aquí? 
Usted tenía problemas con narcotraficantes?  
Conoce alguien que tenía problemas con ellos? 
Security 
Hay conflictos en la comunidad? 
Hay violencia común (corporal) en la comunidad? Por ejemplo: violencia en la calle, escuela etc. 
Por favor, me puede contar de la ultima incidencia – (Que pasó? Cuando y que hiciste?) 
- como estuve la reacción personal/ de la comunidad? 
Como ha cambiado la situacion con la violencia in comparación a diez/ cinco años? 
Porque crees hay mucha/ poca violencia? 
Hay más violencia ahora que antes? (cinco años)  
Sales en la noche cuando no hay luz? 
En que sector estas trabajando? 
Quien da seguridad economica? 
Rule 
En tu opinión cuales son las valores, normas más aceptadas en su comunidad? 
Quien define estas normas reglas? 
Quien lo controla las reglas? 
Tu estas siguiendo los leyes los normas del estado o de otra autoridad?  
Security 
Como define usted seguridad? 
Come percibes la seguridad en la comunidad? 
A quien confíes más en tu comunidad cuando tienes problemas familiares?  
Con quien hablarías cuando haya violencia? 
- Cuando tienes problemas económicas 
Como resolveron los problemas? 
Como piensan los personas de la comunidad sobre estado?  
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 Cuales son las instituciones importantes aca? 
Que rol tiene el estado y como ha cambiado? 
Las autoridades estan siguiendo los tan normas y leyes del Estado? 
Power 
En su opinión, quien es lo mas poderoso en el nivel local? 
- Porque tienen influencia? 
- Cual es su posición? 
- A que se dedica? 
Las personas mas importantes tienen algo que ver con la coca/ el narcotráfico? 
Tienes confianza en estos grupos? Porque si? Porque no? 
Hay otros actores influénciales que son importante? - Que rol tienen? Porque son poderosos? 
Estos actores, como entraron a estar poderosos? Cuando llegaron a ser poderosos? 
Los actores mas importantes tienen soporte de la comunidad? 
Perception of the State  
Quien construye infraestructura? (casa, 307ías, electricidad, agua y desague…) 
En su opinión: estos actores están haciendo un buen trabajo?  Que podrian mejorar? 
Que debería el Estado hacer? 
Tienes confianza en el Estado? Y sus actores? 
Porque pagas impuestos? 
Si piensas sobre los proximos diez años, como debería cambiar tu comunidad? 
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Annex II List of Questionnaire Participants  
 
Lable Date of birth (year) Place of birth Current residence Gender 
Cu1 1991 Apurimac Cumunpiari f 
Cu2 1998 Marintari Cumunpiari f 
Cu3 1967 Huanta Cumunpiari f 
Cu4 1980 Cumunpiari Cumunpiari m 
Cu5 1988 San Miguel Cumunpiari m 
Cu6 1983 Huanta Cumunpiari m 
Cu7 1991 San Miguel Cumunpiari Cumunpiari f 
Cu8 1995 Cumunpiari Cumunpiari m 
Cu9 1988 San Miguel - La Mar Cumunpiari f 
Cu10 1979 Sachabamba Cumunpiari m 
Cu11 1952 San Miguel  La Mar Cumunpiari m 
HU1 1969 Tarapoto (San Martin) Huipoca f 
HU3 1964 Iquitos Huipoca f 
HU4 1951 Tingo María (Huanuco) Huipoca m 
HU5 1951 Huánuco Huipoca m 
HU6 1976 Tingo María (Huanuco) Huipoca m 
HU7 1977 Huánuco Huipoca f 
HU8 1986 Huanuco Huipoca m 
HU9 1970 Huanuco Huipoca f 
HU10 1971 Tingo María Huipoca m 
HU11 1971 Ancash Huipoca m 
HU12 1991 Aguaytia Huipoca m 
HU13 1986 Tingo Maria Huipoca m 
HU14 1968 Requena - Loreto Huipoca m 
HU15 1958 Ayacucho Huipoca f 
HU16 1966 Huancayo Huipoca f 
HU17 1990 Puccalpa Huipoca m 
HU18 1977 Huancayo Huipoca m 
HU19 1977 Huipoca Huipoca f 
Ll1 1992 Llochegua Llochegua m 
Ll2 1996 Pucalpa Llochegua f 
Ll3 n.a. Huanta Llochegua m 
Ll4 1966 Huanta Llochegua m 
Ll5 1988 Llochegua Llochegua m 
Ll6 1970 Chibolito - Cajamarca Llochegua m 
Ll7 1985 Quinoa - Ayacucho Llochegua m 
Ll8 1966 Huanta - Santa Ana Llochegua f 
Ll9 1970 Nuevo progreso Llochegua m 
Ll10 1996 Llochegua Llochegua f 
Ll11 1994 Llochegua Llochegua m 
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Ll12 1972 Huancavelica Llochegua f 
Ll13 1986 Huanta Llochegua f 
Ll14 1982 Lima Llochegua m 
Ll15 1974 Pampas Llochegua m 
Ll16 1977 Llochegua Llochegua f 
Ll17 1972 Chungui Llochegua m 
Ll18 1995 Llochegua Llochegua f 
Ll19 1950 Huanta Llochegua m 
Ll20 1963 Huanta Llochegua m 
Ll21 1992 Llochegua Llochegua f 
Ll22 1970 Huanuco Llochegua m 
Ll23 1990 Llochegua Llochegua f 
Ll24 1992 Llochegua Llochegua f 
Ll25 1975 Huanta Llochegua m 
Mo1 1970 Llata Humalies Monzón m 
MO2 1977 Monzón Monzón m 
Mo3 1970 Monzón Monzón m 
Mo4 1959 Monzón Monzón f 
Mo5 1958 Monzón Monzón m 
Mo6 1982 Huanuco Monzón m 
Mo7 1961 Huanuco Monzón f 
Mo8 n.a. Monzón Monzón n.a. 
Mo9 1984 Tantma Monzón f 
Mo10 1985 Monzón Monzón m 
Mo11 1999 Monzón Monzón m 
Mo12 1980 Monzon Monzón m 
Mo13 1983 Monzón Monzón m 
Mo14 1964 Monzón Monzón f 
Mo15 1974 Huancayo Monzón f 
Mo16 1989 Monzón Monzón f 
Mo17 1985 Monzón Monzón m 
Mo18 1950 Lima Monzón f 
Mo19 1963 Tasso Grande - Monzón Monzón m 
Mo20  1974 Huanuco Monzón m 
SSJ1 1989 Tingo Maria Subde San Jorge f 
SSJ2 1966 Pacmitea Subde San Jorge m 
SSJ3 1986 Rupa Rupa Subde San Jorge f 
SSJ4 1991 Tingo Maria Subde San Jorge m 
SSJ5 1991 Prate Piedra Subde San Jorge f 
SSJ6 1972 Huánuco Subde San Jorge f 
SSJ7 1958 Capitán Arellano Subde San Jorge m 
SSJ8 1971 Huánuco Subde San Jorge m 
SSJ9 1984 Huanuco Subde San Jorge m 
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SSJ10 1962 Panau Subde San Jorge m 
SSJ11 1972 Subde San Jorge Subde San Jorge m 
SSJ12 1972 Pachitea Subde San Jorge m 
SSJ13 1952 Huanuco Subde San Jorge m 
SSJ14 1983 Subde San Jorge Subde San Jorge f 
SSJ15 1973 Emilio Baldizan Subde San Jorge m 
StR1 1978 San Miguel Santa Rosa m 
StR2 1973 Santa Rosa Santa Rosa m 
StR3 1952 lima Santa Rosa m 
StR4 1971 Santa Rosa Santa Rosa m 
StR5 1970 Tambo Santa Rosa m 
StR6 1960 San Miguel Santa Rosa f 
StR7 1969 San Francisco Santa Rosa f 
StR8 1993 huanta Santa Rosa m 
StR9 n.a. Santa Rosa Santa Rosa m 
StR10 1990 n.a. n.a. m 
StR11 1959 Huanta Santa Rosa m 
StR12 1991 Santa Rosa Santa Rosa f 
StR13 1986 Iquitos Santa Rosa m 
StR14 1984 San Miguel Santa Rosa f 
StR15 1982 Sivia Santa Rosa f 
StR16 1995 Santa Rosa Santa Rosa f 
StR17 1986 Anco y Agua Dulce Santa Rosa f 
StR18 1977 Sant José Santuar Santa Rosa m 
StR19 n.a. n.a. Santa Rosa n.a. 
StR20 1970 Ayna Santa Rosa m 
StR21 1965 San Miguel Santa Rosa m 
StR22 1970 Ances San Luis Santa Rosa m 
StR23 1974 Santa Rosa Santa Rosa m 
StR24 1973 Callao Santa Rosa f 
StR25 1997 Santa Rosa Santa Rosa f 
StR26 1994 Santa Rosa Santa Rosa f 
StR27 1988 Ayacucho Santa Rosa m 
StR28 1978 Santa Rosa Santa Rosa m 
StR29 1975 Ayacucho Santa Rosa m 
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Annex IV List of Interviews  
 
Interviewcode Date Position "Local 
Authority" 
Male/ 
Female 
Place 
Agmunmf 09.02.2015 Municipality worker   F/M Aguaytia 
Agongm 15.02.2016 NGO   M Aguaytia 
Agudedum 11.12.2015 Director Primary School   M Huipoca 
Agupolcm 10.12.2015 Police Station Chief   M Aguaytia 
Ahvcadp 10.06.2017 Ex-president Autodefensa x M Tingo Maria 
Ayatax 03.03.2017 Taxi Driver   M Lima 
Conpanp 09.03.2016 President CONPACP x M Ayacucho 
Cumalm 09.01.2016 Mayor x M Cumunpiari 
Devom1 16.11.2016 DEVIDA Official   M Lima 
Devof2m 05.11.2015 Employee DEVIDA    F  Lima 
Devof3m 16112015 Devida Official   M Lima 
Devof4m 02.06.2017 DEVIDA Coordinator   M Tingo Maria 
expdro1 22.03.2017 Journalist   M  Lima 
expdro2 27.03.2017 Journalist   M Lima 
Expinfo 13.11.2015 Consultant   M Lima 
Expjougm 12.11.2015 Journalist   M Lima 
Hualm 11.12.2015 Mayor x M Huipoca 
Hugobm 12.12.2015 Gobernador x M Huipoca 
Hugobm 13.12.2015 Gobernador x M Huipoca 
Hugobtenm 12.12.2015 Teniente Gobernador x M Huipoca 
Huipoca 13.12.2015 Juez de Paz   F Huipoca 
Hujuezf 12.12.2015 Juez de Paz x F Huipoca 
Hutaxm 12.12.2015 Taxi Driver   M Huipoca 
Hutaxm1 12.12.2015 Taxi Driver   M Huipoca 
Liconsm 13.12.2015 Security Consultant   M Lima 
Lijourm 12.11.2015 Investigative Journalist   M Lima 
Lijourm2 27.03.2017 Investigative Journalist   M Lima 
Lisciem1 09.11.2015 Researcher   M Lima 
Llauexp 25.01.2016 Ex-President Autodefensa x M Llochegua 
Lledujoum 12.01.2016 Teacher and Journalist   M Llochegua 
Llexalm 13.01.2016 Ex-Mayor, Founder of Village x M Llochegua 
Llexp2 14.01.2016 Ex-President Autodefensa x M Llochegua 
Llexprofm 13.05.2017 Shop Owner, Ex-Teacher   M Llochegua 
Llfepm 14.01.2016 Ex-Alcalde, FEPAVRAEM x M Llochegua 
Llgobm 10.01.2016 Gobernador x M Llochegua 
Lljuezm 14.01.2016 Juez de Paz x M Llochegua 
Llmaaup 26.01.2016 Presidente Autodefensas x M Llochegua 
Llmunm1 11.01.2016 Municipalidad  x M  Llochegua 
Llpolcm 14.01.2016 Police Station Chief   M Llochegua 
Llpop2 11.01.2016 Comunity Member   M Llochegua 
Llpopcm 12.01.2016 Mecanic   M  Llochegua 
Llpopm 11.01.2016 Transportista   M Llochegua 
Llpopm1 10.01.2016 Cocalero   M  Llochegua 
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Llpopm2 10.10.2016 Cocalero   M Llochegua 
Llpopulcar 11.01.2016 Community Member   M Llochegua/ Sivia 
Llprofm 12.01.2016 Teacher   M Llochegua 
Lltienf 10.01.2016 Shop Owner   F Llochegua 
Lltram 12.01.2016 Narcotraficante   M Llochegua 
Monalm 31.05.2017 Mayor Monzón    M  Monzón  
Monaup 22.11.2015 President Autodefensa x M Monzón 
Moncacm 19.02.2016 Cacaotero   M Monzón 
Moncafm 31.05.2017 Cafetalero   M Monzón  
Moncam1 01.12.2015 ENACO   M Monzón  
Moncamcm 22.11.2015 Cafetalero   M Monzón  
Moncamm1 26.11.2015 Campesino  x M  Monzón  
Moncamm2 26.11.2015 Campesino    M Monzón  
Moncoclm 23.11.2015 Cocalero Líder 
 
M Monzón 
Mondedum2 01.12.2015 Director School 
 
M  Monzón  
Mondev1 26.11.2015 DEVIDA Coordinator x M Monzón 
Mondevf1 19.02.2016 Devida Employee 
 
F Monzón  
Mondevm 02.06.2017 Employee DEVIDA 
 
M  Monzón  
Moneduf1 30.11.2015 Coordinator Education 
 
F Monzón  
Monedum1 01.12.2015 Teacher   
 
M Monzón  
Monenm1 10.12.2015 ENACO 
 
M Monzón  
Monexgobm 04.12.2015 Ex-gobernador x M Monzón  
Monexgobm2 22.11.2015 Ex-gobernador x M Monzón  
Mongobcm 12.02.2016 Gobernador x M Monzón/Cachicoto 
Monjourm 30.05.2017 Journalist 
 
M Monzón  
Monjuezm 22.11.2015 Juez de Paz x M Monzón 
Monlocp1 22.11.2015 Comunity Member x M Monzón 
Monm1 22.11.2015 Autodefensa x M Monzón 
Monmunm1 22.11.2015 Municipalidad "Chief of Staff" 
 
M Monzón 
Monmunregm 30.11.2015 Regidor  
 
M Monzón  
Monongf 23.11.2015 ONG 
 
F Monzón  
Monongm1 21.11.2015 ONG  
 
M Monzón  
Monpol1 22.11.2015 Police 
 
M Monzón 
Monresm1 30.11.2015 Restaurant Owner  
 
M Monzón 
Montienf 29.11.2015 Shop Owner 
 
F Monzón 
Montienm2 22.12.2015 Shop Owner/ Ex-Bar Owner 
 
M Monzón 
Monunm1 09.12.2015 UN-Staaf 
 
M Monzón 
Palmpoldim 22.01.2016 Police Dinandro 
 
M VRAEM/ Palmapampa 
Provraf 14.01.2016 Employee Provraem 
 
F  Llochegua 
Sivmunm1 26.01.2016 Municipalidad, Journalist 
 
M Sivia 
Sroalm 20.01.2016 Mayor Santa Rosa x M Santa Rosa 
Sroauexp 22.01.2016 Ex-President Autodefensa 
 
M Santa Rosa 
Sroaulm 07.03.2016 Autodefensa x M Santa Rosa 
Sroaupm 16.01.2016 Presidente Autodefensas x M Santa Rosa 
Srococ 07.03.2016 Cocalero 
 
M Santa Rosa 
Sroexalm 10.01.2016 Ex-Mayor  
 
M Santa Rosa  
 
 
313 
Sroexalm 16.05.2017 Ex-Mayor x M Santa Rosa 
Srogobm 15.01.2016 Gobernador x M Santa Rosa 
Srojuezm 08.01.2016 Juez de Paz x M Santa Rosa 
Srojuezm2 15.05.2017 Juez de Paz 
 
M  Santa Rosa  
Sropolj 14.05.2017 Policia Santa Rosa 
 
M Santa Rosa 
Sropop 22.01.2016 Comunity Member 
 
M Santa Rosa 
Sropop2 08.03.2016 Comunity Member 
 
M Santa Rosa 
Sropop3 09.03.2016 Comunity Member 
 
F Santa Rosa 
Sroprofm 16.05.2017 Ex-Teacher 
 
M Santa Rosa 
Sroresf 14.05.2017 Restaurant owner, Coca farm 
owner 
 
F Santa Rosa  
Sroresm 08.03.2016 Restaurant owner, Coca farm 
owner 
x M Santa Rosa 
Sroserp 15.03.2016 Presidente Serenazgo Santa Rosa 
 
M  Santa Rosa 
Srotram 22.01.2016 Narcotraficante 
 
M  Santa Rosa 
Srotram2 20.01.2016 Ex-Narcotraficante 
 
M Santa Rosa 
Srotram3 16.01.2016 Narcotraficante 
 
M Santa Rosa 
Ssjgobf 16.12.2015 Gobernador X F Subde de San Jorge 
Strexal 19.02.2016 Ex-Juez de Paz x M Monzón 
Ticoc 20.11.2015 Cocalero Líder 
 
M Tingo Maria 
Tihotm1 15.12.2015 Hotel Owner 
 
M Tingo Maria 
Tijourm 15.12.2015 Investigative Journalist 
 
M Tingo Maria 
Tinexpaum 01.06.2017 Presidente Autodefensas 
 
M Alto Huallaga 
Tinjourm 01.06.2017 Journalist 
 
M Tingo Maria 
Vracocl 09.03.2016 Lider Cocalero x M Ayacucho 
Vradevj 01.02.2016 Devida leading employee 
 
M Ayacucho 
Vraexong 08.03.2016 Ex-ONG 
 
M Pchari 
Vrafim 03.02.2016 Persecutor Drug offenses 
 
M Ayacucho 
Vrapold 22.01.2016 Police Dinandro 
 
M Palmapampa 
Vrapold 21.01.2016 Police leading position 
 
M Pichari 
Vrapolint 21.01.2016 Police Inteligence 
 
M Pichari 
Vrataxm 06.03.2016 Taxi Driver 
 
M  Pichari 
Vraunexch 30.01.2016 UN Driver 
 
M Ayacucho 
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Annex V Original Quotes in Spanish 
 
Subchapter Quote 
AHV 
Evolution 
of the 
Region 
“aquí se sembraba solo caña de azúcar, todo esos cerros de ahí estaban repletos de caña de azúcar, el dueño era un chileno 
que se llamaba Loli, era dueño de todo esos cerros, por eso le llaman pista Loli a la pista de aquí abajo por ese hacendado, 
y la hacienda era grande todo ese cerro.“ (Monjourm) 
 
Ellos ya tenían coca desde antes para el intercambio, para el chaccheo, se cambiaba jamon, papas,  el intercambio 
comercial con la localidad de Áncash, los conchucanos venían con sus 15 mulas, y cambiaban jamón por una arroba de 
coca, los conchucanos son del callejón de Huaylas,  de Conchucos.“ (Moncamcm) 
Si, fue por el Estado Peruano, la fábrica de drogas pero para cosas licitas seria, no para las cosas ilícitas. Se hicieron la 
pozas y todo, una fábrica pues, (...) una sola, de ahí trajeron químicos para que puedan elaborar la droga y de ahí sacaban 
pasta básica de cocaína, de ahí lo sacaban pero supongo que para cosas licitas y no para cosas ilícitas” (Monjourm)  
“Entonces a partir de 1966 el Estado dice que están haciendo mal y que se tiene que cerrar esa fábrica, en 1966. Entonces 
dicen que hay que cortar esa fábrica de droga en el valle del Monzón, entonces despidieron a los empleados que eran de 
Áncash, todos los empleados eran ancashinos. Cuando ellos fueron despedidos se fueron a sus lugares de origen. Y la gente 
ya no podía vender su coca, porque la fábrica había cerrado. […]  
Ellos dijeron que como ya no hay quien compre la coca y como la gente estaba acostumbrada a vender su coca en la fábrica, 
y como ya no había fabrica no había donde vender la coca, entonces el señor [de Ancash] pensó en traer a uno de los 
trabajadores para que le enseñe a cómo hacer la droga. Entonces su amigo vino, y en su casa en Paucapo, hicieron una 
mini fábrica para hacer droga. (...) esos ex trabajadores sabían cómo hacer la droga, porque la gente antes no sabía cómo 
hacer los químicos, por eso esos trabajadores durante un mes les enseñaron a la gente en Paucapo, de cómo hacer la 
droga, entonces el ayudante miraba, y después el hacía ya su poza con plásticos, el otro ayudante también hacia, y así se 
ha multiplicado en todo el valle. Así empieza el mercado negro aquí en Monzón.“ (Monjourm) 
 
 No, no tenia mucha influencia. no tenía influencia. Siempre estaba presente las autoridades, tan solo en un periodo faltaba 
la presencia del estado la presencia policial para que de orden. había un tiempo del terrorismo, entonces aquí era violencia. 
Claro no tenia poder sino era violencia anónimo, secreto.” (Monmunregm)  
  
Sendero 
and the 
Conflict 
“Eso de la guerrilla si fue un verdadero atraso para el Monzón. Muchos años hemos estado completamente en problemas 
cuando existía el terrorismo. Entonces no  sabíamos si estar con el terrorismo o no estar. En esos tiempos yo vivía aquí en 
el Monzón,  inclusive en las noches te sacaban a las 7pm de tu casa y toda la noche en la plaza de arma estabas te parabas 
te sentabas. Yo en ese tiempo era directora del colegio. Una fecha cuando yo venía con mis alumnos de Tingo María me 
quiso quitar a mis alumnos porque ellos decían que no son estudiantes sino son soldados y por eso los querían matar” 
(Moneduf1) 
“por ejemplo el alcalde estaba sujeto a los que es el narcotráfico o la guerrilla, entonces tenía que obedecer dar algo a 
cambio de que no lo maten, de que no lo desaparecer, que no atenten contra ellos, ms que nada pedían una cuota a los 
que tenían pocas posibilidades, por ejemplo a un comérciate, tu estas llevando tanto, trae tu camión que vas a colaborar 
con el partido, y se bajaban 5 sacos de arroz, 5 sacos de azúcar así les pedía la guerrilla y si no hacías eso era probable que 
te mate, o había la posibilidad de que ya no puedas trabajar. Entonces tú por la necesidad de trabajar y de manera tranquila 
tenías que colaborar” (Monresm1)  
“en el Monzón era otra realidad, aquí ya  prácticamente desde los años, 2000. 2001, 2003, 2004 de repente por ahí se 
quisieron infiltrar pero nosotros hemos dicho ahí nada más. Quien ha respondido a eso el pueblo.” (Mongobcm). 
  
State 
Security 
Forces and 
Involveme
nt in Drug 
Trafficking 
 
“Anteriormente la policía tuvo mala fama. Cuando entro Sendero la policía se escapó de Monzón,  se fue a pesar de que 
tenían su puesto y todo. Había Banco de la Nación pero cuando llega Sendero la policía se escapa pero queda el Banco. 
Cuando entra Sendero se lleva el dinero del Banco y votan todas las cosas del Banco.” (Moneduf1)239 
Eran autoridades impuestas por los grupos terroristas. No eran autoridades que se elegían en unas elecciones. Eran 
autoridades impuestas a la fuerza, contra su voluntad.  [...] 
A esas autoridades los imponían por la fuerza. Entonces como te decía, después de eso de a poco, empieza a tomar su 
lugar el Estado. Entonces empiezan por atender en la parte de infraestructura, es decir centros educativos. Se empieza a 
construir centros educativos.” (Monedum1) 
“El cambio fue que se pacifico, cuando esta al lado las fuerzas armadas.” (Monmunregm) 
 
239 A local journalist agrees: “En los 80 la policía nacional estaba pero se van en el 86 cuando apareció el terrorismo, ellos 
escaparon, no les hicieron frente. Por eso a la policía se les decía los “escapalones”” (Monrad) 
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The illicit 
Economy in 
AHV 
“¿Cómo se inició en el narcotráfico? 
 Si me volví narcotraficante fueron por las circunstancias. Yo era agente, vendedor viajero de la marca Galaxy, y recorría 
el país vendiendo sus equipos a clientes que pagaban en partes. Sucede que hice una buena venta, pero al momento de 
pagarme no lo hicieron con dinero sino con droga. Me sorprendí, y en un inicio no sabía qué hacer con lo recibido, pero 
tenía que convertir ese producto en dinero y busqué a quién venderlo. Fue fácil y gané mucho más dinero de lo que recibía 
al vender los equipos Galaxy. Desde allí busqué la manera de meterme en el negocio. 
  
Sendero 
and the 
Conflict 
En ese tiempo aunque había plata  la gente tenía miedo en ese entonces, no querían vivir así, llegaban 10, 11 de la noche  
la guerrilla venia tocaba la puerta y tenías que ir a la reunión quieras o no quieras tenías que asistir. Ahí te juzgaban, 
mataban (Monresm1) 
  
State and 
the Illicit 
Economy 
Ya toma su lugar las fuerzas armadas. Pero siguió el narcotráfico y estaban involucrados  los propios militares. No era un 
cambio que queríamos (Monedum1) 
 “Si yo llegué a ser grande fue porque Fujimori y Montesinos me apoyaron a cambio den un monto mesual, de 50 mil 
dólares. Yo me hice grande durante el gobierno de Fujimori. El Perú fue un narcoestado en esa época. Narcoestado porque 
fue con ayuda del Ejército que en enero de 1990 iniciamos la construcción de la pista de aterrizaje en Campanilla (distrito 
de la provincia de Mariscal Cáceres, departamento de San Martín) y el 15 de marzo comenzó a funcionar y empezaron a 
entrar las avionetas (para recoger la droga con destino a Colombia)). Fueron los militares los que me  facilitaron  el rodillo 
y el cargador frontal para construir la pista. Además los soldados de la Base de Punta Arenas, con autorización de sus jefes, 
me ayudaban a subir la droga a las avionetas. Los militares obedecían a Montesinos. La época de Fujimori fue un 
narcoestado. Fujimori tenía pleno conocimiento de las narcoactividades y eso aparece también en documentos 
desclasificados de Estados Unidos.” (LaRepublica 2016b).  
  
The Coca 
Economy 
“Más antes había mucho dinero. Muchos dólares” (Monedeum2) 
  
The Coca 
Economy 
 
“La hoja de coca,  ese era el único sustento, y eso es porque nuestras autoridades veían la coca como único producto, 
entonces era más fácil trabajar con la coca, porque te rendía cada tres meses, y después de eso tenías tiempo para dormir 
incluso.” (Monmunm1) 
 
“Si, mucha prostitución. Venían mujeres colombianas, brasileras. Todo pagado, porque había plata” (Monenm1) 
“ellos ya tenían un dinero bastante entonces se dedicaban a emborracharse en las calles, así hasta otra cosecha.” 
(Monmunm1) 
“Después de la guerrilla cuando ya se fueron. Ya era diferente ya. Mejor dicho cada uno buscaba su entorno laboral. 
Entonces se dedicaron a los que es comercialización de  drogas. Se vendía como vender pan. Agarrabas tu mochila se ponía 
10 a 5 kilos e ibas a otro punto a negociar. Y así comercializabas como si fuera algo muy común, eso era.” (Monresm1)  
Si, había. Compradores directos. Por aquí abajo hacían vuelos, por esa pista de dónde vienes. De Cachicoto más arriba, eso 
era  la pista. De ahí salían las avionetas” (Monenm1) 
Vivíamos en una desesperación aquí y cada cual se tenía que cuidar, cuidar su vida, su hogar, porque no había garantías 
para tu vida si tu decías y proponías que hay que cultivar otros productos alternativos, te decían que eras un traidor, y solo 
permitían que siembres coca, pero lo hacían con la finalidad de robar también, porque toda la gente que sembraba coca 
tenía que dar un sol por arroba, y el que tenía 100 arrobas, eran 100 soles, entonces de esa plata vivían los dirigentes.” 
(Monmunm1) 
  
Social 
Consequen
ces 
“Antes interesaba más dinero, trabajo y diversión, otras cosas.” (Monresm1) 
“[E]stán mal acostumbrados cuantos años se ha vivido de eso nada más.  A lo fácil nada más y ahora usted sabe, esperar 
y acostumbrarse a ese tipo de vida es un poco difícil. Aquí se tiene otro tipo de vida chupar y bailar 
Antes había mucha borrachera? 
Si, mucha prostitución. Venían mujeres colombianas, brasileras. Todo pagado, porque había plata.” (Monenm1) 
 
Security 
“nuestras autoridades veían la coca como único producto, entonces era más fácil trabajar con la coca, porque te rendía 
cada tres meses, y después de eso tenías tiempo para dormir incluso. Entonces eso se ha incubado en la sociedad, la 
delincuencia, la vagancia.  
¿Pero porque delincuencia? 
Porque ellos ya tenían un dinero bastante entonces se dedicaban a emborracharse en las calles, así hasta otra cosecha.” 
(Monmunm1) 
“Algunos que sabían han invertido en sus hijos pero otros decían ya que no soy profesional mis hijos también van a seguir 
sembrando coca. Pero otros no han pensado así, yo por ejemplo eh educado a mis hijos en la ciudad y ya son profesionales.“ 
(Monmunm1) 
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“(…) los cocaleros le dijeron traidor, (…) le decían que no es hijo del Monzón, porque el incentivada a sembrar cosas licitas. 
Era un gran cambio, él se dedicaba ahora a sembrar solo café, porque sabía que con la droga no se iba ir bien, porque 
todos sus hermanos estaban en la cárcel por la droga.“ 
“La situación social en esos tiempos era terrible. Tu no podías opinar nada porque detrás de ti había gente y le avisaban a 
los “traqueteros” a los que compran droga y ellos de alguna manera te hacían llegar las indirectas, las amenazas. Ese 
tiempo no era fácil. En ese ambiente se ha trabajado con todos los riesgos.” (Monunm1) 
“Yo era gobernador de Monzón y cuando dejo el cargo ellos hicieron su huelga, yo no me asentia a esta huelga. no me 
asentia a esa huelga porque no tenia principio esta huelga. Entonces vino un grupo de huelgistas a mi casa, lo cortaron el 
brazo a mi senora. Entonces me dijeron este es traido. A mi me agarroron me secuestraron. yo les denunciépor secuestro 
por terrorismo, porque ellos vinieron encapuchado. Porque todos que vienen asi, encapuchado, para mi es terrorismo. 
me llevaron a dos cuadras y a mi senora les cortaron el brazo. A mi ultimo hijo, lo traumaron. Todo esto traumó a mi hijo.” 
(Mongobcm) 
 
  
 
Coca Rules 
“Era muy dificil, no habia Policia, no habia fiscalia. la presencia del estado era nulo aqui en esta epoca. (…) Naturalmente 
Monzon era una verguenza porque mataban a cualquier persona yo fui amenazado de muerte asi por eso las garantias 
que pedí. Me dio la provincia ni siquiera me dieron aqui la governacion ningunos.” (Moncamcm) 
“Era bastante peligroso que entrara gente desconocida porque se pensaba que era policía o soplón. Era muy delicado que 
gente desconocida entrara. Por eso solo entraban familias conocidas aquí. Entonces la gente extraña no podía ingresar así 
nada más” (Moneduf1) 
“Ya era por cuestiones de narcotráfico. Ya no era ya por terrorismo. Ajustes de cuentas, asaltos. Ósea donde hay 
narcotráfico ahí necesariamente tiene que haber asaltos, ese tipo de muertes era,  ya no era por la guerrilla.”(Monedum1) 
“La seguridad estaba organizado por quien? 
El mismo pueblo, con las autoridades, las rondas campesinas, hemos hecho un trabajo si agarramos un choro a la losa 
(cancha deportiva) llamabamos a sus familiares o caso contrario se lo mandamos a la autoridad competente. Eso y era 
función de lo tenientes gobernadores que en ese momento tenían su cargo.” (Monexgobm)  
 
“si había un robo, que podía hacer esa persona…. 
En ese caso solo se le advertía a la persona, aunque más antes esos temas de robos no había aquí. No había robos, dejabas 
tu puerta abierta y no pasaba nada, no había violencia, ni robo. No había de que se tenía que denunciar a la policía a esa 
clase de gente se le llevaba abajo al río porque esa gente no valía para nada. Gente ratera y delincuente perjudica el 
bienestar del pueblo.  
¿Entonces que hizo el pueblo? 
Lo botaban al rio, lo mataban cuando cometía robos, más robo sobre todo no tanto los que cometían violencia, si no robos.” 
(Monmunm1) 
 
“El mismo pueblo, con las autoridades, las rondas campesinas, hemos hecho un trabajo si agarramos un choro a la losa 
(cancha deportiva) llamabamos a sus familiares o caso contrario se lo mandamos a la autoridad competente. Eso y era 
función de lo tenientes gobernadores que en ese momento tenían su cargo.” (Mongobcm) 
“La subcultura del narcotrafico ha creado sus propias reglas sus propias formas de vivir sin la presencia del estado. La 
poblacion ha ido - no felices talvez  pero acostumbrandose adaptandose porque tenia algo de treinta anos. entonces la 
gente se habia adaptado y defindia este estatus quo, no?“ (Monongm1) 
“En el tema del narcotráfico las autoridades siempre estaban un poco presionadas por el simple hecho de que el 
narcotráfico dominaba casi todo. Y las autoridades como no había un respaldo del Estado. No había la policía. Tenían 
miedo las autoridades del narcotráfico. Entonces se sometían a ellos, tenían que seguir la ilación (consecuencias), tenían 
que obedecer porque simplemente si no hacían caso mataban a las autoridades.” (Monedum1) 
"las reglas importantes eran que tienes que ser conocido para ingresar al valle, si no eres conocido alguien tiene que 
garantizar para que tu ingreses y el resto ya era cosa de que ellos [los lideres cocaleros] imponían su justicia popular"  
  
Power “cuando iba a Lima me di cuenta que la coca no solo en Perú, sino a nivel mundial está penalizado. Eso me decían los 
cocaleros, es decir más antes yo era dirigente y no me daba cuenta verdaderamente como eran las reglas, pero me di 
cuenta y me aparte de ellos, pero me insinuaron con la gente, y por esa razón me apartaron a mí.“ (Monmunm1) 
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“los dirigentes cocaleros nunca han permitido que el gobierno llega al Monzón. Porque los cocaleros decían: si nosotros 
dejamos entrar a los profesionales al estado, nos van a erradicar la hoja de coca Los dirigentes eran en este tiempo Iburcio 
Morales, era Ticeran, todos ellos eran los dirigentes. ellos eran dueños del valle. 
Y cuales fueron los autoridades?  
los autoridades eran el alcalde, el gobernador. pero ellos no pintaban nada. [Los que manejaban] eran los dirigentes 
cocaleros. Tu te caías mal o estas haciendo algo, venían los dirigentes cocaleros te amenazaban de frente. tu tenias que 
hacerles caso allí. Ellos eran los dueños  (Monexgobm) 
 
“una cosa es las autoridades elegidas por el voto popular y otra cosa son los lideres en elececion local que hacen (short 
pause) de la subcultura que te digo. y ellos fueron los que controlaban. y el eligido popularmente por las reglas del estado. 
Me dicen que no querian energia porque eso venia caigo de la tema coca.” (Monongm1) 
Llega un momento en que los cocaleros empezaron a vernos mal al proyecto de arroz, empezaron a vernos mal, porque en 
una forma se está dividiendo. Entonces decían que los estábamos dividiendo. Y eso era cierto porque mucha gente ya no 
sembraba coca, estaba sembrando productos de pa´ llevar, o se dedicaba a la ganadería o empezaban a sembrar cacao, 
porque también eso había, o hacían reforestación, también había crianza, el proyecto les daba. Entonces llega un momento 
en que Iburcio Morales presiono a los directivos, que en ese tiempo era COPAN (¿?) la institución con la que se trabajaba. 
Entonces hubo un momento que dijeron saben que señores hasta aquí nada mas o se juntan con Naciones Unidas o con 
nosotros. Por ende también había la presión de la parte armada donde nos decían saben que señores ustedes tienen 
que salir de aquí. Y hubo una reunión fuerte. Por suerte ahí en la plaza de Cachicoto nos dijeron hasta aquí 
nada más, Naciones Unidas se va” [...] “Ahí nada más vino Iburcio Morales y se coludieron (unieron) ahí Morales como 
cocalero, el mismo presidente del COPAN más el grupo armado, conjuntamente con el narcotráfico. Porque  ese tiempo 
había bastante coca. Había droga hasta por gusto entonces era una fuerza. Entonces nos dieron un plazo de una semana 
para salir todos nosotros. Todos los trabajadores y salimos. Todos nosotros salimos y sacamos a las justas un camión, el 
otro camión se quedó ahí, se quedaron los tractores. Entonces que pasa ha pasado el tiempo. Ellos que hacen ni bien 
salimos nosotros ellos empezaron a vender el abono que teníamos bastante. Al toque nada más se lo venden todo el abono” 
(Monunm1) 
  
Post-
Eradication 
Economy 
“Migran pues. De aquí salen y se meten más al fondo de nuevo planta coca ahí y siguen viviendo la misma vaina. Porque 
la producción de la coca es más rentable aquí en Perú, aquí en el valle. Por eso dicen que con una hectárea de coca ya 
tienen para que vivan. En cambio sembrar café, cosechas una vez al año. Y que haces en un año. Además cuando plantas 
esta chiquita, que haces en esos años. Tienes que esperar 5 años. En esos 5 años que cosa comes. De que vives y la cosecha 
es una vez al año. En el cacao es la misma situación. Aunque aquí cacao no produce, eso es en la parte baja” (Monenm1)  
 
“Ahora primero erradican, después quieren plantar otra cosa. Por ejemplo, aquí en este valle no producen cacao, solo 
café. Lo único. Ni siquiera se ha hecho experimentos con otras plantas como, lúcumas, paltas. Otras plantas que pueden 
dar en la zona Nunca han hecho estudios” (Interview Monenm2). 
“De aquí un kilómetro podía encontrar un pozo de maceración donde hacen la droga, ahora ya no, uno tiene que ir a 
buscarlo, con información de inteligencia y con mucho riesgo de meterse a la selva porque francotiradores nomás nos 
vuelan la cabeza, 6,7 a 8 horas ahora se cuidan más, por la erradicación de la hoja de coca desde el años 2011, 12, 13, 14 
a minimizado la producción, pero el tráfico de drogas continua.” (Agupolcm). 
  
Security ¿Te sentiste segura aquí? 
“Al principio no, no me sentía segura por había personas que me tildaban de soplona, de espía y que estoy viniendo a ver 
quién es cocalero, pero de repente eso decían por su ignorancia. Pero el tiempo me ha dado la razón y no es así. Ahora por 
ejemplo tengo alumnos que están llevando los cursos que nosotros damos y nos va bien. Trabajamos con las instituciones 
bien, trabajamos con los colegios y hasta ahora hay una buena aceptación” Monongf1) 
 
“Mejor dicho hay más violencia en el sentido de que hay más problemas familiares por problemas económicos. Hay más 
violencia en los hogares. Pero ya no hay muertes sin razón porque el narcotráfico si traía eso. Ajustes de cuentas, se 
mataban por dinero, asaltos, diferentes cosas pues.” (Monresm1) 
 
“Para empezar ya no hay asaltos y si los hay va ser una cosa fortuita, de mil uno. Ya la vida se puede realizar aquí 
totalmente en paz. Podemos festejar un cumpleaños, yo duermo con mi ventana abierto y no pasa absolutamente nada. 
Dado que la presencia de la policía ha devuelto la tranquilidad y la paz” (Monedum1) 
 
“¿Ahora te sientes más seguro o igual? 
Claro un poco más seguro seria porque ya no hay el miedo que pueda sentir que por una calumnia te matan, sin ser juzgado 
y sin ninguna razón te mataban (Monresm1) 
 
“La policía siempre tiene un poco de mala fama, nunca ha tenido una buena fama porque. Como la gente aquí estamos en 
la chacra no trabajan legalmente. Se trabaja informalmente.(…) [Las policias] Vienen aquí a hacer sus  rondas y la gente 
dice que están molestando. Los taxistas dicen que los están molestando. La policía tiene fama siempre de pedir dinero.” 
(Monresm1) 
 “Porque saben muy bien "ah la policia me va agarrar no me van a chapar, no tienen preso me van a dejar". En cambio el 
pueblo no dice eso, en contrario te agarrar te chapa y te masacreo (...) por ejemplo en el ultimo ano habian muchos robos 
habian asaltos. entonces esto es el tema de ahora. la gente esta consciente que la policia las lleva a la comisaria doy mi 
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declaracion y mi suelta. tu no puedos tocar a esta persona porque esta bajo del ley. Todos las ladrones los rateros saben 
esto.“ (Monjuezm) 
  
State 
Interventio
n 
El primer logro no fue nuestro, sino de la Policía, cuando captura a Artemio en el 2011 y a otros 42 cabecillas terroristas 
(...) Esto fue crucial para empezar a negociar con los líderes y las autoridades del Monzón. El Monzón tenía un 71% de 
pobreza total. La población había estado entre dos fuegos: el narcotráfico y el terrorismo. Ahí ya entramos nosotros y con 
nosotros llegó el Estado que había estado ausente. Se organizaron las caravanas, y lo primero que llevamos fue salud, 
educación, RENIEC, porque nos encontramos con un Monzón donde gran cantidad de la población no tenía identidad. 
Entonces no podían entrar al Sistema Integral de Salud (ni) a los programas sociales”. (Caretas 2017). 
“Vino el Estado, tomó la decisión y nos erradicó. Y no se puede pues con los militares, las bombas lacrimógenas y la muerte 
de dos o tres. Tocó decidir. Vivo puedo trabajar. Muerto no puedo ayudar a mi familia“ (Caretas 2017)  
 
Rule in 
Post-Illegal 
Coca Boom 
“(…) ya tiene otra mentalidad. Antes todo era alcohol, fiesta, ahora no. Ahora se abstienen. Hay un cambio radical, pero el 
estado debe proteger esos cambios” (interview Pedro Monm3). 
“Un proyecto que empiece de cero y arriba como tres años, ese es un apoyo al campesino. Por ejemplo te dan un café, 
desde abajo, desde macheateado (una siembra limpia de hierbas y maleza) hasta que crezca tres años. Eso sería el apoyo 
del gobierno. ¿Qué clase de apoyo es?  El que te dan una bolsita, unas cuantas bolsitas de café.  El agricultor no va poder 
hacer nada, la agricultura no va cambiar. Por eso no va ver un cambio.” (Monm1) 
“Si la gente no confía en el Estado. Porque tienes que pensar cuantos años de creación tiene el Monzón, mire en qué 
condiciones vivimos, no tenemos agua, desagüe, sus calles, sus veredas no estamos desarrollados para nada. Entonces en 
cuestión de agua y desagüe, dos tres periodos ya están prometiendo, el alcalde que entra eso no se hace realidad, entonces 
que podemos esperar?” (Monresm1)  
“Pues la policia esta siempre detras casi no se destingue el problema de la violencia.” (Moncamcm).   
(“el alcalde, porque es el único que puede buscar inversiones” Interviews MOlocp.; survey question). 
"No estoy usando un casco cuando estoy conduciendo de un lado a otro en el pueblo. ¿Para qué? ¿Para conducir a la 
vuelta de la esquina? Es loco" (MonJuezm1) 
Se sienta incomoda la gente, por la ordenanza municipal porque la policia esta dando orden poco les choca no? Toda la 
vida has vivido asi, asi estas bien, pero tienes que cambiar. Asi estamos sensibilisar la gente, la policia, la municipalidad, el 
juzgado y las autoridades estamos sensibilisando a la gente. hay que ponerlas en orden. como debe ser no tan asi. Porque 
antes era tierra de nadie, monzón era mal visto entre la sociedad.” (Monjuezm1) 
“Tú te compras una moto y no tienes ni placa, no usas casco, eres informal, no pagas tus tributos al Estado como debe ser. 
Y la policía viene y tiene sus normas y exige. Empieza a molestar entonces el ciudadano se incomoda. En ese sentido 
antes estábamos mejor sin la policía. Por eso se margina a la policía.” (Monresm1) 
 
“Mas antes no existia el robo, porque mas antes exisitia el chapa tu chorro, como se ve en las noticias. Aca la gente hice 
con su propia justicia. No llevaban a la policia porque este no existia. Cada uno hice su propia justicia y capturaron al 
chorro. Entonces el robo tenia miedo tambien existia el terrorismo, el narcoterrorismo, pues aca estaba prohibido de robar 
asaltar. La gente tenia miedo en estos tiempos no solo por el ejercito sino por la subversion que existia. Ellos te soprendian 
y te llevaban.“ (Monjuezm) 
 
“Hay mucha gente que desconoce las normas los leyes talvez por omision puede ir en contra de ello. pero sin embargo ya 
todos trabajan.” (Moncamcm) 
  
VRAEM 
History “[T]oda la gente vivía en una calle no mas. mas o menos 150 familias una calle era. todos eran comerciantes. Negocios. 
Las agricultores cada uno vivían a su chacra. venían cada domingo traían su producto. Café cacao, coca, barbasco. bastante 
agricultura había. Todo era monte” (Lltienda: 22 - 22). 
Conflict 
and the 
Coca Valley 
“La gente tenía que sacar a formación y formar más pueblos por eso te estoy diciendo hay varios pueblos, 41 bases, 41 
pueblos que acá se han reunido y se han formado varias ciudades, porque anteriormente la gente se vivía en diferentes 
sitios, chacras, cada cual vivía en sus chacras, más antes que sendero, y producían cacao, café, maní, pero por Sendero se 
ha  reunido y se han formado casas por aquí por allá, pequeñas ciudades” (Sroaupm). 
“Antes cada uno viva en su chacra en una pequenia casita, con unos animales menores, como gallina o cerdo. cada una 
vivia en las chacras por el problema de la subversion la gente se agrupó aqui y el comite de autodefensa piensan formar 
las agrupaciones. Entonces antoriamente no se llamaba comunidades caserios o centro poblado sino agrupaciones. El 
unico que sellama centro poblado era Llochegua. Así nacen los centros poblado” (Llcadex)  
 
“La plata de la coca ayudo en ese tiempo a financiar la comida, las armas con todo eso se pudo luchar en la guerra, pero 
con eso yo o te digo que la coca continúe hasta ahora financiando” (Sroaulm)   
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“De un grupo… o sea habían traficantes de armas aquí. Traficantes de armamento, de carabiners, esporádicamente como 
te digo era algo sorprendente pero si llegamos a tener las armas.” 
Entonces los traficantes llegaban acá [a Llochegua] y preguntaban: “Ustedes necesitan armas? 
“Si, “necesitan armas, yo de les traigo o adelante los cómplices les traigo. O sea había trafico de armas en la capital de 
Perú en Lima que el mismo ejercito lo vendía. O sea la situación era una desgracia común. Entonces que estaban haciendo 
de baja, lo sacaban por parte normal y lo vendían. Creo que era difícil traerlos aca, pero el traficante lo traía y nos vendía.”  
(Llexaup) 
“Cosechabamos los terreno abandonados. Pero no solamente ha sido coca. Ha sido café, cacao y coca los tres productos. 
Pero todo el ingreso ha sido para comprar munición y armamento. De esa manera nos hemos armados nosotros. Nadie 
nos ha dado arma (…) Claro la mayor cantidad siempre venía de la coca. Porque había coca y se vendía. Se cosechaba y se 
vendía.” (Llexaup1) 
“yo no sé porque a Fujimori le dicen narcotraficante porque Fujimori desapareció completamente, a cero el narcotráfico, 
que hizo, cerro todas las fronteras, puso radares, hasta yo mismo he llorado porque yo tenía 40 arrobas de coca y no podía 
vender a nadie y se vendía me pagaban 5 soles y eso no cubría ni el trabajo que se hacía, es  mas eso fue muy bueno para 
la reflexión del hombre (…)” (Llauexp2) 
  
Organizing 
the Illicit 
Economy 
“Todos son pobres son gente agricultora, transportista, bueno al menos eso te dicen. Son gente que les han dicho oye 
llévame este paquetito y te pago 200 soles, algunos decían que si sabían que estaban llevando droga peor que necesitaban 
el dinero para su mama, para su hermana, para su hijo o para ellos mismos, y otros te dicen que no sabían nada.” (Vrafim: 
102 - 102) 
  
Cocaleros “A ver, yo soy cocalero. Gracias a la coca estoy tratando educar a mis hijos para que manana mas tarde mis hijos no sean 
igual que yo. Yo quiero darle la mejor calidad de educación a ellos y mejor calidad de vida para que ellos mas tarde sean 
utiles para la sociedad mejor que yo.Por eso aprovechamos este poco presupuesto que nos da la hoja de coca invertimos 
en nuestros hijos y la famila y muchos aspectos” (Llfepm)  
“En Santa Rosa hay muchos la mayoría de Santa Rosa son narcotraficantes, sobre todo de los centros poblados pero sabes 
que de un 100% un 20 % está en las ciudades y el 80% en los centros poblados. (…) La manera de operar del narcotráfico 
en Palmapampa por ejemplo es camionetas Hilux, motos Honda, un único lugar que te aseguro que el dueño es narco 
donde encuentras piscinas, una barra y unos chefs, per tu llegas a ese lugar y automáticamente toda la gente que está ahí 
te mira raro. Yo estuve en Palmapampa para un curso de técnicas de investigación, ahí nos fuimos con dos fiscales y dos 
de la DINANDRO, y ahí los de la DIRANDRO nos dijeron ven a eso grupo, donde había una chica y chicos con camionetas 
HIlux y jóvenes de 19, 18 años en sus motos, y ellos me dijeron que hace 4 meses habían atrapado  a la chica que estaba 
embarazada llevando droga, pero lo no se explicaba era porque estaba libre si le habían puesto a disposición del juez. El 
ministerio publico la acuso, el juez dispuso que se le llevara al penal peor tres meses después esta libre y todos lo que están 
con ella son traficantes, y ellos no son de vender poco ellos te distribuyen kilos y son jóvenes el más mayor tendrá 23 años, 
y esa camioneta que ellos tienen yo no lo puede tener pues.” (Vrafim: 110 - 118)! 
 
“Porque hay pobreza, aparentemente porque es selva, existe narcotráfico, hay plata, no, sino que el que se lleva la plata 
es los que producen la cocaína, acá el producto cuesta mil soles y allá ¿Cuánto cuesta? ¿70mil? Entonces no hay beneficio 
económico, prácticamente el agricultor es esclavo de su chacra (..)” (Llmunm1) 
“Mira, aquí en el VRAEM quieras o no quieras estas involucrado y están metidos en el tema del narcotráfico, directa o 
indirectamente. Los directos son los mismos narcotraficantes y los indirectos son los transportistas, los comerciantes, los 
restaurantes, y si no hay droga al valle no entra dinero. Y no solo mantiene al VRAEM sino a otros departamentos como 
Ayacucho, y otros. Es decir si hay una intervención radical va a bajar todo, va haber menos transporte, menos venta de 
abarrotes, y si antes venían 50 personas después solo vendrían 15, 10, entonces todo va a bajar (…), así automáticamente 
la coca baja y todo baja.” (Vraexong) 
 
  
Coca as 
binding 
factor in 
society 
“Nosotros como agricultor no podemos hacer nada. Mas aun, a lo que yo tengo que entendido como cocalero nunca habia 
una persona que a mi me presionó. Yo vendo la coca a cualquier persona que me ofrece como cualquier producto oferto 
o demanda hay. entonces a la persona que me ofrece un poquito mas, yo lo vendo. Pero no se quien es, solo viene en la 
noche, recoge la coca y se va.” (Llfepm) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
320 
 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung  
 
Umkämpfte Staatsbildung? Die Wirkung von illegalen Ökonomien an den Rändern des Staates 
 
Der Einfluss von illegalen Ökonomien auf lokale Ordnungen steht im Mitteltpunkt der vorliegenden 
Arbeit. Die Dissertation hinterfragt den konventionellen Erklärungsansatz von Staatsschwäche durch 
illegale Aktivitäten. Mit der Untersuchung des Zusammenspiels von lokaler Ordnung am Rande 
staatlichen Einflusseses und illegalen Ökonomien will die vorliegende Analyse eine Forschungslücke 
schließen. Entgegen der verbreiteten Annahme, dass diese Ökonomien zu Instabilität und zu Gewalt 
führen, zeigt die Arbeit, dass illegale Ökonomien zur Entwicklung stabiler lokaler Ordnungen beitragen, 
anstatt diese zu zerstören. Dabei fokussiert die Dissertation auf Regionen mit nur schwachem oder 
keinem Einfluss des Staates. 
Die Analyse folgt einem strukturierten, fokussierten Vergleich von zwei Regionen in Peru: VRAEM und 
Alto Huallaga. Mit einer Fallstudie über die VRAEM-Region in Peru analysiert die Arbeit die aktuellen 
Auswirkungen des Drogengeschäfts auf die lokale Ordnung. Die Alto Huallaga Region ist das historische 
Zentrum für die globale Kokainproduktion und wird hingegen von der peruanischen Regierung als 
Vorzeigeprojekt für eine erfolgreiche Bekämpfung der Drogenöknomomie präsentiert. Durch den 
Vergleich eines aktuellen mit einem ehemaligen Zentrum für die Drogenproduktion wird das 
Verständnis über den Einfluss illegaler Ökonomien auf lokale Ordnungen ausgearbeitet. Während 
umfangreicher Feldforschung wurden qualitative Daten erhoben und 120 Interviews sowie 124 
theoriegeleitete schriftliche Befragungen durchgeführt. Die Analyse zeigt, dass die Drogenökonomie 
wesentlichen Anteil an der Entwicklung lokaler Ordnung hat: insbsondere in den Bereichen Ökonomie, 
Sicherheit und Machtstrukturen. Diese lokalen Ordnungen sind in sich stabil, folgen aber nicht dem 
normativen Ordnungsverständnis des Staates.  
Die Arbeit legt dar, dass illegale Ökonomien eine stabilisierende Wirkung haben, anstatt eine direkte 
Bedrohung für den Staat darzustellen. Damit leistet die Dissertation einen Forschungsbeitrag zu 
Studien über Staatsentwicklung unabhängig von einem eurozentristrisch geprägten Normverständnis. 
 
 
 
